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Studies  in  Applied  Tactics 


BY 

Lieutenant-General  Georg  von  Alten. 


Authorized  Translation 
(with  substitution  of  American  Army  Organization) 


Major  C.  H.  Barth, 

12th  U.  S.  Infantry. 


PART  I. 
Reconnaissance. 

PART   II. 

Cavalry  Outposts. 
March  and  Combined  Outposts. 


1908. 

Feanklin  Hudson  Publishing  Compant, 

Kansas  City,  Mo. 


u 


0 


TRANSLATOR'S  PREFACE. 


Since  the  applicatory  system  of  instruction  in  the  art  of 
war  has  come  into  such  favor,  and  justly  so,  a  great  many  books 
have  appeared  based  on  this  system.  All  those  producing  these 
books  are  disciples  of  General  von  Verdy,  and  have  imitated 
him  more  or  less  successfully.  The  more  nearly  they  have  suc- 
ceeded, the  better  their  results  have  been.  It  is  believed  that 
the  following  pages  devoted  to  research  in  this  field  will  be 
found  both  valuable  and  interesting.  The  first  part  will  appeal 
particularly  to  cavalry  officers,  as  it  deals  with  cavalry  recon- 
naissance, especially  that  of  smaller  bodies.  The  second  part 
will  appeal  to  all  officers  studying  troop-leading  of  the  divis- 
ion and  army  corps. 

The  author  kindly  consented  to  his  work  being  translated 
and  changed  in  so  far  as  found  desirable  in  adapting  it  to  our 
own  Army  organization.  Therefore  it  must  be  remembered, 
for  example,  that  a  troop  of  cavalry  is  assumed  to  contain  ioo 
men,  divided  into  4  platoons.  These  changes  were  made  to 
facilitate  a  study  of  the  problems. 

Whenever  practicable,  our  own  Field  Service  Regulations 
are  quoted  and  referred  to  by  foot-note.  This  happens  quite 
frequently,  the  similarity  between  the  German  and  our  own 
doubtless  being  due  to  the  former  having  been  freely  con- 
sulted in  formulating  the  latter. 


PREFACE. 


To  "know  how"  is  the  principal  thing  in  every  art,  and 
in  the  art  of  war  nothing  fosters  this  so  much  as  individual  effort 
and  determination  to  succeed.  The  following  pages  were  writ- 
ten with  this  in  view;  it  being  intended  to  offer  material  in  as 
varied  a  form  as  my  imagination  could  produce.  The  discus- 
sion of  the  problems  and  the  narrative  of  events  are  intended 
to  smooth  the  reader's  way  in  arriving  at  his  own  decisions. 
But  I  protest  against  my  work  being  considered  as  model  solu- 
tions. Good  will  come  only  from  testing  its  correctness,  not 
from  accepting  it  on  faith.  I  would  also  caution,  against  any 
attempt  to  deduce  general  rules  from  any  single  solution  as  they 
might  fail  in  the  first  attempt  to  apply  them.  It  is  very  seldom 
that  a  situation  in  war  is  repeated,  and  it  would  be  impossible 
to  rely  on  memory  to  assist  in  arriving  at  a  decision.  The  leader 
must  not  allow  any  vain  endeavor  to  recall  something  he  has 
learned  interfere  with  his  exercising  his  common  sense  and  cre- 
ative energy.  He  even  must  be  cautious  about  making  use  of 
his  own  past  experience.  Still  less  can  the  form  of  my  studies 
serve  as  a  model.  The  form  is  of  so  little  value  compared  with 
the  substance  that  it  is  not  worth  while  to  imitate. 

The  German  Service  Regulations  form  the  basis  for  the 
work,  although  considerable  discretion  was  exercised  in  their 
application.  Exceptions  prove  the  rule,  and  an  individual  case 
all  the  more  justifies  a  deviation  from  a  rule  because  the  Regu- 
lations are  the  work  of  man.  Before  the  tribunal  of  history, 
reference  to  a  regulation  will  not  be  accepted  as  an  excuse  for 
a  neglect ;  and  in  all  ages  new  and  startling  thoughts  and  meas- 
ures have  triumphed  over  routine. 


6  Preface. 

To  carry  out  the  idea  of  the  following  studies,  the  problems 
in  the  text  are  separated  from  my  solutions  which  follow,  so 
that  the  reader  is  able  to  write  down  his  own  unbiased  solution 
before  taking  cognizance  of  mine. 

At  first  considerable  time  should  be  taken  to  think  about 
each  problem.  Mature  reflection,  covering  every  detail,  is  the 
best  preparation  for  quick  decision.  Work  should  continue  on 
a  problem  until  the  reader  is  personally  satisfied  with  the 
solution. 

By  using  a  continuation  of  the  same  "situation,"  higher 
and  lower  commanders  in  turn  have  a  chance  to  be  heard.  It 
can  only  be  an  advantage  for  a  junior  officer  occasionally  to 
solve  problems  carrying  him  beyond  his  actual  rank  and  com- 
mand; and  a  senior  may  improve  his  capacity  as  instructor  by 
occupying  himself  with  problems  that  on  service  would  devolve 
on  juniors. 

The  first  part  of  this  book  deals  with  cavalry  reconnais- 
sance, and  especially  that  of  smaller  bodies.  This  branch  of 
the  military  service  is  discussed  first  because  it  usually  initiates 
operations  of  war,  and  because  the  principles  involved  should 
be  familiar  to  the  commanders  of  all  branches  of  the  service  if 
they  wish  to  correctly  employ  and  energetically  support  the 
advance  cavalry.  Even  the  junior  officers  of  infantry  and 
artillery  employed  in  the  service  of  security  and  information 
require  a  knowledge  of  the  powers  and  limitations  of  the  sister 
arm  in  advance  of  the  army  if  the  cogs  of  the  machine  are  to 
work  smoothly. 

The  second  part  of  the  book  deals  with  cavalry  outposts, 
and  the  service  of  security  of  the  different  arms  combined.  In 
this  way  an  insight  will  be  obtained  into  the  command  of  larger 
bodies  of  troops,  which  will  be  discussed  later  if  I  may  hope  for 
a  favorable  hearing. 

Georg  von  Alten. 

Berlin,  October,  1902. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Part  I. 

Page 
Introduction — "General  Situation"  and  "Special  Situation"  of  the 

Blue  Army 9 

Estimate  of  the  situation  formed  by  Colonel  A ,ist  Cavalry — 

Arrangements  made  by  him  on  the  evening  of  May  4th 12 

Arrangements  of  Captain  E ,  Troop  A,  1st  Cavalry,  and  in- 
structions given  by  him  after  receiving  Colonel  A 's  orders 

the  evening  of  May  4th 21 

Lieutenant  F 's  patrol 32 

Lieutenant  C 's  patrol  early  on  May  5th 57 

Decision  and  arrangements  of  Captain  E the  morning  of  May 

5th,  after  arriving  at  Reichenthal 72 

Instructions  issued  by  Colonel  A at  5  a.  m.,  May  5th 92 

Arrangements  made  by  Major  W ,  commanding  1st  Squad- 
ron 1st  Cavalry 99 

Colonel  A 's  further  intentions 105 

Progress  of  Lieutenant  C 's  patrol  from  9  a.  m.  to  3.50  p.  m. . .    115 

Conduct  of  Lieutenant  D 's  "strategical"  patrol  from  p.  m., 

May  3d,  to  a.  m.,  May  5th 132 

The  hostile  officer's  patrol  at  Wormditt 155 

Retrospect 162 

Part  II. 
1.     Cavalry  Outposts.  Page 

Selection  of  the  Night  Position, 

Events  occuring  in  the  1st  Cavalry  until  5  p.  m. ;  reflections  and 

arrangements  of  its  commander  at  this  hour 177 

Arrangements    of     the     Lieutenant-Colonel     and     squadron 
commander 213 

Protection. 

Troop  B  on  outpost.     Surprise  of  a  cavalry  picket 220 

Outpost  of  Troop  C 248 

Detached  Posts. 

Post  at  Altkirch 256 

Lieutenant  L ,  at  Regerteln 273 

Modern  Methods  of  Forwarding  Information  and  Orders 278 

7 


Table  of  Contents. 

2.  The  Army  Corps  on  the  March.  Page 
Dispositions  for  the  March. 

Orders  of  the  Commanding  General,  i  st  Division,  issued  4th  May, 

P-  m " -293 

Arrangements  of  the  advance-guard  commander 307 

Arrangements  of  the  captain  of  Troop  C,  3d  Cavalry,  to  estab- 
lish communication  with  the  advance  cavalry 314 

Mounted  orderlies 318 

Changes  in  arrangement  of  units  during  the  march 319 

A  Temporary  Halt 329 

3.  Halt  for  the  Night. — Combined  Outposts. 

Quarters  and  Supplies 341 

Security  and   Information. 

Arrangements  of  the  Commanding  Officer,  Advance  Guard,  1st 
Division,  5th  May,  1  p.  m 347 

Arrangements  of  outpost  commanders  and  their  subordinates.  .    351 

4.  Conclusion 361 

Message  Blank 363 

Vocabulary  of  German  Names  and  English  Equivalents 364 


Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 


PART  I. 


RECONNAISSANCE. 

A  blue  army  in  friendly  territory  is  moving  from  the  Vis- 
tula (Weichsel)*  on  the  front  Gilgenburg-Saalfeld,  against  a 
hostile  red  army  coming  from  the  east.f  The  two  cavalry 
divisions  (ist  and  2d)  of  the  blue  army  are  united  on  the  right 
flank  of  the  army.  The  left  wing  of  this  army  consists  of  tha 
First  Army  Corps, J  to  which  the  First  Cavalry  from  the  First 
Cavalry  Division  has  been  attached.  The  fortress  of  Konigs- 
berg  has  its  full  armament  and  is  garrisoned  by  (blue)  organized 
militia. 

May  4,  1904,  the  ist  Division,§  ist  Army  Corps,  is  in  and 
near  Saalfeld,  with  its  advance  troops  at  Barten.     The  2d  Divi- 

*Much  time  will  be  saved  the  reader,  subsequently,  if  he  will  under- 
score in  red  the  names  of  places  the  first  time  he  locates  them  on  the  map. 
— Translator. 

It  is  recommended  that  the  following  "situation"  be  carefully  read , 
and  re-read  if  necessary,  with  maps  before  you,  so  that  a  clear  idea  can  be 
obtained  of  all  details  of  the  situation. — Translator. 

fSee  accompanying  maps.  In  consulting  these — particularly  the  one 
drawn  to  a  scale  of  1 :  300,000 — it  is  urgently  recommended  that  a  read- 
ing-glass be  used. — Translator. 

JFor  organization  of  an  army  corps,  a  division,  and  cavalry  division, 
see  par.  4,  F.  S.  R.  ("  F.  S.  R. "  refers  to  our  own  Field  Service  Regulations.) 
— Translator. 

§The  term  "division"  means  division  of  infantry;  whenever  a  cavalry 
division  is  meant,  it  is  so  stated  in  the  text. 


io  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

sion,  ist  Army  Corps,  is  in  rear  of  the  ist  and  extends  as  far  as 
Gerswalde.  The  ist  Cavalry  (1,200  strong),  which  detrained 
at  Marienburg  on  May  3d,  is  in  and  near  Maldeuten. 

The  orders  issued  the  evening  of  May  4th  from  head- 
quarters 1  st  Army  Corps  direct,  that  on  the  following  day  the 
corps  continue  its  march  via  Maldeuten  towards  Mohrungen, 
while  the  1st  Cavalry  reconno iters  to  the  front  and  the  left  flank. 
The  van  guard  of  the  ist  Division  leaves  Barten  at  6  a.  m.  The 
neighboring  2d  Army  Corps  marches  via  Liebemiihl  with  the  in- 
tention of  having  its  advance  troops  reach  Locken  on  May  5th. 

By  11  p.  m.,  May  4th,  Colonel  A ,  commanding  the 

ist  Cavalry,  has  the  following  information :  Traffic  has  been 
suspended  on  the  railways  east  of  the  line  Liebemiihl-Saal- 
feld-Elbing,  the  rolling-stock  having  been  withdrawn.  The 
railway  between  Maldeuten,  Pr.*  Holland,  and  Miihlhausen  is 
guarded  by  (blue)  organized  militia.  The  railway  telegraph 
line  as  far  as  Horn  railway  station,  t  south  of  Narien-see  (lake), 
is  still  in  working  order.  Nothing  has  been  seen  or  heard  of 
the  enemy  at  this  station.  But  the  operator  at  Ziegenberg 
reported  at  9  p.  m.  that  he  would  discontinue,  after  having 
failed  for  some  time  to  get  any  reply  from  Briickendorf 
railway  station.  $ 

A  telegram  was  received  from  Liebstadt  that  no  communi- 
cation had  been  had  with  Guttstadt  since  5  p.  m.,  nor  with 
Wormditt  since  8  p.  m. 

Colonel  A had  sent  out  two  patrols  of  1  officer,  1  non- 
commissioned officer,  and  12  troopers  each.     Lieutenant  B , 

commanding  one  of  these  patrols,  had  wired  from  Liebstadt 
that  the  enemy  had  not  been  seen  at  Wormditt  as  late  as  6  p.  m. ; 
that  until  the  same  hour  the  enemv  had  not  been  seen  on  the 


*  Abbreviation   for   "Preussische"    (Prussian). — Translator. 

t  Marked  "H.  St.,"  due  north  of  Horn,  on  map.     Consult  the  1 :  100,000 
map  to  find  small  towns. — Translator. 

JMarked  "H.  St.,"  near  Briickendorf,  on  map. — Translator. 


Reconnaissance.  ii 

Liebstadt-Guttstadt  highway  as  far  east  as  Wolfsdorf;  and 
that  the  patrol  would  remain  at  Liebstadt  over  night.  Lieu- 
tenant C ,  commanding  the  other  patrol,  had  wired  from 

Horn  railway  station,  where  he  expected  to  spend  the  night, 
that  at  7  p.  m.  the  enemy  had  not  yet  appeared  at  Kallisten 
or  Bruckendorf. 

As  early  as  the  afternoon  of  May  3d,  Lieutenant  D , 

with  10  troopers  on  selected  horses,  had  been  sent  from  Marien- 
burg  with  orders  from  the  commanding  general  of  the  1st 
Corps  to  reconnoiter  in  the  general  direction  of  Heilsberg  and 
Bartenstein. 

Lieutenant  D spent  the  night  of  May  3d~4th  with  the 

organized  militia  at  Pr.  Holland,  and  reported  at  8  a.  m.  May 
4th,  from  Wormditt,  that  so  far  he  had  seen  nothing  of  the 
enemy;  that  he  had  learned  on  telegraphic  inquiry  that  noth- 
ing had  been  seen  of  the  enemy  at  Landsberg,  Mehlsack,  or 
Guttstadt,  but  that  since  7  a.  m.  telegraphic  communication 
had  been  interrupted  with  Landsberg  and  Heilsberg.  Just 
before  11  p.  m.  a  telegram  was  received  from  Zinten,  indicating 

that  Lieutenant  D had  encountered  hostile  patrols  at  Rau- 

nau,  Neuendorf,  and  Groszendorf,  and  that  apparently  Heils- 
berg, Landsburg,  and  Bartenstein  were  occupied  by  the  enemy. 

The  weather  is  cool,  and  some  rain  has  fallen  the  last  few 
days.  The  ground  is  favorable  for  cavalry,  and  horsemen  can 
go  almost  anywhere  on  the  roads. 

Required  :* 

1.  What  is  Colonel  A — — 's  estimate  of  the 

situation  ? 

2.  What   arrangements   does   he   make  after 

up.  m.,  May  4TH? 


*Before  reading  the  author's  solution  to  these  and  all  succeeding 
problems,  it  is  recommended  that  the  reader  work  out  his  own  solution 
in  full. — Translator.  I 


12  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

The  following  is  offered  in  answer  to  "  i  " : 

From  the  messages  announcing  interruption  of  telegraphic 

communication  and  from  Lieutenant  D 's  last  message,  it 

is    apparent    that    the    enemy    is    approaching.     Lieutenant 

D 's  message  from  Wormditt,  stating  that  the  enemy  had 

not  been  seen  at  Landsberg,  Mehlsack.  or  Guttstadt,  cannot 
mislead  anyone  if  it  is  remembered  that  this  was  sent  at  8  a.  m. 

A  collision  of  the  main  opposing  forces  is  not  to  be  ex- 
pected on  May  5th;  the  intervening  distance  is  too  great. 
This  day,  therefore,  is  still  at  the  disposal  of  the  cavalry  to  se- 
cure further  information  of  the  enemy.  However,  such  infor- 
mation must  not  arrive  too  late,  if  to  be  of  service  to  the  army 
during  its  march  on  May  6th. 

Narien-see  blocks  the  direct  advance  towards  the  east 
and  against  the  enemy.  It  would  be  precarious  to  divide 
the  1  st  Cavalry  so  as  to  have  it  advance  both  north  and  south 
of  the  lake  (Narien-see),  and  it  is  unnecessary  to  do  so,  because 
the  divisional  cavalry*  of  the  1st  Division,  reinforced  if  neces- 
sary by  that  of  the  2d  Division,  probably  will  advance  to  the 
south  of  the  lake.  Besides,  the  protection  of  the  left  flank  and 
the  appearance  of  the  enemy  at  Wormditt  and  Heilsberg  de- 
mand increased  vigilance  towards  the  north.  Therefore  it  is 
advisable  to  have  the  entire  regiment  march  via  Mohrungen 
and  the  north  end  of  the  lake.  It  does  not  yet  appear  what 
course  to  follow  later. 

The  following  is  offered  in  answer  to  "2": 

The  arrangements  called  for  by  the  development  of  the 
situation  will  be  noted  in  the  following  paragraphs  (from  "a" 
to  "g"). 

(a)     Orders  from  Headquarters  1st  Cavalry: 

♦Cavalry  attached  to  a  division  of  infantry,  and  therefore  different 
from  that  of  cavalry_  divisions. — Translator 


Reconnaissance.  13 

Headquarters  ist  Cavalry,  Maldeuten,  Prussia, 

4  May  04,  11.20  p.  m. 
Field  Orders 

Na 1.  The  enemy  apparently  has  continued  his  march  in  a  west- 
erly direction.  The  telegraph  line  to  Landsberg  and  Heils- 
berg  has  been  cut  since  this  morning,  and  to  Wormditt,  Gutt- 
stadt,  and  BruckEndorf  since  this  evening.  Heiesberg  and 
Landsberg  apparently  were  occupied  by  the  enemy  to-day. 
The  ist  Army  Corps  will  march  via  Maedeuten  towards  Mohr- 
ungen  the  5th  inst.,  and  the  2d  Army  Corps  via  Liebemuhl 
towards  Locken. 

2.  This  regiment  will  be  formed  by  5  a.  m.  the  5th  inst.  in 
column  of  route  on  the  Maedeuten-Gr.*  Wiemsdorf  highway, 
with  head  of  column  at  the  latter  place.  The  ist  Squadron,f 
which  is  to  protect  the  formation,  will  be  in  the  lead. 

3.  Troop  A  will  be  sent  in  advance  of  the  regiment  and  will 
be  under  my  immediate  orders. 

4.  The  baggage  train, J  with  the  advance  guard  pontoon 
train,  will  be  formed  by  6  a.  m.  the  5th  inst.  on  the  SEEGERTs- 
waede-Gr.  Wilmsdorf  highway,  with  head  of  column  at  the 
Overland  Canal. § 

5.  Squadron  commanders  will  report  to  the  right  command- 
er for  further  instructions    at    5   a.    m.    the   5th   inst.    at  Gr. 

WlEMSDORF. 

By  order  of  Colonel   A : 

C B , 

Capt.  and  Adjt.  ist  Cav., 

Adjutant. 
Dictated  to  the  officers||  detailed  to  receive  orders. 

(b)  Before  the  above  order  is  sent  out,  the  commander  of 
Troop  A  is  ordered  to  report  to  the  colonel,  who  acquaints  him 
with  this  order,  together  with  the  necessary  details  concerning 
the  situation,  and  adds  the  following  instructions: 

"You  will  reconnoiter  in  advance  of  the  regiment  towards 
Wormditt-Guttstadt-Munsterberg,  leaving  Maldeuten  at  4  a. 

m.   to-morrow.     Lieutenant   B ,  of  your  squadron,   is  at 

Liebstadt  to-night,  with  12  troopers,  and  Lieutenant  C , 

*  Abbreviation  for  "Grosz"  (Great). — Translator. 

fOn  the  supposition  that  it  furnished  the  outposts  during  the  preced- 
ing night. 

JThe  "regimental  train"  is  styled  "baggage  train"  in  the  proposed 
revision  of  F.  S.  R. — Translator. 

§"Oberlandische  Kanal"  on  the  1:300,000  map. — Translator. 

||The  squadron  adjutants  in  this  case. — Translator. 


14  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

of  the  2d  Squadron,  is  at  Horn  railway  station;  both  can  be 
reached  by  wire,  so  you  would  best  at  once  communicate  with 
them.  Lieutenant  B will  be  under  your  orders.  Lieu- 
tenant C— —  will  be  ordered  to  promptly  reconnoiter  to-mor- 
row morning  via  Briickendorf  towards  Gr.  Buchwalde-Jonk- 
endorf  and  later  try  to  join  the  regiment  via  Kallisten.  At 
first  I  shall  take  the  regiment  in  column  of  route  as  far  as  Gr. 
Hermenau;  further  dispositions  will  largely  depend  on  your 
messages  from  the  front.  I  shall  hold  the  railway  station  at 
Mohrungen  until  relieved  by  the  ist  Division. 

"I  shall  request  the  corps  commander  to  use  his  divisional 
cavalry  for  reconnaissance  south  of  the  Narien-see  towards 
the  Alle  River." 

(c)  After  the  order  had  been  dictated  to  the  squadron 
adjutants,  the  following  telegram  was  sent  to  corps  head- 
quarters : 

The  ist  Cavalry  will  leave  Gr.  Wilmsdorf  at  5  a.  m.  the  5th  inst.  I 
intend  provisionally  to  take  it  in  column  of  route  as  far  as  Gr.  Hermenau, 
and  would  request  that  the  divisional  cavalry  of  the  ist  Division,  and,  if 
possible,  also  that  of  the  2d  Division,  be  sent  forward  early  to  reconnoiter 
via  the  south  end  of  Narien-see  towards  Miinsterberg-Jonkendorf.  I  shall 
occupy  the  telegraph  stations  of  Mohrungen  and  Gr.  Hermenau.  I  would 
request  that  any  information  for  me  yet  to  arrive  be  sent  to  Maldeuten 
till  4-30  a.  m.,  to  Mohrungen  till  7  a.  m.,  and  after  that  to  Gr.  Hermenau. 

(d)  The  following  telegram  is  sent  to  headquarters  ist 
Division : 

Lieutenant  C ,  ist  Cavalry,  who  is  at  Horn  to-night,  is  ordered 

to  advance  early  to-morrow  morning  via  Briickendorf  towards  Gr.  Buch- 
walde-Jonkendorf,  and  to  send  any  important  information  to  the  cavalry 
of  the  ist  Division,  whose  advance  via  the  south  end  of  Narien-see  towards 
Miinsterberg-Jonkendorf  I  have  recommended  to  corps  headquarters. 

(e)  Lieutenant  C ,  at  Horn,  receives  the  following  tel- 
egraphic orders : 

ist  Army  Corps  will  march  towards  Mohrungen  the  5th  inst.,  and 
the  2d  Army  Corps  via  Liebemuhl  towards  Locken.  At  5  a.  m.  the  5th 
instant  this  regiment  will  advance  from  Gr.  Wilmsdorf  via  Mohrungen- 
Gr.  Hermenau  towards  Wormditt-Guttstadt-Munsterberg.  Troop  A  will 
leave  Maldeuten  at  4  a.  m.  to  reconnoiter  in  advance  of  the  regiment. 
You  will  start  early  in  the  morning  on  reconnaissance  via  Briickendorf 


Reconnaissance.  r5 

towards  Gr  Buchwalde-Jonkendorf;  later  joining  your  regiment  via 
Kallisten.  Send  me  information,  if  possible  by  wire,  until  7  a.  m.  to 
Mohrungen,  after  that  to  Gr.  Hermenau.  Also  send  any  important  in- 
formation to  the  cavalry  of  the  1st  Division,  which  will  advance  via 
Mohrungen  and  the  south  end  of  Narien-see  towards  the  Alle. 

(/)     Lieutenant  B ,  at  Liebstadt,  is  wired  as  follows: 

You  are  placed  under  the  orders  of  Captain  E ,  commanding 

Troop  A,   1st  Cavalry,  from  whom  you  will  receive  further  orders. 

(g)  A  regimental  staff  officer  of  the  1st  Cavalry,  who  has 
been  busy  gathering  telegraphic  information  since  arriving  at 
Maldeuten,  continues  his  work  during  the  night. 

An  estimate  of  the  situation  often  is  required  in  problems 
on  applied  tactics  because  it  helps  to  a  clear  conception  of  the 
situation.  Only  the  important  and  determining  factors  should 
be  noted,  omitting  all  well-known  facts.  It  is  not  advisable  to 
give  reasons  for  details  in  the  conclusion  adopted,  because  judi- 
cious arrangements  as  a  rule  justify  themselves. 

"Arrangements"  include  more  than  the  formal  orders 
issued  by  a  commander.  They  include  everything  undertaken 
to  insure  unity  of  action  among  the  co-ordinate  parts  and  the 
attainment  of  the  commander's  aim.  It  is  recommended  that 
officers  desiring  to  advance  in  professional  knowledge  repeat- 
edly write  out  messages,  instructions,  etc.,  so  their  form  may 
present  no  difficulties  when  circumstances  demand  quick  deci- 
sion and  action. 

The  situation  of  the  1st  Cavalry  and  the  arrangements  to 
be  made  by  its  colonel  in  some  respects  are  of  great  importance, 
and  therefore  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  them  will  follow 
what  has  gone  before. 

Colonel  A (as  always  should  be  done  by  subordinates) 

doubtless  has  consulted  the  General  Staff  map  (scale  1 :  100,000) 
as  well  as  the  General  map  (scale  1 1300,000),  to  get  a  compre- 
hensive idea  of  the  situation  as  regards  the  whole  army.  He 
could  easily  see  that  there  was  still  a  considerable  distance  be- 
tween the  opposing  armies.  If  on  the  evening  of  May  4th  the 
leading  hostile  patrols  have  but  reached  the  line  Wormditt- 


1 6  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Briickendorf,  it  may  be  assumed  that  the  heads  of  the  main 
columns  are  at  least  a  day's  march  east  of  the  Alle.  Lieutenant 
D 's  message,  stating  that  Landsberg  and  Heilsberg  ap- 
parently are  occupied  by  the  enemy  on  the  4th,  strengthens 
this  assumption.  As  it  is  a  question  of  large  bodies  on  both 
sides,  whose  rate  of  march  is  lessened  by  depth  of  column  and 
scarcity  of  good  roads,  it  is  reasonable  to  conclude  that  there 
will  be  no  serious  engagement  on  the  5th.  The  probability  of 
encountering  hostile  cavalry  necessitates  holding  our  own  well 
in  hand,  and  it  is  all  the  more  important  to  go  past  the  north 
end  of  Narien-see  as  the  1st  Cavalry  is  called  upon  to  protect 
the  left  flank  of  the  1st  Army  Corps  as  well  as  to  screen  its  ad- 
vance. The  latter  duty  is  self-evident  and  needed  no  special 
mention  in  orders  from  corps  headquarters.  If  army  head- 
quarters had  not  sent  the  railway  rolling-stock  back  so  com- 
pletely and  so  far  (a  measure  that  now  proves  very  detrimen- 
tal), detachments  of  infantry  could  be  sent  forward  on  May  4th 
to  Liebstadt,  Gr.  Hermenau,  Mohrungen,  and  Horn,  and  thus 
materially  simplify  the  duties  of  the  cavalry. 

The  question  arises  as  to  whether  5  a.  m.,  the  selected  hour 
of  departure,  answers  the  purpose,  or  seems  too  late. 

The  sun  rises  at  about  4  a.  m.*  It  will  take  over  half  an 
hour  for  the  troops  to  assemble  from  their  cantonments,  and 
we  must  allow  at  least  an  hour  for  feeding  and  saddling,  if  this 
is  not  to  be  done  hurriedly ;  therefore  the  men  must  be  astir  by 
3  a.  m.,  and  perform  some  of  their  duties  in  the  dark,  notwith- 
standing the  favorable  season  of  the  year  and  the  not  very  early 
time  set  for  departure.  Further  news  of  the  enemy,  the  head 
of  whose  columns  did  not  arrive  on  the  Passarge  River  until 

evening,  is  not  to  be  expected  before  Colonel  A 's  arrival 

at  Gr.  Hermenau — i.  e.,  between  7  and  8  a.  m. ;  and  not  until 
then  can  it  be  decided  on  what  road  to  continue  the  advance. 
Therefore  it  would  be  of  little  use  to  arrive  at  this  cross-roads 

^Central  European  time. 


Reconnaissance.  17 

any  earlier.  Although  so  far  the  exertions  required  of  the  troops 
may  not  have  been  excessive,  still,  a  consideration  of  the  com- 
ing day  demands  every  permissible  economy  of  strength;  and 
a  materially  earlier  departure,  instead  of  permitting  a  quiet  issue 
of  orders,  would  have  necessitated  hurry  and  marching  by  night, 
which  unduly  consume  strength.  Unnecessary  curtailment  of 
rest  indicates  nervousness  on  the  part  of  the  leader  and  shakes 
the  confidence  of  the  troops  in  his  capabilities. 

Colonel  A simply  orders  the  assembly  of  his  regiment 

and  defers  issuing  the  order  to  march  until  later.  Although  on 
the  evening  of  the  4th  he  had  already  decided  in  what  direction 
to  march,  his  delay  in  announcing  this  is  natural,  for  experience 
shows  that  even  well-founded  decisions  often  need  alteration 
at  the  last  moment,  and  that  therefore  it  is  wise  to  never  order 
more  than  what  is  absolutely  necessary.  Assembling  on  the 
road  instead  of  in  the  adjoining  fields  saves  time  and  strength 
and  can  be  ordered  unhesitatingly,  as  there  is  no  danger  of  sur- 
prise by  the  enemy.  Paragraph  3  of  the  regimental  order,  and 
the  instructions  to  the  commanding  officer  of  Troop  A  based  up- 
on it,  require  special  notice. 

While  the  plan  here  adopted  of  having  a  troop  perform  all 
the  reconnoitering  in  the  main  direction  of  advance  is  not  con- 
trary to  the  German  Field  Service  Regulations,  still,  it  is  not 
generally  followed  in  the  Army.  More  frequently  the  different 
reconnoitering-patrols  are  sent  out  directly  by  the  higher  com- 
manders, and  receive  their  instructions  from  the  latter,  while 
troops  sent  after  them  form  their  support  and  are  charged  with 
keeping  up  communication.  Obviously  it  is  very  difficult  for 
a  higher  commander  to  arrange  for  the  movement  and  relief  of 
distant  patrols  day  by  day,  aside  from  the  fact  that  this  method 
does  not  take  full  advantage  of  the  discretion  and  experience 
of  troop  commanders.  Further  events  in  our  problem  may  help 
to  clear  up  this  subject. 


18  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Concerning  the  remainder  of  the  regimental  order  there 
need  only  be  said  that  it  contains  the  necessary  information  of 
the  enemy  and  of  our  supporting  troops  in  concise  terms,  so 
that  all  concerned  may  take  notice.  The  baggage  train  is 
assembled  somewhat  later  than  the  troops,  thus  enabling  the 
latter  to  use  their  heavy  baggage  until  the  last  moment.  Be- 
sides, it  is  very  detrimental  for  the  train  to  load  and  depart  in 
the  dark.  But  6  a.  m.  probably  is  the  latest  time  permissible 
for  its  assembly  if  it  is  to  march  ahead  of  the  train  of  the  ist 
Division.  In  case  of  danger  the  train  would  have  to  join  that 
of  the  i  st  Division,  in  which  event  it  would  be  unable  to  rejoin 
its  regiment  on  the  5th.  Such  separation  can  be  endured  for 
a  short  time,  but  if  prolonged,  it  not  only  is  inconvenient,  but 
also  dangerous.  Were  the  baggage  train  not  urgently  need- 
ed, it  surely  would  soon  have  disappeared  as  an  unnecessary 
impediment.  Just  remember  that  the  baggage  train  includes 
rations  and  forage-wagons,  and  that  the  troop  wagons,  besides 
officers'  baggage  and  reserve  clothing  for  men,  carry  armorers' 
outfits,  horse  medicines,  and  field  forges. * 

In  staff  rides  and  maneuvers,  where  heavy  baggage  ap- 
pears only  on  paper,  we  often  see  in  orders  the  words,  "The 
baggage  train  will  go  into  park  here  or  there."  As  soon  as 
the  train  actually  appears,  it  becomes  a  different  question  to 
dispose  of  it  judiciously. 

As  a  rule,  the  light  bridge  train,  the  same  as  medicine-carts, 
goes  with  the  light  train,  which  is  never  separated  from  the 
troops  and  therefore  needs  no  special  mention  in  orders.  But 
it  has  heavy,  cumbrous  wagons  that  cannot  keep  up  with  troops, 
especially  on  country  roads.  Therefore  it  is  preferably  left 
with  the  baggage  train  as  soon  as  it  appears  probable  that 
the  bridge  train  will  not  be  needed  in  the  first  line. 


*Company  and  troop  wagons  may  carry  950  lbs.  tentage,  250  lbs. 
officers'  baggage,  350  lbs.  cooking  utensils,  and  two  days'  rations  and 
grain.     (Par.  396,  F.  S.  R.) 


Reconnaissance.  l9 

Colonel  A is  fortunate  to  have  the  telegraph  available 

for  communication  with  the  different  headquarters  as  well  as 
with  his  own  patrols.     This  is  an  advantage  due  to  being  in 

friendly  territory,  and  is  utilized  by  Colonel  A in  making 

his  arrangements.  It  may  seem  strange  that  his  orders  and 
messages,  intended  for  transmission  by  wire,  should  not  be  ab- 
breviated to  a  so-called  telegraphic  style.  But  experience  has 
taught  me  that  this  style  greatly  favors  mistakes.  The  omis- 
sion of  a  single  word,  even  if  it  seems  superfluous,  may  lead  to 
no  end  of  confusion.     Short,  clear  sentences  are  preferable. 

It  is  mentioned,  under  "g,"  that  a  regimental  staff  officer 
has  been  busy  obtaining  telegraphic  information  since  arriv- 
ing at  Maldeuten.  Naturally  he  would  have  several  cyclists 
as  orderlies.  Every  means  must  be  utilized  that  will  afford 
additional  information  of  the  enemy.  In  spite  of  this,  war 
often  is  very  disappointing  on  account  of  the  scarcity,  unreli- 
ability, and  slowness  of  information.  From  Maldeuten  an  effort 
can  be  made  to  learn  from  a  larger  telegraphic  station — such  as 
Elbing — how  far  on  the  Allenstein-Korschen^  line  telegraphic 
communication  still  exists;  and  inquiry  of  the  last  station  on 
the  line  may  throw  a  flood  of  light  on  the  situation.  Of  course 
such  information  must  be  cautiously  received,  because  the  enemy 
in  this  way  may  try  to  spread  false  reports;  and  our  telegrams 
must  never  prove  traitorous.  Therefore  you  must  studiously 
avoid  any  expressions  from  which  the  enemy  might  draw  con- 
clusions as  to  our  situation  or  intentions,  such,  for  instance,  as 
"Answer  by  wire  to  headquarters  ist  Cavalry  at  Maldeuten." 
One  way  of  accomplishing  the  object  is  to  collect  the  answers 
at  a  remote  station  with  which  we  are  in  assured  telegraphic 
communication.  It  must  be  separately  decided  in  each  case 
whether  the  subordinate   (in  our  case,  Colonel  A )   may 

*See  General  map.  Korschen  is  northeast  of  Allenstein,  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  map. — Translator. 


20  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

conduct  such  telegraphic  inquiry  without  reference  to  higher 
authority. 

The  date  of  the  regimental  order  is  "4  May  04,  1 1-20  p.  m." 
Very  likely  May  5th  has  arrived  before  the  squadron  adjutants, 
receiving  the  order,  are  dismissed.  Therefore  the  words  "to- 
day" and  "to-morrow"  in  the  body  of  the  order  might  lead  to 
misunderstanding — this  is  avoided  by  inserting  the  date.  Not 
until  late  at  night  are  the  orders  received  by  those  for  whom 
they  are  intended.  These  officers,  awakened  from  a  heavy 
sleep  of  exhaustion,  by  poor  light  must  consult  maps  that  have 
become  more  or  less  unintelligible  through  use  in  wind  and  rain, 
and  must  hastily  make  their  dispositions.  This  forms  a  fruitful 
source  for  the  most  unlikely  misunderstandings. 

It  is  long  past  midnight  at  regimental  headquarters  before 
all  arrangements  are  completed  for  the  following  day,  which 
surely  will  tax  officers  and  men  in  the  extreme.  Only  a  few 
hours  remain  in  which  to  rest  and  gain  new  strength — a  re- 
minder that  some  of  the  time  before  arrival  of  orders  from  corps 
headquarters  should  have  been  thus  utilized.  A  soldier  should 
be  able  to  store  up  sleep,  as  it  were,  considering  that  he  never 
knows  what  may  be  required  of  him  at  any  time.  As  soon  as 
information  or  orders  arrive,  the  guard  at  regimental  head- 
quarters must  awaken  the  officer  on  duty.  The  latter  must 
decide  whether  or  not  the  regimental  commander  should  be 
awakened. 

Leaving  regimental  headquarters,  let  us  consider  the  im- 
portant task  that  devolves  on  Captain  E ,  commanding 

Troop  A.  This  troop  is  quartered  at  Maldeuten,  where  it  ar- 
rives on  the  afternoon  of  May  4th,  after  a  march  of  26  miles. 
It  is  well  quartered  and  had  plenty  to  eat  for  horses  and  men. 
Its  baggage  train  arrived  at  8  p.  m. 

Captain  E makes  a  memorandum  of  the  verbal  instruc- 
tions received  from  Colonel  A ,  and  reads  them  aloud  before 


Reconnaissance.  21 

leaving  the  latter's  headquarters,  finding  it  unnecessary  to  ask 
any  questions  about  them. 

What  arrangements  does  Captain  E make  after 

RECEIVING  HIS  INSTRUCTIONS  AND  AFTER  HAVING  LEARNED  BY 
WIRE  FROM  THE  TWO  OFFICERS  IN  LlEBSTADT  AND  HORN  THAT 
THEY  HAD  NOTHING  NEW  TO  REPORT? 

After  leaving  his  regimental  commander,  Captain  E 

presumably  verbally  told  his  squadron  commander  what  orders 
he  had  received,  directed  his  first  sergeant  and  squad-leaders 
to  report  to  him  for  orders,  and  went  to  the  railway  station  to 
communicate  with  the  officers  at  Liebstadt  and  Horn.  He 
would  send  the  following  telegrams  from  the  office  at  the  rail- 
way station. 

(a)  To  Lieutenant  C ,  at  Horn: 

Troop  A,  1  st  Cavalry,  en  route  to  Gr.  Hermenau,  will  arrive  at 
Mohrungen  shortly  after  5  a.  m.,  and  looks  for  reports  at  both  places. 

(b)  To  Lieutenant  B ,  at  Liebstadt: 

You  will  continue  your  reconnaissance  via  Wormditt  and  Guttstadt. 
By  6  a.  m.,  at  Gr.  Hermenau,  I  shall  expect  a  report  of  your  reconnaissance 
to  Wormditt  and  Scharnick.  Any  approach  of  the  enemy  must  be  at  once 
wired  here  and  after  4  a.  m.  also  to  Mohrungen. 

If  Captain  E has  not  a  list  of  telegraph  stations,  and 

cannot  obtain  one  at  the  station,  he  should  enter  a  list  of  tele- 
graph lines  and  stations  on  his  General  map,  as  obtained  upon 
inquiry  from  the  station  agent,  and  arrange  with  the  latter  to 
forward  telegrams.  The  captain  then  returns  to  Maldeuten, 
and  it  will  be  fully  an  hour  after  midnight  before  he  will  have 
issued  his  orders.     These  will  be  as  follows: 

1.  Lieutenant  F will  report  at  my  quarters  at  2  a.  m.,  with 

1  sergeant  and  14  men  of  his  platoon,  ready  for  patrol  duty.  [This  order 
is  sent  to  the  lieutenant  at  once.] 

2.  Troop  A  will  be  assembled  at  4  a.  m.  at  the  southern  exit  of 
Maldeuten,  ready  to  march. 

3.  The  troop  escort  wagons  will  be  ready  at  the  same  place  at  5-45 
a.  m.,  and  will  join  the  baggage  train  of  the  squadron. 

The  first  sergeant  copies  these  orders.     At  2  a.  m.,  when 
Lieutenant  F reports,  the  captain  explains  the  situation 


22  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

to  him,  including  the  instructions  sent  Lieutenants  B and 

C ,  and  directs  him  as  follows: 

"You  will  ride  via  Mohrungen-Gr.  Hermenau,  at  first  to 
reconnoiter  towards  Kallisten  and  then  along  the  Kallisten- 
Guttstadt  road.  I  shall  expect  a  report  of  your  reconnais- 
sance as  far  as  the  Passarge  by  6  a.  m.,  at  Herzogswalde,  to 
which  place  I  shall  send  a  connecting-patrol." 

The  captain  had  previously  written  these  instructions  in 
his  note-book. 

Chance  has  favored  Captain  E with  an  important  and 

enviable  task.  His  efficiency  is  increased  not  only  by  the  ela- 
tion of  a  cavalryman  who  feels  that  he  now  may  show  of  what 
he  himself  is  capable  and  what  his  troopers  can  do,  but  also  by 
an  appreciation  of  the  difficulties  and  responsibilities  devolving 
upon  him.  An  experienced  troop  commander  is  ready  to  meet 
all  manner  of  obstacles  and  appreciates  the  bearing  his  work 
has  on  the  decisions  of  higher  authority.  Therefore,  with  care- 
ful deliberation  he  tries  to  provide  for  every  contingency.  It 
is  important  that  he,  as  well  as  his  regimental  commander, 
should  obtain  information  at  Gr.  Hermenau  from  all  points 
under  consideration.  He  is  justified  in  ordering  the  patrol  at 
Liebstadt  to  reconnoiter  via  Wormditt  as  well  as  Guttstadt, 
because  telegraphic  communication  still  seems  possible  for 
some  distance  along  the  railway  towards  Wormditt.  The  cap- 
tain does  not  think  it  advisable  to  send  Lieutenant  B— —  more 
detailed  instructions,  for  example,  about  dividing  his  patrol, 
holding  the  telegraph  station  at  Liebstadt,  etc.  How  easily 
may  the  conditions  there  change  before  morning,  so  that  such 
instructions  could  not  be  carried  out  and  the  officer  would  be 
placed  in  an  embarrassing  position.  Therefore  the  lieutenant 
is  told  what  is  expected  of  him  and  is  allowed  to  do  it  in  his 
own  way. 

The  captain  sends  Lieutenant  F into  the  gap  between 

Lieutenants  B and  C ,  the  region  south  of  the  Lieb- 


Reconnaissance.  23 

stadt-Guttstadt  road.     It  is  to  be  hoped  that  information  will 

be  available  from  Lieutenant  C 's  district  before  the  troop 

reaches  Gr.  Hermenau. 

It  is  true  that  the  net  broadly  and  promptly  spread  by 

Captain  E to  obtain  information  has  wide  meshes,  but  it 

affords  some  assurance  that  the  enemy  will  not  be  able  to  slip 
through  unobserved. 

In  Troop  A  the  issue  of  orders  has  taken  until  towards  early 
dawn.  The  first  sergeant  and  squad-leaders  hardly  will  be  able 
to  obtain  another  half-hour's  rest  in  the  straw  if  everything 
among  horses  and  men  is  to  be  in  ship-shape  order  for  the  long 
day's  work  by  4  a.  m.,  the  time  for  departure.  This  is  an  earn- 
est reminder  for  higher  authorities  to  issue  their  orders  early, 
as  these  form  the  basis  for  others. 

By  4  a.  m.  May  5th  word  is  received  from  Elbing  that  tele- 
graphic communication  has  been  interrupted  with  Konigsberg 
and  Pr.  Eylau  since  a.  m.  of  May  4th,  and  with  Landsberg  since 
noon  that  day.  The  latter  office  was  dismantled  on  the  ap- 
proach of  hostile  troopers.  The  telegraph  line  was  destroyed 
between  Mehlsack  and  Wormditt  on  the  evening  of  May  4th, 
but  at  Mehlsack  itself  the  enemy  had  not  appeared  up  to  2  a.  m. 

May  5th.     At  2  a.  m.  Lieutenant  B reported  that  he  was 

about  to  leave  for  Guttstadt  with  7  troopers,  sending  Sergeant 
H and  5  troopers  to  Wormditt. 

These  reports  do  not  cause  Captain  E to  change  any 

of  his  arrangements.     At  4  a.  m.  he  marched  from  Maldeuten 

and  sent  Corporal  M with  3  troopers  ahead  to  Herzogs- 

walde  as  a  connecting-patrol  for  Lieutenant  F .     At  5-20 

a.  m.  the  troop  arrived  at  the  Mohrungen  station,  where  the 
following  telegrams  were  found: 

1.     By  wire  from  Horn  railway  station  at  5  a.  m.  May  5th. 

Hillside  just  west  of  Bruckendorf, 

5  May  04,  4-10  a.  m. 
Found  railway  station  near  Briickendorf  occupied  by  enemy,  who 

fired  on  us.  C , 

Lieutenanz. 


24  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 


MALDEUTEN, 

5  May  04,  4  a.  m. 

Major  D ,  with  3  troops  3d  Cavalry,  leaves  Drenken  at  5  a.  m., 

reeonnoitering  via  Pfeiling  towards  Miinsterberg-Jonkendorf. 

By  order  of  Colonel  A :  B , 

Adjutant. 

Captain  A leaves  a  corporal  and  1   private  at  the 

railway  station  with  orders  to  see  that  all  messages  received 
for  the  troop  are  repeated  to  Gr.  Hermenau,  and  to  take  charge 
of  any  for  regimental  headquarters.  None  of  these  must  be 
allowed  to  fall  into  the  enemy's  hands.  Upon  arrival  of  reg- 
imental headquarters  the  detail  is  to  rejoin  its  troop.  The 
telegraph  office  in  the  town  of  Mohrungen  had  received  no  dis- 
patches of  any  importance.  It  and  the  postoffice  were  notified 
to  hide  all  matter  that  could  be  of  any  value  to  the  enemy,  and 
to  remain  in  constant  communication  with  the  railway  station. 

The  troop  commander  sent  a  short  dispatch  back  to  reg- 
imental headquarters  at  Gr.  Bestendorf  and  then  continued  the 
march.  At  6  a.  m.  the  troop  arrived  at  Gr.  Hermenau,  where 
the  following  dispatches  were  found. 

1.  Message  from  Sergeant  H ,  who  was  sent  to  Worm- 

ditt  by  Lieutenant  B : 

WORMDITT, 

5  May  04,  4  a.  m. 
Yesterday  evening  20  hostile  troopers  cut    the    telegraph   line,  de- 
stroyed the  instruments,  and  blew  up  rails  and  switches  at  the  station. 
They  remained  here  over  night  and  left  at  1  a.  m.,  going  towards  Aiken. 

(This    message    was    wired    from    Sportehnen    to     Gr. 

Hermenau.) 

2.  Lieutenant  B reports  at  5.3^  a.  m.,  from  Pittehnen 

(forwarded  by  wire  from  Liebstadt) : 

Shortly  after  4  a.  m.  I  encountered  a  platoon  of  hostile  cavalry  at 
Scharnick  and  retired  to  this  point.  Am  still  holding  the  crossing.  The 
Passarge  here  can  be  crossed  only  on  the  bridge. 

3.  Lieutenant  F reports  from  the  edge  of  the  woods 

north  of  Sanglau  at  5  a.  m. : 


Reconnaissance.  25 

Twelve  hostile  troopers  are  riding  from  Lettau  towards  Herzogs- 
ualde.  I  shall  continue  my  reconnaissance  via  Sanglau  towards  Kallisten. 
I  have  sent  a  lance  corporal  and  2  men  to  Sackstein  to  report  direct  to  the 
troop. 

The  trooper  carrying  this  message  passed  between  Ponarien 
and  Royer  Forst  (Forest),  but  did  not  see  anything  more  cf  the 
enemy.  Upon  inquiry,  he  stated  that  the  highway  at  Walters- 
dorf  was  entirely  deserted  at  about  5  a.  m. 

No  word  had  been  received  from  the  patrol  sent  to 
Herzogswalde. 

To  WHAT  DECISION  DOES  CAPTAIN  H COME,  AND  WHAT 

ARRANGEMENTS  DOES  HE  MAKE,  AFTER  6  A.  M.  ? 

Hostile  troopers  are  reconnoitering  on  all  roads  leading 
from  the  east.  But  no  insight  has  yet  been  obtained  behind 
these  advanced  parties. 

The  captain  may  have  hoped  for  more  definite  informa- 
tion from  his  patrols.  He  probably  hoped  for  information  at 
Gr.  Hermenau  that  would  have  simplified  his  task. 

But  on  again  comparing  time  and  distance  he  realizes  that 
by  6  a.  m.  he  hardly  could  have  expected  more  definite  informa- 
tion unless  large  bodies  of  hostile  troops  crossed  the  Passarge 
early  in  the  morning.  So  far  there  is  no  word  about  Kallisten 
from  Lieutenant  F ,  nor  about  Sackstein,  although  Lieu- 
tenant F had  sent  a  patrol  to  the  latter  point.     Therefore 

the  question  arises  whether  Captain  E should  await  the 

arrival  of  further  information  that  might  serve  as  a  basis  for 
further  arrangements.  It  takes  time  to  wait,  and,  as  the  patrols 
everywhere  have  encountered  hostile  ones,  which  hamper  their 
freedom  of  action,  the  same  uncertainty  might  still  obtain  upon 
arrival  of  the  regiment,  if  the  troop  did  not  take  an  active  part 
in  the  reconnaissance. 

There  are  good  reasons  for  not  sending  further  strong  pa- 
trols in  the  three  main  directions:  Kallisten,  Guttstadt,  and 
Wormditt.     At  neither  point  would  a  decisive  superiority  be 

—3— 


26  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

obtained,  the  captain's  personal  supervision  and  power  to  assist 
would  become  nil,  and  the  scattered  troop  hardly  could  be  as- 
sembled again  during  the  day.  In  case  the  regiment  encoun- 
tered the  enemy,  the  troop  would  have  lost  its  fighting  power. 
Therefore  it  seems  best  that  the  troop  continue  on  its  way  as  a 
closed  body,  so  that  at  one  point,  at  least,  it  may  be  able  to 
pierce  the  hostile  screen  and  obtain  some  light.  What  direc- 
tion shall  the  captain  choose? 

Captain  E need  not  bother  about  the  hostile  patrol 

that  advanced  early  in  the  morning  from  Wormditt  towards 

Aiken.     A  part  of  Lieutenant  B 's  patrol  is  at  Wormditt, 

and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  this  will  be  able  to  make  the  necessary 
dispositions  to  watch  the  roads  converging  on  that  point. 
But,  as  this  party  might  be  driven  off  by  other  advancing  hos- 
tile troops,  it  is  advisable  to  send  out  an  intermediate  patrol  to 
Liebstadt,  where  this  in  addition  should  take  charge  of  the  im- 
portant telegraph  office.     Lieutenant  F is  advancing  via 

Kallisten.  The  12  hostile  troopers  that  passed  him  are  an 
annoyance,  but  at  the  latest  they  will  be  driven  back  by  the  head 
of  the  regiment,  and  must  not  influence  Captain  E 's  deci- 
sion.    It  is  to  be  hoped  that,  if  Lieutenant  F 's  report  on 

Kallisten  does  not  reach  the  troop  in  time,  it  at  least  will  thus 

reach  the  regiment.     And,  besides,  Major  D ,  3d  Cavalry,* 

will  reconnoiter  via  Kallisten. 

Therefore  the  Liebstadt-Outtstadt  road  seems  to  offer  the 
best  opportunity  for  profitable  reconnaissance,  although  no 
definite  conclusion  can  be  drawn  from  the  sole  fact  that  in  that 
direction  Lieutenant  B met  a  rather  strong  hostile  detach- 
ment. It  is  the  central  one  of  the  three  possible  directions  and 
admits  of  a  change  to  either  of  the  other  two  without  too  great 
a  detour. 

Probably  many  a  one  whom  the  "maneuver-habit"  would 
have  led  to  choose  the  Gr.  Hermenau-Liebstadt  highway  as 

*Of  the  divisional  cavalrv. — Translator. 


Reconnaissance:.  27 

the  route  for  the  troop's  advance  would  never  have  given  a 
thought  to  the  country  road  via  Herzogswalde-Reichenthal  as 
a  desirable  route.  How  often  we  hear  the  advice,  ' '  Remain  on 
the  good  roads,"  and  "Even  do  not  hesitate  to  make  a  detour 
if  thereby  the  troops  can  remain  on  a  good  road."  The  princi- 
ple is  correct,  but,  in  my  opinion,  as  a  rule,  is  not  applicable  on 
reconnaissance  duty.  Large  bodies  of  troops  will  and  must 
select  the  best  roads ;  therefore  on  these  we  shall  find  the  enemy's 
columns.  But  if  your  advanced  patrols  also  keep  to  these 
roads,  the  enemy's  will  prevent  all  insight. 

Patrols  and  reconnoitering  troops  can  accomplish  their 
object  much  more  readily  on  side  roads.  Of  course  there  is  a 
limit  to  the  use  of  side  roads  and  fields  when  thereby  the  ad- 
vance is  too  much  retarded.  In  this  case  there  are  other  reasons 
favoring  the  Herzogswalde-Reichenthal  road:  the  troop  will 
be  able  to  keep  the  bridge  at  Sackstein  under  observation, 
whence  no  report  has  been  received,  so  far;  the  troop  can 
quickly  turn  south  if  necessary  on  account  of  reports  received 
from  Kallisten;  it  may  be  possible  to  drive  off  the  hostile  patrol 
coming  from  Lettau;  and,  as  the  route  leads  over  high  ground, 
an  extended  view  is  obtained  of  a  large  territory.     Therefore 

Captain  E orders  his  advance  party  to  ride  via  Narien  mill,* 

sends  a  small  patrol  of  3  troopers  around  the  south  side  of 

Royer  Forest  to  the  Teufelsberg  185,  and  sends  Sergeant  h 

with  6  troopers  to  Liebstadt.  The  latter  is  ordered  to  occupy 
the  railway  station  near  the  town,  see  that  messages  for  the 
troop  are  sent  the  latter  on  the  Herzogswalde-Reichenthal- 
Pittehnen  road,  and  repeat  all  important  messages  for  the  troop 
to  Gr.  Hermenau.  In  addition  he  is  directed  to  observe  the 
roads  leading  to  Gottchendorf,  Wormditt,  Klogehnen,  and 
Pittehnen.  Anything  important  to  be  wired  direct  to  regi- 
mental headquarters  at  Gr.  Hermenau.  A  connecting-post  of 
3  men  is  left  at  Gr.  Hermenau. 

*"Narien  M."   on   1:100,000  map. — Translator. 


28  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Captain  E then  dictates  the  following  message  to 

regimental  headquarters : 

Gr.  Hermenau, 
5  May  04,  6-20  a.  m. 
Twenty  hostile  troopers  were  at  Wormditt  last  night,  destroyed  the 
railway  and  telegraph  at  that  point,  and  left  on  the  way  towards  Aiken  at 

1  a.  m.     I  am  not  pursuing  them  from  this  point.     Sergeant  H and  5 

troopers  are  now  located  at  Wormditt. 

Lieutenant  B encountered  a  platoon  of  hostile  cavalry  at  Schar- 

nick  early  this  morning,  and  at  5.30  a.  m.  had  retreated  to  Pittehnen. 

At  5  a.  m.  to-day  12  hostile  troopers,  coming  from  Lettau,  rode 
towards  Herzogswalde.     Their  whereabouts  is  not  known.     Lieutenant 

F is  reconnoitering  via  Kallisten  towards  Guttstadt.     Troop  A  will 

advance  via  Herzogswalde-Pittehnen  to  reconnoiter  the  Liebstadt-Gutt- 

stadt  road.     Lieutenant  F sent  a  lance  corporal  and  2  troopers  to 

Sackstein.     No  report  yet  received  from  them. 

I  am  leaving  connecting-posts  at  telegraph  stations  in  Liebstadt 
and  Gr.  Hermenau  and  at  Herzogswalde. 

E . 

Captain. 

The  message  is  wired  to  Mohrungen  and  in  addition  is  sent 

to  Colonel  A by  a  trooper  riding  along  the  highway.     The 

man  is  instructed  to  note  when  and  where  he  meets  Colonel 
A ,  and  is  then  to  ride  to  Corporal  M ,  at  Herzogswalde. 

In  practice  rides  and  at  Kriegs-spiel  many  of  you  may  have 
been  surprised  to  notice,  as  I  have,  that,  when  under  similar  cir- 
cumstances a  leader  was  asked  for  his  decision  and  arrangements, 
his  first  answer  would  be :  "I  shall  at  once  forward  the  mes- 
sage." At  maneuvers,  on  the  contrary,  the  message  is  entirely 
forgotten,  or  at  least  is  not  thought  of  for  some  time.  Both 
practices  are  contrary  to  what  is  required  in  war.  The  sending 
of  a  message  is  seldom  of  more  importance  than  a  consideration 
of  further  necessary  arrangements,  which  as  a  rule  also  must 
form  the  subject  of  a  report.  A  combined  report  of  what  has 
been  seen  and  what  has  been  resolved  upon  furnishes  the  supe- 
rior with  a  better  picture  than  would  two  separate  reports  for- 
warded by  two  horses  instead  of  one. 

It  is  evident  that  in  maneuvers  as  in  war,  where  the  enemy 
actually  is  in  evidence,  and  miles  are  not  measured  only  by  the 
dividers,  a  message  is  easily  overlooked.     Time  presses  and 


RECONNAISSANCE.  29 

more  thought  is  devoted  to  riding  than  to  writing.  A  watchful 
assistant — an  adjutant  or  a  first  sergeant — may  remind  you 
of  it. 

It  is  self-evident  that  the  regimental  commander  should  be 
kept  constantly  informed  of  the  reconnaissance  work  and  where- 
abouts of  the  troop.     Captain  E possibly  might  content 

himself  with  forwarding  the  messages  received ;  simply  append- 
ing his  intended  action. 

It  seems  expedient  to  me  that  he  should  report  to  his  colo- 
nel in  an  abbreviated  form  what  has  happened  so  far,  possibly 
showing  the  source  of  his  information.  He  thus  would  spare 
his  superior  the  labor  of  reading  unnecessary  details,  or  mistakes 
that  would  have  to  be  sifted,  and  force  himself  to  carefully  test 
all  information  received.  Only  in  exceptional  cases  should  the 
original  messages  be  forwarded,  as  when  time  presses  or  when 
the  exact  words  received  are  of  importance  for  the  recipient. 
To  habitually  forward  all  messages  would  be  incompatible  with 
the  troop  commander's  obligation,  whose  duty  it  is  to  see  that 
the  situation  is  cleared  up,  and  who  therefore  should  separate 
the  important  from  the  unimportant — the  true  from  the  false. 
It  would  be  different  if  the  troop  acted  simply  as  a  support  for 
a  number  of  independent  patrols.  In  this  event  the  original 
messages  would  have  to  be  promptly  forwarded.  This  would 
increase  the  demand  for  horses  and  increase  the  difficulties  of 
supervision  at  regimental  headquarters. 

The  time  that  the  captain  has  devoted  to  quietly  composing 
and  writing  his  report  (of  which  report  he  will  retain  a  copy)  he 
will  regain  in  overtaking  his  advance  party  in  company  of  a 
subaltern  and  several  troopers  (trumpeter,  etc.),  his  troop  fol- 
lowing at  a  trot. 

If  in  the  meantime  Lieutenant  B has  been  driven  away 

from  Pittehnen,  the  time  may  be  at  hand  when  Captain  E 

first  meets  the  enemy.  He  might  also  encounter  the  hostile 
patrol  that  advanced  via  Lettau.     Notwithstanding  the  rapid- 


jo  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

ity  of  movement,  it  is  important  to  carefully  look  about  in  every 
direction,  to  avoid  being  surprised.  An  officer  and  2  troopers 
are  sent  to  the  Teufelsberg,  which  limits  the  view  to  the  south, 
while  the  captain  himself  rides  to  Knoll  136  west  of  the  north 
end  of  Herzogswalde,  carefully  concealing  himself  and  his  com- 
panions from  hostile  observation.  The  view  to  the  northeast 
is  quite  limited,  the  heights  at  Pragsden  and  Wuchsing  limit  it. 
The  highway  from  Pragsden  to  Liebstadt  is  visible  almost  along 
its  entire  length,  and  nothing  of  importance  is  visible  on  it, 
neither  is  there  on  the  short  stretch  of  highway  visible  near 
Blumen.  In  the  vicinity  of  Warrhof  there  is  a  small  group  of 
horsemen  moving  on  the  Alt-Bolitten-Liebstadt  highway.  The 
captain  turns  his  field-glasses  in  that  direction,  but  his  horse's 
movements  prevent  his  obtaining  an  accurate  view.  But  he 
does  not  wish  to  dismount  until  he  finds  out  what  the  situation 
is  in  Herzogswalde,  whither  he  sends  a  trumpeter.     Neither  his 

advance  party  nor  Corporal  M 's  connecting  patrol  is  visible, 

and,  by  the  time  he  learns  that  the  latter  is  at  the  southern  edge 
of  the  village  and  the  advance  party  at  the  exit  towards  Reich- 
enthal,  his  troop  is  already  approaching.  While  thus  waiting, 
the  captain  may  have  indulged  in  some  strong  language,  for  both 
detachments  committed  an  error.  Fortunately,  no  disastrous 
results  have  followed,  but  it  serves  as  a  lesson  and  will  not  be 
repeated.  Both  parties  have  thought  only  of  the  front  and 
forgot  that  the  large  village  behind  them  obstructed  all  view  of 
the  troop.     The  advance  party  should  have  left  a  man  on  Knoll 

136.     For  his  own  safety,  Corporal  M at  least  should  have 

guarded  the  cross-street  in  the  village  if  perchance  Knoll  136  had 
not  served  his  purpose  better  by  affording  a  better  lookout  and 
cover. 

The  captain'did  not  at  once  dismount,  even  though  he  could 
not  advantageously  use  his  field-glasses  while  mounted.  Pos- 
sibly he  had  the  French  General  Staff  officer  in  mind  who,  leav- 
ing his  escort  at  the  foot  of  a  hill  near  Beaumont,  August  29, 


Reconnaissance.  31 

1870,  dismounted  and  was  captured  by  some  Prussian  Garde- 
Uhlans,  who  ascended  the  hill  from  the  opposite  side,  unob- 
served. In  the  present  case  the  large  village  of  Herzogswalde 
might  have  harbored  enemies;  hence  the  captain's  befitting 
caution.     It  is  ascertained  that  the  group  of  horsemen  south 

of   Liebstadt   is  Sergeant   L 's  patrol    (connecting- post). 

After  the  captain  had  scanned  the  whole  surrounding  country 
with  his  glasses  without  discovering  the  enemy,  the  officer,  who 
had  returned  from  Knoll  185,  reported  that  from  the  latter  point 
(whence  a  view  could  be  had  to  beyond  Waltersdorf,  as  far  as 
Seubersdorf,  the  Seubersdorf  Forest,  and  Willnau)  neither  our 
own  troops  nor  those  of  the  enemy  were  visible.  The  officer 
there  overtook  the  patrol  sent  around  Royer  Forest ;  it  had  not 
seen  anything  suspicious.  The  three  troopers  were  left  on  the 
knoll  until  further  orders  and  were  continuing  in  observation. 

Nothing  is  known  of  the  enemy  in  Herzogswalde.  The 
inhabitants  are  assembled  partly  in  the  village  street  and  partly 
in  the  church,  where,  notwithstanding  its  being  a  week  day  and 
very  early  in  the  morning,  religious  services  are  in  progress. 
The  fields  and  trails  are  deserted.  News  of  the  approach  of  the 
hostile  army,  as  well  as  of  the  interruption  of  telegraphic  com- 
munication, has  spread  among  the  villages.  Fear  and  terror 
have  taken  possession  of  the  people.  This  is  increased  by  false 
and  exaggerated  rumors  and  by  the  absence  from  home  of  the 
able-bodied  men  who  have  been  called  to  the  colors.  Although 
these  people  do  not  talk  much,  still,  the  captain  has  the  trouble 
of  investigating  several  rumors  brought  to  him  by  them.  He 
recognizes  these  rumors  as  untenable  and  fantastic,  still  he 
takes  the  necessary  time  to  investigate. 

Then  he  has  his  advance  party  resume  its  march,  first  di- 
recting it  to  Knoll  153,  and  orders  the  patrol  at  Teufelsberg  to 
ride  towards  Naglack,  thus  covering  the  advance  of  the  troop 
on  the  south.     On  account  of  the  supposed  presence  of  a  hostile 


32  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

patrol  in  the  neighborhood,  Corporal  M 's  patrol  at  Herzogs- 

walde  is  increased  to  6  men,  with  the  following  instructions : 

"You  will  ride  to  the  Teufelsberg,  observing  in  all  direc- 
tions as  far  as  you  can,  and  watching  the  course  of  the  troop 
as  far  as  you  can,  which  will  advance  en  Guttstadt  via  Pit- 
tehnen.  You  will  keep  up  communication  between  the  troop 
and  the  regiment,  and  therefore  will  read  all  messages  arriv- 
ing and  see  that  everything  of  importance  is  forwarded  to  the 
regimental  commander,  who  should  arrive  at  Gr.  Hermenau 
shortly  after  7  a.  m.  I  must  leave  it  to  your  judgment  to 
send  me  any  messages  that  are  of  importance  for  me  and  that 
still  can  reach  me.  You  know  that  at  5  a.  m.  a  hostile  pa- 
trol of  12  men  was  seen  riding  from  Lettau  towards  Herzogs- 
walde,  and  that  it  has  since  disappeared.  Do  not  allow  your- 
self to  be  surprised  by  it." 

The  captain  sends  a  short  written  report  to  the  regiment, 
stating  that  the  enemy  could  not  be  seen  from  Herzogswalde ; 
that  no  further  information  had  been  received;  that  the  troop 
had  resumed  its  march  towards  Pittehnen,  and  that  Corporal 

M ,  with  6  men  as  connecting-post,  had  been  sent  to  the 

Teufelsberg.  Then  (it  is  now  6.50  a.  m.)  he  starts  his  troop  at 
a  trot  and  himself  rides  to  the  height  near  Wuchsing. 


Let  us  devote  our  attention  for  awhile  to  Lieutenant  F — — . 

Awakened  at  1.30  a.  m.  in  Maldeuten,  he  had  received  his 
orders  in  the  captain's  quarters  at  about  2  a.  m.,  at  once  record- 
ing them.  It  would  have  been  fatal  if  later  his  memory  should 
have  failed  him  concerning  a  name  or  number.  Beidses,  as  a 
means  of  protection,  the  patrol-leader,  as  well  as  the  one  order- 
ing him  to  duty,  should  have  the  orders  in  black  and  white. 

The  orders  were  as  follows: 

You  will  ride  via  Mohrungen-Gr.  Hermenau,  first  to  reconnoiter 
towards  Kallisten  and  then  along  the  Kallisten-Guttstadt  road.  I  shall 
expect  a  report  of  your  reconnaissance  as  far  as  the  Passarge  by  6  a.  m.  at 
Herzogswalde,  whither  I  shall  send  a  connecting-patrol. 


Reconnaissance.  33 

The  captain  also  imparted  the  information  concerning  the 
enemy,  the  regimental  commander's  intention,  the  troop's  orders 
and  those  of  Lieutenants  B and  C ,  and  that  the  cav- 
alry of  the  1st  Division  would  advance  from  south  of  Narien-see 
towards  the  Alle. 

Captain  E has  been  busy  the  past  three  hours  making 

arrangements  for  his  scout,  and  he  certainly  is  entitled  to  unin- 
terrupted rest  until  the  time  of  departure  of  his  troop.       Still, 

Lieutenant  F ,  before  leaving  his  superior,  must  carefully 

think  over  his  orders  with  his  map  before  him,  so  he  can  ask 
for  information  on  any  points  about  which  he  may  be  in  doubt. 
The  bodily  exhaustion  and  mental  tension  that  are  the  rule  in 
war  must  be  fought  at  every  point  by  will-power. 

Concerning  maps,  it  is  to  be  assumed  that  all  cavalry  offi- 
cers are  provided  with  a  General  map  and  a  General  Staff  map 
of  the  section  under  consideration.  This  may  be  so  in  your 
own  country.  The  patrol-leaders'  tasks  would  become  most 
difficult  without  maps.  In  such  cases  they  would  have  to  pre- 
pare maps  for  themselves,  showing  at  least  the  principal  roads, 
villages,  railways,  and  water-courses. 

Lieutenant  T had  no  questions  to  ask  of  his  captain. 

But  before  having  his  patrol  mount  he  satisfied  himself,  as  far  as 
darkness  would  permit,  that  his  men  were  properly  equipped  for 
the  trip.  A  lame  horse  or  a  sick  man  could  still  be  exchanged. 
The  hurried  departure  necessitated  deferring  an  examination 
of  the  saddling  and  shoeing  until  the  first  halt.  The  horses 
could  not  be  fed  before  starting,  but  it  may  be  assumed  that 
they  had  a  good  feed  in  the  evening.  It  is  of  no  consequence 
that  the  men  start  without  breakfast.  A  patrol  has  an  advan- 
tage over  a  troop  in  securing  food.  A  piece  of  bread  and  cheese 
with  a  cup  of  milk  can  be  had  at  almost  any  farm-house. 

Although  the  ride  as  far  as  Mohrungen  can  be  considered 

perfectly  safe,  still  Lieutenant  F forms  a  point  or  advance 

party  of  three  men  and  has  it  precede  the  patrol  about  300 


34  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

yards  on  the  highway.  And  until  daylight  2  men  ride  as  con- 
necting-file between  the  point  and  the  patrol.  When  first  com- 
ing to  a  walk  from  a  trot,  the  officer  informs  his  men  of  the  task 
before  them  and  informs  the  sergeant,  who  is  to  take  his  place 
in  case  of  accident,  more  in  detail  concerning  the  situation. 
The  sergeant,  too,  will  write  down  the  import  of  the  order  at 
the^first  opportunity.  Arriving  at  the  railway  station  of  Gr. 
Bestendorf  the  lieutenant  inquires  for  news,  but  receives  none, 
any  more  than  at  Mohrungen.  From  the  latter  place  be  makes 
telegraphic  inquiry  of  Liebstadt,  Gr.  Hermenau,  and  Horn, 
but  learns  nothing  new.  He  simply  receives  word  that  the 
patrol  left  Liebstadt  at  2  a.  m.,  and  the  one  at  Horn  left  at  3 
a.  m.  The  short  halt  at  the  railway  station  of  Mohrungen  was 
utilized  to  readjust  the  saddles,  then  the  patrol  continued  along 
the  highway  via  Georgenthal.  About  4  a.  m.,  at  dawn,  the 
patrol  reaches  Gr.  Hermenau.  A  hasty  survey  of  the  terrain 
reveals  nothing  suspicious ;  the  inhabitants  know  nothing  about 
the  enemy;  a  farmer  who  was  in  Alt-Bolitten  yesterday  after- 
noon states  that  the  enemy  had  not  been  seen  there  either. 
Renewed  inquiry  by  wire  of  Liebstadt  and  Mohrungen  results 
in  no  change  in  the  situation.  Upon  inquiry  of  Maldeuten, 
word  is  received  that  telegraphic  communication  with  Landsberg 
and  Pr.  Eylau,  as  well  as  between  Wormditt  and  Mehlsack, 
was  cut  off  the  4th  inst.  The  village  president  (of  Gr.  Hermen- 
au), upon  inquiry,  states  that  at  Kloben,  Kallisten,  Sackstein, 
and  farther  down  the  Passarge  averages  15  yards  in  width  and 
2  yards  in  depth;  that  the  meadows  along  the  stream  are 
marshy;  that,  as  far  as  he  knows,  the  stream  can  be  crossed 
only  on  the  bridges;  and  that  there  are  no  fords  between 
Briickendorf  and  Pittehnen. 

What  will  Lieutenant  F do  after  this,  and  what 

ARRANGEMENTS  DOES  HE  MAKE  AT  ABOUT  4  A.  M.  ? 

Although  the  captain's  orders  specifically  direct  the  patrol 
towards  Kallisten,  the  leader  realizes  that  Lieutenant  B , 


Reconnaissance.  35 

who  is  to  reconnoiter  from  Liebstadt  towards  Wormditt  and 
Guttstadt,  cannot  see  the  country  south  of  the  Liebstadt- 
Guttstadt  highway,  and  that  therefore  this  task  devolves  on 

Lieutenant  F .     It  is  simplified  by  the  fact  that  the  Passarge 

between  Kallisten  and  Pittehnen  apparently  can  be  crossed  only 
on  the  bridge  at  Sackstein.  The  next  point  of  crossing  above 
Kallisten,  the  bridge  at  Kloben,  also  lies  within  Lieutenant 
F 's  domain;  while  the  Passarge  south  of  this  point  prop- 
erly can  be  left  to  the  charge  of  Lieutenant  C reconnoiter- 

ing  toward  Jonkendorf  and  to  the  cavalry  of  the  ist  Division. 

Therefore  Lieutenant  F 's  reconnaissance  from  Gr.  Her- 

menau  should  at  first  be  directed  towards  the  Passarge  between 
Kloben  and  Sackstein,  and,  being  well-versed  in  map-reading, 
he  concludes  that  the  village  president's  statement  concerning 
the  passableness  of  the  stream  is  correct,  as  there  are  no  trails 
or  roads  indicated  on  the  map  across  the  broad  meadows  along 
the  river.  The  work  can  be  accomplished  by  sending  small  pa- 
trols towards  the  three  bridges,  while  the  leader  with  the  remain- 
der of  his  patrol  follows  on  the  central  road  to  the  vicinity  of 
Lettau-Waltersdorf.  The  small  patrols  cover  quite  a  large 
territory  and  it  will  be  difficult  for  any  hostile  detachment  to  es- 
cape their  notice.  What  one  does  not  see,  another  will.  The 
captain  at  Herzogswalde  expects  a  report  of  the  reconnaissance 
as  far  as  the  Passarge  by  6  a.  m.  It  is  over  9  miles  from  Gr. 
Hermenau  to  the  Passarge,  and  about  6  miles  back  to  Her- 
zogswalde. Therefore  there  is  no  time  to  be  lost,  and  simul- 
taneous reconnaissance  towards  all  three  bridges  promises 
the  quickest  results. 

But  there  are  objections  to  this  method  of  procedure. 
Each  of  the  small  patrols  must  contain  at  least  3  men,  so  that 
after  sending  back  the  first  message,  it  may  not  be  reduced  to 
a  single  pair  of  eyes.  Therefore  the  lieutenant  would  retain 
but  the  sergeant  and  5  men.  But  he  may  encounter  the  enemy 
on  this  side  of  the  Passarge.     In  this  event  the  scattered  small 


36  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

patrols  probably  would  be  completely  dispersed.  Their  mes- 
sages largely  would  fail  to  reach  the  officer,  and  where  are  they 
then  to  go  ?  Neither  the  messengers  nor  the  leaders  of  the  small 
patrols  are  sufficiently  well  acquainted  with  the  general  situa- 
tion. They  have  no  maps,  and  the  absence  of  field-glasses 
limits  their  power  of  vision.  They  therefore  can  do  little  more 
than  report  the  presence  of  hostile  advance  parties.  The  offi- 
cer, with  his  few  remaining  men,  cannot  carry  out  his  instruc- 
tions even  if  he  should  succeed  in  slipping  by  the  hostile  detach- 
ments unobserved.  After  sending  back  a  single  message,  he 
would  be  almost  without  escort.  Being  unable  to  protect  his 
march  with  point  and  flankers,  his  activity  would  soon  come 
to  an  end. 

In  time  of  peace,  when  fighting  capacity  does  not  count, 
where  most  persons  have  maps,  where  no  one  is  captured,  and 
where  individual  messengers  safely  ride  past  hostile  detach- 
ments, the  subdivision  of  an  officer's  patrol  into  a  number  of 
small  groups  may  sometimes  achieve  the  desired  end.  In  time 
of  war  it  exposes  the  leader  to  the  loss  of  his  escort,  which  is 
necessary  for  his  safety,  for  reliefs  to  messengers,  and  for  fight- 
ing. Ferreting  out,  recognizing,  and  observing  the  enemy  es- 
sentially is  the  function  of  the  leader.  He  alone  has  a  general 
view  of  the  situation,  and  with  his  map  and  field-glasses  posses- 
ses superior  facilities  for  the  work.  His  men  can  perform  only 
secondary  duties  for  him;  and  small  parties  of  them  will  be 
detached  only  for  short  distances  and  to  accomplish  some 
minor  object — otherwise  the  reins  will  slip  from  the  leader's 
hands  and  the  thinnest  hostile  screen  will  become  impenetrable. 

Should  Lieutenant  F conclude  to  send  a  patrol  each  to 

Sackstein  and  Kloben  and  with  the  remainder  of  the  patrol 
himself  to  ride  to  Kallisten,  he  would  reduce  his  detached 
parties  to  6  men;  but,  should  he  encounter  the  enemy,  he  could 
not  count  on  sending  messages.  He  would  not  improve  his 
case  much.     He  would  prefer  to  keep  his  men  together  as  long 


Reconnaissance.  37 

as  possible  and  divide  them  only  when  it  becomes  absolutely 
necessary,  and  when  a  reassembling  seems  reasDnably  assured. 
He  can  at  least  advance  to  the  vicinity  of  Herzogswalde  with 
his  patrol  united. 

Lieutenant  F 's  decision  as  to  the  extent  of  territory 

to  be  covered  by  him,  and  his  action  concerning  the  Passarge, 
lead  to  the  question:  "Why  is  he  required  at  first  to  reconnoi- 
ter  only  towards  Kallisten?  Why  did  not  the  captain  say, 
'Reconnoiter  the  Passarge  from  Kloben  to  Sackstein'  ?  " 

In  the  Field  Service  Regulations  we  see  "that  orders  must 
state  clearly  what  information  is  desired,  what  points  are  of 
special  importance"  ;*  and  it  undoubtedly  was  of  importance  to 
the  captain  that  on  his  arrival  at  Gr.  Hermenau  he  should  have 
news  not  only  of  Kallisten,  but  of  the  entire  Passarge  within 
reach  of  this  patrol. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  more  detailed  orders  in  this  par- 
ticular would  have  been  desirable.  But  the  captain  had  a  right 
to  count  on  the  officer's  interpreting  the  orders  in  the  manner 
intended.  As  a  rule,  it  must  be  sufficient  to  give  the  general 
direction — the  main  line  of  advance — in  which  a  reconnaissance 
shall  take  place.  If,  in  addition,  the  patrol  commander  is  in- 
formed of  the  orders  of  the  neighboring  patrols,  his  discretion 
and  energy  may  be  trusted  to  look  out  for  the  intervening 
country. 

The  second  part  of  the  order  simply  calls  for  a  reconnais- 
sance of  the  Kallisten-Guttstadt  road.  But  no  officer  on  this 
account  would  claim  that  hostile  detachments  off  the  road  did 
not  concern  him.  At  Maldeuten  no  special  importance  could 
be  assigned  the  bridges  over  the  Passarge  because  the  captain 
so  far  had  no  information  as  to  the  passableness  of  the  stream. 
We  also  must  bear  in  mind  the  many  arrangements  we  had  to 
make  hastily  and  late  at  night  before  condemning  any  failure 
of  his  to  go  into  minute  details  in  any  particular  case.     Too 

*See  par.  75,  F.  S.  R. 


38  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

great  anxiety  easily  leads  to  pedantry  and  certainly  would  have 

delayed  Lieutenant  F 's  departure.     A  fault-finder  even 

might  take  exception  to  the  word  "reconnoiter,"  and  ask  that 
the  officer  be  told  to  what  extent  the  reconnaissance  should  be 
carried — whether  hostile  patrols,  cavalry  in  close  formation,  or 
even  the  infantry  in  rear  of  these  should  be  sought  out.  Lieu- 
tenant F very  properly  asked  no  questions  of  this  sort  when 

he  recorded  his  orders.  The  captain  simply  could  have  replied 
that  he  was  not  a  clairvoyant,  and  could  not  know  in  advance 
what  important  things  might  happen  at  the  front.  The  value 
of  an  officer's  patrol  materially  depends  on  the  military  judg- 
ment of  the  leader,  who  should  be  able  to  grasp  the  situation 
and  work  into  his  superior's  hand  without  previously  receiving 
an  enumeration  of  all  details — a  feat  of  which  the  latter  would 
not  be  capable. 

Lieutenant  F—  will  be  able  to  learn  from  the  inhabitants 
of  Gr.  Hermenau  whether  the  Teufelsberg  affords  as  good  a 
point  of  view  as  is  to  be  inferred  from  the  map;  if  it  does,  then 
this  becomes  the  next  objective.  It  seems  less  advisable  to  go 
there  around  the  south  side  of  Royer  Forest  than  to  gain  the 
eastern  edge  of  the  forest  by  the  Gr.  Hermenau-Herzogswalde 
road  and  then  to  continue  across  the  hilly  country  between  the 
village  and  the  forest.  In  this  way  we  shall  obtain  a  quicker 
and  better  view  of  the  road-forks  at  Herzogswalde. 

Although,  in  the  darkness  and  while  covered  by  the  lake 
to  the  eastward,  the  patrol  could  safely  advance  (to  Gr.  Her- 
menau) with  only  a  point  in  advance,  from  now  on  greater  pre- 
cautions will  be  necessary  to  prevent  an  unexpected  clash  with 
hostile  detachments.  A  mounted  patrol  cannot  crawl,  but  must 
advance  rapidly.  Its  safety  depends  on  a  skillful  utilization  of 
cover  and  continuous  and  vigilant  watch  for  the  enemy  in  every 
direction,  so  as  to  discover  the  enemy  before  being  itself  dis- 
covered. As  spying  and  feeling  for  the  enemy  is  very  difficult 
while  going  at  a  rapid  gait  on  horseback,  the  movements  of  a 


Reconnaissance.  39 

patrol  will  usually  be  by  rushes,  as  is  the  case  with  the  cavalry 
point  of  an  advance  guard. 

A  detachment  on  patrol  duty  will  be  organized  in  such  a 
way  that  certain  designated  men  are  permanently  held  respon- 
sible for  the  observation  of  the  country  to  the  flanks  and  rear, 
with  authority  to  leave  the  road  as  necessary  to  reach  good 
view-points  or  to  accompany  the  patrol  with  a  lateral  interval, 
but  without  becoming  conspicuous  at  a  distance.  There  has 
been  endless  discussion  as  to  whether  it  is  better  for  a  patrol  to 
advance  as  a  compact  body  or  on  a  broad  front.  There  is  no 
formation  that  will  apply  to  all  cases.  On  a  road  through  a 
dense  forest,  a  compact  formation  may  be  best,  while  in  a  nar- 
row valley  flankers  might  be  very  necessary.  Only  in  excep- 
tional cases  should  the  patrol-leader  ride  with  the  point,  as  when 
he  alone  is  able  to  find  the  way  or  where  there  is  no  special  dan- 
ger. He  should  not  unnecessarily  expose  himself  to  the  danger 
of  capture. 

The  arrangements  Lieutenant  F has  to  make  at  4  a.  m. 

consist  in  dividing  and  instructing  his  men  in  accordance  with 
the  foregoing  principles,  at  the  same  time  showing  them  the 
map,  explaining  the  situation  and  informing  them  of  his  im- 
mediate intentions. 

He  will  have  the  nose-bags  filled  with  oats  at  Gr.  Hermen- 
au.  Who  knows  if  there  will  soon  be  another  opportunity  to  do 
this?  The  supply  of  grain  carried  along  enables  the  patrol  to 
feed  at  any  secluded  spot  without  again  visiting  a  village. 

The  men  can  take  advantage  of  the  short  halt  at  Gr.  Her- 
menau  to  get  their  breakfast  and  lay  in  a  supply  of  food  for  the 
future.  Of  course  the  officer  protects  himself  against  surprise 
by  posting  sentries,  and  does  not  allow  his  men  to  remain  within 
inclosures.  In  France  this  resulted  in  the  capture  of  many  a 
German  cavalry  patrol,  and  even  in  your  own  country  it  is  a 
dangerous  practice. 


4-o  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

In  leaving  Gr.  Hermenau  the  officer  has  the  point  precede 
the  patrol  at  a  considerable  distance.  The  point  must  ride  to 
the  eastern  edge  of  Royer  Forest,  the  patrol  not  following  into 
the  forest  until  it  is  informed,  by  pre-arranged  signal  from  con- 
necting files,  that  the  field  is  clear. 

Using  the  necessary  cautionary  measures  and  after  vainly 

questioning  the  inhabitants  of  Narien  mill,*  Lieutenant  F , 

sharply  looking  to  all  sides  and  into  the  depths  of  the  forest, 
arrives  at  its  eastern  border.  Then,  after  sending  two  troopers 
to  Herzogswalde  to  make  inquiry,  and,  riding  outside  the  village, 

to  rejoin  the  patrol,  Lieutenant  F takes  the  patrol  through 

low-lying  ground  to  the  Teufelsberg.  This  prominent  hill  also 
might  have  attracted  hostile  troopers ;  therefore  the  point  of  the 
patrol  advances  towards  it  considerably  in  advance  of  the  re- 
mainder of  the  party.  At  4.40  a.  m.  the  top  of  the  hill  is  reached. 
The  sun  has  risen,  but  the  hazy  spring  morning  does  not  ad- 
mit of  a  distant  view.  But  the  highway  north  and  south  of 
Waltersdorf  can  be  plainly  seen  as  well  as  the  country  about 
Bergling  and  Reichau,  Gr.  Trukainen,  Naglack,  Banners,  and 
Pragsden.  The  2  troopers  who  had  been  sent  to  Herzogs- 
walde reported  that  nothing  was  known  of  the  enemy  at  that 
point.  The  people  on  the  farms  near  the  Teufelsberg  say  the 
same  thing. 

Nowhere  in  road  or  field  is  man  or  beast  visible. 

The  officer  decides  to  continue  the  advance  and,  to  avoid 
the  highway,  will  go  along  the  Sanglau-Bergling  road,  whence 
he  hopes  to  be  able  to  watch  the  highway  and  country  just  west 
of  it  and  get  a  glimpse  of  the  Kallisten-Seubersdorf  road.  But 
it  now  becomes  necessary  to  send  a  detachment  to  Sackstein. 
The  sergeant,  who  in  case  of  necessity  must  command  the  patrol, 
is  not  selected  for  this  duty,  but  an  adroit  lance  corporal  and  2 
men,  who  are  given  the  following  instructions: 

*"Narien  M,"  east  of  Gr.  Hermenau,  on  1:100,000  map. 


Reconnaissance.  41 

'You  will  ride  to  Sackstein  and  see  if  anything  ean  be 
learned  about  the  enemy,  also  carefully  questioning  the  inhab- 
itants. Send  report  of  your  investigation  to  the  troop  at  Herz- 
ogswalde.  It  is  about  5  miles  to  Sackstein,  and,  as  the  troop 
commander  expects  a  report  by  6  a.  m.  a  rapid  gait  must  be  taken 
— about  7  or  8  miles  an  hour.  Should  the  connecting-patrol  sent 
by  the  troop  to  Herzogswalde  not  yet  have  arrived,  the  report 
must  go  back  to  Gr.  Hermenau.  From  Sackstein  you  will  try 
to  rejoin  your  patrol  as  soon  as  possible  via  Mathildenberg." 

The  officer  shows  the  men  on  the  map  the  route  they  should 
follow  (also  pointing  it  out  in  the  country  before  them),  shows 
them  the  route  he  will  follow,  and  gives  them  the  names  of  the 
villages  in  sight.  He  sees  the  3  men  depart  and  then  continues 
on  his  way. 

Shortly  after  5  a.  m.,  as  he  reaches  the  fir  thicket  north  of 
Sanglau  on  the  Herzogswalde-Sanglau  road,  he  sees  the  point 
taking  cover  behind  the  nearest  buildings  of  Sanglau  and  sig- 
nalling, "Enemy  in  sight."     The  connecting-file  drops  behind 

a  little  knoll  and  repeats  the  signal.     Lieutenant  F ,  looking 

across  some  underbrush  (where  the  letter  L  of  "  Lettau  "  is  on  the 
map),  discovers  12  troopers  trotting  along  the  road  from  Lettau 
towards  Herzogswalde;  2  men  about  100  yards  in  advance  of 
the  point.  Nothing  is  seen  on  the  road  norti  of  Lettau,  nor 
at  Waltersdorf  or  on  the  road  between  this  poiin.  and  Mathil- 
denberg. Looking  through  his  field-glasses,  the  lieutenant 
becomes  satisfied  that  the  men  are  hostile  troopers. 

What  does  Lieutenant  F decide  to  do? 

Instead  of  discussing  the  subject  now,  I  should  prefer  that 
instruction  be  derived  from  the  events  following,  as  far  as  these 
may  serve  the  purpose.  Therefore  I  shall  proceed  with  the 
narrative  and  return  to  particular  points  later. 

Lieutenant  F remembers  several  cases  in  his  peace 

service  where  superiors  called  attention  to  the  directions  in  the 


42  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Field  Service  Regulations  that  the  prime  duty  of  a  reconnoiter- 
ing  patrol  was  to  see — combat  being  simply  a  means  to  an  end. 
He  cannot  remember  a  single  case  where  the  so-called  "bat- 
tling" of  patrols  met  with  the  approval  of  superiors.  In  every 
instance  the  opposing  patrols  got  out  of  each  other's  way  and 
both  continued  their  reconnaissance.  To  be  sure,  the  young 
officer  realizes  that  war  may  on  occasion  demand  a  different 
method  of  procedure.  But  on  careful  examination  of  the  case 
he  remembers  that  the  Regulations  state  that  ' '  patrols  should 
avoid  combat  unless  it  is  absolutely  necessary  in  the  execution 
of  their  orders."*  As  the  hostile  patrol  apparently  is  about  to 
ride  past  him  into  the  woods,  presumably  it  will  not  prevent 
his  continuing  his  reconnaissance.  Therefore,  as  soon  as  the 
enemy  has  reached  the  woods,  he  trots  ahead  across  a  meadow, 
keeping  a  sharp  lookout  to  the  rear.  But  before  doing  this,  he 
sends  the  message  of  which  we  already  know: 

Twelve  hostile  troopers  are  riding  from  Lettau  towards  Herzogs- 
walde.  I  shall  continue  my  reconnaissance  via  Sanglau  towards  Kallisten. 
I  have  sent  a  lance  corporal  and  2  men  to  Sackstein  to  report  direct  to  the 
troop. 

The  messenger  is  ordered  to  rapidly  ride  between  Ponarien 
and  Royer  Forest,  and  then  via  Narien  mill  to  Gr.  Hermenau. 
He  is  to  take  advantage  of  the  woods  to  cover  himself  from  the 
hostile  patrol.  Sending  the  message  is  in  accord  with  the  para- 
graph of  the  Regulations  which  says  that  "as  soon  as  it  is  certain 
that  the  enemy  has  been  discovered,  a  message  should  be  sent."t 

Lieutenant  F considers  that  one  trooper  is  sufficient  to 

carry  the  message.  He  must  economize  in  horses  and  men  and 
has  reasons  to  hope  that  the  man  will  succeed  in  reaching  the 
goal  which  is  near.  The  man  cannot  be  sent  via  Herzogswalde 
as  he  might  easily  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  hostile  patrol.  Ex- 
ception might  be  taken  in  various  ways  to  the  wording  of  the 

*See  par.  80,  F.  S.  R. 
fSee  par.  79,  F.  S.  R. 


Reconnaissance.  43 

message.  The  captain  woefully  misses  any  definite  mention  of 
the  extent  to  which  the  reconnaissance  has  progressed;  for  he 
can  only  indirectly  learn  by  questioning  the  messenger  that 

Lieutenant  F has  seen  nothing  of  the  enemy,  aside  from 

the  12  troopers,  not  even  on  the  Naglack-Waltersdorf-Kallisten 
road ;  but  to  what  extent  this  road  was  visible  the  captain  does 
not  learn.  It  is  fortunate  that  the  messenger  remembered  the 
name  "Waltersdorf."  But  the  exacting  captain  may  forgive 
the  young  patrol-leader,  should  he  meet  the  latter  again  and 
learn  how  hurriedly  the  message  was  written  and  how  his  atten- 
tion was  almost  constantly  directed  to  the  hostile  patrol. 

Carefully  taking  advantage  of  the  conformation  of  the 

ground,  Lieutenant  F reaches  Seubersdorf  (R.  G.)*  at  5.45 

a.  m.  From  the  heights  near  Bergling  the  highway  is  visible 
from  Waltersdorf  to  Kallisten,  but  nothing  is  noticed  on  it, 
any  more  than  on  the  heights  near  Deppen  which  limit  the  view 
to  the  east.  In  Seubersdorf  the  inhabitants  say  that  about  an 
hour  ago  12  to  15  hostile  troopers  passed  through  the  village 
on  the  way  towards  Willnau. 

What  arrangements  must  Lieutenant  F make 

NOW? 

Lieutenant  F started  with  1  sergeant  and  14  men,  of 

whom  he  sent  3  to  Sackstein  and  1  to  Gr.  Hermenau,  leaving 
him  1  sergeant  and  10  men.  His  captain  certainly  would  like 
to  learn  very  soon  what  the  lieutenant  knows  up  to  now,  espe- 
cially as  the  message  concerning  the  reconnaissance  to  the  Pas- 
sarge  cannot  be  delivered  by  6  a.  m.,  as  originally  ordered.  By 
6  a.  m.  the  troop  was  to  be  at  Gr.  Hermenau,  but  would  hardly 
remain  there.  Should  it  go  towards  Liebstadt  or  Pittehnen, 
the  message  even  if  forwarded  by  the  connecting-post  at  Her- 
zogswalde,  would  reach  the  captain  rather  late  and  would  lose 
its  importance.     Should  the  troop  advance  via  Sackstein  or 

*"R.  G.,"  abbreviation  for  Ritter-gut,  a  knight's  manor. 


44  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Waltersdorf,  it  would  be  approaching  the  patrol,  and  a  message 
from  the  latter  would  be  less  urgently  needed.  Already  at 
Bergling  the  lieutenant  debated  about  sending  a  report  stating 
that  no  enemy  was  visible  on  the  highway  as  far  as  Kallisten,  be- 
cause this  would  have  taken  at  least  two  messengers  without  his 
having  cleared  up  the  situation  as  far  as  the  Passarge.  Not  the 
spirit  but  only  the  form  of  the  captain's  orders  would  have  been 
complied  with  in  this  case  by  sending  a  report  to  Herzogswalde 
by  6  a.  m. ;  and,  besides,  the  road  thither  presumably  was 
blocked  by  the  hostile  patrol  that  had  recently  gone  in  that 
direction.  Even  now  the  message  must  be  forwarded  by  at 
least  two  men,  as  the  hostile  troopers  in  rear  render  the  region 
unsafe.  Should  the  three  troopers  sent  to  Sackstein  fail  to 
rejoin  the  patrol,  it  would  be  reduced  to  eight  men,  and  yet 
the  day's  work  which  may  still  call  for  a  number  of  messages, 
has  hardly  begun.     It  is  proper  to  consider  whether  Lieutenant 

F should  not  defer  writing  his  next  message  until  he  can 

report  something  more  definite  concerning  the  state  of  affairs 
on  the  Passarge,  more  particularly  because  in  Kallisten  or  the 
neighboring  villages  he  probably  will  learn  something  more 
about  the  hostile  detachments  that  crossed  the  stream  early 
in  the  morning.  Then,  should  the  message  not  reach  the  troop, 
presumably  it  will  reach  the  regimental  commander,  who,  as  the 
lieutenant  knows,  expects  to  arrive  at  Gr.  Hermenau  by  7  a.  m. 
Nothing  would  be  gained  by  following  the  hostile  detach- 
ment that  went  towards  Willnau.  It  ought  to  run  into  the 
cavalry  of  the   1st  Division,  and  hardly  could  be  overtaken. 

Lieutenant  F at  once  turns  towards  Kallisten.     The  ride 

to  this  point  requires  caution,  as  the  enemy  may  be  holding  the 
Passarge  bridge,  but  it  would  take  too  long  to  go  via  Kloben. 
The  officer  carefully  examines  Kallisten  through  his  field-glasses 
and  questions  the  occupants  of  the  mill  (at  K  of  "Kallisten" 
on  the  map),  but  learns  nothing.  Then  the  point  rides  ahead 
towards  the  village,  while  2  men  at  a  rapid  gait  follow  the  Weng- 


Reconnaissance.  45 

litten-Kloben  road  along  the  left  bank  of  the  Passarge  to  find 
out  the  nature  of  the  stream  and  examine  the  construction  of 
the  bridge  at  Kloben. 

The  point  finds  that  there  is  no  enemy  in  Kallisten  and 
rapidly  rides  to  the  nearest  height  east  of  Deppen.     Lieutenant 

F ,  constantly  keeping  a  sharp  lookout  to  the  rear,  follows 

into  the  village  as  far  as  the  bridge.  The  lance  corporal  with 
one  private  from  Sackstein  trotted  up  to  this  point  and  reported 
as  follows:  "Nothing  was  seen  of  the  enemy  in  or  near  Sack- 
stein; and  the  villagers  knew  nothing  about  him."  He  had 
sent  one  man  with  a  written  message  to  Herzogswalde  and  then 
rode  along  the  edge  of  the  woods  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Pas- 
sarge without  seeing  anything  suspicious  in  the  river  valley  or 
on  the  eastern  ridge  of  hills.  Upon  being  questioned,  the  lance 
corporal  is  unable  to  give  definite  information  concerning  the 
construction  of  the  bridge  at  Sackstein,  and  very  properly  is 
censured  for  it  by  the  lieutenant.  It  is  true  that  the  patrol 
received  no  specific  instructions  to  examine  the  terrain,  but  this 
is  so  much  a  matter  of  course  as  not  to  require  special  mention 
and  would  always  be  attended  to  by  a  skillful  patrol-leader. 
It  is  inexcusable  that  the  importance  of  a  bridge  across  an  un- 
fordable  stream  should  not  have  appealed  to  the  patrol-leader. 

The  inhabitants  of  Kallisten  state  that  early  in  the  morn- 
ing a  hostile  body  of  horsemen  crossed  the  bridge  and  rode  off 
on  the  road  to  Waltersdorf.  Statements  differ  as  to  the 
strength  of  the  body.  There  were  6  men  in  the  lead,  followed, 
according  to  some,  by  30  or  40  more;  according  to  others,  by 
an  entire  troop. 

The  lieutenant  is  inclined  to  believe  that  the  latter  estimate 
is  an  exaggeration,  as  he  probably  would  have  noticed  so  large 
a  body  in  the  vicinity  of  Bergling-Waltersdorf,  and  as  only  12 
to  15  men  are  reported  to  have  passed  through  Seubersdorf. 
He  argues  that  west  of  Kallisten  a  part  of  the  30  or  40  hostile 
troopers  took  the  Waltersdorf-Lettau  road,  and  the  remainder 


46  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

the  road  to  Willnau.  A  hostile  officer  who  spoke  German 
pretty  well  inquired  at  Kallisten  about  the  roads  and  about 
our  troops.  The  villagers  answered  truly  that  they  had  seen 
no  soldiers,  but  that  a  large  army  was  advancing  from  western 
Prussia.     A  trooper,  sent  back  by  the  hostile  officer,  took  the 

road  to  Heiligenthal.     Lieutenant  F further  inquires  about 

the  depth  of  water  in  the  Passarge  and  about  the  existence 
of  fords,  orders  the  sergeant  to  have  a  sentry-pcst  at  the  western 
exit  of  Kallisten  to  guard  the  bridge  and  keep  open  the  line  of 
retreat,  and  then  gallops  to  the  point.  The  latter  has  halted 
about  650  yards  east  of  Deppen  on  the  road  to  Heiligenthal, 
which  road  can  be  seen  for  about  1,100  yards.  Aside  from 
this  the  view  extends  only  as  far  as  the  nearest  woods  north 
and  south  of  the  road  and  to  Knoll  123  on  the  road  to  Schlitt. 

As  Lieutenant  F notices  nothing  of  importance,  he  is 

about  to  write  his  message  when  he  concludes  that  it  would  be 
advisable  to  survey  the  country  from  Knoll  157,  which  is  near 
by  and  promises  an  extended  view.  Leaving  a  connecting-file 
behind,  he  gallops  after  the  point  which  he  had  sent  ahead, 
and  finds  his  expectations  realized.  The  view  extends  beyond 
Heiligenthal  and  Ankendorf  to  Oueetz.  To  the  north  he  can 
follow  the  highway  almost  as  far  as  Scharnick  and  can  over- 
look the  more  elevated  parts  of  the  ground  between  this  high- 
way and  the  Passarge.  South  of  the  Heiligenthal-Queetz  high- 
way the  view  is  limited  by  Knoll  170  (southeast  of  Heiligen- 
thal), but  between  this  and  Height  157  near  Alt-Garschen  the 
view  extends  to  Rosengarth,  and  south  to  the  vicinity  of  Schlitt. 
To  the  rear  (west)  he  can  see  the  heights  between  Kloben  and 
Seubersdorf,  but  the  Willnau-Seubersdorf-Kallisten  road  can- 
not be  seen.  Examining  this  region,  first  with  the  naked  eye 
and  then  with  his  field-glasses,  and  at  the  same  time  orienting 
himself  by  his  map,  he  concludes  in  a  few  minutes  that  nothing 
hostile  is  in  sight.     The  fact  that  none  of  the  population  is  work- 


Reconnaissance. 


47 


ing  in  the  fields  makes  it  less  difficult  to  reconnoiter  than  in 
time  of  peace. 

Write  the  message  to  be  sent  at  6-30  a.  m.  ;  and  how 
wile  it  be  forwarded? 

With  the  renewed  reminder  that  my  solution  shall  serve 
only  as  an  example  and  not  as  a  model,  I  shall  give  the  word- 
ing of  the  message,  because  it  presents  my  ideas  in  the  briefest 
form  and  because  the  continuation  of  the  study  requires  this 
as  a  basis. 


SENDING  DETACHMENT. 

LOCATION. 

DAY. 

MONTH. 

TIME. 

Officer's  Patrol, 

Lieut.  F , 

1st  Cav. 

Knoll  157, 

S.  W.  of  Heili- 

genthal. 

5 

5 

6-30 
a.  m. 

No.  2. 

Received 

To  Captain  C ,  ist  Cavalry: 

After  having  avoided  the  hostile  patrol  of  12  troopers  near  Lettau 
(whose  presence  I  have  already  reported),  I  came  here  via  Bergling-Seu- 
bersdorf  (R.  G.)-Kallisten  without  seeing  anything  of  the  enemy  en  route 
or  on  the  continuously  observed  Waltersdorf- kallisten  highway.  Inhabit- 
ants of  Seubersdorf  say  that  before  5  a.  m.  to-day  12  to  15  hostile  cavalry- 
men passed  through  their  town,  going  towards  Willnau.  Inhabitants  of 
Kallisten  state  that  early  this  morning  a  hostile  cavalry  detachment  rode 
through  their  town.  Estimates  of  the  strength  vary  from  30  men  to  a 
troop;  the  latter  seems  to  me  excessive.  A  hostile  officer  who  spoke  Ger- 
man inquired  in  Kallisten  concerning  the  roads  and  our  troops.  He  was 
told  that  none  of  our  troops  had  been  seen,  but  that  a  large  army  was  ap- 
proaching from  west  Prussia.  The  officer  sent  back  a  trooper,  who  took 
the  road  to  Heiligenthal.  The  hostile  detachment  went  westward  along 
the  highway.  I  presume  that  part  of  it  went  towards  Willnau,  and  the 
remainder  towards  Waltersdorf-Lettau.  A  lance  corporal  of  my  patrol 
found  no  enemy  at  Sackstein  and  sent  a  message  to  Herzogswalde.  From 
here  nothing  is  visible  of  the  enemy  towards  Scharnick,  Queetz,  Rosen- 
garth,  or  Schlitt.  I  shall  continue  reconnoitering  towards  Guttstadt,  and 
intend  keeping  north  of  the  highway. 

The  bridge  at  Kallisten  consists  of  a  broad  stone  arch;  the  one  at 
Kloben  is  narrow  and  of  wood,  but  suitable  for  wheel  traffic.  The  Pas- 
sarge  is  quite  high;  inhabitants  claim  that  it  averages  at  least  2  yards  in 
depth.  The  meadows  are  marshy,  and  no  fords  exist  in  the  neighborhood. 
Apparently  passage  of  the  stream  is  everywhere  limited  to  the  bridges. 


48  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Inhabitants  of  this  vicinity  claim  that  the  bridge  at  Sackstein  is  of  wood, 
but  suited  for  wheel  traffic.  Although  the  road  thence  to  Waltersmuhl 
is  used  by  teams,  it  in  part  is  an  unreveted  causeway.* 

F •, 

Lieutenant. 

A  trooper  of  the  point  is  designated  to  take  back  the  mes- 
sage and  received  the  following  verbal  instructions: 

"In  the  first  place,  you  will  ride  back  to  the  bridge  at 

Kallisten,  tell  the  sergeant  to  give  you  Private  P as  a 

companion,  and  then  to  take  the  entire  patrol  to  the  edge  cf 
that  grove  of  trees  (grove  northeast  of  Deppen),  where  I  shall 
i   in  him. 

"Your  further  instructions  are  to  take  this  message  to 
Herzogswalde.  The  captain  intended  posting  a  patrol  there 
to  forward  my  messages.  You  will  deliver  the  message  to  the 
patrol  with  the  fc Hewing  orders:  The  message  should  be  sent 
to  the  captain  if  he  can  be  readily  and  easily  reached.  Should 
there  be  any  dcubt  about  this,  the  message  must  go  to  the  reg- 
imental commander,  who  expected  to  be  at  Gr.  Hermenau  at 
7  a.  m.,  and  presumably  will  continue  his  march  from  that 
point.  It  is  more  important  that  the  colonel,  than  the  cap- 
tain, should  receive  the  message.  If  you  should  not  find  the 
patrol  at  Herzogswalde,  you  must  look  up  the  colonel.  The 
envelope  should  remain  unsealed.  Carefully  read  the  message 
and  impress  its  contents  on  your  mind.  The  important  pcints 
in  it  are:  Kallisten  and  the  Heiligenthal  regie n  are  free  frLin 
the  enemy;  Sackstein  was  so  as  late  as  5.25  a.  m.  A  hostile 
cavalry  detachment  early  this  morning  rode  through  Kallisten; 
a  part  cf  it  rede  towards  Willnau,  the  remainder  towards  Wal- 
tersdorf-Lettau.  A  he  stile  messenger  rode  from  here  towards 
Heiligenthal.     I  am  going  towards  Guttstadt. 

"You  Avill  ride  alcng  the  highway  through  Mathildenberg, 
then  through  Bergling-Sanglau  back  over  cur  route,  and  must 

*The  latter  statements  naturally  would  be  omitted  from  the  reader's 
solution. 


Reconnaissance.  49 

carefully  avoid  meeting  the  hostile  patrol  in  our  rear.  You 
will  take  the  message  to  the  captain,  if  you  should  see  our 
troop.  You  will  not  return  to  me,  but  will  join  the  troop  or 
the  regiment.  Try  to  reach  Herzogswalde  by  about  7.30  a.  m. 
The  distance  is  about  7  miles,  so  you  must  go  alternately  at 
a  trot  and  walk." 

Lieutenant  F — • — -'s  message,  as  well  as  the  instructions  he 
gave,  deserve  closer  inspection. 

To  begin  with,  it  may  seem  strange  that  the  message  is 
designated  as  "No.  2."  The  one  sent  at  5  a.  m.  was  "No.  1." 
The  lance  corporal  sent  to  Sackstein  knew  nothing  of  the  latter 
fact,  and  therefore  numbered  his  "1,"  with  'sending  station' 

as  "Lieutenant  F 's  officer's  patrol."     His  signature  and 

the  contents  of  Lieutenant  F 's  first  message  will  help  ex- 
plain the  apparent  inconsistencies  to  the  receiving  officer.  But 
it  is  a  question  whether  the  message  sent  at  6.30  a.  m.  should 
not  be  numbered  "3,"  The  numbering  of  messages  is  intended 
to  help  the  receiving  officer  determine  whether  any  have  gene 
astray.  In  this  event,  it  is  hoped  he  will  investigate  and  be 
able  to  supply  the  deficiency.  The  case  under  considerate  n 
shows  that  the  directions  don't  always  fit;  and  my  readers 
probably  have  had  the  same  experience  themselves.  For  ex- 
ample, if  a  patrol  must  send  messages  to  different  parties,  as 

is  the  case  with  Lieutenant  C ,  who  not  only  reports  to  the 

regimental  commander,  but,  under  certain  conditions,  also  to 
the  cavalry  of  the  1st  Division  (see  page  14),  messages  can 
hardly  be  numbered  without  causing  confusion ;  and  even  the 
instructions  that  a  series  of  numbers  shall  hold  for  one  day 
only  will  cause  misunderstandings.  The  moment  such  specific 
instructions  cannot  be  generally  carried  out  they  arc  of  doubt- 
ful value.  They  draw  on  a  painstaking  patrol-leader's  time 
and  energy  and  produce   false   impressions  at  the    receiving 

station.     Had  Lieutenant  F designated  his   message   as 

"No.   3,"  his  captain   probably  would   have    concluded    that 


50  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

one  had  been  lost.  Furthermore,  experience  teaches  that 
where  numerous  messages  are  received  there  is  seldom  op- 
portunity to  check  up  the  numbers,  as  should  be  done  to  ob- 
tain the  object  in  view.  The  one  attempting  to  do  this  will 
have  endless  trouble  and  confusion.  In  time  of  peace  it  usually 
takes  place  at  the  end  of  a  maneuver,  and  then  serves  as  a  point 
for  the  discussion  following.  This  should  prove  the  small  prac- 
tical value  of  a  requirement  whose  discontinuance  would  help 
to  simplify  the  message  system.  It  would  be  more  valuable  in 
any  message  briefly  to  refer  to  a  preceding  one,  as  was  done  at 
the  beginning  of  the  foregoing  example. 

The   address   also    demands   our    attention.     Lieutenant 

F can  expect  his  message  to  reach  Captain  H only  in 

case  the  troop  has  followed  towards  Kallisten.  He  himself 
specifically  tells  the  messenger  that  it  is  more  important  the 
message  should  reach  the  colonel  than  the  captain.     The  recon- 

noitering  of  Troop  A  is  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  Colonel  A 's 

decisions,  and  although  Captain  E must  retain  control  of 

the  reconnaissance  service  as  much  as  possible,  still,  in  this  case, 
it  is  highly  probable  that  the  message  will  not  reach  the  captain, 
but  the  colonel.  Therefore  the  instructions  given  the  messen- 
ger were  right  and  proper.     Why,  then,  was  the  message  not 

addressed  to  Colonel  A ?     Lieutenant  F fears  that  the 

message  might  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  hostile  patrol  in  his 
rear,  and  that  in  this  case  the  colonel's  address  might  be  a  valua- 
ble pointer  for  the  enemy.  We  must  admit  that  he  is  right,  and 
that  his  caution  is  reasonable.  Our  Field  Service  Regulations 
wisely  omit  instructions  on  similar  points.  The  practical  sol- 
dier always  will  be  able  to  help  himself;  for  the  impractical 
one  there  could  not  be  minute  enough  instructions  given  to 
cover  every  case  and  its  exceptions. 

The  captain's  not  having  told  or  even  intimated  to  Lieu- 
tenant F what  route  he  would  follow  from  Gr.  Hermenau 

makes  it  more  difficult  for  the  lieutenant  now  and  later  to  cor- 


Reconnaissance.  51 

rectly  address  his  messages.  But  even  if  the  lieutenant  before 
leaving  Maldeuten  had  asked  the  captain  about  this,  he  would 
have  received  no  definite  answer.  On  the  contrary,  an  erro- 
neous designation  of  the  route  might  easily  divert  the  messen- 
ger service  into  wrong  directions.  In  the  body  of  the  message 
the  information  concerning  the  direction  taken  by  the  hostile 
messenger  upon  leaving  Kallisten  is  not  without  importance; 
and  Lieutenant  F should  have  inquired  about  the  direc- 
tion had  the  information  not  been  volunteered. 

The  description  of  the  terrain  in  the  message  is  all  too  often 
omitted  in  time  of  peace.  Its  value  for  the  higher  cavalry 
commander  is  patent.     It  must  simplify  matters  for  Colonel 

A to  learn,  already  at  Herzogswalde  or  Gr.  Hermenau, 

whether  the  Passarge  can  be  forded  or  can  be  crossed  only  on 
the  bridges;  and  he  would  have  cause  to  praise  an  officer  who 
in  sending  such  a  message  distinguished  between  what  he  him- 
self had  seen  and  what  was  hearsay.  Unfortunately,  as  later 
transpires,  the  colonel  is  quite  angry  on  account  of  the  illegible 
writing,  which  lessens  the  value  of  the  message. 

The  length  of  the  message  is  justified  by  its  importance. 
The  Field  Service  Regulations  very  properly  state:  "It  is  not 
the  profusion  of  messages  that  counts,  but  the  quality,  such  as 
will  clear  up  the  situation  and  are  exhaustive  and  suitable  as  a 

basis  for  further  action."     Lieutenant  F was  able  only  to 

report  on  small  hostile  scouting  parties,  and  has  seen  nothing 
of  the  enemy  near  Heiligenthal;  but  this  very  fact  will  be  of 
importance  for  the  regimental  commander.  And  the  lieuten- 
ant's accurate  statements  afford  a  safer  basis  for  future  action 
than  if  the  message  read:  "There  is  no  enemy  in  the  region 
as  far  as  the  Passarge  or  near  Heiligenthal,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  a  few  hostile  patrols  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Passarge." 
The  wording  would  be  "short  and  sweet,"  but  might  arouse 
the  regimental  commander's  doubt  as  to  its  accuracy  and 
reliability. 


52  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

The  trooper  who  is  to  carry  the  message  will  have  to  prick  up 
his  ears  and  tax  his  wits  if  he  is  to  understand  and  remember 
his  lieutenant's  instructions,  which,  by  the  way,  hardly  could 
have  been  shortened. 

The  route  to  be  followed  by  the  trooper  is  easily  described 
if  the  man  carefully  observed  the  country  during  this  morning. 
An  experienced  patrol-leader  will  embrace  every  opportunity 
to  instruct  his  men  concerning  roads  and  names  of  localities, 
so  they  could  find  their  way  back.  He  thus  leaves  behind  a 
string  of  landmarks — Daumling's*  white  pebbles.  Without 
these  the  enlisted  man  will  lose  himself,  even  in  friendly  ter- 
ritory where  the  inhabitants  can  help  him.  How  much  more 
difficult  is  it  for  him  in  hostile  territory  where  the  names  of 
localities  sound  strange  to  his  ears  and  the  inhabitants  either 
give  no  information  at  all  or  such  as  is  false,  and  on  occasion 
even  endanger  the  life  of  a  solitary  horseman. 

Lieutenant  F did  not  mark  the  rate  of  speed  en  the 

envelope  in  the  usual  way.  Even  if  the  cavalryman  is  taught 
not  to  mechanically  follow  the  rate  of  speed  indicated,  but  that 
the  horse's  condition  and  the  nature  of  the  country  may  call 
for  deviations,  still,  he  does  not  as  a  rule  find  mile-stones  along 
his  route  to  regulate  his  speed.  The  explanation  in  the  Field 
Service  Regulations  is  of  little  assistance.  "Ordinary"  speed 
calls  mainly  for  a  walk;  "rapid,"  mainly  for  a  trot.  How  little 
shall  he  trot  in  the  first  instance,  and  how  little  shall  he  walk  in 
the  second?  In  time  of  peace  it  may  be  possible  to  drill  messen- 
gers in  these  gaits,  but  in  time  of  war  there  will  be  little  left  of 
the  skill  acquired,  due  to  weariness  of  the  horses  from  the  extra 
weight  they  have  to  carry  and  the  roughness  of  the  country  to 

*Daumling,"  in  German  folk-lore,  was  the  youngest  of  seven  children 
whose  indigent  parents  in  a  time  of  famine  decided  to  abandon  them  in  a 
dense  forest.  Daumling,  overhearing  the  plot,  gathered  a  lot  of  pebbles, 
and,  when  taken  to  the  forest  with  the  other  children  for  the  purpose  stated 
secretly  dropped  these  pebbles  from  time  to  time  and  afterwards  by  their 
means  led  the  other  children  out  of  the  forest  again. — Translator. 


Reconnaissance.  53 

be  traversed  that  often  is  lacking  in  roads.  In  many  eases  5 
miles  per  hour  (as  prescribed  for  "ordinary")  will  not  suffice, 
while  7  to  8  miles  per  hour  ("rapid")  would  be  unnecessary,  or 
should  not  be  required  after  a  long  ride,  while  a  slightly  slower 
gait  is  still  possible.  It  is  therefore  praiseworthy  if  the  send- 
ing officer  also  considers  this  point,  and,  deviating  from  the 
routine  form,  adds  explanatory  remarks.  If  the  messenger  is 
relieved  from  the  necessity  of  estimating  the  number  of  miles 
per  hour  he  is  traveling,  he  can  devote  additional  time  to  look- 
ing out  for  the  enemy  and  examining  the  terrain,  and  is  relieved 
from  the  necessity  of  estimating  distances  and  of  frequently 
consulting  his  watrh,  should  he  have  one. 

As  the  patrol,  after  but  a  short  night's  rest,  has  already 

traveled  about  25  miles,  Lieutenant  F thinks  best  that  his 

messenger  take  a  medium  gait  which  should  bring  him  to  Her- 
zogswalde  in  60  to  65  minutes. 

Another  point  requires  consideration.     Lieutenant  F 

gives  the  messenger  a  companion,  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  he  must  husband  his  strength  to  the  utmost.  The  inse- 
curity of  the  district  in  which  the  enemy  is  already  prowling 
about  exposes  a  solitary  trooper  to  great  danger.  Four  eyes 
see  better  than  two,  and  mutual  assistance  helps  to  overcome 
difficulties  of  the  road.  Two  horsemen  can  help  each  other 
across  swampy  meadows  and  marshy  ditches  where  one  would 
be  mired.  If  one  horse  becomes  disabled,  the  other  can  carry 
the  message  farther.  One  man  stands  guard  while  the  other 
inquires  the  way  and  questions  countrymen.  In  a  hand-to- 
hand  tight  the  two  support  each  other,  and  one  of  them,  in  case 
of  necessity,  can  make  use  of  his  firearms.     For  these  reasons 

we  must  approve  Lieutenant  F 's  sending  the  men  together 

instead  of  writing  a  duplicate  message  and  sending  a  copy  by 
each  man  over  a  different  route.  The  chances  for  safe  delivery 
would  hardly  be  improved  in  the  latter  case.  Having  each  of 
the  duplicate  copies  carried  by  2  men  would  be  an  unwarranted 


54  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

drain.  With  good  instruction  had  in  time  of  peace,  it  is  un- 
necessary to  caution  that  the  message  must  not  fall  into  the 
enemy's  hands. 

Lieutenant  F continues  in  observation  while  writing 

the  message  and  instructing  the  messenger.  When  he  sees  that 
the  patrol,  led  by  the  sergeant,  has  reached  the  edge  of  the 
grove  north  of  the  Deppen-Heiligenthal  road,  he  indicated  to 
the  point  a  knoll  northwest  of  Heiligenthal,  to  which  it  is  next 
to  ride.  He  himself  gallops  to  the  grove  and  says  to  the  ser- 
geant: "I  shall  ride  with  the  point.  You  will  follow  with  the 
patrol  to  the  left  and  rear  under  cover  and  will  watch  for  signals 
from  me."  As  the  country  is  open  and  affords  a  good  view  in 
all  directions,  thus  precluding  a  surprise,  the  officer  considers 
it  permissible  to  ride  near  the  point,  where  he  can  use  his  own 
eyes  and  indicate  to  the  point  the  route  to  be  followed. 

Keeping  west  of  the  Heiligenthal-Scharnick  highway, 
whose  shade-trees,  though  without  leaves,  afford  some  cover, 
and  only  peering  over  the  crest  of  the  ridge  of  hills,  he  passes 
Komalmen,  whose  inhabitants  know  nothing  of  the  enemy, 
and  arrives  at  Height  135  east  of  this  village.  The  sergeant 
had  been  on  Knoll  140  southeast  of  Waltersmiihl,  and  had  re- 
ported that  nothing  suspicious  was  visible  from  that  point. 
The  lieutenant  had  sent  2  men  to  Waltersmiihl,  who  have  just 
returned  and  report  that  nothing  had  been  seen  of  the  enemy 
in  that  village.  The  lieutenant  scans  the  horizon,  naturally 
looking  mostly  to  the  east.  At  this  instant  (7.25  a.  m.)  he  sees 
6  troopers  on  the  Queetz-Guttstadt  highway,  northwest  of 
Glottau,  trotting  towards  Oueetz.  They  are  followed  at  a 
distance  of  several  hundred  yards  by  a  body  in  close  order. 
The  shade-trees  along  the  highway  prevent  an  accurate  esti- 
mate of  the  number.  Besides,  there  is  a  group  of  horsemen 
visible  on  Height  150  northeast  of  Queetz  (R.  G.).  The  latter 
village  itself  is  hidden  by  Height  138.  East  of  Glottau  the 
Glottau-Guttstadt  highway  is  not  visible.     Finally,  a  single 


Reconnaissance.  55 

trooper  is  seen  trotting  along  the  highway  from  Heiligenthal 
towards  Ankendorf.  Towards  Lingnau-Neuendorf  the  coun- 
try is  visible  as  far  as  the  highway  connecting  these  points  and 
is  free  from  the  enemy.  Farther  west,  Knoll  141  at  the  north 
end  of  Zaun-see  limits  the  view,  then  we  see  the  roofs  of  Schar- 
nick  and  Warlack,  but  not  the  Lingnau-Wolfsdorf  highway 
Nor  is  there  anything  suspicious  visible  in  this  direction. 

What  arrangements  wile  Lieutenant  F make  at 

ABOUT  7.25  a.  m.,  AND  HOW  WIEE  HE  CONDUCT  HIMSEEE? 

Apparently  hostile  cavalry  from  Guttstadt  is  following 
its  patrols  sent  across  the  Passarge  early  in  the  morning,  and 
in  a  very  short  time  will  bar  the  way  via  Kallisten. 

Possibly  communication  via  Sackstein  will  yet  remain 
open  for  a  little  while.  But  after  that  the  patrol's  retreat  will 
be  seriously  menaced  and  presumably  it  will  be  able  to  regain 
safety  only  by  going  in  a  northerly  direction.  But  the  enter- 
prising officer  thinks  of  safety  only  in  so  far  as  through  its  being 
threatened  his  undertaking  might  suffer.  An  officer  is  placed 
in  charge  of  a  patrol  not  only  because  his  military  judgment  is 
considered  superior  to  that  of  a  non-commissioned  officer,  but 
because  the  utmost  is  expected  of  his  determination  and  capac- 
ity for  self-sacrifice.  Should  he  now  ride  back  via  Sackstein, 
he  would  be  able  to  report  only  about  detached  hostile  groups 
which  would  afford  no  basis  for  weighty  decisions. 

Lieutenant  F positively  must  send  a  message  concern- 
ing what  he  has  just  seen.  He  further  decides  to  continue  his 
reconnaissance  and  observe  what  is  coming  from  Guttstadt, 
fully  realizing  the  difficulties  and  dangers  of  his  venture.  He 
can  depend  on  his  horses  and  on  his  own  nerves.  He  hopes  to 
benefit  by  his  past  careful  conduct,  for  the  enemy  apparently 
has  not  discovered  him;  and  it  is  of  prime  importance  that  he 
remain  undiscovered.  Unfortunately,  this  requirement  pre- 
cludes his  attempting  to  capture  the  hostile  trooper  now  trotting 


56  StudiES'in  Aitlif.d  Tactics. 

by  before  his  eyes.  The  patrol  under  cover  quickly  rides  into 
the  grove  en  the  southwest  shore  of  Zaun-see  and  hides  itself 
there.  The  lieutenant  sends  the  sergeant  and  3  men  to  Knoll 
j  25  at  the  north  end  of  the  grove  to  observe  without  showing 
themselves,  and  himself  remains  in  the  south  end  of  the  grove, 
where  he  writes  the  following  message: 

Near  Komalmen, 
5  May  04,  7-35  a.  m. 

To  Captain  E : 

Six  hostile  troopers  are  trotting  along  the  highway  from  Glottau  to- 
wards Queetz;  in  rear  of  them  follows  a  body  of  cavalry  in  close  order, 
whose  strength  cannot  be  determined.  A  second  group  of  horsemen  is 
visible  on  Knoll  150  northeast  of  Queetz  (R.  G.) .  I  shall  remain  east  of  the 
Passar^c. 

F , 

Lieutenant. 

As  the  officer  cannot  see  the  highway  near  Queetz  as  well 
from  the  grove  near  Komalmen  as  he  could  from  his  former 
point  of  view,  and  as  time  presses,  he  must  forego  naming  the 
strength  of  the  hostile  body  in  his  message.  In  view  of  the 
reduced  numbers  of  his  patrol,  he  decides  to  send  but  one  man 
with  the  message,  for  this  purpose  choosing  the  man  who  had 
been  to  Sackstein  with  the  lance  corporal.  He  directs  the  man 
to  go  via  Waltersmuhl-Sackstein  to  Herzogswalde,  which  route 
he  still  thinks  available.  The  message  again  is  addressed  to 
the  captain,  though  the  messenger  is  cautioned  that  it  is  more 
important  the  colonel  should  receive  the  message.  Again  in 
this  ease  the  rate  of  speed  is  not  marked  in  the  orthodox  way. 
Five  miles  per  hour  ("'ordinary")  seems  too  slow  to  him,  and, 
considering  that  the  horse  already  has  traveled  over  30  miles 
to-day,  it  will  not  be  able  to  go  these  8  or  9  miles  at  the  rate  of 
7  to  8  miles  per  hour  ("rapid").  Therefore  he  says  to  the  mes- 
senger: "You  will  go  at  a  slow  trot,  alternating  with  short 
distances  at  a  walk."  The  messenger  is  directed  to  ride  along 
the  slopes  in  such  a  way  that,  without  losing  the  opportunity 
to  look  around,  he  still  will  be  fairly  well  concealed.  He  is  to 
avoid  habitati  ns  as  much  as  possible,  except  that  in  Komal- 


Reconnaissance.  57 

men  he  is  to  tell  the  people  that  the  patrol,  passing  along  in 
rear  of  the  height,  has  gone  via  Warlack  towards  Kleinefeld. 
In  this  way  the  officer  wishes  to  mislead  h  stile  inquirers. 

Leaving  Lieutenant  F to  his  own  devices,  the  divers- 
ity of  the  situation  will  warrant  our  following  the  experiences 

and  conduct  of  Lieutenant  C .     The  latter  passed  the  night 

of  May  4th-5th  in  the  little  farm-houses  close  to  Horn  rail- 
way station,  and  about  midnight  received  the  following  tele- 
graphic orders  from  headquarters  of  the  1st  Cavalry: 

ist  Army  Corps  will  march  towards  Mohrungen  the  5th  inst.  and  the 
2d  Army  Corps  via  Liebemiihl  towards  Locken.  At  5  a.  m.  the  5th  inst. 
this  regiment  will  advance  from  Gr.  Wilmsdorf  via  Mohrungen-Gr.  Her- 
menau  towards  Wormditt-Guttstadt-Miinsterberg.  Troop  A  will  leave 
Maldeuten  at  4  a.  m.  to  reconnoiter  in  advance  of  the  regiment.  Yon  will 
start  early  in  the  morning  on  reconnaissance  via  Bruckendorf  towards  Gr. 
Buchwalde-Jonkendorf ;  later  joining  your  regiment  via  Kallisten.  Send 
me  information,  if  possible  by  wire,  until  7  a.  m.  to  Mohrungen,  after  that 
to  Gr.  Hermenau.  Also  send  any  important  information  to  the  cavalry 
of  the  1  st  Division,  which  will  advance  via  Mohrungen  and  the  south  end 
of  Narien-see  towards  the  Alle. 

Soon  after  this  Captain  E 's  telegram  from  Maldeuten 

was  received: 

Troop  A,  1st  Cavalry,  en  route  to  Gr.  Hermenau,  will  arrive  at  Mohrun- 
gen shortly  after  5  a.  m.,  and  looks  for  reports  at  both  places. 

As  Lieutenant  C already  knew  in  the  evening  that  the 

telegraph  station  at  Ziegenberg  had  been  closed  and  that  the 
one  at  Bruckendorf  no  longer  answered  to  its  call,  he  decided 
to  advance  on  the  latter  place  with  his  whole  patrol  at  3  a.  m. 
the  5th  inst.  He  hoped  to  obtain  better  results  on  this  day 
with  fresh  horses,  and  rightly  feared  that  an  expedition  by 
night,  when  no  survey  of  the  situation  could  be  had,  would 
yield  no  adequate  return.  It  was  suspected  as  far  back  as 
Maldeuten  that  a  hostile  advance  party  had  reached  Brucken- 
dorf.    More  than  this  could  hardly  be  determined  during  the 

night.     Besides,  Lieutenant  C considered  the  condition  of 

his  patrol  consisting  of  1  sergeant  and  12  troopers  (quartered 

in  the  two  farm  buildings)  of  whom  not  more  than  one-half 
—5— 


58  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

dared  sleep  at  the  same  time.  Sending  out  3  or  4  men  would 
have  made  it  impossible  for  the  remainder  to  gain  stiength  for 
the  coming  day. 

There  was  no  telegraph  chart  at  Horn  railway  station,  but 
the  operator  stated  that  in  the  vicinity  there  was  nothing  but 
the  railway  telegraph  line,  excepting  a  single  wire  between 
Locken  and  Osterode. 

After  providing  for  the  destruction  of  the  message  tapes* 
at  the  office  and  after  the  members  of  the  patrol  were  informed 
of  the  situation  and  the  task  of  the  patrol,  he  departed  with  it 
early  on  the  5th,  via  Gubitten,  for  Ziegenberg,  and  here  en- 
countered 3  hostile  troopers  whose  retreat  to  Briickendorf  he 
vainly  attempted  to  cut  off.  Several  shots  were  fired  on  the 
pursuers  from  the  bridge,  but  without  taking  effect;  and  so  the 
patrol  assembled  at  the  farm  (north  of  the  letter  c  in  "Briicken- 
dorf") about  1,400  yards  west  of  Briickendorf.  Through  the 
mist  in  the  valley  Lieutenant  C — —  could  only  make  out  that 
several  persons,  some  on  foot  and  some  mounted,  were  moving 

about  at  the  bridge.     Lieutenant  C ■  learns  from  the  farmer 

that  hostile  troopers,  whose  language  he  could  not  understand, 
had  arrived  in  the  village  and  at  his  farm  the  preceding  even- 
ing; that  they  had  taken  a  good  horse  from  him  and  then  re- 
turned to  the  station;  that  early  this  morning  he  had  seen  3 
troopers  ride  by  towards  Ziegenberg;  and  that  he  did  not  know 
how  large  a  detachment  of  the  enemy  was  at  Briickendorf. 

Lieutenant  C further  learns  that  the  Passarge  is  flooded, 

the  water  being  at  least  2  yards  deep  everywhere,  and  that 
there  are  no  fords  in  the  vicinity.  The  Passarge  meadows 
recently  were  flooded,  and  can  be  crossed  only  by  foot-men. 
There  is  said  to  be  an  old  wooden  bridgef  over  the  Passarge 

*These  contain  signals  recorded  in  ink,  giving  a  permanent  record ; 
thus  differing  from  our  system,  where  the  signals  are  received  by  sound 
alone. 

fSee  map  1 :  1  oo.ooo. 


Reconnaissance.  59 

opposite  the  north  end  of  Briickendorf  which  can  be  approached 
only  from  the  left  bank — there  being  no  road  through  the 
swampy  meadow  on  the  right  bank.  At  Alt-Kochendorf  there 
is  said  to  be  a  single  stringer  of  a  former  bridge  across  the  Pas- 
sarge,  a  narrow  foot-path  leading  to  this  from  both  sides  of  the 
stream.  The  next  crossing  further  down  is  said  to  be  at  Kloben, 
where  there  is  a  good  wooden  bridge. 

What  are  Lieutenant  C — — 's  intentions  and  ar- 
rangements at  4  a.  m.  ? 

(As  a  matter  of  course,  the  message  on  page  23  might 
be  altered  as  thought  best;  its  contents  were  intended  simply 
as  a  basis  for  Captain  B 's  decisions.) 

It  is  with  Lieutenant  C as  with  his  comrade,  Lieuten- 
ant F ;  his  main  idea  is  to  make  an  extended  reconnaissance 

to  the  Alle.     Lieutenant  F was  unopposed  at  the  Passarge 

crossing  of  Kallisten,  but  Lieutenant  C at  Briickendorf  is 

opposed  by  hostile  fire-arms.  Even  if  the  opponents  should 
be  few  in  number,  it  would  be  very  venturesome  to  attempt 
forcing  a  crossing  afoot  or  on  horseback.  Swampy  meadows 
preclude  his  using  the  nearest  bridge,  which  in  addition  lies 
within  effective  fire  of  the  enemy.  It  would  require  at  least  an 
hour  and  a  half  to  go  around  by  Kloben,  with  the  possibility  of 
finding  the  bridge  occupied  by  the  enemy.  It  would  be  less  of 
a  detour  to  go  via  Magergut-Kammersdorf,  but  this  is  con- 
siderably to  one  side  of  the  route  to  be  followed  by  the  regiment. 
It  would  not  be  surprising  if  the  officer  desisted  from  any  fur- 
ther attempt  at  penetrating  farther  to  the  east,  thinking  it 
impracticable  to  do  so  at  this  time,  and  hoping  that  the  enemy 
himself  might  soon  advance  and  open  the  road.  He  might  be 
confirmed  in  this  view  by  the  thought  that  he  would  be  able  to 
keep  the  enemy  in  sight,  who  also  could  find  no  crossing  near  by, 
and  thus  render  good  service  to  the  cavalry  of  the  1st  Division 
which  is  following:.     But  on  further  reflection  he  must  see  that 


6o  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

it  is  highly  improbable  the  enemy  himself  will  open  the  trouble- 
some door  for  him.  If  the  enemy  leaves  but  a  few  men  behind, 
the  door  will  remain  closed.  Upon  further  reflection  he  realizes 
that  his  solicitude  for  the  divisional  cavalry  is  simply  an  excuse 
with  just  enough  color  to  quiet  his  military  conscience,  which  con- 
demns inactivity  and  a  waiting  policy  in  a  patrol.  It  is  not  un- 
reasonable to  assume  that  the  three  hostile  troopers  who  barely 
escaped  across  the  Passarge  will  exaggerate  the  number  of  their 
pursuers  and  induce  the  leader  to  remain  at  the  bridge  and  n<  t 
venture  to  an  encounter  with  us  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Pas- 
sarge. In  the  meantime  we  have  a  more  free  field.  If  Lieu- 
tenant C looks  beyond  his  regiment  and  the  divisional 

cavalry,  it  may  occur  to  him  that  a  message  by  wire  from  Locken 
to  Osterode  may  reach  Army  headquarters  sooner  than  through 
regular  channels  of  the  ist  Army  Corps.  If  only  the  message 
should  amount  to  something — if  it  only  really  cleared  up  the 
situation!  He  can  hardly  hope  to  discover  anything  of  im- 
portance in  the  corner  between  the  Passarge  and  Mahrung-see. 
He  can  report  that  he  encountered  the  enemy  at  Briickendcrf, 
and  then  cheerfully  intrust  the  divisional  cavalry  with  the  task 
of  settling  with  the  hostile  parties  in  front  of  the  Army  Corps. 
He  is  anxious  to  take  advantage  of  the  hours'  start  he  has  over 
his  troop  and  of  the  carefully  treasured  strength  of  his  horses, 
and  dismisses  the  last  remaining  objection — viz.,  that  his  patrol, 
in  advancing  via  Kammersdorf,  puts  itself  on  the  line  of  march 
of  the  neighboring  corps.  If  the  latter 's  cavalry  is  far  enough 
in  the  lead,  it  will  be  all  the  easier  for  the  patrol  to  advance. 
I  le  decides  to  send  a  message  to  the  telegraph  station  at  Horn , 
citing  his  further  instructions  (which,  therefore,  should  have 
been  included  in  the  message  on  page  23)  and  then  to  tide 
forward  under  cover  towards  Magergut,  keeping  the  Passarge 
bridge  under  observation  so  as  to  take  advantage  of  any  oppor- 
tunity that  might  offer  there.  Then  he  intends  advancing  via 
Kammersdorf  tcwards  Schaustern.     East  of  Kammersdorf  the 


Reconnaissance.  6i 

Passarge  does  not  flow  through  open  meadows,  but  between 
closely  wooded  banks.  Should  the  bridge  on  the  road  to  Schau- 
stern  prove  unserviceable  or  be  blocked  by  the  enemy,  the  two 
yards'  depth  of  water  has  no  terrors  for  him  or  his  horses.  At 
Kammersdorf  he  will  be  able  to  learn  of  places  suitable  for 
swimming  the  stream.  It  is  very  important  to  be  cautious 
during  the  advance.  The  point  must  keep  well  to  the  front, 
for  it  is  highly  probable  that  hostile  troopers  also  will  be  en- 
countered  in   the  vicinity  of   Kammersdorf.     To   this   point 

Lieutenant  C wishes  to  ride  rapidly  and  then,  before  going 

any  farther,  will  watch  the  highway  at  Briickendorf  for  a  little- 
while.  In  the  meantime  inquiry  is  to  be  made  as  to  the  condi- 
tion of  affairs  at  Lccken  and  whether  telegraphic  communica- 
tion still  exists  with  Osterode. 

To  be  sure,  a  doubt  arises  as  to  whether  Colonel  A , 

who  expressly  prescribed  the  route  via  Briickendorf,  will  ap- 
prove of  the  deviation  to  the  south.     But  on  various  occasions 

during  peace  maneuvers  Lieutenant  C had  noticed  that 

his  colonel  approved  of  the  decision  of  a  subordinate  not  be- 
cause it  was  the  best,  but  because  it  was  a  decision.  He  pins 
his  faith  to  this  and  unhesitatingly  proceeds  to  carry  out  his 
plan. 

The  patrol  reaches  the  vicinity  of  Jagd-see*  unmolested; 
the  highway  towards  Locken  is  deserted,  two  troopers  are  sent 
to  the  latter  place.  The  sun  shines  brightly  and  has  scattered 
the  mist.  A  glance  through  the  field-glasses  shows  no  change 
at  Briickendorf.  No  one  is  visible  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Pas- 
sarge. The  patrol  crosses  the  highway  bridge  across  the  low 
ground  between  Jagd-see  and  Miihlen  T.f  and  turns  to  the  left 
into  the  country  road  towards  Kammersdorf.  As  the  point 
reaches  the  grove  northeast  of  Mergel-see,  the  leader  overtakes 

*See  map  i  :ioo,ooo — a  small  lake  marked  "Jagd-S."  south  of 
Mahrung-see  and  west  of  Kammersdorf. 

|A  long  narrow  mill-pond  just  west  of  Jagd-see. 


62  Studies  in  Appued  Tactics. 

it  at  a  gallop  and  at  the  first  glance  to  the  east  from  the  grove 
he  discovers  several  horsemen  on  the  Kammersdorf-Schaustern 
road.*  They  are  several  hundred  yards  east  of  the  cemetery,  f 
and,  trotting  towards  it  along  the  road  that  is  visible  almost  to 

the  edge  of  the  woods,  Lieutenant  C counts  12  men  and 

recognizes  them  as  enemies.  A  second  glance  shows  that  there 
is  no  enemy  in  sight  as  far  as  Point  128  on  the  Locken-Sten- 
kienen  road  or  towards  Eissing-see.  The  main  body  of  his 
patrol  is  just  trotting  across  the  bridge  between  Jagd-  and 
Mergel-see.  The  two  troopers  sent  to  Locken  have  not  yet 
returned. 

What  does  Lieutenant  C decide  to  do? 

A  signal  to  the  patrol  and  a  short  gallop  would  carry  it 
back  to  the  highway  and  Ramten  mill,  to  a  safe  point  of  obser- 
vation, though  under  penalty  of  separation  from  the  2  men 
sent  to  Locken,  who  would  have  to  try  to  rejoin  the  patrol 
along  the  left  bank  of  the  Locke.  To  insure  a  union  with 
these  2  men,  the  patrol  might  ride  back  to  Locken. 

The  hostile  patrol  might  be  avoided  in  yet  another  way: 
By  rapidly  riding  along  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Mergel-see  and 
hiding  in  the  vicinity  of  Gr.  Schwarze-see  until  the  enemy  has 
passed,  unless  one  of  his  scouts,  riding  up  the  high  ground  east 
of  the  latter  lake,  should  discover  the  ruse,  and  unless  other 
enemies  should  approach  from  Pulfnick.  It  is  hardly  practica- 
ble to  secure  a  hiding-place  at  Kammersdorf  in  the  few  minutes 
available.  And  with  the  most  patriotic  motives  of  the  inhab- 
itants the  matter  could  not  be  kept  secret,  aside  from  the  rattle 
of  accouterments  and  neighing  of  horses.     Neither  does  the 

the  grove  near  the  road,  in  which  Lieutenant  C now  is, 

offer  any  place  of  concealment. 


*The  place  where  Lieutenant  C halts  is  but  a  trifle  lower  than 

Knoll  108,  so  that,  being  mounted,  he  can  look  over  and  beyond  it. 

fOn  the  Kammersdorf-Schaustern  road,  about  700  yards  east  of  the 
former  place. 


Reconnaissance.  63 

The  young  officer  does  not  long  consider.  It  never  occurs 
to  him  to  hurry  back  to  Ramten  or  Locken.  Without  taking 
his  eyes  off  the  enemy  he  quietly  says  to  a  member  of  the  point : 
"This  way  with  the  patrol  at  a  gallop!"  Then  he  loosens  his 
sword  in  its  scabbard,  forms  his  approaching  troopers  within 
the  grove  so  they  cannot  be  seen  without,  and  awaits  his  oppor- 
tunity. The  enemy  halts  at  the  cemetery;  2  men  ride  into  the 
village,  the  remainder  go  to  Knoll  109.  After  anxious  minutes, 
the  two  hostile  troopers  reappear  at  the  south  edge  of  the  vil- 
lage and  signal  to  the  others,  and,  while  the  former  ride  along 
the  edge  of  the  village  towards  the  bridge  between  Jagd-see 
and  Mergel-see,  the  larger  body  trots  towards  the  edge  of  the 
grove — straight  at  the  corner  where  our  patrol  is  halted.  Lieu- 
tenant C allows  it  to  come  quite  near  and  then  charges  it, 

disregarding  the  detached  troopers.  The  melee  is  soon  ended. 
Eleven  troopers  against  ten ;  powerful  well-ridden  horses  against 
hardy  but  underbred  ones.  In  addition  to  this,  there  is  the 
advantage  of  surprise.  The  hostile  point  of  2  troopers  will  not 
change  the  result,  even  though  it  arrived  on  the  scene.  The 
disparity  in  numbers  under  the  latter  contingency  might  even 
be  more  unfavorable  without  affecting  the  victory. 

For  the  present  we  shall  not  discuss  whether  Lieutenant 

C ■  acted  correctly  and  judiciously.     We  shall  let  later  events 

decide,  as  in  the  case  of  Lieutenant  F ,  who  at  Lettau  al- 
lowed the  hostile  patrol  to  ride  past  unmolested.  Identically 
the  same  conditions  are  never  repeated  either  in  life  in  general 
or  in  war,  and  the  reader  surely  will  have  noticed  the  difference 
between  the  two  cases.  In  accordance  with  his  orders,  Lieu- 
tenant F could  continue  his  reconnaissance,  via  Kallisten 

towards  Guttstadt,  without  being  detected.     Lieutenant  C 

would  have  been  able  to  continue  his  advance  only  in  case  he 
succeeded  in  hiding  himself  with  his  patrol  on  the  eastern  shore 
of  Mergel-see,  which  was  highly  improbable.  His  soldier's 
pride  resented  the  idea  of  a  retreat  to  Ramten  or  Locken  before 


64  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

an  enemy  but  slightly  superior  in  numbers;  for  cur  cavalryman 
felt  himself  more  than  equal  to  the  enemy  under  existing  con- 
ditions— a  feeling  to  be  encouraged  and  not  repressed.  Even 
if  the  patrol  were  defeated  in  the  encounter,  for  example,  if  at 
the  decisive  moment  hostile  reinforcements  appeared,  no  stain 
would  attach  to  the  officer's  escutcheon  of  honor,  a  gain  so  great 
that  no  theory  may  thrust  it  aside  unheeded.  An  officer  would 
f  rever  lese  the  confidence  of  his  men,  who  ought  willingly  to 
follow  him  to  certain  death,  should  he  but  once  give  them  cause 
to  suspect  him  of  cowardice. 

At  the  most,  Lieutenant  C 's  military  judgment  might 

be  criticised.  But  we  cannot  refuse  to  praise  his  quick  decision 
and  skillfully  led  attack,  which  brought  success.  It  might  be 
objected  that,  instead  of  charging  in  knightly  fashion,  he  should 
have  used  his  rifles.  Roosevelt's  Rough  Riders  or  a  mounted 
body  of  war-experienced  Boers  would  have  done  the  latter, 
and  it  is  recommended  that  every  cne  of  cur  cavalry  officers 
carefully  consider  in  individual  cases,  whether  the  saber  or 
bullet  promises  the  best  results.  Here  at  Kammersdcrf  dis- 
mounting to  fight  on  foot  would  have  had  to  be  executed  in 
considerable  haste,  and  had  the  enemy  changed  the  direction 
of  his  march  and  not  ridden  into  the  ambuscade,  valuable  time 
w  uld  have  been  lost.  He  would  have  been  obliged  hastily  to 
return  rifles  and  mount  again.  And,  if  dismounted,  an  excited 
man  very  easily  might  have  pressed  the  trigger  prematurely 
and  spoiled  the  surprise.  Against  single  troopers  the  rifle 
promises  good  results  only  at  close  range.  How  difficult  it  is 
to  drop  fleeing  game  at  even  ioo  yards'  distance!  Hew  much 
greater  is  the  nerve-tension  of  the  soldier  than  that  of  the 
hunter,  and,  besides,  the  former  must  aim  more  than  10  yards 
ahead  of  a  trooper  galloping  by  at  600  yards'  distance.  The 
rattle  of  20  to  30  shots  would  alarm  the  whole  neighborhood 
and  would  attract  all  hostile  detachments  within  hearing. 
Lieutenant  C did  right  to  remain  in  the  saddle,  whereby 


Reconnaissance.  65 

it  became  easier  to  cut  off  the  enemy's  retreat  and  capture 
prisoners. 

As  a  basis  for  the  continuation  of  our  problem  the  follow- 
ing will  be  assumed:  Two  severely  and  two  slightly  wounded 
enemies  and  one  un wounded  one  fell  into  cur  hands;  likewise 
two  sound  horses.  Four  hostile  troopers,  including  an  officer, 
escaped  towards  Pulfnick,  and  three  towards  Schaustern.  At 
5.10  a.  m.  Lieutenant  C — ■ — ■  has  assembled  his  patrol  at  Knoll 
10S,  excepting  two  men  whom  he  has  sent  to  Height  128.  Of 
his  men,  one  was  seriously  wounded  by  a  saber-cut  across  the 
face,  another  was  lightly  wounded,  also  in  the  head.  With  the 
exception  of  a  few  scratches — -the  lieutenant  himself  received 
a  severe  blow  across  his  arm  with  the  flat  of  a  saber — no  damage 
was  dene.  The  two  troopers  sent  to  Locken  have  returned,  and 
report  that  nothing  has  been  seen  there  of  the  enemy  or  cf  our 
own  troops;  and  that  the  telegraph  line  to  Osterode  is  in  work- 
ing order — -one  operator  being  on  hand. 

The  hostile  patrol  belonged  to  the  6th  Dragoons.  It  was 
impossible  to  talk  with  the  prisoners.  Several  troopers  are 
now  visible  en  the  heights  southwest  of  Bruckendorf,  who, 
through  field-glasses,  are  believed  to  belong  to  the  enemy. 

What  will  Lieutenant  C do — -bearing  in   mind 

THAT  CONDITIONS  ARE  DIFFERENT  FROM  TIME  OF  PEACE,  WHERE 
THERE  ARE  NO  WOUNDED  AND  NO  PRISONERS? 

The  officer  again  has  his  men  take  cover  in  the  grove  near 
Jagd-see,  whence  he  continues  his  observations,  for  the  same 
purpese  designating  individual  men  to  watch  certain  districts 
to  the  rear.  He  takes  care  that  no  one  shows  himself  unneces- 
sarily and  that  there  is  as  little  moving  about  as  possible.  The 
soldier,  ss  well  as  the  hunter,  appreciates  the  value  of  immo- 
bility, which  materially  lessens  the  danger  of  discovery.  The 
wounded  also  are  brought  into  the  grove.  Even  the  two  se- 
verely wounded  prisoners  must  submit  to  this.     War  is  a  rough 


66  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

trade.  Human  sympathies  must  give  way  before  the  exigencies 
of  the  service.  The  lieutenant  sends  the  sergeant  and  a  trooper 
to  the  village  to  bring  back  the  village  president  and  four  re- 
liable men  with  two  well-horsed  wagons  filled  with  straw.  The 
village  president  is  intrusted  with  the  care  of  the  three  severely 
wounded  men  under  the  protection  of  the  red  cross,  and  the 
slightly  wounded  are  bound  up  as  well  as  possible.  Then  the 
two  slightly  wounded  and  the  unwounded  prisoner,  shackled  if 
necessary,  are  put  in  the  wagons  under  guard  of  the  slightly 
wounded  trooper  and  the  four  villagers,  and  are  sent  to  Locken 
in  charge  of  a  reliable  unwounded  trooper.  The  officer  retains 
one  of  the  captured  horses  as  an  extra  mount;  the  remaining 
led  horses  are  fastened  alongside  the  draft-horses  of  the  wagons. 
The  man  selected  as  escort  for  the  wagons  receives  the  follow- 
ing instructions: 

"You  will  take  the  wagons  back  through  Locken  to  Liebe- 
miihl  and  will  take  care  that  the  prisoners  and  this  message  are 
delivered  to  a  high-ranking  officer  of  troops  marching  on  this 
road  (the  Locken-Liebemuhl  highway),  taking  receipt  for  the 
men  and  message.  Then  you  will  ride  with  our  wounded 
trooper,  or  at  least  with  his  horse,  to  Mohrungen,  and  will  see 
that  the  original  of  the  telegram  I  shall  give  you  reaches  head- 
quarters of  the  ist  Army  Corps.  Should  the  wounded  be  un- 
able to  stand  the  journey,  they  will  be  left  in  some  house  along 
the  road,  taking  receipt  for  them. " 

The  telegram  is  as  follows: 

Locken, 

5  May  04, a.  m. 

To  the  Telegraph  Operator,  Osterode: 

At  4-40  a.  m.  to-day  I  encountered  12  men  of  the  hostile  6th  Dragoons 
near  Kammersdorf;  and  I  sent  3  prisoners  back  over  the  road  toLiebemuhl. 
I  was  unable  to  converse  with  them. 

Briiekendorf  is  occupied  by  hostile  troopers.  I  shall  continue  towards 
Jonkendorf.  This  message  should  be  promptly  wired  to  Army  headquar- 
ters, whose  whereabouts  is  unknown  to  me,  and  to  Mohrungen. 

C 

Lieutenant  ist  Cavalry, 
Commanding  Patrol. 


Reconnaissance.  67 

The  message  was  worded  in  the  same  way,  except  that  the 
last  sentance  was  omitted.  The  message  and  telegram  are 
given  to  the  trooper  in  an  unsealed  envelope  with  instructions 
to  familiarize  himself  with  the  contents.  The  telegram  is  to  be 
wired  from  Locken,  the  trooper  again  taking  possession  of  the 
original,  after  sending,  as  already  stated.  The  trooper  is  cau- 
tioned that  he  will  be  held  responsible  for  the  prisoners,  and 
warned  to  guard  the  unwounded  one  with  special  care.  Upon 
arriving  at  Mohrungen,  he  is  to  make  a  verbal  report  of  what 
has  happened  at  Bruckendorf  and  Kammersdorf. 

As  soon  as  the  wagons  have  left,  and  Lieutenant  C is 

satisfied  that  no  danger  threatens  from  Magergut  or  Pulfnick, 
he  continues  on  his  way  with  the  patrol.  Presumably  this  can- 
not be  until  about  6  a.  m.  The  incident  described  requires 
considerable  time.     We  should  very  much  like  to  have  matters 

proceed  more  rapidly  and  have  Lieutenant  C resume  his 

march  earlier.  But  we  must  avoid  illusions,  although  some- 
times in  reality  many  things  can  be  hurried.  In  hostile  territory 
I  have  known  a  hay-wagon  to  be  hitched  up  at  night  and  made 
ready  to  transport  wounded  men  in  a  few  minutes.  Possibly 
the  officer  might  limit  himself  to  writing  the  message  and  tele- 
gram, leaving  everything  else  to  the  sergeant.  But  in  thinking 
the  matter  over  we  must  realize  that  the  sergeant  hardly  would 
be  in  a  position  to  appreciate  all  the  attending  circumstances, 
that  it  seems  most  important  the  telegram  should  safely  reach 
headquarters  at  Mohrungen,  and  that  the  prisoners  should  be 
delivered  to  someone  able  to  question  them.  The  statements 
of  the  prisoners  alone  might  be  more  valuable  than  the  gain  of 
half  an  hour  in  resuming  the  reconnaissance.  The  prisoners' 
departure  must  be  guarded  against  detection  by  other  hostile 
patrols  that  might  appear  at  any  moment.  And,  finally,  Lieu- 
tenant C hesitates,  as  did  Lieutenant  F ,  to  separate 

himself  from  the  sergeant  who  must  lead  the  patrol,  should  any 
accident  happen  to  the  officer. 


68  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

The  telegram  simply  gives  Mohrungen  as  the  second  ad- 
dress, not  "Headquarters  ist  Army  Corps,"  because  this  would 
disclose  too  much  should  the  dispatch  fall  into  the  enemy's 
hands. 

Should  our  wounded  trooper  be  unable  to  act  as  guard  on 
the  wagon,  another  trooper  probably  would  have  to  be  sent 
ali  ng.  In  fact,  an  escort  cf  two  is  sufficient  only  on  the  sup- 
position that  the  four  villagers  will  do  their  duty.  The  laws 
of  war  make  it  expedient  to  make  believe  these  civilians  are 
simply  to  minister  to  the  needs  of  the  wounded.  But  it  may 
be  assumed  that  these  friendly  villagers  will  not  allow  any 
prisoner  to  escape.  The  officer  need  have  no  conscientious 
scruples  about  this  arrangement.  Other  nations  do  not  observe 
the  laws  of  war  as  strictly  as  wTe  do.  It  is  too  important  that 
the  patrol,  already  reduced  to  a  sergeant  and  8  men,  be  not 
further  weakened. 

The  detailed  account  of  Lieutenant  C 's  conduct  after 

encountering  the  enemy  must  enly  be  looked  upon  as  an  attempt 
to  call  the  attention  of  anyone  net  familiar  with  war  to  the  dif- 
ference between  it  and  peace  conditions.  In  time  of  peace, 
opposing  patrols  en  meeting  possibly  exchange  friendly  greet- 
ings and  then  proceed  with  their  respective  roles  irrespective 
of  each  other.  Our  example  shows  how  serious  is  the  duty  cf 
a  patrol  under  such  circumstances  in  time  of  war.  But  general 
rules  of  conduct  cannot  be  devised.  Each  case  must  be  de- 
cided on  its  own  merits.  Everyone  must  depend  on  expedients 
that  ingenuity  and  experience  will  suggest.  Many  may  be  able 
to  devise  more  suitable  measures  than  these  given  by  me.  But 
in  two  particulars  I  wish  to  defend  mine  against  possible  objec- 
tions— viz. :    Why  does  not  Lieutenant  C turn  over  all  his 

wounded  to  the  care  of  the  village  president  of  Kammersdorf  ? 
In  this  case  he  would  have  to  arrange  for  the  transportation  of 
but  one  unwounded  prisoner,  which  would  have  simplified  the 
proceedings  and  saved  time.     But  undoubtedly  more  can  be 


Reconnaissance.  6g 

gleaned  from  the  statement  of  three  prisoners  ercss-questioned 
separately  than  from  only  ene,  and  war  experience  (all  too 
easily  lost  in  time  of  peace)  shows  the  great  value  of  such  state- 
ments for  higher  commanders.  An  eft-repeated  reminder  cf 
Napoleon's  to  his  generals  was,  "Send  me  prisoners."  The 
Field  Sendee  Regulations  also  call  attention  to  the  importance 
of  prisoners.  Our  slightly  wounded  trooper  is  sent  along  not 
only  as  a  guard,  but  also  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  his  fall- 
ing into  the  hands  cf  hostile  patrols  at  Kammersdorf  and  being 
questioned  by  them.  Were  it  possible  to  move  our  seriously 
wounded  trooper,  he,  too,  would  be  sent  back. 

The  transportation  must  first  go  to  Lccken  because  the 
telegram  is  to  be  sent  from  there.  But  it  does  not  go  thence 
over  the  shortest  route  (via  Eckersdorf)  to  Mohrungen  and  cur 
own  army  corps  en  account  of  the  length  and  insecurity  of  the 
road.  The  prisoners  are  of  more  importance  even  than  the 
telegram  (in  which  the  number  of  the  hostile  regiment  is  the 
only  important  news)  and  should  be  promptly  brought  to  a 
place  cf  safety  and  where  they  can  be  questioned.  This  sug- 
gests the  idea  of  turning  them  over  to  the  2d  Army  Corps  ad- 
vancing via  Liebemiihl. 

Lieutenant  C will  have  found  out  from  the  inhabitants 

of  Kammersdorf  where  the  Passarge  can  be  most  easily  forded. 
Should  such  a  place  be  near  a  road,  it  will  be  used  not  only  to 
avoid  a  possible  ambuscade  at  the  bridge,  but  also  to  make  his 
messengers  feel  independent  of  the  bridge  on  their  way  back. 
Horses  trained  to  swim  streams  can  cress  narrow  places  2  yards 
deep  without  difficulty,  and  with  the  rider  in  the  saddle.  Of 
course  the  rider  alsD  must  be  experienced  and  must  assist  the 
horse;  if  necessary,  dismounting  and  holding  on  by  the  mane. 

The  patrol  succeeds  in  crossing  the  Passarge  east  of  Grim- 
mak-see  (at  the  point  on  the  map  where  the  letter  F  cf  "  Forst 
is  located).     The  enemy  is  not  found  at  the  bridge.     The  2 
troopers  are  called  in  from  Knoll  128,  and  report  that  the  flee 


70  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

ing  troopers  disappeared  in  the  woods  northeast  of  Pulfnick. 
At  6.30  a.  m.  the  patrol  reaches  Knoll  119  south  of  Labens. 
From  this  point  the  villages  of  Stenkienen,  Windtken,  and 
Schaustern  can  be  seen,  as  well  as  the  railway  nearly  to  the 
woods  south  of  Kl.  Gemmern.  The  view  is  limited  by  Heights 
127,  135,  131,  and  128.  Nothing  is  seen  in  motion  anywhere. 
The  inhabitants  of  Labens  report  that  early  in  the  morning  a 
body  of  he  stile  troopers  had  passed  there  going  towards  Kam- 
mersdorf;  that  nearly  an  hour  ago  3  troopers  had  returned 
in  haste  and  had  continued  towards  Windtken;  and  that  no 
hostile  troops  were  in  Schaustern  or  Windtken  during  the  night. 

Which  way  will  Lieutenant  C go  now,  and  what 

ARE  HIS  PLANS  CONCERNING  THE  RAILWAY  AHEAD  OF  HIM? 

As  the  day  advances  it  becomes  more  likely  that  larger 
bodies  of  hostile  cavalry  will  be  met.  The  three  troopers  re- 
treating towards  Windtken  presumably  came  from  there;  and, 
even  without  this  pointer,  the  roads  from  Jonkendorf  to  Bal- 
lingen  and  to  Pupkeim  and  the  Jonkendorf-Blankenberg  road 
would  be  likely  lines  of  approach  for  the  enemy.  He  probably 
also  will  approach  along  the  Alt-Schoneberg-Stenkienen  road, 

but  this  region  is  beyond  the  sphere  of  Lieutenant  C 's 

patrol.  It  is  best  to  observe  the  Jonkendorf-Ballingen  and 
Jonkendorf-Pupkeim  roads  from  between  the  two,  where 
several  patches  of  woods  offer  concealment.  The  patrol  must 
move  in  that  direction,  but  without  going  through  Windtken, 
for  this  would  take  us  directly  towards  the  enemy  and  keep  us 
too  long  in  the  open.  It  would  be  best  to  ride  acrcss  country, 
between  Schaustern  and  Windtken,  towards  the  nearest  woods. 
If  the  meadows  could  not  be  crossed,  a  road  could  be  followed 
from  Knoll  131  to  the  woods.  Anyone  who  has  actually  at- 
tempted to  take  up  rails  realizes  that  the  patrol  on  reaching 
the  railway  must  not  be  delayed  by  such  effort.  And  as  the 
patrol  has  no  high  explosives,  it  would  be  useless  to  attempt  de- 
stroying track  or  switches  at  Windtken  without  the  assistance 


Reconnaissance.  71 

of  the  railway  employees.  The  officer  received  no  specific 
instructions  to  undertake  any  such  work  and  hesitates  to  do  so 
on  his  own  responsibility,  because  it  seems  to  him  very  unlikely 
that  the  enemy  will  use  this  part  of  the  track.  For  the  present 
this  district  may  be  included  in  the  enemy's  field  of  operations, 
but  it  may  soon  belong  to  that  of  our  own  army. 

But  the  destruction  of  the  telegraph  line  is  a  different  ques- 
tion.    According  to   the  German  Field  Service  Regulations, 

Lieutenant  C 's  right  to  do  so  is  somewhat  problematical, 

as  only  by  a  forced  construction  can  he  be  looked  upon  as  an 
independent  commander.  But  he  knows  that  the  station  at 
Briickendorf  must  have  been  surprised  by  the  enemy,  for  the 
operator  did  not  report  the  latter's  approach  nor  his  (the 
operator's)  intention  to  discontinue  his  office.  It  is  therefore 
possible  that  the  enemy  is  using  the  line  to  send  back  his  own 
messages.  This  might  be  ascertained  at  Windtken.  But  the 
officer  dees  not  want  to  visit  this  place.  A  strict  and  conserv- 
ative interpretation  of  the  Regulations  would  result  in  Lieu- 
tenant C 's  deciding  not  to  molest  the  telegraph  line.     Thus 

he  would  assume  no  responsibilities  and  possibly  avoid  the  un- 
pleasantness of  an  explanation,  considering  that  his  instruc- 
tions do  not  indicate  that  he  is  to  attempt  any  demolitions. 

But  Lieutenant  C ,  as  he  already  has  demonstrated,  is  a 

man  who  dees  not  fear  to  assume  responsibility  and  who  re- 
members the  splendid  words  of  the  introduction  to  the  Field 
Service  Regulations,  which  are  that  "every  officer  must  unhes- 
itatingly act  to  the  best  of  his  ability  in  every  contingency, 
even  without  waiting  for  orders  concerning  details."  He  also 
remembers  the  concluding  remarks,  which  are:  "Even  the 
lowest  soldier  must  bear  in  mind  that  he  will  be  more  severely 
dealt  with  for  an  omission  or  neglect  than  for  any  error  in 
choice  of  means."  While  superior  authority  sometimes  might 
be  able  to  indicate  the  points  in  advance. where  demolitions 
should  be  attempted,  still  it  is  impossible  to  give  instructions 


~2  S'i'umks  in  Applied  Tactics. 

to  every  patrol  concerning  railways  and  telegraph  lines  that 
may  be  encountered. 

If  nothing  but  the  wire  is  cut,  there  will  be  but  little  work 
to  subsequently  repair  the  line.  But  if  the  wire  is  strung  en 
high  poles,  it  will  be  difficult  to  cut  without  iron  climbers  and 
wire-nippers.  The  best  place  to  select  would  be  near  a  section  - 
house.  The  patrol  must  not  be  long  delayed  by  the  work  as 
it  might  be  discovered  if  it  remained  long  in  such  an  exposed 
position. 

At  about  7  a.  m.  the  patrol  may  reach  the  woods  east  <  f 
Schaustern  after  having  cut  the  telegraph  wire  just  south  c  f 
said  village  with  the  assistance  of  some  countrymen.  The 
patrol  is  enly  about  8  miles  from  Horn  in  an  air-line,  but  has 
actually  come  about  12  h  miles  in  4  hours.  This  apparently 
is  a  short  distance.  The  regimental  commander  at  Gr.  Her- 
menau,  not  understanding  the  situation,  may  be  very  angry 
at  the  infrequency  of  messages  from  this  patrol,  particularly 
because  they  could  be  forwarded  by  wire  from  Horn.  It  re- 
mains to  be  seen  whether  the  loss  of  time  that  resulted  from 

Lieutenant   C 's   detour   via   Kammersdorf    and   skirmish 

will  be  made  good  in  other  ways. 


Bearing  the  following  in  mind,  let  us  glance  back  at  Troop 
A,   which   at   6.50  a.   m.   left  Herzogswalde  for   Reichenthal. 

Captain  E — ■ — ■  left  Corporal  M and  6  troopers  at  the  Teu- 

felsberg  (it  might  be  added  that  the  corporal  made  arrange- 
ments at  the  southern  exit  of  Herzogswalde  to  have  messengers 
directed  to  his  new  station) ;  3  were  sent  to  Naglack  to  observe 
towards  the  south;  1   sergeant  and  6  troopers  Avere  sent  to 

Liebstadt;  and  Lieutenant  F ,  with  14  men,  was  sent  via 

Kallisten  towards  Guttstadt.  Of  the  latter  patrol,  1  trooper 
has  returned  with  a  message  and  has  rejoined  the  troop.  Then, 
2  men  were  left  at  M  oh  run  gen,  3  at  Gr.  Hermenau,  and  1  man 
was  sent  back  from  each  of  these  two  places  with  a  message 


Reconnaissance.  73 

for  the  regimental  commander.     Therefore  the  captain  has  1 

officer  and  63  men  left.     Nothing  is  known  of  Lieutenant  F , 

except  that  about  5  a.  m.  he  rode  past  1 2  hostile  troopers  near 
Lettau  (of  these  nothing  has  since  been  heard),  and  that  he 
sent  a  lance  corporal  to  Sackstein,  but  the  latter's  message  has 
not  yet  been  received. 

At  7.05  a.  m.  the  captain  reaches  Knoll  153  near  Wuchsnig 
with  his  point,  and  looks  about.  The  houses  of  Pittehnen  are 
visible,  but  no  details.  No  enemy  is  visible  on  the  Iyiebstadt- 
Pittehnen  highway,  nor  in  the  intervening  country.  Two  horse- 
men are  visible  on  Knoll  no  near  Elditten,  but  it  cannot  be 
determined  whether  they  are  friend  or  foe.  The  flanking-patrol 
is  galloping  in  from  Gr.  Trukainen.  A  small  detachment,  ap- 
parently hostile,  is  seen  galloping  alongside  the  highway  from 
the  south  towards  Naglack.  The  captain  sends  a  non-com- 
missioned officer  and  3  troopers  on  reconnaissance  to  Pittehnen, 
and  has  the  troop  halt  under  cover  in  rear  of  the  hill,  with  the 
idea  of  surprising  the  hostile  troopers  as  soon  as  they  should 
approach  near  enough.  At  the  same  time  he  sends  several 
troopers  via  Gr.  Pragsden  (where  they  are  concealed  from  the 
south)  to  the  Passarge  to  examine  the  river  and  look  for  fords. 
It  is  true  that  he  was  told  in  Herzogswalde  that  there  are  no 
fords  in  the  vicinity,  but  he  wants  to  be  sure  about  it.  The 
hostile  detachment,  consisting  of  10  men,  halts  between  Nag- 
lack and  Banners.  The  captain  then  orders  his  leading  platoon 
to  drive  the  enemy  away  and  to  advance  far  enough  to  obtain 
a  view  of  the  country  about  Lettau-Waltersdorf  and  towards 
Sackstein.  The  hostile  troopers  retreat  towards  Alt-Menzels 
and  disappear  in  the  woods.  The  platoon  follows  as  far  as  a 
hill  south  of  Alt-Menzels  and  sends  a  patrol  to  Sackstein  and 
another  to  Height  148  near  the  highway. 

At  7.45  the  platoon  returns  via  Naglack.  The  platoon 
commander  reports  that  the  hostile  detachment  crossed  the 
Passarge  at  Sackstein.     The  pursuing  patrol  was  ordered  by 

—8— 


74  Studies  in   Applied  Tactics. 

the  platoon  commander  to  remain  at  Sackstein  for  the  present 
and  continue  watching  the  enemy.  Nothing  suspicious  was 
seen  at  Waltersdorf  or  L-ettau  nor  on  the  part  of  the  highway- 
visible  south  of  Waltersdorf.  The  inhabitants  of  Naglack 
stated  that  at  5  a.  m.  tc-day  3  friendly  (blue)  troopers  passed 
through  the  village  and  inquired  the  way  to  Sackstein.  Im- 
patient at  the  time  lost  through  the  hostile  patrol,  the  captain, 
looking  backwards  to  see  if  the  regiment  has  yet  come  in  sight, 
trots  towards  Reichenthal  without  further  delay,  going  north 
of  the  road  through  the  low  ground,  to  be  covered  from  view 

as  much  as  possible.     He  depends  on  Corporal  M ,  at  Teu- 

felsberg,  discovering  his  march  and  notifying  the  colonel  about 
it,  as  well  as  about  the  encounter  with  the  hostile  patrol.  The 
orders  of  the  patrol  at  Sackstein  are  not  changed ;  and  2  troopers 
are  again  sent  towards  Naglack  to  keep  en  the  lookout  to  the 
south. 

Even  before  reaching  Reichenthal,  the  captain  recognizes 
the  situation  at  Pittehnen.  Shots  are  fired  from  the  heights 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Passarge  which  are  answered  from  the 
houses  of  the  hamlet.  A  hostile  troop  of  cavalry  is  visible  on 
the  Pittehnen-Elditten  highway,  having  just  halted  about  half- 
way between  these  two  points.  A  part  of  the  troop  dismounts 
and  advances  towards  Pittehnen.  East  of  Elditten  the  high- 
way is  visible  as  far  as  the  woods  between  this  point  and  Wolfs- 
dorf,  but  nothing  is  visible  on  it.  The  scouts  sent  to  the  Pas- 
sarge have  reported  that  the  stream  is  not  fordable  and  that  the 
meadows  will  not  support  the  weight  of  a  horse.  The  inhabit- 
ants of  Gr.  Pragsden  have  informed  the  captain  that  between 
Sackstein  and  Pittehnen  there  is  neither  ford  nor  bridge,  but 
that  there  are  two  fords  at  Kalkstein. 

What  does  the  Captain  decide  to  do  at  8  a.  m.  at 
Reichenthal? 

(It  must  be  remembered  that  Lieutenant  F 's  mes- 
sages of  6.30  from  Heiligenthal  and  7.35  from  Komalmen  have 
not  yet  been  received.) 


Reconnaissance.  75 

If  the  captain  at  Herzogswalde  cr  Wuchsnig  had  received 

word  of  Lieutenant  P from  Heiligenthal  and  of  the  lance 

corporal  from  Sackstein,  he  might  have  decided  to  advance  via 
Sackstein,  and,  driving  back  the  hostile  patrol,  would  now  be 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Passarge;  whereas  this  bothersome 
stream,  like  an  impenetrable  wall,  still  precludes  an  extended 
view,  while  the  regiment  is  already  on  the  captain's  heels. 

Without  knowing  what  Lieutenant  F in  the  meantime 

had  discovered,  it  would  have  been  justifiable  for  the  captain 
to  deviate  from  the  chcsen  route  of  Pittehnen-Guttstadt  only 
in  case  the  hostile  patrol  from  Naglack  had  been  backed  up  by 
larger  bodies.  At  the  same  time  the  captain,  notwithstanding 
his  impatience,  could  not  continue  his  march  until  he  had  shaken 
off  this  patrol  and  obtained  a  view  behind  it.  Now  the  hostile 
troop  at  Elditten  forms  a  new  obstacle.  The  captain  may 
correctly  guess  the  colonel's  displeasure,  who  will  have  expected 
better  results  from  the  former's  discretion  and  spirit  of  enter- 
prise. How  often  such  mishaps  mar  the  plans  of  the  most 
active  and  experienced  leader !  Had  it  not  been  for  the  delay 
caused  by  the  hostile  patrol,  the  captain  long  ago  would  have 
been  at  Elditten — possibly  victor  over  the  hostile  troop — and 
would  have  had  an  extended  view  of  the  road  to  Guttstadt. 
When  the  captain  learns  what  considerations  induced  Lieuten- 
ant F ■  to  desist  from  accepting  battle  at  Lettau,  he  may 

exclaim:  "Would  that  my  dear  lieutenant  had  remembered 
less  of  the  Regulations!" 

But  how  shall  the  captain  adjust  himself  to  the  new 
situation  ? 

It  will  not  do  to  turn  back  from  Reichenthal  and  go  to 
Sackstein.  This  would  open  the  way  for  the  hostile  troop  via 
Pittehnen  and  enable  it  promptly  to  ferret  out  our  regiment 
and  send  back  welcome  news.  And,  besides,  it  might  not  be 
possible  to  ride  to  Sackstein  unobserved.  It  seems  equally 
inadvisable  and  impracticable  to  attempt  fording  the  Passarge 


76  Studies  in  Appued  Tactics. 

at  Kalkstein.  If  we  are  not  to  lose  more  time  by  waiting,  there 
is  nothing  to  be  done  but  to  forcibly  break  through  at  Pittehnen. 
If  the  hostile  troop  waits  dismounted  on  the  right  bank  of  the 

Passarge,  Captain  E also  must  dismount  and  drive  the 

enemy  away  by  dismounted  fire  action  and  capture  the  bridge. 
Of  course  fire-superiority  cannot  be  obtained  by  numbers,  but 
by  superior  markmanship.  Would  a  company  of  blue  infantry 
hesitate  in  the  face  of  a  hostile  company?  Why  should  it  be 
different  with  troop  against  troop  than  with  company  against 
company? 

It  would  be  advantageous  if  the  troop  could  reach  the 
vicinity  of  Pittehnen  under  cover,  where  Height  108  apparently 
offers  a  commanding  position.  We  might  succeed  in  this  by 
circling  to  the  west  and  crossing  the  highway  at  the  point  P  of 
"Pittehnen."  It  will  be  necessary  to  use  combat  patrols, 
particularly  towards  Kalkstein ;  unfortunately,  this  reduces  the 
fighting  strength.  But  doubtless  the  hostile  troop  also  has  weak- 
ened itself  by  using  similar  patrols.  We  must  consider  whether 
the  led  horses  should  be  kept  west  of  Height  108,  and  what 
amount  of  mobility  is  desired  of  them.  If  the  horses  are  im- 
mobile,* the  men  after  capturing  the  bridge  en  foot  would  have 
to  return  for  their  horses;  while,  if  mobile,  they  can  be  brought 
up  to  the  riders.  But  in  the  latter  case  from  one-fourth  to 
one-half  of  the  men  must  remain  with  the  horses,  which  greatly 
reduces  the  number  of  men  on  the  firing-line.  Quick  results 
are  to  be  expected  only  when  not  a  man  is  missing.  If  the 
troop  is  victorious,  there  will  be  time  and  opportunity  to  mount 
— this  may  take  place  by  platoon.  If  the  troop  does  not  suc- 
ceed, the  men  can  quickly  fall  back  on  their  horses.  Neither 
must  there  be  a  mounted  reserve,  though  one  is  ordinarily  pre- 
scribed— the  stream,  which  protects  from  any  sudden  hostile 
mounted  attack,  justifies  the  omission. 

*A11  the  horses  of  a  platoon  linked  together  in  a  circle  and  watched  by 
a  single  horse-holder.     (Wagner's  "Organization  and  Tactics.") 


RfcXONNAISSANCE.  77 

Presumably  the  hostile  troop  dismounted  simply  to  clear 
the  way  to  Pittehnen.  The  enemy  probably  will  remount  and 
cross  the  Passarge  as  soon  as  he  has  driven  the  blue  patrol  out 
of  Pittehnen.  But  the  captain  does  not  want  to  wait  for  this. 
It  is  quite  possible  that  his  troop  has  already  been  discovered 
by  the  enemy;  for  example,  from  Knoll  no  south  of  Hlditten. 
If  the  enemy  simply  wishes  to  block  the  way  at  Pittehnen,  he 
can  all  the  better  make  preparations  for  this  the  longer  he  is 
left  undisturbed.  The  captain  also  rejects  the  idea  of  asking 
for  assistance  from  the  colonel,  by  the  time  this  could  arrive 
the  enemy  also  may  have  been  reinforced ;  and  it  is  doubtful 
if  the  colonel  would  grant  the  request.  Asking  for  reinforce- 
forcements  is  very  properly  frowned  upon  in  the  (German) 
Army.  If  a  detachment  positively  is  not  strong  enough  to  do 
what  is  required  of  it,  the  situation  and  present  intentions  of 
its  commander  are  reported  to  higher  authority,  and  it  is  left 
for  him  to  decide  whether  reinforcements  shall  be  sent  or  not. 


Deciding  to  act  at  once,  the  captain  sends  a  non-com- 
missioned officer  and  4  troopers  via  Blumen  towards  Kalkstein, 
as  a  protection  against  the  north  and  northwest,  and  conducts 
the  troop  along  depressions  of  ground  to  the  west  of  Reichen- 
thal,  constantly  keeping  an  eye  on  the  enemy.  When  he,  with 
his  troop  close  behind  him,  and  so  far  apparently  not  seen  by 
the   enemy,    reaches   the    Reichenthal-Blumen   road,    he   sees 

Lieutenant  B 's  patrol  hastily  riding  baek  from  Pittehnen 

on  the  road  towards  Liebstadt,  and  sees  the  hostile  troop  mount ; 
whereupon  the  following  happens:     He  (the  captain)  lets  the 

hostile  main  body,  which  is  following  Lieutenant  B in  some 

disorder,  get  out  of  Pittehnen  about  1,000  yards,  and  then 
charges  it  in  flank.  He  has  nearly  1,000  yards  to  go,  but  it  is 
down  hill  and  for  a  short  time  the  terrain  still  conceals  him. 

But  fortune  only  half-way  favors  the  captain.  The  enemy 
discovers  the  attack  too  soon,  and  gives  way  to  the  north.     The 


78  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

troop,  advancing  at  a  gallop,  forces  the  enemy  to  separate  and 
retreat  hastily.  A  few  hostile  troopers  escape  into  the  woods 
and  a  group  rides  around  the  southern  border  of  the  same, 
while  the  greater  part  turns  north  towards  Klogehnen.  The 
captain  follows  the  latter  with  his  troop,  only  detaching  half  of 
the  left  platoon  to  the  left  around  the  woods.  He  sends  an 
officer  and  6  troopers  towards  Pittehnen  to  protect  the  right 
flank. 

The  horses  are  tired  out  by  the  time  they  reach  Height  94 
southeast  of  Klogehnen.  The  captain  is  convinced  that  he 
cannot  overtake  the  enemy,  who  is  continuing  his  flight  in  dis- 
order towards  Gillwalde  and  Stollen.     He  orders  Sergeant  K 

and  6  troopers  to  follow  and  keep  touch  with  the  enemy.  As 
he  assembles  the  troop  the  group  detached  from  the  left  flank 
rejoins  on  the  Polkehnen-Klogehnen  road.  The  leader  re- 
ports that  he  sent  3  troopers  to  follow  the  hostile  troopers  flee- 
ing towards  Stollen.     The  combat-patrols  join  the  troop,  as 

well  as  Lieutenant  B and  6  men  of  Troop  B,  who  were 

driven  from  Pittehnen  (1  man  fell  in  the  engagement  at  the 
Passarge  bridge).  Three  of  the  hostile  troopers,  who  retreated 
into  the  woods,  have  been  captured.  One  of  our  troopers  is 
able  to  talk  with  them,  and  the  captain  thus  learns  that  he  had 
encountered  Troop  No.  2,  5th  Dragoons,  which  left  Heilsberg 
early  this  morning,  having  spent  the  night  there  with  the  entire 
regiment.  The  prisoners  can  neither  describe  the  road  over 
which  they  came  to-day  nor  tell  where  they  were  night  before 
last,  or  where  their  regiment  is,  which  they  have  not  seen  to- 
day. Nor  can  anything  else  of  importance  be  found  out  from 
them. 

The  troop  is  assembled  by  8.35  a.  m.  Of  the  detached 
troopers,  5  have  reported  who  were  left  at  Mohrungen  and  Gr. 
Hermenau  and  were  relieved  by  others  from  the  regiment,  and 
the  2  messengers  sent  to  the  regimental  commander.  They 
report  that  the  regiment  arrived  at  Mohrungen  at  about  6.20 


Reconnaissanck.  79 

a.  m.,  and  at  Gr.  Hermenau  shortly  after  7  a.  m.  They  bring 
no  orders  or  information.  Four  horses  were  captured  by  the 
troop,  which,  aside  from  two  horses  seriously  hurt  by  falling, 
has  had  no  losses. 

About  this  time  a  regimental  staff  officer,  accompanied  by 
a  trooper,  arrives  and  states  that  the  advance  guard  of  the 
regiment  arrived  at  Herzogswalde  at  8  a.  m.,  where  the  reg- 
imental commander  expects  to  halt  for  a  while.  The  troop 
commander  is  to  report  how  matters  are  progressing  with  him. 
The  staff  officer  is  unable  to  definitely  answer  the  captain's 
inquiries  concerning  messages  received  by  the  regimental  com- 
mander or  the  latter's  intentions.  He  simply  remembers  to 
have  heard  that  a  message  had  been  received  from  Lieutenant 

F .     The  enemy  was  not  visible  from  Herzogswalde,  and 

while  the  staff  officer  en  route  through  Reichenthal  saw  what 
had  happened  in  the  troop,  he  saw  nothing  else  concerning  the 
enemy. 

The  officer  who  with  6  troopers  was  sent  to  protect  the 
right  flank  of  the  troop  during  the  pursuit  is  visible  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Passarge  at  the  bend  of  the  highway  northeast  of 
Pittehnen. 

What  are;  Captain  E 's  decisions  and  arrange- 
ments SOUTH  OF  KLOGEHNEN  ABOUT  8.35   A.   M.  ? 

Should  the  captain  follow  the  retreating  troop,  he  would 
drive  it  farther  away  and  prevent  its  obtaining  any  insight  into 
the  movements  of  the  regiment.  But  in  this  event  he  would 
abandon  his  reconnaissance  towards  Guttstadt.  Both  of  these 
enterprises  cannot  be  carried  out  together.  If  the  pursuit  is 
continued  to  the  north,  only  small  patrols  can  be  sent  towards 
Guttstadt,  which  would  not  assure  an  energetic  and  profitable 
reconnaissance.  But,  taking  all  things  into  consideration,  the 
latter  direction  is  of  greater  importance  than  the  one  towards 
Wormditt.     Hostile  infantry  surely  will  not  be  encountered 


8o  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

towards  Wormditt.  If  the  5th  Dragoons  turned  that  way 
from  Heilsberg,  the  road  through  Guttstadt  may  be  all  the  more 
accessible  for  operations  against  the  main  columns  of  the  enemy, 
and  the  troop  may  yet  be  able  to  obtain  timely  information 
about  them.  If  larger  bodies  of  hostile  cavalry  are  approach- 
ing from  Guttstadt,  a  further  pursuit  of  the  defeated  troop 
would  be  useless. 

There  is  an  objection  to  a  continued  advance  to  the  east. 
Soon  after  crcssing  the  Passarge,  communication  with  the  reg- 
iment will  become  precarious,  unless  the  latter  should  follow 
on  the  same  road.  The  captain  does  not  know  whether  this 
will  happen  or  not.  Should  the  regiment  take  a  different  direc- 
tion, the  colonel  might  want  to  have  the  bridge  at  Pittehnen 
held.  Therefore  the  captain  might  conclude  to  halt  until  he 
had  asked  for  further  orders,  as  he  is  but  4^  to  5  miles  from  the 
regiment.  He  can  get  word  in  an  hour  if  the  regiment  has  re- 
mained at  Herzogswalde.  During  this  time  he  can  cover  the 
regiment  from  the  hostile  troop  that  retreated  to  the  north  as 
well  as  from  Guttstadt ;  and  he  can  begin  further  reconnaissance 
in  the  latter  direction  by  sending  out  new  patrols.  Uncon- 
sciously the  mental  lassitude,  observed  by  those  experienced 
in  war  to  fellow  even  successful  engagements,  works  in  favor 
of  the  latter  plan.  The  over-taxed  nerves  clamor  for  their 
rights,  and  it  takes  a  strong  will-power  to  overcome  this 
condition. 

To  ask  for  orders  of  a  superior  and  await  his  reply  is  a 
doubtful  expedient  for  an  enterprising  and  self-reliant  man. 
Often  enough  he  had  urged  his  subordinates  to  independent 
action  and  self-help,  and  in  many  instances  had  shown  them 
what  a  mistake  it  was  to  ask  for  orders.  Is  it  possible  that  here 
we  have  the  exception  that  authorizes  or  calls  for  a  departure 
from  the  rule?  The  captain  tries  to  imagine  himself  in  the 
colonel's  position  when  the  latter  received  the  request.  At  the 
most  he  will  communicate  the  plans  he  has  formed  in  the  mean- 


Reconnaissance.  8i 

time,  but  he  hardly  will  be  able  to  give  minute  instructions  as 
to  the  future  conduct  of  the  troop.  He  knows  less  about  the 
situation  at  Pittehnen  than  the  captain,  and  does  not  know 
what  information  has  been  received  there  since  the  request 
was  made,  or  that  may  be  received  during  the  next  half-hour. 
Very  likely,  therefore,  he  will  refer  the  captain  to  his  general 
instructions,  and  emphatically  call  his  attention  to  the  fact 
that  all  details  are  left  exclusively  to  him.  Possibly  the  request 
will  shake  the  colonel's  confidence  in  the  captain,  and  induce 
the  former  against  his  will  to  give  detailed  instructions  that 
later  seem  impracticable  and  only  place  the  captain  in  a  worse 
predicament  than  before. 

To  be  sure,  we  here  have  to  deal  with  a  sin  of  omission  en 
the  part  of  the  colonel  or  his  adjutant;  namely,  that  the  staff 
officer  sent  to  Pittehnen  was  not  carefully  informed  about  the 
information  that  had  been  received  at  regimental  headquarters, 
or  the  colonel's  further  plans — an  error  with  which  also  the 
staff  officer  himself  is  to  be  blamed.  Had  the  latter  been  able 
to  inform  the  captain  concerning  the  situation,  the  latter  would 
have  been  able  to  decide  more  readily.  But  no  matter  how 
much  such  mistakes  are  to  be  regretted,  and  how  much  damage 
they  may  do,  they  always  will  happen.  Every  leader  must  be 
prepared  for  them  and  know  how  to  deal  with  them. 

If  the  captain  has  been  at  all  in  doubt,  he  will  be  brought 
to  a  decision  by  the  fact  that,  in  case  the  regiment  in  the  mean- 
time should  have  left  Herzcgswalde,  he  might  have  to  wait 
hours  for  an  answer,  and  that  in  any  event  valuable  time  again 
would  have  been  lost.  Should  the  regiment  follow  via  Pit- 
tehnen, communication  is  not  threatened;  should  it  advance 
via  Sackstein  or  Kallisten,  the  troop  in  going  towards  Gutt- 
stadt  would  more  quickly  regain  communication  than  if  it 
remained  at  Pittehnen.  If,  contrary  to  all  expectation,  the 
regiment  should  turn  towards  Wormditt,  as  might  happen  if 
positive  and  conclusive  inf.  rmation  should  demand  it,  the  troop 


82  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

is  all  the  more  obliged  to  reconnciter  towards  Guttstadt.  Fi- 
nally, the  message  to  be  sent  by  the  staff  officer  to  the  colonel 
will  enable  the  latter  to  make  any  arrangements  necessary  to 
further  the  troop's  action. 

But  the  troop  commander  will  not  let  the  staff  officer  go 
until  the  latter  fully  understands  the  former's  plans  and 
arrangements. 

The  most  important  thing  is  the  route  to  be  taken  by  the 
troop.  The  smooth  highway  favors  speed  and  apparently  af- 
fords a  good  view.  But  it  has  already  been  mentioned  that 
reconncitering  parties  as  far  as  possible  should  avoid  the  high- 
ways. It  is  fair  to  assume  that  the  hostile  troop  encountered 
near  Pittehnen  will  be  followed  by  a  larger  body  of  cavalry, 
and  this  can  be  more  readily  discovered  and  its  strength  esti- 
mated from  the  country  to  one  side  of  the  road  than  by  a  direct 
encounter  with  it  on  the  road.  The  vigilance  of  point  and 
flankers  may  guard  against  surprise,  but  they  are  not  suited 
for  careful  and  thorough  reconnaissance  work,  because  they  are 
forced  to  defend  themselves  against  hostile  patrols  that  are 
striving  to  prevent  observation.  The  enemy's  eyes,  the  same 
as  our  own,  most  carefully  scan  the  highway  and  would  dis- 
cover our  troop  all  too  soon.  But  the  best  way  to  observe  the 
enemy  is  from  a  place  of  concealment.  The  highway  can  be 
farther  and  better  overlooked  from  the  heights  to  the  south 
than  to  the  north  of  it  and  the  southern  route  will  more 
promptly  establish  communication  through  Sackstein,  whence 
no  further  information  has  been  received. 

Therefore  the  captain  decides  at  first  to  ride  to  Kleinefeld, 
which  he  hopes  to  reach  unobserved.  But  before  beginning 
his  march  he  must  attend  to  several  things. 

What  shall  be  done  with  the  prisoners  ?  As  the  troop  had 
an  interpreter,  it  is  unlikely  that  more  will  be  found  out  from 
them  at  regimental  headquarters  than  has  already  been  learned. 
The  regimental  staff  will  hardly  have  time  to  bother  with  them, 


Reconnaissance  83 

and,  besides,  it  is  uncertain  where  the  regiment  will  be  fcund. 
Therefore  it  seems  best  to  send  them  back  to  the  army  corps. 

Sergeant  L 's  patrol  is  still  at  Liebstadt.     He  can  send 

back  the  prisoners  through  Gr.  Hermenau  to  Mohrungen  by 
means  of  the  police  or  citizens  assisted  by  a  trooper.  They 
will  be  taken  to  Liebstadt  in  a  wagon  from  Pittehnen,  escort- 
ed by  3  troopers,  who  are  promptly  to  return  to  Pittehnen  and 
report  to  Corporal  P .  These  troopers  will  inform  the  non- 
commissioned officer  at  Liebstadt  of  the  situation  and  the  cap- 
tain's further  intentions.     Corporal  P is  informed  of  this, 

and  is  ordered  to  remain  at  Pittehnen  with  3  troopers  as  a  con- 
necting-post and  to  secure  the  way  across  the  Passarge.  This 
detail  includes  the  two  men  whose  horses  were  injured  in  the 
pursuit.     The  captured  horses  are  turned  over  to   Corporal 

P as  remounts  for  the  two  men.     The  3  troopers  detailed 

to  escort  the  prisoners,  upon  returning,  will  form  part  of  the 
connecting-pcst.  Corporal  P is  cautioned  that  all  mes- 
sages of  importance  for  corps  headquarters  must  be  sent  to 
Mohrungen,  particularly  if  communication  with  the  regiment 
becomes  uncertain.  For  this  purpose  it  is  advisable  to  use  the 
telegraph  from  Liebstadt. 

It  is  not  the  great  distance,  but  the  unsafe  road,  that  leads 
to  the  establishment  of  a  post  at  the  Passarge  bridge.  Later 
in  the  day  it  may  prove  useful  as  a  means  of  communication 
with  the  army  corps. 

Finally,  instructions  must  be  sent  Sergeant  K ,  who 

was  ordered  to  follow  the  hostile  troop,  and  the  message  to  be 
taken  back  by  the  staff  officer  must  be  written. 

It  is  recommended  that  both  these  messages  be  writ- 
ten  IN   FULL,   AND,   TO   SHOW  HOW  LONG  IT  TAKES,   THAT  THE 

WRITING  BE  TIMED. 

PlTTEHEN, 
5  May,  8-40  a.  m. 

To  Sergeant  K : 

Troop  A  will  continue  its  advance  towards  Guttstadt  via  Kleinefeld. 
You  will  keep  touch  with  the  defeated  troop  and  protect  the  regiment  to- 


84  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

wards  the  north.  Messages  should  be  sent  to  the  regiment  through  Ser- 
geant L ,  at  Liebstadt,  or  Corporal  P ,  at  Pittehnen.     At  8  a.  in. 

the  regiment  was  at  Herzogswalde.  The  3  troopers  that  the  chief  of  the 
3d  platoon  sent  to  follow  the  enemy  towards  Stollen  are  placed  under  your 
orders.     The  bearer  of  this  message  should  return  to  the  connecting-post 

at  Pittehnen.  E , 

Captain. 


Pittehnen, 
5  May,  S-55  a.  m. 
To  Adjutant,  1st  Cavalry: 

After  being  delayed  by  a  group  of  hostile  troopers  at  Naglack,  this 
troop  arrived  at  Reichenthal  at  about  8  a.  m.  and  attacked  a  hostile  troop 
that  was  advancing  from  Pittehnen  on  the  highway  towards  Blumen.  The 
enemy  escaped  to  the  north  and  was  pursued  as  far  as  Klogehnen.  He  has 
disappeared  towards  Stollen.  Sergeant  K and  9  troopers  are  follow- 
ing to  keep  touch  with  the  enemy  and  protect  the  regiment  towards  the 
north.  Three  prisoners  state  that  the  enemy  consisted  of  Troop  No.  2, 
5th  Dragoons,  which  left  Heilsberg  early  this  morning,  where  it  had  passed 
the  night  with  the  entire  regiment.  The  prisoners  neither  can  describe 
the  route  they  followed  to-day,  nor  tell  where  they  were  night  before 
last,  or  where  their  regiment,  which  they  have  not  seen  to-day,  now  is. 
They  apparently  know  nothing  else  of  importance.  I  am  sending  the 
prisoners  to  Mohrungen  via  Liebstadt,  and  shall  advance  via  Kleinefeld 

towards  Guttstadt.     A  connecting- post,  under  Corporal  P ,  is  left  at 

Pittehnen,  to  which  point  please  send  information  concerning  future  move- 
ment of  the  regiment  and  of  any  important  messages  received.  I  shall 
attempt  to  establish  communication  with  the  regiment  through  Sackstein. 
I  have  not  yet  received  any  word  from  the  right  bank  of  the  Passarge. 
Below  Sackstein  the  stream  can  be  crossed  only  on  bridges,  excepting  at 
Kalkstein,  where  there  are  said  to  be  two  fords. 

Captain. 
It  took  me  about  5  minutes  to  write  the  instructions  to 

Sergeant  K ,  and  the  message  to  the  adjutant  took  nearly 

15  minutes.  Some  may  be  able  to  do  it  in  less  time.  It  is  not 
so  much  the  actual  writing,  as  a  careful  consideration  of  the 
subject-matter,  that  takes  time.  In  the  field,  additional  time 
will  be  consumed  by  all  sorts  of  interruptions  and  the  observa- 
tion of  terrain  and  enemy.  All  this  must  be  borne  in  mind  by 
both  the  sender  and  receiver.  It  is  desirable  to  diminish  the 
time  required  as  much  as  possible.  But  can  this  best  be  done 
by  shortening  the  wording?  Searching  for  the  shortest  form 
of  expression  might  take  longer  than  rapidly  writing  several 


Reconnaissance.  85 

longer  sentences,  and  might  result  in  ambiguities  similar  to 
these  often  arising  from  the  so-called  telegraphic  style.  It  is 
most  appropriate  to  say,  "Please  excuse  this  long  letter;  I 
haven't  time  to  write  a  shorter  one."  It  is  hardly  possible  to 
omit  anything  contained  in  the  foregoing  messages. 

But  the  question  arises  whether  the  captain  might  not 
have  saved  the  1 5  valuable  minutes  taken  in  writing  the  second 
message,  by  letting  the  staff  officer  carry  back  a  verbal  report. 
As  we  here  have  an  officer,  and  above  all,  the  colonel's  selected 
staff  officer,  to  take  back  word,  the  captain  certainly  would  be 
authorized  in  sending  a  verbal  message  to  his  superior.  No 
one  would  blame  the  captain  if  he  considered  such  verbal  mes- 
sage sufficient.  But  his  confidence  in  the  staff  officer  may  have 
been  somewhat  shaken  by  the  latter's  imperfect  knowledge  of 
the  situation,  for  a  reliable  and  energetic  officer  would  not  have 
left  Herzogswalde  in  such  blissful  ignorance.  The  captain  is 
the  responsible  party,  and  he  would  be  blamed  for  any  mis- 
understanding caused  by  inaccurate  transmission  of  the  mes- 
sage. He  knows  what  a  valuable  document  a  written  message 
is.  Possibly  he  already  has  learned  by  experience  that  such  a 
document  may  serve  as  a  protection  against  unmerited  censure ; 
and,  even  if  this  consideration  would  not  be  the  motive  for  a 
high-minded  man's  course  of  action,  still,  the  thought  of  his 
reputation  as  a  careful  commander  justified  his  course.  The 
troop  cannot  start  at  once ;  it  must  first  let  the  point  and  flank- 
ers gain  the  necessary  lead.  This  allows  some  time  in  which 
to  restore  order  after  the  pursuit,  and  enables  horses  and  men 
to  somewhat  recover  from  its  effects.  It  also  affords  some  time 
for  writing  the  message  which  is  dictated  to  two  men  so  that  a 
copy  can  be  retained  by  the  first  sergeant. 

While  the  latter  forms  the  troop  under  cover  near  Pit- 
tehnen,  the  captain  has  an  opportunity  to  commend  his  men 
for  their  meritorious  conduct,  and  to  order  the  horses  to  be 
watered,  before  joining  the  officer  whom  he  has  intrusted  with 


86  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

keeping  watch  towards  Guttstadt.  He  finds  the  latter  and  the 
6  troopers  at  the  bend  of  the  road  northeast  of  Pittehnen. 

The  captain  took  alcng  Lieutenant  B and  his  6  men  of 

Troop  B,  as  well  as  2  non-commissicned  officers  and  io  men  of 
his  own  troop,  to  promptly  make  the  necessary  arrangements 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Passarge. 

The  officer,  Lieutenant  S ,  reports  that  two  hostile 

troopers  were  visible  for  a  few  minutes  on  Height  no  south 
of  Elditten;  but  that  he  had  seen  nothing  else  of  the  enemy. 
The  captain  scans  the  country,  excepting  a  number  of  depres- 
sions, as  far  north  as  Klogehnen,  and  to  Height  in  north  of 
Schwenkitten,  then  from  the  grove  on  the  road  to  Dittrichsdorf 
beyond  Height  1 1 1  to  the  border  of  the  woods  on  the  slope  of 
Hasenberg,*  as  far  as  half-way  between  Elditten  and  Kleinefeld 
and  as  far  as  Height  no  south  of  Elditten.  There  is  nothing 
suspicious  to  be  seen  anywhere,  and  the  occupants  of  the  neigh- 
boring farm  do  not  know  anything  more  than  what  the  captain 
already  has  learned.  To  the  rear  the  view  extends  as  far  as  the 
highway  at  Gr.  Pragsden  and  Wuchsnig.  There  is  nothing  to 
be  seen  of  the  regiment. 

The  captain  requests  the  staff  officer  to  listen  to  his  next 
arrangements  and  then  to  rapidly  ride  back  to  the  colonel. 

What  arrangements  does  Captain  E make  at  the 

BEND  OF  THE  HIGHWAY  NORTHEAST  OF  PlTTEHNEN? 

So  far  the  patrols  in  front  of  the  troop,  whose  arc  had  been 
partly  penetrated  by  the  h'  stile  troop,  have  been  detained  by 
the  Passarge.  The  assembled  blue  troop,  after  driving  the 
enemy  away,  has  entered  the  outer  zone  of  the  reconnoitering 
screen  and  its  own  safety  as  well  as  a  continuation  of  the  recon- 
naissance calls  for  a  rearrangement  of  the  service  in  its  front. 
We  can  resort  to  the  regulation  plan  of  sending  out  patrols  in 
fan-shape  order:  one  patrol  via  Arnsdorf-Freymarkt  towards 

*"Hasen  B."  on  map. 


Reconnaissance.  87 

Schmolainen,  one  along  the  Wolfsdorf-Guttstadt  highway,  one 
via  Kleinefeld-Warlack  towards  Glottau,  and  possibly  a  fifth 
via  Hohenfeld-Waltersmi'ihl  towards  Heiligenthal-Rosengarth. 
These  wculd  form  the  orthodox  screen  and  would  sufficiently 
protect  the  body  of  the  troop,  following  at  some  distance,  from 
surprise.  But  on  closer  examination  of  existing  conditions  we 
see  that  such  a  typical  formation  is  not  suited  to  this  case. 

Even  in  figuring  on  a  minimum  strength  for  these  patrols, 
we  hardly  wculd  have  each  one  consist  of  less  than  a  leader  and 
5  men ;  taking  30  men  in  all.  This  would  reduce  the  strength 
of  the  main  body  of  the  troop  to  an  unwarranted  extent.  But 
even  patrols  of  6  men,  if  the  distance  from  their  support  in- 
creases, cannot  perform  their  duty  properly  and  will  become 
helpless  as  soon  as  they  have  sent  back  two  or  three  messages. 
And,  as  for  sending  these  messages  by  2  men  each,  as  should 
be  done  in  close  proximity  to  the  enemy,  this  is  entirely  out  of 
the  question. 

But  at  least  the  patrol  sent  via  Arnsdorf-Freymarkt  to- 
wards Heilsberg  would  have  to  be  considerably  stronger,  as  it 
prcbably  could  not  return  to-day.  If  the  captain  does  not 
wish  to  see  his  command  melt  away  in  small  detachments,  he 
must  adopt  a  different  system. 

Of  what  use  is  the  typical  net-work  of  small  patrols  whose 
threads  cross  all  avenues  leading  towards  the  enemy?  Practi- 
cally only  as  a  means  of  protection.  These  small  groups  ac- 
complish relatively  little  in  the  way  of  obtaining  information — 
the  hostile  screen  will  see  to  this.  Even  if  the  latter  is  raised 
a  little  here  and  there,  thus  affording  the  patrols  an  extended 
glimpse,  it  will  seldom  happen  that  the  messenger  sent  back 
will  bring  the  information  obtained  on  time. 

On  page  35  mention  has  already  been  made  of  the  small 
value  of  reconnaissance  by  junior  non-commissioned  officers 
without  map  or  field-glasses,  and  without  comprehensive  mili- 
tary judgment. 


88  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

The  united  trccp  is  able  to  tear  the  hostile  screen,  and  the 
captain,  who,  with  his  practiced  eye  is  able  to  judge  the  com- 
plete situation,  exposes  the  enemy's  cards  if  he  personally  ar- 
rives on  the  spot  where  there  is  something  to  be  seen.  It  is  a 
very  different  matter  if  he  can  report,  "I  have  seen,"  than  if  he 
must  repeat  the  incomplete  and  frequently  contradictory  re- 
ports of  his  non-commissioned  officers.  It  therefore  seems  best 
that  the  captain  personally  undertake  the  reconnaissance  at  the 
head  of  his  troop  south  of  the  Pittehnen-Guttstadt  highway, 
and  for  the  same  purpose  intrusting  an  officer  with  a  large  patrol 
north  of  this  highway.  The  men  detailed  to  protect  the  march 
of  the  troop  will  confine  themselves  to  narrow  limits  and,  like 
the  latter,  will  try  as  far  as  possible  to  remain  unseen.  It  is 
unnecessary  to  send  a  patrol  along  the  highway,  as  this  is  visible 
from  the  road  through  Kleinefeld,  and  would  unnecessarily 
attract  the  enemy's  attention. 

In  many  other  cases  a  similar  method  to  the  foregoing 
might  be  applicable,  but  it  would  be  folly  to  think  of  deducing 
a  general  rule  from  it.  More  valuable  than  the  recognition  of 
the  suitability  of  the  foregoing  scheme  is  this:  that  it  is  more 
easy  to  ride  on  the  road  of  careful  thought  and  conformity  than 
in  the  ruts  of  conventionality. 

The  captain  orders  Lieutenant  S to  take  i  non-com- 
missioned officer  and  8  men  and  ride  ahead  to  Elditten,  to  ob- 
serve from  that  point — using  the  church-tower  for  this  purpose. 
He  intends  to  follow  with  the  troop  and  go  to  Kleinefeld  under 
cover  alongside  the  road,  with  a  point  1,000  to  1,500  yards  in 
advance.  A  flanking  patrol  will  be  sent  via  Hohenfeld  to  keep 
the  Passarge  valley  and  its  left  bank  under  observation  and 
permit  of  visual  communication  with  the  regiment,  should  it 
advance  via  Pittehnen  of  Sackstein. 

To  Lieutenant  B ,  who,  with  his  6  troopers,  has  gone 

a  comparatively  short  distance  to-day,  the  captain  assigns  1 


Reconnaissance.  89 

non-commissioned  officer  and  8  men  of  his  own  troop,  and  sends 
him  to  reconnoiter  north  of  the  Guttstadt  highway. 

What  instructions  does  the  Captain  give  to  Lieu- 
tenant B ? 

"We  have  learned  from  prisoners  that  during  the  past 
night  the  5th  Dragoons  was  at  Heilsberg.  We  have  not  found 
out  whence  the  regiment  came,  where  it  is  to-day,  or  to  what 
larger  unit  it  belongs.  The  hostile  cavalry  might  advance 
from  Heilsberg  towards  Wormditt  or  Liebstadt,  or  via  Gutt- 
stadt. It  is  important  that  this  point  be  cleared  up  for  our 
colonel,  but  it  is  more  important  that  corps  headquarters  find 
out  something  about  the  infantry  columns  following,  over  what 
roads  they  are  advancing,  and  where  the  heads  of  columns  are. 
I  am  going  towards  Guttstadt  with  the  troop,  and  for  the  pres- 
ent shall  remain  south  of  the  highway.  You  will  reconnoiter 
the  country  north  to  include  the  Wormditt-Freymarkt-Heils- 
berg  highway  and  east  to  the  Alle.  If  you  have  time,  you  will 
also  tbserve  the  Guttstadt-Heilsberg  road,  which  you  may  be 
able  to  do  by  going  via  Sperlings  to  Liewenberg.  Friendly  in- 
habitants were  unable  to  give  any  information  west  of  the  Pas- 
sarge.  Now  that  hostile  advance  patrols  have  passed  by,  more 
may  be  learned  by  questioning  the  inhabitants.  If  you  find 
the  road  at  Freymarkt  and  the  Alle  crossings  free  of  the  en- 
emy, you  must  report  the  fact — you  yourself  must  decide  when 
your  patrol  shall  return.  The  prospect  of  discovering  some- 
thing of  importance  and  the  condition  of  your  horses  may  de- 
cide you  to  pass  the  night  in  an  advanced  village.  I  wish  to 
remind  you  that  it  is  not  important  to  investigate  details,  but 
that  you  should  find  out  the  general  situation  as  conclusively 
as  possible. 

"Send  your  messages  to  the  relay  station  at  Pittehnen. 
Should  this  have  been  discontinued,  or  the  road  be  barred, 

you  must  not  search  for  the  troop  or  regiment,  but  the  mes- 

—7— 


9o  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

sengers  should  endeavor  to  forward  messages  to  corps  head- 
quarters at  Mchrungen;  for  this  purpose  reach  Iyiebstadt  and 

thence  wire  to  Mohrungen.      Sergeant  L and  6  men  are 

at  Liebstadt.  It  is  reported  that  there  are  two  fords  across  the 
Passarge  at  Kalkstein." 

These  might  be  the  verbal  instructions  for   Lieutenant 

B ,  and  presumably  they  are  longer  than  those  composed 

by  the  majority  of  my  readers.  Therefore,  referring  to  what 
I  have  said  on  page  19  concerning  the  "telegraphic  style," 
and  to  my  draught  of  previous  messages,  I  wish  further  to 
justify  the  above  instructions. 

Very  properly  stress  is  laid  on  military  brevity.  But  who- 
ever has  learned  by  experience,  as  I  have,  will  admit  that  brevity 
may  be  overdone  and  become  a  useless  formula.  How  often 
mistakes  have  arisen  from  short  commands  even  on  the  drill- 
ground,  where  a  few  clear  sentences  would  have  explained 
matters.  Whoever  reads  the  orders  and  instructions  of  great 
commanders,  handed  down  to  us  in  history,  sometimes  is  sur- 
prised at  their  minuteness,  deviating  very  much  from  the  scant 
style  of  our  maneuver^  and  map  problems.  When  the  Prusso- 
German  Army  began  its  last  great  war,  a  lack  of  skill  and  un- 
certainty in  composing  orders  became  manifest  in  many  cases, 
which,  as  soon  as  recognized,  was  earnestly  combated  and 
remedied  by  careful  instruction.  Our  Army  Regulations  de- 
voted much  attention  to  this  important  point;  and  in  the 
General  Staff  and  the  military  schools,  as  well  as  with  tioops, 
strenuous  efforts  were  made  to  iemedy  the  defects.  Therefoie 
gteat  progress  has  been  made  in  the  art  of  issuing  orders  in  the 
German  Army.  Even  the  candidate  for  a  commission  is  re- 
quired to  understand  it  on  his  entrance  examination,  and  on 
maneuvers  the  wording  of  orders  takes  up  much  of  the  critique. 

The  progress  attained  by  years  of  study  is  unmistakable. 
But  on  many  occasions  I  have  found  out  that  this  art  is  merely 
a  matter  of  form,  that  many  points  contained  in  some  orders 


Reconnaissance.  91 

based  upon  the  prescribed  models  were  superfluous  and  that 
other  points  were  missing  that  happen  not  to  be  mentioned  in 
these  models.  I  wish  to  call  attention  to  the  provisions  of  the 
Field  Service  Regulations  relating  to  Letters  of  Instructions,* 
in  place  of  orders,  a  form  that  is  but  little  used  any  more,  but 
which  I  believe  should  be  used  not  only  with  larger  commands, 
but  also  with  smaller  ones — particularly  in  reconnaissance  duty 
and  verbal  communications  in  general. 

An  ordinary  conversational  form  often  is  clearer  and  more 
easily  understood  than  the  brief  order-form,  which,  besides, 
deters  a  subordinate  from  asking  for  elucidation  or  further  ex- 
planation, and  which  seldom  affords  insight  into  the  situation 
or  the  commander's  plans.  Whoever  has  seen  General  von 
Goeben,  one  of  our  most  prominent  commanders,  in  trying 
times,  will  never  forget  the  friendly  and  instructive  manner  in 
which  he  gave  his  instructions  and  orders,  thus  helping  his 
subordinates  to  a  successful  cooperation.  The  general  had  the 
reputation  of  being  taciturn,  but  his  orders  in  time  of  war — 
particularly  his  verbal  ones — often  assumed  the  form  of  in- 
structions without  losing  definiteness  of  character. 

Particularly  Gceben's  example  called  my  attention  to  this 
point,  and  I  must  caution  you  not  to  sacrifice  necessary  details 
to  brevity  and  terseness. 

It  is  possible  that  my  draft  of  instructions  to  Lieutenant 

B ,  if  included  in  a  report  on  a  maneuver,  or  delivered  before 

an  inspector,  would  be  unfavorably  criticised.  Instructions 
something  like  the  following  would  be  more  favorably  received: 

"The  troop  will  advance  south  of  the  Pittehnen-Gutt- 
stadt  highway ;  you  will  reconnoiter  north  of  the  same  towards 
Freymarkt-Heilsberg. " 

I  admit  that  this  form  would  do  if  Lieutenant  B were 

a  specially  capable  officer,  who  looked  out  for  everything  else 
himself;  who  realized  how  important  it  is  to  get  a  glimpse  be- 

*See  par.  29,  F.  S.  R. 


92  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

hind  the  hostile  cavalry,  to  find  the  infantry  columns  and  the 
crossings  of  the  Alle,  to  get  a  view  of  the  Heilsberg-Guttstadt 
highway,  to  report  to  corps  headquarters,  to  remain  out  all 
night  if  necessary,  to  question  inhabitants,  and  to  make  use 
of  the  telegraph  line  from  Ltebstadt.  But  if  the  captain  is  not 
absolutely  certain  of  such  exceptional  intelligence  in  his  subordi- 
nates, it  would  be  better  for  him  to  impart  some  of  his  own 
intelligence  and  knowledge.  Besides,  cooperation  would  be 
more  likely  to  result.  The  captain  by  all  means  must  tell  the 
officer  what  he  found  out  from  the  prisoners,  and  he  ought  to 
say  more  about  the  situation  in  general  than  is  contained  in 

my  draft,  were  it  not  fair  to  assume  that  Lieutenant  B 

already  had  this  information  from  the  colonel,  who  had  sent 
him  ahead.  Neither  would  it  do  to  omit  instructions  concern- 
ing the  messengers'  route. 

I  am  not  in  favor  of  instructions  covering  all  sorts  of  pos- 
sible contingencies;  but  the  omission  of  a  useful  hint  is  more 
questionable  than  the  addition  of  a  sentence  that  on  close  in- 
spection proves  to  be  superfluous.  Excessive  brevity  as  easily 
causes  doubt  as  verbosity. 

But  the  abbreviated  form  of  instructions,  with  addition 
of  messengers'  route,  may  do  for  the  lieutenant's  note-book  and 
the  first  sergeant's  letter-book. 


After  discussing  a  number  of  important  events  at  the  ex- 
treme front  of  the  cavalry  reconnoitering  parties,  we  must 
return  to  regimental  headquarters;  but  in  doing  so,  you  must 
try  to  forget  in  your  deliberations  and  discussions  what  has 
been  said  as  having  happened  at  the  front,  very  much  as  you 
would  a  vivid  and  impressive  dream.  To  help  produce  this 
effect,  let  us  assume  for  the  time  being  that  entirely  different 
reports  concerning  the  enemy  and  our  own  patrols  have  been 
received. 


Reconnaissance.  93 

Then  it  is  recommended  that  pages  9  to  15  be  re- read  to 
refresh  the  memory. 

During  the  night  (May  4th-5th)  the  messages  received  by 
Captain  E from  Elbing  also  came  to  regimental  headquar- 
ters ;  viz.,  that  telegraphic  communication  had  been  interrupted 
with  Konigsberg  and  Pr.  Eylau  since  early  on  May  4th  and  with 
Landsberg  since  noon  the  same  day;  that  hostile  troopers  had 
seen  seen  at  the  latter  place;  that  the  telegraph  line  was  de- 
stroyed between  Mehlsack  and  Wormditt  on  the  evening  of 
May  4th;  and  that  the  enemy  had  not  appeared  at  Mehlsack 
itself  as  late  as  2  a.  m.  May  5th.  The  following  telegram  is 
received  from  corps  headquarters: 

The  cavalry  of  the  ist  Division  and  at  least  one  troop  from  the  2d 
Division  will  reconnoiter  via  Pfeilings  towards  Jonkendorf-Munsterberg 
on  the  5th  inst. 

Colonel  A was  not  awakened  on  account  of  these  mes- 
sages. They  were  not  shown  him  until  after  4  a.  m.,  when  the 
following  was  received: 

Drenken, 
5  May,  3-30  a.  m. 
Shall  leave  at  5  a.  m.  with  3  troops  to  reconnoiter  via  Pfeilings  to- 
wards Jonkendorf-Munsterberg. 

D , 

Major  2>d  Cavalry. 

The  regimental  commander  considers  it  desirable  to  have 
a  personal  interview  with  the  major,  whose  message  should  be 
acknowledged.  He  therefore  sends  back  word  by  the  return- 
ing messenger  asking  the  major  to  overtake  him  on  the  road 
to  Mohrungen. 

There  are  no  further  arrangements  necessary  at  this  time 
(about  4  a.  m.) ;  still,  corps  headquarters  is  informed  by  wire 
that  there  is  no  change  in  the  situation  and  that  the  regiment 
will  start  on  time.  A  messenger  would  not  have  been  sent  for 
this  purpose,  but,  the  telegraph  line  being  convenient,  this 
report  of  minor  importance  is  sent  by  wire.     It  is  not  without 


94  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

value  for  corps  headquarters  to  learn  that  nothing  has  hap- 
pened to  interfere  with  the  execution  of  existing  orders. 

Before  starting,  the  regimental  adjutant  reports  that  Lieu- 
tenant F had  wired  from  Gr.  Hermenau  at  4  a.  m.,  asking 

to  be  informed  by  wire  of  any  further  information  received 
since  his  departure  and  stating  that  he  had  neither  seen  nor 
heard  anything  of  the  enemy.  So  far  telegraphic  communica- 
tion with  Mohrungen  and  Liebstadt  as  well  as  with  Horn  has 
not  been  interrupted.     Upon  inquiry  it  has  been  learned  that 

Lieutenant  C left  the  latter  station  at  3  a.  m.     Trocp  A, 

1st  Cavalry,  left  Maldeuten  at  4  a.  m.,  as  ordered. 

On  his  way  to  Gr.  Wilmsdorf  the  colonel  and  his  staff  ride 
past  the  different  troops  which  already  have  largely  joined  the 
column  and  dismounted  upon  arriving  at  their  respective  places, 
as  is  always  done  without  orders  upon  halting,  unless  it  be  neces- 
sary to  be  in  immediate  readiness  for  action.  Promptly  at  5 
a.  m.  Colonel  A arrives  at  Gr.  AVilmsdorf.  Unless  unavoid- 
able, he  purposely  tries  never  to  arrive  before  the  time  named 
by  himself,  so  as  to  avoid  even  the  suspicion  of  being  nervous 
or  perturbed,  and  not  to  interfere  with  the  routine  duties  of  his 
staff.  The  squadron  commanders  report  at  Gr.  Wilmsdorf, 
stating  that  nothing  of  importance  has  happened  among  the 

troops.     Troop  C,  Captain  W commanding,  has  been  sent 

forward  half  way  to  Gr.  Bestendorf  to  protect  the  regiment 
while  assembling.  A  platoon  of  Troop  D  is  at  the  railway  sta- 
tion of  Maldeuten  for  the  same  purpose.  This  station  is  occu- 
pied by  a  platoon  of  the  organized  militia. 

What  arrangements  does  Colonel  A make   at 

5  A.   M.  ? 

The  German  Field  Service  Regulations  say  practically 
nothing  about  the  manner  in  which  cavalry  divisions,  or  sub- 
divisions of  the  same,  shall  protect  their  march ;  one  is  tempted 
to  add,  "fortunately."     Here,  where  everything  depends  en 


Reconnaissance.  95 

circumstances,  every  regulation,  no  matter  how  carefully 
worded,  would  be  a  detriment.  But,  in  spite  of  the  notable 
absence  of  instructions,  there  is  hardly  a  cavalry  officer  who 
would  be  helpless  in  the  face  of  the  pn.blem.  Most  of  them 
certainly  would  devise  suitable  arrangements,  even  though 
differing  from  each  other.  And  yet  the  protection  of  the 
march  of  cavalry  is  by  no  means  easier  or  simpler  than  that 
of  a  force  of  all  arms,  whose  work  in  this  particular  to  a  great 
extent  is  performed  by  the  cavalry  sent  in  advance.  We  might 
almost  believe  that  the  detailed  and  comprehensive  instructions 
of  our  Field  Service  Regulations,  for  the  protection  of  the  march 
of  the  main  columns  of  an  army,  unconsciously  are  based  on  a 
long-sinee-forgotten  system  of  peace  training  and  on  a  convicti  n 
of  its  being  innocuous.  My  contemporaries  may  remember  the 
careful  method  of  examining  localities  along  the  line  of  march, 
and  which  no  body  of  troops  was  allowed  to  pass  until  point 
and  flankers  had  sent  back  word  that  everything  was  all  right. 
This  method  was  conscientiously  followed  for  a  whole  day  by 
the  division  to  which  I  belonged  in  the  campaign  of  1866.  We 
had  started  at  3  a.  m.  and  at  6  p.  m.  we  reached  our  destination, 
12  miles  away.  But,  beginning  with  the  following  morning, 
no  one  ever  thought  of  the  carefully  practiced  rule  which  never- 
theless has  been  partly  resurrected  in  long  paragraphs  of  the 
Field  Service  Regulations,  to  be  sure  in  a  purified  and  better 
form,  so  that  following  it  cannot  result  in  similar  disadvantages. 
But  it  would  be  a  decided  advantage  if  the  present  regulations 
were  condensed  and  all  figures  and  measurements  were  omitted ; 
for  no  one  can  depend  on  these,  but  everyone  is  forced  to  make 
arrangements  en  his  own  judgment  and  responsibility  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  requirements  of  each  case.  As  the  (German) 
Field  Service  Regulations  require  that  cavalry  must  adopt 
such  formation  of  column  and  means  of  protection  as  may 
be  demanded  by  circumstances,  commanders  of  infantry  would 
also  be  able  to  do   this  if  only  the  fundamental    principles 


96  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

of  the  service  of  security  are  established  and  peace  training  as- 
sures an  intelligent  and  certain  execution  of  the  same.  Later 
I  shall  return  to  this  subject,  but  think  it  appropriate  to  refer 
to  the  subject  here  so  as  to  call  the  cavalry  leader's  attention 
to  the  value  cf  the  independence  authorized  by  the  Regulations. 

The  measures  adopted  to  obtain  information  also  help  in 
the  matter  of  security  or  protection,  but  are  not  sufficient. 
The  troops  must  not  be  surprised  by  the  enemy  and  must  ex- 
tend a  second  and  closer  series  of  tentacles,  finer  meshed  and 
more  reliable,  to  serve  as  a  second  network  of  reconncitering 
bodies.  The  subdivisions  of  this  system  will  differ  according 
to  the  country  and  circumstances,  and  require  a  more  permanent 
organization  and  supervision. 

As  the  commander  of  a  larger  body  of  troops  cannot  per- 
sonally attend  to  the  details  of  this  service,  he  intrusts  it  to  the 
care  of  one  or  more  subordinates,  and,  as  it  is  not  a  question  of 
independent  action,  and  to  avoid  unnecessary  expenditure  of 
energy,  the  detachments  for  this  purpose  are  made  as  small  as 
circumstances  will  permit. 

Colonel  A wishes  to  intrust  Troop  C,  which  already  is 

in  front,  with  the  duty  of  protecting  the  march  of  the  regiment. 
But  the  troop  will  be  unable  to  satisfactorily  perform  this  duty 
towards  the  north,  the  exposed  flank,  of  the  regiment.  The 
platoon  of  Troop  D  at  the  Maldeuten  railway  statkn  is  c.  n- 
veniently  situated  to  assist  in  this  matter.  But  the  latter  easily 
might  need  reinforcement,  and  if  it  remained  under  the  imme- 
diate command  of  the  colonel,  the  latter,  contrary  to  his  wishes, 
would  have  to  continually  arrange  the  vari<  us  details.  There- 
fore the  colonel  orders  as  follows: 

"The  regiment  provisionally  will  march  via  Gr.  Bestendcrf 
and  Mohrungen  to  Gr.  Hermenau.  Troop  C  is  detailed  as  ad- 
vance guard.     I  shall  personally  give  the  captain  his  orders. 

Major  W ,  commanding  ist  Squadron,  is  charged  with  the 

protection  of  the  left  flank.     For  this  purpose  he  may  use  the 


Reconnaissance.  97 

platoon  of  Troop  D  now  at  the  Maldeuten  railway  station.  Our 
march  will  begin  at  5.10  a.  m.,  at  a  walk.  Afterwards  the 
gait  will  be  regulated  by  that  of  the  advance  guard,  where  I 
shall  be." 

The  regimental  and  squadron  adjutants  write  down  this 
order. 

Then  the  colonel  joins  Troop  C  and  gives  the  captain  the 
following  orders: 

"Hostile  patrols  arrived  last  night  at  Wormditt,  Guttstadt 
and  Briickendorf.  The  regiment  provisionally  will  march  via 
Gr.  Bestendorf  and  Mohrungen  to  Gr.  Hermenau.  You  will 
form  the  advance  guard  with  your  troop.  Besides  protecting 
our  march  in  front,  it  is  important  that  you  reccnnoiter  the 
defile  between  Narien-see  and  Mahrung-see  and  the  Willnau- 
Kallisten  road.  Lieutenant  C left  the  railway  station  near- 
est Horn  at  3  a.  m.  to-day  to  reconnoiter  via  Briickendorf  to- 
wards Jonkendorf-Gr.  Buchwalde.  There  is  still  telegraphic 
communication  with  the  station  nearest  Horn  via  Mohrungen; 
also  with  Liebstadt.  Troop  A  at  4  a.  m.  advanced  from  Mal- 
deuten to  Gr.  Hermenau  and  will  reconnoiter  towards  Worm- 

ditt-Guttstadt-Munsterberg.     Major  W is  charged  with 

the  protection  of  our  left  flank.  You  will  keep  connection  with 
the  main  body  of  the  regiment.  I  shall  remain  with  your  troop 
and  indicate  the  gait." 

After  having  satisfied  himself  that  Captain  W has 

obtained  no  information  concerning  the  enemy,  so  that  pre- 
sumably the  march  will  not  be  interfered  with  for  the  present, 
the  colonel  sends  the  following  written  order  to  the  officer  in 
charge  of  the  baggage  train: 

The  baggage  train  will  start  at  6  a.  m.,  at  first  following  the  regi- 
ment on  the  Mohrungen-Georgenthal  highway  to  a  point  east  of  the  Moh- 
rungen railway  station. 

It  may  seem  strange  that  no  arrangements  are  made  for 
the  protection  of  the  bagage  train,  which  might  be  attacked 
by  hostile  patrols  from  the  north.     It  also  may  have  been 


98  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

noticed  that  the  regimental  order  of  May  4th  neither  designated 
an  escort  nor  a  commander  for  the  train.* 

With  the  baggage  train  of  a  cavalry  regiment  (sup- 
posedly about  400  yards  long,  but  probably  500  or  600  yards 
long)  there  always  is  a  considerable  number  of  armed  men, 
such  as  men  in  charge  of  led  horses,  convalescents, ,  men  whose 
horses  have  become  disabled,  and  other  detailed  men — probably 
amounting  to  7  or  8  men  per  troop  and  aggregating  80  or  90 
all  told.  If  these  men  are  properly  utilized,  and  not  unneces- 
sarily scattered,  they  will  be  sufficient  to  drive  off  hostile  patrols. 

The  detail  of  8  or  10  troopers  would  not  help  matters  much, 
especially  as  there  always  are  some  mounted  men  with  the  train. 
The  men  with  the  train  would  best  be  commanded  by  an  officer 
and  this  is  the  rule  in  our  field  maneuvers.  But  in  time  of  war 
an  officer  seldom  can  be  spared  for  this  purpose,  as  his  presence 
would  be  badly  missed  in  his  command,  f  whereas  he  probably 
never  would  become  actively  engaged  with  the  enemy  while 
with  the  train.  Why  would  not  one  of  the  paymasters  answer 
the  purpose  ?  All  of  them  are  reliable  non-commissioned  officers 
accustomed  to  command.  Even  for  an  entire  division,  pay- 
masters in  time  of  war  have  often  conducted  trains  with  perfect 
satisfaction.  In  the  regimental  order  no  mention  is  made  of 
a  paymaster  to  command  the  train  because  it  is  assumed  that 
he  has  been  permanently  detailed  for  this  purpose. 

Some  explanation  is  necessary  for  the  colonel's  order  re- 
quiring the  troop  to  preserve  connection  with  the  main  body.| 
This  is  contrary  to  the  requirement  of  the  (German)  Field 
Service  Regulations,  which  provide  that  subdivisions  of  col- 
umns shall  preserve  connection  with  those  farther  to  the  front. 

*But  see  pars.  399,  401,  and  402,  F.  S.  R. 

i'Par.  401,  F.  S.  R.,  provides  that  the  regimental  quartermaster  shall 
control  the  train.  The  Germans  keep  all  their  regimental  staff  with  the 
troops  for  service  with  them. — Translator. 

J  But  see  par.  105,  F.  S.  R.,  where  this  is  prescribed. 


Reconnaissance.  99 

In  woods,  close  country,  at  night,  or  in  a  fog  it  often  happens 
in  larger  commands  that  connection  is  lost.  Who  has  not 
experienced  this?  I  ascribe  the  fault  mainly  to  the  above 
named  requirement.  The  commander  of  the  entire  force  usu- 
ally is  in  front  with  the  advance  guard  and  directs  its  move- 
ments. If  the  commander  of  the  main  body  or  of  its  leading 
unit,  who  but  casually  understands  the  situation  and  knows 
nothing  of  the  information  received,  is  charged  with  preserv- 
ing connection,  he  can  simply  make  the  customary  arrange- 
ments: he  sends  a  few  privates  forward  where  even  an  officer 
at  times  might  be  led  astray.  In  close  country,  in  towns  of 
straggling  villages,  for  example,  the  advance  guard  sends  a 
reccnncitering  detachment  to  one  side,  the  connecting-file  may 
easily  mistake  this  for  the  advance  guard  itself  and,  following 
it,  may  lead  the  entire  main  body  on  a  wrong  road,  for  there 
is  no  one  with  the  latter  who  at  once  would  recognize  the  mis- 
take. But  the  advance-guard  commander  knows  the  road  and 
all  he  has  to  do  is  to  notify  the  main  body  the  moment  there 
is  a  change  of  direction,  or  if  it  becomes  difficult  to  follow.  If 
he  is  held  responsible  for  preserving  connection,  he  will  be 
careful  to  see  that  the  main  body  does  not  lose  its  way,  for  he 
alone,  aside  from  the  commanding  officer,  is  able  to  do  this. 
This  provision  of  the  Field  Service  Regulations  doubtless  is  a 
relic  of  the  time  when  the  commanding  officer,  who  had  to 
know  the  road,  habitually  marched  with  the  main  body  and 
not  with  the  advance  guard. 

Now  let  us  see  what  the  subordinate  commanders  decide 
to  do  in  consequence  of  the  colonel's  orders. 

First:  What  arrangements  does  Major  W ,  com- 
manding First  Squadron,  make? 

The  major  is  charged  with  the  protection  of  the  left  flank 
of  the  regiment.  Here,  naturally,  as  elsewhere,  "protection" 
includes  keeping  the  enemy  at  a  distance  and  preventing  recon- 


ioo  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

naissance  c  n  his  part.  This  need  not  be  impressed  on  an  ex- 
perienced cavalry  officer,  although  good  protection  dees  not 
always  insure  perfect  screening.  For  example,  holding  a  bridge 
may  prevent  all  attacks  by  the  enemy,  while  neighboring 
heights  might  afford  him  ample  opportunity  for  reconnaissance. 

At  first  the  Eestendcrf  Forest  will  form  a  complete  screen 
for  the  regiment;  if  it  is  to  remain  so,  the  enemy  must  be  pre- 
vented from  entering  it  unobserved.  A  protecting  body  there- 
fore must  be  sent  to  the  north  border ;  in  part  also  because  that 
affords  an  extended  view.  As  the  regiment  will  start  at  once 
and  soon  will  go  at  an  increased  gait,  there  is  no  certainty  that 
the  platoon  at  the  Maldeuten  railway  station  will  gain  sufficient 
distance  via  Freywalde  to  insure  its  being  able  to  protect  the 

flank  in  time  and  by  itself.     Therefore  Major  W selects 

a  platoon  of  the  leading  troop  and  instructs  its  commander  as 
follows  in  the  presence  of  the  troop  commander: 

"The  regiment  will  start  at  once  and  at  first  go  as  far  as 
Gr.  Hermenau  via  Gr.  Bestendorf-Mohrungen.  Troop  C, 
which  is  in  advance,  will  form  the  advance  guard.  You  will 
cover  the  left  flank  and  at  first  will  ride  via  Alt-Kelken  to  the 
north  border  of  the  forest  and  then  in  the  general  direction  of 
Steindorf-Rollnau  to  Wiese.  You  will  remain  at  Wiese  until 
further  orders,  reconnoitering  thence  towards  Kahlau,  Gold- 
bach,  and  Silberbach.  The  ist  platoon  of  Troop  D,  which  now 
is  at  the  Maldeuten  railway  station,  will  at  first  follow  you  via 
Freywalde  to  Rollnau  and  protect  the  flank  in  rear  of  you." 

The  ist  platoon  of  Troop  D  receives  orders  conforming 
to  the  foregoing.  It  is  self-evident  that  both  platoons  must 
look  out  for  their  own  protection  towards  the  north  and  must 
observe  the  region  about  Hagenau  and  Konigsdorf.  Their 
orders  contain  nothing  about  the  enemy,  because  it  may  be 
assumed  that  the  squadron  commanders  already  have  told 
all  their  officers  what  is  known  of  the  enemy,  and  that  the 


Reconnaissance.  ioi 

officer  at  the  Maldeuten  railway  station  secured  this  informa- 
tion for  himself  from  the  telegraph  office  at  that  place. 

It  is  true  that  half  a  troop  is  used  as  flank  guard,  but  the 
two  platoons  will  not  have  to  make  much  of  a  detour,  and 
presumably  they  could  be  on  hand  in  case  of  an  engagement. 
The  distance  accidentally  existing  between  the  two  platoons 
is  not  objectionable;  it  broadens  the  front  of  protection  on 
the  north.  The  platoons  will  arrive  respectively  at  Wiese 
and  Rollnau  before  the  regiment  passes  Mohrungen,  and  the 
anticipated  halt  at  the  latter  place  will  enable  the  major  to 
issue  further  instructions. 

What  are  the  advance-guard  commander's  arrange- 
ments? 

It  may  be  assumed  that  the  captain  has  vedettes  at 
Wolla  and  Alt-Kelken  and  a  patrol  on  the  highway  at  the 
eastern  exit  of  Gr.  Bestendorf.  Protection  must  promptly 
be  arranged  for  to  the  front,  so  that  the  regiment's  march  may 
not  be  delayed.  Therefore  the  captain  orders  as  follows  in  a 
loud  tone  of  voice,  so  that  every  man  may  understand: 

"The  troop  is  the  advance  guard  for  the  regiment.  The 
line  of  march  at  first  is  through  Mohrungen  to  Gr.  Hermenau. 
Troop  A  went  ahead  an  hour  ago  over  this  road. 

"Patrol  ahead  of  the    advance   party:    Lieutenant   G 

and  8  troopers,  including  the  patrol  at  the  eastern  exit  of 
Bestendorf.  You  will  ride  ahead,  at  first  to  the  vicinity  of 
Alt-Bolitten  and  Herzogswalde. 

"Advance  party:   Sergeant  B with  i  corporal  and  10 

troopers.  You  will  go  past  Mohrungen  railway  station  and 
Georgenthal — trot  out! 

"Right  flank  patrol:    Lieutenant  N and   12  troopers, 

including  the  vedette  at  Wolla.  You  will  ride  through  Kuh- 
diebs-Paradies-Himmelforth-Willnau  towards  Kallisten,  and 
will   protect   the  right   flank   of  the  regiment.      Messages  at 


102  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

first  will  be  sent  to  Mohrungen,  with  which  point  there  is  still 
telegraphic  communication  from  Horn  railway  station;  later, 
messages  will  be  sent  direct  to  Gr.   Hermenau.     Lieutenant 

C ,  i  st  Cavalry,  who  left  Horn  railway  station  at  3  a.  m., 

is  going  past  Briickendorf  towards  Jonkendorf.  You  must 
hasten  your  ride  as  far  as  the  vicinity  of  Horn. 

"Left  flank  patrol:   Sergeant   K with  the  vedette  at 

Alt-Kelken,  and  5  troopers.  Ycu  at  first  will  ride  past  Alt- 
Kelken-Neu-Bestendorf-Neuhof  to  the  north  exit  of  Georgen- 
thal  and  will  protect  the  left  flank  of  the  troop. 

"Sergeant  V and  5  troopers:    You  will  ride  between 

the  troop  and  the  main  body  of  the  regiment,  and  are  respon- 
sible for  preserving  connection  between  the  two  bodies." 

If,  in  the  meantime,  the  troop  must  start,  he  can  give 
part  cf  the  instructions  en  route.  The  captain  rides  at  the 
head  of  the  main  body  of  his  troop  and  keeps  the  advance 
party  or  connecting-files  in  sight. 

The  colonel,  who  has  listened  to  the  captain's  orders,  adds 

the  following  to   Lieutenant  N 's  orders:    "Be  sure  and 

report  by  wire  from  the  station  nearest  Horn.     Major  D , 

with  3  troops  of  the  3d  Cavalry,  leaves  Drenken  at  5  a.  m., 
following  the  regiment  at  first  and  then  reconnoitering  through 
Pfeilings  toward  Jonkendorf."  The  colonel's  additional  order 
shows  how  judicious  it  was  for  him  to  have  listened  to  the 
captain's  orders.  It  was  not  done  from  distrust  of  the  latter's 
judgment,  but  from  a  desire  to  keep  track  of  events  and  to  be 
able  to  add  to  his  own  orders  if  necessary,  which  would  still  be 
possible  at  this  time.  In  his  orders  to  the  captain  he  omitted 
the  information  concerning  the  detachment  of  the  3d  Cavalry, 
which  is  of  importance  for  the  troop  as  well  as  for  Lieutenant 
N .  Such  an  error  may  be  made  by  even  the  most  method- 
ical commander.  In  listening  to  the  orders  given  by  a  subordi- 
nate, a  superior  must  be  very  careful  to  interfere  only  in  case 


Reconnaissance.  103 

of  extreme  necessity.  He  should  give  the  subordinate  a  free 
hand,  even  if  thereby  his  orders  are  carried  out  a  little  differ- 
ently from  what  he  had  anticipated. 

Neither  of  the  commanders  has  given  any  instructions 
about  the  distance  of  the  advance  party  from  the  troop  or  of 
the  latter  from  the  main  body  of  the  regiment.  The  colonel 
himself  will  order  the  advance  guard  to  start,  and  then  will 
regulate  its  distance  from  the  main  body  of  the  regiment  with- 
out expressing  this  in  figures.  The  captain  purpcsely  omitted 
stating  in  yards  the  distance  the  advance  party  should  be  ahead 
of  the  troop.  It  is  self-evident  that  the  advance  party  must 
try  to  reach  the  edge  of  the  woods  west  of  Mohrungen  as  soon 
as  possible,  to  get  a  good  view;  an  order  to  keep  1,000  yards 
ahead  might  only  serve  to  confuse  it  in  this  intelligent  purpose. 

Sergeant  V 's  orders  to  preserve  connection  with  the 

main  body  does  not  relieve  the  captain  of  the  responsibility 
for  the  proper  execution  of  this  duty.  But  the  sergeant  is  a 
well-instructed  intermediary,  able  to  transmit  information  from 
the  captain  to  the  main  body  concerning  any  change  of  route. 

As  soon  as  the  advance  party  and  patrols  had  made  some 
headway,  the  colonel  had  the  main  body  of  the  troop  start  and 
at  about  6  a.  m.  he  arrived  with  it  at  the  eastern  edge  of  Best- 

endorf  Forest.     Here  Major  D ,  of  the  3d  Cavalry,  comes 

up.  The  colonel  informs  him  of  his  intentions  and  arrange- 
ments. The  major  reports  that  he  intends  gcing  via  Briicken- 
dorf.  The  advance  guard  inquired  for  telegrams  at  the  Gr. 
Bestendorf  station,  and  brought  the  colonel  the  message  sent 

by  Captain  E at  5.20  a.  m.  from  Mohrungen,  in  which  the 

latter  stated  that  the  situation  remained  unchanged  and  that 
he  would  continue  his  advance  towards  Gr.  Hermenau.      At 

6.25   a.   m.   Colonel   A ,  the  advance   guard,    and   Major 

D arrived  at  the  Mohrungen  station,  where  the  follow- 
ing message   from   Lieutenant   C was  received  by  the 

colonel : 


104  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Hillside  just  west  of  Bruckendori", 

5  May,  4-10  a.  m. 
Found  railway  station  near  Briickendorf  occupied  by  enemy,  who 
fired  on  us. 

C , 

Lieutenant. 

The  message  was  wired  at  5  a.  m.  from  Horn  railway  sta- 
tion. It  was  also  learned  that  this  station  no  longer  answered 
to  its  call.  Nothing  was  seen  of  the  enemy  at  Neuhof,  Wiese, 
Georgenthal,  or  Dohringshcf. 

The  colonel  did  not  see  fit  to  stop  the  march.  He  surmised 
that  only  some  advance  patrols  of  the  enemy  had  reached  Horn 

and  believed  that  Major  D could  cope  with  them.     The 

regimental  commander's  decision  is  of  interest  because  there 
is  a  possibility  that  larger  hostile  bodies  of  cavalry  already  may 
have  reached  the  defile  between  Narien-  and  Mahrung-see. 
But  it  will  not  do  to  halt  on  account  of  this  possible  contin- 
gency so  as  to  assist  Major  D in  case  of  necessity.     It 

might  take  a  long  time  to  find  out  something  definite,  and  we 
might  keenly  regret  the  delay  if  in  the  meantime  the  enemy 
appeared  from  the  north,  where  the  regiment's  main  duty  lies. 

Major  D remained  to  await  the  arrival  of  his  troops; 

Colonel  A ,  with  the  advance  guard  took  the  road  past  the 

railway  station  towards  Georgenthal,  but  sent  an  officer  into 
the  town  of  Mohrungen  to  inquire  for  messages  of  the  Postal 
Telegraph  office,  destroy  all  tape  records  of  the  past  few  days, 
and  question  the  mayor  concerning  news  of  the  enemy. 

Upon  arriving  at  Georgenthal  at  6.50  a.  m.,  Colonel  A 

received  the  message  from  Captain  E ,  which  was  as  follows: 

Gr.  Hermenau, 
5  May,  6-20  a.  m. 
Twenty  hostile  troopers  were  at  Wormditt  last  night,  destroyed  the 
railway  and  telegraph  at  that  point,  and  left  on  the  way  towards  Aiken 

at  1  a.  in.     I  am  not  pursuing  them.     Sergeant  H and  5  troopers  are 

now  at  Wormditt. 

Lieutenant  B encountered  a  platoon  of  hostile  cavalry  at  Schar- 

nick  early  this  morning,  and  at  5-30  a.  m.  had  retreated  to  Pittehnen.  At 
5  a.  m.  to-day  12  hostile  troopers,  coming  from  Lettau,  rode  towards  Her- 


Reconnaissance.  105 

zogswalde.     Their  whereabouts  is  not  known.     Lieutenant  F is  recon- 

noitering  via  Kallisteu  towards  Guttstadt. 

Troop  A  will  advance  via  Herzogswalde-Pittehnen  to  reconnoiter  the 
Liebstadt-Guttstadt  road. 

Lieutenant  F sent  a  lance  corporal  and  2  troopers  to  Sackstein. 

No  report  yet  received  from  him.  I  am  leaving  connecting-posts  at  tele- 
graph stations  in  Liebstadt  and  Gr.  Hermenau  and  at  Herzogswalde. 

E- , 

Captain. 

Continuing  at  a  walk,  Colonel  A ,  while  he  held  his 

map  before  him,  had  the  message  read  to  him.  It  is  less 
troublesome  to  find  the  names  of  localities  than  is  usually  the 
case  on  peace  maneuvers.  The  seriousness  of  war  forces  com- 
manders and  their  staffs  to  carefully  consider  all  contingencies 
in  advance  and  familiarize  themselves  with  the  map. 

The  message  contains  nothing  necessitating  a  change  of 
plans,  particularly  as  in  the  meantime  nothing  has  been  seen 
of  the  enemy  at  Goldbach  or  Silberbach. 

At  7.15  a.  m.  the  advance  guard  reached  Gr.  Hermenau. 
The  colonel  discovered  that  telegraphic  communication  still 
existed  with  Liebstadt  and  that  the  patrol  of  Troop  A  located 
there  knew  nothing  of  the  enemy.  Beyond  Liebstadt  tele- 
graphic communication  exists  only  as  far  as  Sportehnen.  A 
short  message  was  received  from  Captain  E at  Herzogs- 
walde, stating  that  he  had  seen  nothing  of  the  enemy  there  and 
had  received  no  further  information.  The  troop  had  resumed 
its  march  towards  Pittehnen  at  6.50  a.  m.,  and  had  sent  the 

connecting-post  under  Captain  M ■  to  the  Teufelsberg.    The 

colonel  thought  it  inadvisable  to  pursue  the  hostile  patrol 
that  went  from  Wormditt  towards  Aiken,  but  he  informed  the 

advance  guard  commander  and  Major  W ■  about  it.     He 

sent  a  short  telegram  to  the  corps  commander,  stating  what 
had  been  accomplished,  and  then  quietly  continued  the  march 
towards  Herzogswalde,  leaving  1  non-commissioned  officer  and 
4  troopers  at  the  telegraph  station  in  Gr.  Hermenau. 

Arriving  at  Herzogswalde  shortly  after  8  a.  m.,  the  reg- 
imental commander  receives  the  following  messages: 


106  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

i.     From  Cc  rpcral  M ,  Trocp  A,  Teufelsberg,  7-55  a.  m. 

Ten  hostile  troopers  were  seen  riding  along  the  road  from  Naglack 
towards  Banners.  They  were  pursued  in  an  easterly  direction  by  a  platoon 
of  Troop  A,  1  st  Cavalry.  The  troop  is  now  in  the  vicinity  of  Reichenthal. 
Nothing  else  seen  of  the  enemy. 

2.  The  same  non-commissioned  officer  transmits  the  mes- 
sage sent  by  Lieutenant  F at  6-30  a.  m.  from  Knoll  157 

southwest  of  Heiligenthal.     (See  page  47.) 

3.  A  message  from  Major  D ,  sent  from  Dohringshof 

at  7-20  a.  m. 

Fifteen  hostile  troopers  reported  as  retreating  from  Pfeilings  along 
railway.     Nothing  heard  from  Lieutenant  C — — . 

This  message  was  wired  from  Mohrungen  to  Gr.  Hermenau. 
No  word  has  been  received  from  the  patrols  sent  out  by  the 
advance  guard  towards  Reichau,  Sanglau,  Waltersdorf,  and 
Sackstein.  The  situation  is  still  obscure.  The  regiment  has 
marched  nearly  16  miles  and  is  considerably  ahead  of  the  army 
corps.     It  is  still  early  and  there  may  be  considerable  more  to 

do  to-day.     Colonel  A thinks  it  best  to  order  a  halt,  which 

will  give  the  reconnoitering  bodies  time  to  obtain  further  infor- 
mation. He  sends  an  officer  to  Troop  A  to  find  out  something 
more  definite  about  this  (his  most  important)  reconnoitering 
body. 

The  squadrons  are  billeted  on  Herzogswalde  for  rations 
and  forage;  the  advance  guard  is  charged  with  the  protection 

of  the  regiment  towards  the  south  and  east,  while  Major  W 

continues  to  see  to  the  protection  towards  the  north.  (In  the 
the  meantime  the  platoon  of  Troop  C  has  rejoined  the  troop; 
and  the  1st  platoon,  Troop  D,  is  at  Alt-Bolitten.) 

The  colonel  takes  advantage  of  the  halt  to  orient  himself 
and  obtain  a  personal  view  of  the  surrounding  country.  First 
he  goes  to  the  Teufelsberg,  where  he  learns  that  the  message 

from  Sackstein,  referred  to  by  Lieutenant  F ,  has  not  been 

received,  and  carefully  scans  with  his  field-glasses  the  broad 


Reconnaissance.  107 

expanse  of  country  visible.  His  view  extends  beyond  the  line 
Willnau-Seubersdorf-Kallisten  and  to  the  heights  east  of  Dep- 
pen  and  to  Waltersmiihl.  Our  own  patrols  are  visible  at 
Reichau  and  Waltersdorf,  but  nothing  is  seen  of  the  enemy. 
No  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  the  movements  of  individual 
figures  seen  in  the  distance.  Following  the  horizon  around 
farther  to  the  north,  Hohenfeld  is  seen.  A  view  to  Elditten 
and  Pittehnen  is  prevented  by  the  tree-covered  heights  east 
of  Gr.  Pragsden  and  west  of  Reichenthal.  To  the  north,  Lieb- 
stadt  and  the  country  west  of  the  railway  can  be  seen,  but 
nothing  suspicious  is  noted.  Then  the  colonel  rides  across 
country  between  Herzogswalde  and  the  Wuchsnig-see,  to  the 
north  end  of  this  lake,  hoping  there  to  get  a  glimpse  of  the 
country  about  Pittehnen.  But  even  Height  153  does  not  ad- 
mit of  this.  At  Elditten  he  sees  several  horsemen,  but  cannot 
tell  whether  they  are  friend  or  foe. 

At  9.30  the  regimental  staff  officer  of  the  1st  Cavalry  sent 

to  Troop  A  returns  with  Captain  E 's  message  of  8.50  a.  m. 

(See  page  84.)  While  the  staff  officer  is  giving  a  more  de- 
tailed account,  a  message  is  received  from  Sackstein,  stating 
that  our  patrols  are  being  fired  on  from  the  right  bank  of  the 
Passarge  at  that  point;  but  that  the  enemy's  strength  could 
not  be  determined;  and  that  individual  hostile  troopers  are 
visible  on  the  heights  near  Waltersmiihl. 

The  squadrons  found  forage  in  Herzogswalde,  and  it  may 
be  assumed  that  they  have  watered  and  fed  by  this  time, 
9.35  a.  m. 

What  are  Colonel  A 's  further  intentions? 

(Lieutenant  F 's  message  dated  7.35  a.  m.,  from  Komal- 

men,  has  not  been  received  by  the  colonel,  and  therefore  canno- 
be  considered.) 

Considerable  valuable  information  is  at  hand,  and  a  suc- 
cessful encounter  has  been  had  with  the  enemy;  nevertheless 


108  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

there  is  uncertainty  about  many  things,  and  it  is  by  no  means 
self-evident  what  shall  be  done. 

We  again  see  that  uncertainty  is  the  normal  condition  in 
war,  and  that  the  more  commanders  are  obliged  in  time  of 
peace  to  grope  about  in  this  semi-darkness,  the  more  will  their 
sense  of  touch  and  power  cf  combination  be  developed. 

Troop  A's  engagement  with  the  enemy  has  demonstrated 
that  we  have  to  deal  with  quite  a  force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry. 
One  of  his  troops  has  been  temporarily  defeated,  but  where  the 
remainder  cf  his  cavalry  force  is  can  only  be  surmised.  Whether 
it  is  acting  alone  or  in  combination  with  ether  troops  is  entirely 
unknown.  The  hostile  regiment  of  dragoons  was  at  Heilsberg 
during  the  night  and  sent  one  of  its  troops  towards  Pittehnen. 
But  so  far  nothing  but  hostile  patrols  have  been  noticed  at 
Kallisten  and  Sackstein;  and  a  larger  body  hardly  could  have 
concealed  itself  in  the  river  valley  near  Sackstein.  Thus  it  is 
possible  that  the  hostile  cavalry,  or  at  least  a  part  of  it,  will 
follow  towards  Pittehnen.  This  assumption  is  the  more  likely 
to  be  correct  because  it  may  seem  more  advantageous  to  the 
hostile  commander  to  advance  past  the  north  end  of  Narien- 
see  than  through  the  defile  between  it  and  Mohrung-see.  Of 
course,  if  this  assumption  is  correct,  the  enemy  can  just  as 
well  advance  via  Woimditt  or  Kalkstein  as  via  Pittehnen.  It 
does  not  signify  that  so  far  nothing  has  been  heard  from  the 
patrol  at  Wormditt.  It  is  a  long  way  off,  the  patrol  may  have 
been  pushed  aside,  or  its  message  may  have  been  intercepted. 

Nevertheless,  should  the  hostile  cavalry  as  a  whole  or  in 
part  come  via  Guttstadt-Kallisten-Willnau,  it  at  first  would 
meet  Major  D— — ,  and  later  the  advance  guard  of  the  army 
corps,  which  would  be  less  objectionable  than  if  it  succeeded, 
by  a  detour  to  the  north,  in  reaching  the  flank  of  the  ist  Army 
Corps  and  locating  one  flank  of  the  army. 

Herzogswalde  is  favorably  located,  in  that  from  here  the 
regiment  can  promptly  advance  against  the  enemy  should  he 


Reconnaissance.  109 

approach  on  any  of  the  above-named  routes.  But,  after  all, 
is  it  Colonel  A 's  duty  to  advance  against  the  hostile  cav- 
alry? According  to  the  wording  of  the  crder,  he  is  simply  to 
"reconnoiter,"  and  the  Field  Service  Regulations  emphasize 
that,  "the  main  object  being  to  observe  the  enemy,  combat 
should  be  avoided,  except  as  a  means  to  this  end."* 

Before  further  discussing  Colonel  A 's  plans,  it  is  de- 
sirable to  get  a  clear  idea  of  this  fundamental  question. 

A  great  number  of  patrols  close  to  each  other,  on  an  ex- 
tended front,  followed  by  contact  troops,  apparently  would 
insure  cur  cavalry  seeing  everything  to  a  great  distance.  How- 
ever, if  the  reconnoitering  is  to  be  performed  in  this  way  not 
for  only  two  or  three  days,  but  for  a  long  time,  provision  must 
be  made  for  the  relief,  reinforcement,  and  support  of  this  ad- 
vance cavalry,  for  even  the  contact  troops  will  be  able  to  con- 
tinue this  destructive  activity  for  a  few  days  only.  This  neces- 
sitates a  further  division  of  the  force,  so  that  possibly  each  regi- 
ment of  the  cavalry  brigade  would  have  to  advance  on  a  separate 
road.  Although  this  theory  has  been  advocated  by  some,  still  it 
is  generally  objected  to,  because  thereby  the  force  would  be  too 
much  scattered.  Experience  proves  that  sometimes  it  is  neces- 
sary to  fight  to  clear  up  the  situation,  and  that  to  succeed  in  this 
event  it  is  necessary  to  keep  the  force  together ;  for  it  is  seldom 
that  we  know  in  advance  whether  there  will  be  a  fight  or  how 
strong  the  enemy  is.  But  there  is  another  reason  for  keeping 
your  force  together  and  being  careful  in  sending  out  detach- 
ments. The  enemy  is  quite  as  anxious  as  we  are  to  get  infor- 
mation, and  to  insure  our  success  it  is  almost  as  important  to 
prevent  the  enemy  from  reconnoitering  and  to  keep  his  com- 
mander in  the  dark  as  it  is  for  us  to  have  ample  information 
of  him. 

Preventing  hostile  reconnaissance,  which  under  the  term 
of   "screening  our   own   movements"    is   not   as   clearly  and 

*See  par.  65,  F.  S.  R. 


no  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

sharply  defined  as  it  should  be,  must  be  considered  by  our 
cavalry  as  of  almost  equal  importance  with  reconnaissance. 
The  word  "almost"  in  this  sentence  is  justified  only  on  the 
supposition  that  our  own  commander-in-chief  is  superior  to 
the  enemy's  and  is  better  able  to  utilize  the  information  he 
receives  than  is  the  case  with  the  enemy. 

By  combat  alone  can  this  end  be  attained,  and  rational 
principles  of  warfare  teach  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  defeat 
every  small  detachment,  but  simply  the  main  hostile  force; 
which  result  will  immediately  be  followed  by  the  retreat  of 
the  smaller  detachments,  and  end  the  enemy's  extended  activity 
in  reconnaissance,  while  furthering  our  own.  No  one  would 
censure  the  cavalry  leader  who,  trusting  in  his  own  good  troops, 
looks  upon  a  combat  with  the  hostile  cavalry  not  as  a  last 
resort,  but  as  the  first  and  best  one.  If  he  seeks  a  decisive 
encounter  instead  of  avoiding  it,  his  confident  demeanor  will 
be  a  powerful  factor  for  success  as  opposed  to  any  less  certain 
and  determined  enemy. 

A  recognition  of  the  correctness  of  this  principle  will  not 
induce  a  prudent  man  to  omit  carefully  weighing  each  separate 
case  or  utilizing  every  advantage.  He  would  not  wish  to  offer 
an  easy  victory  to  a  superior  hostile  force.  Cool  calculation 
must  check  eagerness  for  combat ;  first  consider,  then  venture. 
Sometimes,  contrary  to  our  wishes,  safety  lies  in  accepting  the 
inevitable  by  patiently  and  craftily  waiting  for  a  favorable 
opportunity. 

It  therefore  will  be  well  for  Colonel  A from  the  begin- 
ning to  bear  in  mind  the  possibility  of  an  encounter  with  the 
enemy  and  try  in  advance  to  secure  all  possible  advantages 
in  case  the  combat  should  take  place  as  early  as  to-day.  Even 
the  halt  for  feeding  at  Herzogswalde  will  pay  for  itself  by  in- 
creasing the  power  of  endurance  of  his  troops. 

The  foregoing  general  remarks  were  called  forth  by  the 
fact  that  the  regiment  from  Herzogswalde  could  oppose  the 


Reconnaissance.  hi 

enemy  on  any  of  his  possible  lines  of  advance.  It  may  be  as- 
sumed that  our  patrols  at  the  latest  would  discover  the  enemy 
when  he  crosses  the  Passarge  at  one  of  the  few  bridges.  And 
the  elevated  ground  near  Wuchsnig-see  makes  it  possible  to 
discover  the  enemy's  arrangements  and  strength  while  still 
at  a  distance.  Presumably  the  enemy  is  still  in  ignorance  of 
the  presence  of  our  regiment,  and,  by  remaining  motionless 
and  under  cover  at  Herzogswalde,  it  probably  would  not  be 
discovered,  so  that  it  would  be  able  to  make  an  unexpected 
attack,  or,  in  case  of  the  enemy's  great  superiority,  it  would  be 
able  to  retreat  in  time. 

It  is  not  very  tempting  to  lie  in  wait  for  an  enemy  who 
may  be  making  a  long  detour  or  possibly  has  no  idea  whatever 
of  crossing  the  Passarge.  But  had  we  reliable  information  of 
the  advance  of  greatly  superior  hostile  forces,  such  action  would 
be  earnestly  recommended,  as  a  continuation  of  our  advance 
would  be  admissible  only  under  very  exceptional  circum- 
stances. Only  too  easily  the  advantages  of  a  dash  to  the  Alle 
under  such  conditions  might  be  lost  by  sacrificing  the  regiment. 
But  the  incentive  for  such  an  enterprise  is  wanting — viz.,  the 
certainty  of  the  advance  of  a  superior  hostile  force.  It  is  pos- 
sible and  even  probable  that  we  will  encounter  such  a  force; 
but  the  contrary  is  also  possible,  or  the  possibility  of  meeting 
a  detached  force  that,  however,  would  still  offer  a  chance  for 
a  victory.  Our  own  consciousness,  and  historical  criticism, 
would  never  forgive  us  if,  through  excessive  caution,  we  lost 
the  chance  before  the  decisive  battle  to  penetrate  the  darkness 
that  so  far  has  surrounded  the  enemy's  movements. 

If  after  thoughtful  consideration  it  seems  to  be  a  choice 
between  boldness  and  caution,  there  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the 
proper  course  to  follow. 

Therefore  Colonel  A decides  to  continue  his  march. 

The  direction  is  fixed  by  the  fact  that  hostile  reconnaissance 
from  the  north  must  be  especially  opposed  and  that  a  safe 


ii2  Studies  int  Applied  Tactics. 

crossing  of  the  Passarge  has  been  secured  by  Captain  E . 

This  direction  of  advance  also  will  make  it  more  difficult  for 
the  hostile  troop,  which  has  retreated  towards  Stollen,  to  re- 
sume its  advance.     On  the  fight  bank  of  the  Passarge,  Colonel 

A depends  on  receiving  further  news  from  Captain  E , 

as  a  basis  for  further  arrangements.  Already  in  going  to  Pitt- 
ehnen  he  will  have  the  regiment  advance  as  much  as  possible 
under  cover,  even  if  to  do  so  he  would  have  to  leave  the  regular 
road.  Only  in  case  of  absolute  necessity  would  he  be  willing 
to  sacrifice  the  advantage  of  remaining  unseen  and  of  being 

able  to  surprise  the  enemy.     Captain  E ■  is  informed  of 

the  colonel's  decision.  The  colonel  does  not  think  it  neces- 
sary to  make  further  report  to  corps  headquarters  at  this  time. 

At  10  a.  m.  the  advance  guard  arrives  at  Pitfehnen  and 
the  main  body  at  Reichenthal.  The  commander  of  the  con- 
necting-post at  Pittelrnen  turns  over  the  following  messages: 

i.     From  Sergeant  K ,  sent  from  Stollen,  5th  May, 

9-15  a.  m. 

The  hostile  troop  crossed  the  Passarge  north  of  Sportehnen  and  disap- 
peared in  the  woods.  There  is  no  enemy  at  Kalkstein,  where  there  are 
two  fords.     Nothing  is  to  be  seen  of  the  enemy  as  far  as  Albrechtsdorf. 

2.  From  Lieutenant  B ,  sent  from  Height  114  north- 
west of  Dittrichsdorf,  5th  May,  9-35  a.  m. 

Nothing  suspicious  visible  at  Kalkstein  or  Voigtsdorf,  on  the  highway 
west  and  east  of  Arnsdorf,  or  at  Lauterwalde-Petersdorf.  A  hostile  patrol 
rode  through  Dittrichsdorf  two  or  three  hours  ago.  I  shall  go  via  Arnsdorf 
towards  Freymarkt. 

3.  From  Captain  E ,  sent  from  Kleinefeld,  5th  May, 

9-40  a.  m. 

After  my  advance  party  drove  back  5  or  6  hostile  troopers  from 

Kleinefeld  towards  Scharnick,  2  of  Lieutenant  F 's  messengers,  who 

till  then  had  been  stopped  by  the  hostile  troopers,  delivered  the  inclosed 

message.     I  have  not  received  Lieutenant  F 's  7-35  a.  m.  message. 

Aside  from  the  above  5  or  6  troopers,  nothing  is  seen  of  the  enemy  in  the 
country  before  me.  And  nothing  is  visible  on  the  Elditten-Guttstadt 
highway,  which  I  can  see  quite  well  to  beyond  Lingnau.  A  hostile  troop 
rode  through  Wolfsdorf  this  morning,  presumably  the  one  I  defeated  at 
Pittehnen.  At  Sackstein  there  is  a  hostile  patrol  that  I  shall  drive  away. 
I  shall  next  ride  to  Waltersmuhl  and  send  an  officer  to  Guttstadt. 


Reconnaissance.  113 

Lieutenant  F- 's  message  is  as  follows: 

Zaun-sEE,  near  KomalmEn, 

5  May,  8-35  a.  m. 
Five  hostile  troops  of  cavalry  are  advancing  along  the  Guttstadt- 
Heiligenthal  highway.  The  leading  one  is  the  one  I  reported  at  7-35  a.  m. 
and  must  be  at  Heiligenthal  by  this  time;  the  other  four  have  passed 
Queetz.  There  is  nothing  visible  on  the  highway  back  of  them  as  far  as 
near  Glottau.  Hostile  patrols  have  prevented  my  sending  a  message  until 
now.     I  shall  remain  here  in  observation. 

What  does  Colonel  A decide  to  do? 

The  situation  has  not  materially  changed  since  the  regi- 
ment left  Herzogswalde.  Apparently  there  are  no  large  bodies 
of  hostile  cavalry  on  the  Liebstadt-Guttstadt  highway  or  the 
country  north  of  it  (though  this  is  by  no  means  certain) ;  but 
that  these,  contrary  to  all  expectation,  have  taken  the  road 
from  Guttstadt  to  Kallisten. 

Five  hostile  troops  are  reported,  and  they  probably  belong 
to  the  5th  Dragoons,  of  which  one  troop  was  defeated  at  Pitt- 
ehnen ;  but  possibly  they  simply  are  the  advance  guard  of  a 
larger  body  following  at  some  distance.  From  present  indica- 
tions they  are  going  past  the  south  end  of  Narien-see.  Of  course 
they  might  change  the  direction  of  their  march  if  they  heard 
of  the  presence  of  our  regiment  or  of  the  misfortune  that  befell 
their  troop  at  Pittehnen.  Should  they  continue  the  march 
beyond  the  left  bank  of  the  Passarge,  they  will  reach  Naglack, 
Reichau,  or  Willnau  by  10.30  a.  m.  But  for  the  present  they 
might  be  content  to  hold  the  Passarge  bridge  at  Kallisten  and 
send  out  patrols  from  that  point.  This  is  highly  probable  if 
the  5  troops  as  yet  have  no  substantial  backing.     Already,  at 

Mohrungen  and  Herzogswalde,  Colonel  A had  reflected  on 

the  possibility  of  hostile  cavalry  driving  back  M:;jor  D ■, 

advancing  towards  Mohrungen  past  the  south  end  of  Narien- 
see,  and  thus  discovering  the  advance  of  the  1st  Division. 
Notwithstanding  this,  he  chose  the  northeastern  line  of  march, 
because  it  seemed  to  him  more  important  to  prevent  hostile 
reconnaissance  of  our  left  flank  and  because  he  hoped  for  better 


ii4  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

results  from  reconnaissance  extending  around  by  the  north. 
It  would  be  detrimental  for  us  to  have  hostile  cavalry  discover 
the  head  of  our  infantry  columns  at  one  point  or  another,  but 
it  cannot  always  be  prevented  on  a  broad  front.  However, 
it  would  be  of  much  greater  advantage  for  the  hostile  com- 
mander-in-chief to  locate  the  flank  of  our  army;  for  example, 
to  learn  that  strong  columns  are  marching  on  the  Saalfeld- 
Mohrungen  highway,  and  that  the  district  north  of  that  road 
is  unoccupied.  This  would  form  a  safe  basis  for  his  decisions, 
while  the  discovery  of  the  head  of  a  column  at  Mohrungen 
would  not  be  a  guarantee  that  other  blue  columns  are  not 
marching  on  Liebstadt  and  Wormditt. 

Therefore  if  the  hostile  cavalry  remains  in  the  direction 
of  Kallisten-Willnau,  it  can  do  but  little  damage,  and  the  reg- 
iment unhesitatingly  can  devote  itself  to  its  reconnaissance 
towards  the  Alle.  But  it  is  not  yet  known  in  what  direction 
the  enemy  will  advance  after  crossing  the  Passarge.  Should 
he  advance  via  Herzogswalde-Gr.  Hermenau,  the  hostile  com- 
mander-in-chief might  be  furnished  with  the  important  infor- 
mation above  referred  to.  At  present  (10  a.  m.)  the  regiment  is 
only  about  3  miles  from  Herzogswalde,  and  within  an  hour 
we  might  have  an  opportunity  to  render  the  enemy  harmless, 
and  then  be  able  to  resume  our  reconnaissance  to  the  east 
with  our  messenger-route  secured.  This  possible  chance  must 
not  be  thrown  away.  But  it  would  be  a  mistake  for  us  to 
enter  on  a  wild  chase  after  the  5  hostile  troops  on  the  left  of 
the  Passarge.  The  distances  are  too  great  and  the  country  is 
too  extensive.  And,  anyway,  who  can  tell  whether  we  shall 
find  the  quarry?  Possibly  the  enemy  will  remain  at  Kallisten, 
as  already  suggested.  In  this  case  the  regiment  would  have 
the  bothersome  stream  between  itself  and  its  objective.  At 
Pittelmen  the  regiment,  so  to  speak,  has  one  foot  on  each  bank 
of  the  stream,  ready  to  draw  either  to  the  opposite  side  if  neces- 
sary.    Troop  A  by  this  time  must  be  near   Waltersmuhl  and 


Reconnaissance.  115 

have  a  view  of  the  Queetz-Heiligenthal  road  as  well  as  towards 
Kallisten.  In  a  short  time  we  ought  to  have  word  from  the 
troop  and  the  numerous  patrols  sent  via  Willnau,  Reichau, 
Lettau,  Waltersdorf,  and  Sackstein,  as  to  whether  the  enemy 
has  crossed  the  Passarge  and  what  route  he  has  taken  from 
Kallisten.  It  seems  all  the  more  desirable  to  await  this  as 
our  reconnaissance  towards  Guttstadt  and  Heilsberg  does  not 
seem  to  be  interfered  with  at  present,  and  the  delay  in  the 
regiment's  advance  therefore  does  not  check  its  regular  work. 
The  colonel's  desire  for  action  is  again  blocked  by  this  renewed 
halt,  but  experience  has  taught  him  that  it  is  the  rule  for 
closed  bodies  of  cavalry  to  advance  tentatively,  cautiously,  and 
deliberately  until  that  moment  when  the  occasion  calls  for  quick 
and  sure  action.  He  knows  that  nothing  so  quickly  destroys 
the  confidence  and  efficiency  of  men  as  when  hasty  decisions 
have  to  be  paid  for  by  many  miles  of  trotting. 

The  colonel  will  take  advantage  of  the  proximity  of  the 
telegraph  station  at  Liebstadt  to  send  his  report  to  corps  head- 
quarters, in  which  he  will  invite  attention  to  the  advantage  of 
having  Gr.  Hermenau  promptly  occupied  by  a  detachment  of 
cyclists  so  as  to  check  hostile  reconnaissance. 


The  situation  growing  out  of  Lieutenant  C 's  recon- 
naissance is  of  more  than  ordinary  interest,  and  therefore  will 
next  occupy  our  attention.  His  experience  could  not  be  con- 
tinuously followed  without  presenting  a  distorted  picture. 

Lieutenant  C had  cut  the  telegraph  wires  at  Schau- 

stern  and  at  7  a.  m.  had  arrived  at  the  grove  east  of  Schaustern 
apparently  without  having  been  detected  by,  and  without  him- 
detecting,  the  enemy.  (See  pp.  57-72.)  His  patrol,  besides 
himself,  still  consists  of  1  non-commissioned  officer  and  8 
troopers,  one  of  whom  is  leading  a  captured  horse.  At  Schau- 
stern it  was  learned  that  yesterday  evening  about  20  hostile 


n6  Studies  ix  Applied  Tactics. 

troopers  passed  through  there,  going  towards  Bruckendorf. 
Nothing  has  been  learned  from  the  neighboring  villages,  be- 
cause everybody  is  staying  at  home.  Lieutenant  C ,  care- 
fully working  forward  through  the  various  groves,  at  7.20  a.  m. 
reaches  Knoll  160  north  of  Gottken  and  from  here  sees  several 
horsemen  riding  from  Height  155  east  of  Wengaithen  towards 
the  latter  village,  and  also  sees  several  others  riding  along  the 
highway  from  Jonkendorf  towards  Pupkeim.  He  withdraws 
to  the  north-most  grove,  from  whose  border  he  carefully  con- 
tinues his  observations.  The  groves  consist  of  a  mixture  of 
pines  and  firs,  with  underbrush  along  the  border,  whose  young 
foliage  affords  fair  cover,  so  that  the  officer  succeeds  in  remain- 
ing concealed  and  by  9  a.  m.  has  discovered  the  following: 
Four  hostile  troops  followed  the  advance  party  on  the  Jonken- 
dorf-Pupkeim  highway,  and  at  the  latter  place  diverged  to- 
wards Schlitt,  They  have  just  (at  9  a.  m.)  passed  Schlitt. 
Since  then  no  others  have  followed  them  on  the  road  as  far 
back  as  near  Jonkendorf,  where  the  lieutenant's  view  ends. 
Another  hostile  body  of  one  or  two  troops  rode  over  the  ridge 
east  of  Wengaithen  towards  the  latter  village,  but  could  not 
be  followed  any  farther,  as  Knoll  160  was  occupied  for  some 
time  by  a  hostile  patrol  and  the  Wengaithen-Schaustern  road 
could  not  be  seen  from  the  hiding-place.  Since  8  a.  m.  nothing 
more  has  been  seen  of  the  enemy  at  Wengaithen. 

Lieutenant  C did  not  care  to  report  the  hostile  patrols, 

for  which  purpose  the  way  probably  would  still  have  been  open 
via  Neu-Kockendorf-Kloben  or  via  Kammersdorf.  When  he 
saw  the  closed  bodies  of  the  enemy  the  patrols  already  were 
far  in  advance — some  troopers  had  gone  via  Pupkeim  towards 
Neu-Kockendorf — so  that  his  message  no  longer  could  get 
through. 


Reconnaissance.  i  i  7 

What  are  Lieutenant  C 's  arrangements  and  in- 
tentions AFTER  9  A.  M.  ? 

It  is  self-evident  that  it  would  be  of  considerable  value 

for  Colonel  A to  know  what  Lieutenant  C has  seen. 

How  can  the  information  be  sent?  The  regiment  might  have 
reached  Gr.  Hermenau  at  about  7  a.  m.  It  is  hard  to  guess 
where  it  now  is  or  where  it  will  be  two  or  three  hours  from  now. 

It  is  true  that  later  Lieutenant  C is  expected  to  rejoin 

the  regiment  via  Kallisten,  and  naturally  a  message  should  be 
sent  in  that  direction.  But  even  should  the  messenger  succeed 
in  getting  through  the  hostile  cavalry,  it  may  be  confidently 
assumed  that  the  events  would  overtake  the  message.  Long 
before  it  could  reach  the  regimental  commander  the  latter 
would  gain  touch  with  the  enemy.  It  is  all  the  more  hazardous 
because  the  Passarge  can  be  crossed  only  on  bridges,  and  these 
the  enemy  surely  will  hold.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  mes- 
sengers (of  whom  there  must  be  at  least  two)  must  avoid  meet- 
ing the  enemy,  how  will  they  be  able  to  find  their  way  without 
a  map  over  the  circuitous  route  they  must  take?     Lieutenant 

C does  know  that  Troop  A  is  to  reconnoiter  ahead  of  the 

regiment  towards  Wormditt-Guttstadt-Munsterberg.  But  it 
seems  even  more  hopeless  to  try  to  find  the  troop  in  the  broad 
expanse  of  territory  between  the  Passarge  and  the  Alle.  It 
might  be  suggested  that  the  message  be  sent  to  Locken,  and 
thence  either  be  wired  via  Osterode  to  Mohrungen,  or  be  de- 
livered to  the  advance  parties  of  the  2d  Army  Corps,  which 
by  this  time  should  have  reached  that  vicinity.  But  even  if 
promptly  forwarded  by  wire,  the  message  probably  would  not 
reach  the  regimental  commander  until  afternoon.  Its  contents 
are  of  no  value  for  the  commander  of  either  the  1st  or  2d  Army 
Corps,  for  these  know  without  being  told  that  closed  bodies  of 
cavalry  will  follow  the  hostile  patrols.  The  manner  in  which 
these  troops  are  grouped  is  of  no  particular  value  to  the  corps 
commanders;  and  the  message  gives  insufficient  information 


n8  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

concerning  their  strength,  because  those  so  far  seen  might  be 
followed  by  entire  regiments  in  the  next  half-hour. 

The  result  of  the  deliberation  is:  A  message  reporting  the 
appearance  of  the  hostile  troops  of  cavalry  would  be  of  but  lit- 
tle use,  probably  would  not  reach  its  destination,  and  would 
seriously  weaken  the  already  reduced  patrol.     It  is  evident 

that  Lieutenant  C cannot  be  of  service  to  the  colonel  in 

the  latter's  immediate  deliberations.     Any  information  that 

Lieutenant  C might  send  him  about  the  appearance  of 

hostile  cavalry  near  Pupkeim  would  not  arrive  in  time.  He 
will  the  more  energetically  devote  himself  to  the  general  is- 
sue: the  reconnaissance  towards  Jonkendorf-Gr.  Buchwalde. 
Should  he  succeed  in  reaching  Allenstein  Beechwoods  ( Allen  - 
steiner  Buchwald)  unobserved,  he  may  hope  not  only  to  get 
a  view  of  Jonkendorf,  but  also  of  the  Jonkendorf-Gottkendorf 
highway. 

After  the  hostile  troops  have  disappeared  from  view  to- 
wards Schlitt,  and  it  had  been  ascertained  from  the  south-most 
grove,  near  Knoll  160,  that  the  enemy  no  longer  was  visible  at 
Windtken,  Ballingen,  or  Gottken,  the  patrol  trotted  towards 
Allenstein  Beechwoods,  utilizing  the  cover  afforded  by  the 
ground.  It  is  hard  to  get  through  the  woods,  on  account  of 
some  marshy  ground  and  several  wet  ditches.  The  patrol  does 
not  reach  the  edge  of  the  woods  near  Knoll  173  until  10.30 
a.  m.  From  this  point  Jonkendorf,  Mondtken,  and  the  high- 
way can  be  seen  almost  as  far  as  Wilhelmsthal.  To  the  east 
the  view  extends  as  far  as  Knoll  143  northeast  of  Mondtken. 
No  one  is  to  be  seen  anywhere. 

What  else  wile  Lieutenant  C do? 

Although  the  colonel's  orders  simply  call  for  a  reconnais- 
sance to  Jonkendorf,  and  do  not  indicate  that  it  is  to  extend 
beyond  this  point,  still  it  must  seem  very  desirable  to  go  a 
little  farther. 


Reconnaissance.  119 

The  preceding  night  at  Maldeuten,  when  the  colonel  dic- 
tated the  order,  he  must  have  looked  upon  the  line  Jonken- 
dorf-Gr.  Buchwalde  as  a  well-advanced  goal,  and  in  doing  so 
it  probably  did  not  occur  to  him  that  the  patrol  might  get 
behind  the  closed  bodies  of  the  hostile  cavalry.  This  is  a  rare 
piece  of  good  luck  of  which  the  patrol-leader  must  take  ad- 
vantage on  his  own  initiative.  The  commanding  officer  in 
advance  cannot  mention  all  possibilities,  his  orders  thereby 
would  become  too  minute  and  indefinite.  He  must  depend  on 
an  officer's  supplementing  his  orders  where  demanded  by  cir- 
cumstances. Subordinates  should  not  aim  to  carry  out  their 
orders  literally,  but  to  efficiently  support  their  superior's  in- 
tentions and  intelligently  utilize  all  advantages  that  chance 
may  offer. 

According  to  the  wording  of  Lieutenant  C 's  orders, 

it  would  answer  if  he  now  rode  to  the  vicinity  of  Gr.  Buchwalde 
and  then  to  Kallisten  to  look  up  his  colonel  and  report:  "At 
10.30  a.  m.  there  was  no  enemy  at  Jonkendorf  or  Mondtken, 
and  at a.  m.  there  was  none  at  Gr.  Buchwalde." 

But  this  can't  be  done  now.  Having  come  this  far,  is  it 
not  possible  to  investigate  a  little  farther  and  provide  head- 
quarters with  better  information?  Under  proper  supervision 
few  officers  would  be  lacking  in  the  enterprise  and  insight  here 
necessary  to  independently  exceed  these  orders. 

The  farther  the  patrol  now  advances  the  more  easily  may 
its  retreat  be  intercepted.  The  district  towards  Allenstein, 
bounded  by  river,  lake,  and  marshy  ground,  calls  for  special 
caution.  As  the  patrol  should  remain  undiscovered,  it  is  ad- 
visable not  to  advance  from  Knoll  173  straight  across  the 
open  country  between  Jonkendorf  and  Mondtken,  but  to 
work  along  the  edge  of  the  woods  to  the  vicinity  of  Knoll 
143,  and  then,  rapidly  crossing  the  open  country,  to  gain  the 
shelter  of  the  grove  east  of  Mondtken. 


120  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

The  northwest  corner  of  this  grove  was  reached  at  11.20 
a.  m.,  and  the  non-commissioned  officer  with  2  men  was  posted 
at  the  southern  edge,  while  Lieutenant  C ,  from  a  favor- 
able lookout  at  the  northwest  corner,  carefully  examined  the 
vicinity.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  a  pair  of  good  field-glasses 
proves  to  be  of  great  value  for  the  cavalry  officer.  The  very 
best  kind  is  only  just  good  enough.  Lieutenant  C over- 
looks the  valley  of  the  Alle  to  beyond  Bergfriede,  the  Mossong- 
see  and  the  hills  on  its  eastern  shore,  the  wooded  lowlands 
to  beyond  Braunswalde,  whose  northern  exit  and  its  church 
are  very  distinctly  visible.  He  also  sees  the  elevated  village 
of  Hochwalde,  but  Diwitten  is  hidden  by  woods  and  hills. 
He  sees  nothing  suspicious  anywhere.  A  section-hand,  who 
has  remained  in  his  section-house  at  the  edge  of  the  grove, 
says  that  early  in  the  morning  several  hostile  troopers  went 
through  Kainen  towards  Polleicken.  The  officer  has  the  tele- 
graph wire  cut,  with  the  assistance  of  the  section-hand,  and 
then  proceeds  to  the  south  edge  of  the  grove.  From  here  he 
can  see  as  far  as  Redigkainen  and  Height  138  east  of  Redig- 
kainen-see  ("Redigk.  S."  on  map).  Knoll  124,  near  Kalt- 
fliesz,  obstructs  part  of  the  view,  but,  past  its  southern  end, 
the  western  end  of  the  Gottkendorf  railway  station  can  be 
seen,  and,  proceeding  farther  west,  the  terrain  sloping  up- 
wards to  the  heights  on  the  northern  shore  of  the  Okull-see 
can  be  seen.  The  towers  of  Allenstein  are  plainly  visible  in 
the  distance.  Four  horsemen  are  trotting  from  Gottkendorf 
towards  Wilhelmsthal  along  the  highway.  Nothing  else  is  to 
be  seen  of  the  enemy  in  this  district,  either.  The  officer  is 
aware  that  the  Alle  forms  an  obstacle  similar  to  the  Passarge, 
and  the  section-hand  states  that  a  horseman  could  not  ford 
it;  that  the  meadows  of  the  Alle  are  reported  soft  and  marshy; 
and  that  there  is  a  wooden  bridge  at  Kainen  suitable  for 
light  teams. 


Reconnaissance.  121 

What  will  Lieutenant  C do  at  11.40  a.  m? 

Still  nothing  is  seen  of  the  hostile  main  columns.  A 
message  stating  that  nothing  more  had  been  seen  of  the  ene- 
my up  to  11.40  a.  m.  at  Kainen,  Kaltfliesz,  and  Gottkendorf 
would  be  more  valuable  than  one  stating  that  none  had  been 
seen  at  Jonkendorf  and  Mondtken  up  to   10.30  a.   m.     But 

the  difference  in  value  is  not  very  great,  and  Lieutenant  C 

hopes  to  do  still  better.  He  does  not  yet  despair  of  getting 
touch  with  the  hostile  main  forces,  well  knowing  how  im- 
portant this  may  be  for  his  commander-in-chief.  And  though 
continuing  his  reconnaissance,  he  hopes  to  be  able  to  report 
negative  results  in  time,  whose  value  is  not  to  be  under- 
estimated, if  none  other  are  obtainable.  Being  far  in  advance 
of  the  army,  he  feels  the  importance  of  his  task,  for  in  all 
probability  there  is  not  another  patrol  in  front  of  the  1st  Army 
Corps  that  can  see  as  far  as  he  can.  Less  than  four  miles 
away  lies  Allenstein,  whose  steeples  seem  to  beckon  to  him. 
If  insight  is  to  be  had  anywhere,  it  ought  to  be  at  this  im- 
portant cross-roads.  Should  nothing  be  seen  there  of  the 
hostile  columns  early  in  the  afternoon,  and  should  he  succeed 
in  returning  to  his  regiment  or  to  Locken  by  evening  or  even 
by  dawn  the  following  day  with  this  information,  the  com- 
manders would  have  a  very  different  basis  for  their  further 
decisions  than  if  they  remained  without  it.  It  is  true  that 
difficulties  are  increasing.  The  space  between  the  Alle  and 
the  Okull-see  is  becoming  so  narrow  that  the  danger  of  getting 
cut  off  is  growing  to  an  alarming  degree.     Therefore,  that  his 

mission  may  not  fail  at  the  last  moment,   Lieutenant  C 

decides  to  use  extraordinary  precautions,  and  to  not  cross  the 
troublesome  creek  that  flow^s  past  Wilhelmsthal  and  Kaltfliesz 
into  the  Alle  until  he  to  some  extent  has  made  sure  of  his  retreat. 

For  this  reason  the  sergeant  is  sent  ahead  with  two  troop- 
ers. He  is  to  ride  to  Kaltfliesz,  look  about  from  Knoll  124, 
and,  if  the  country  seems  safe,  to  leave  one  man  at  this  knoll 
—9— 


122  Studies  in  AppuEd  Tactics. 

and  with  the  other  one  ride  to  the  heights  at  the  south  end 
of  the  Redigkainen-see  to  obtain  a  view  of  the  Gottkendorf- 
Allenstein  highway.  He  is  authorized  to  carefully  make  in- 
quiries at  the  railway  station,  and  in  isolated  farm-houses. 
The  sergeant,  in  the  presence  of  his  2  men,  is  carefully  in- 
structed about  the  roads  and  localities.  He  doubtless  already 
knows  how  to  take  advantage  of  the  folds  of  the  ground  for 
cover.  If,  in  spite  of  this,  he  should  stumble  on  the  enemy, 
his  good  horse  may  be  expected  to  bring  him  back.  At  any 
rate,  the  officer  will  receive  information  from  the  lookout  near 
Kaltfliesz,  and  can  govern  himself  accordingly.  A  signal  is 
agreed  upon  for  use  between  the  sergeant  and  the  patrol 
through  the  lookout,  in  case  the  sergeant  finds  the  region 
about  Gottkendorf  free  of  the  enemy;  in  which  event  the 
patrol  will  continue  its  march. 

During  the  sergeant's  absence  the  entire  region — also  to 
the  rear — will  be  carefully  watched,  and  the  four  hostile  troop- 
ers, trotting  towards  Wilhelmsthal,  will  be  kept  in  view  as 
far  as  conditions  will  permit. 

At  11.50  a.  m.  the  sergeant  left,  and  at  12.30  p.  m.  he 
returns  at  a  rapid  gait  and  reports: 

"From  an  elevation  near  the  railway  station  a  part  of 
the  highway  on  this  side,  and  beyond,  a  village,  situated  on 
the  lake,  was  visible.  A  column,  which  I  believe  to  be  in- 
fantry, wss  marching  on  this  highway.  At  the  same  time 
several  horsemen  appeared  at  Gottkendorf." 

Lieutenant  C ■  himself  sees  5  or  6  horsemen  on  an  ele- 
vation west  of  the  Gottkendorf  railway  station.  The  four 
troopers  trotting  ahead  towards  Wilhelmsthal  continued  along 
the  road  and  disappeared  from  view  in  Tonkendorf.  Nothing 
else  has  been  seen  of  the  enemy,  not  even  from  the  north  edge 
of  the  grove  in  looking  towards  Braunswalde  and  Bergfriede. 


Reconnaissance.  123 

What  are  Lieutenant  C 's  further  intentions? 

At  first  it  will  be  necessary  to  further  observe  the  enemy 
and  see  if  the  sergeant's  suspicions  as  to  infantry  are  correct. 
This  can  be  done  from  the  hiding-place  where  the  patrol  has 
lain  concealed  for  an  hour.  But  shall  we  be  able  to  determine 
the  strength  and  composition  of  the  enemy's  force  from  this 

point?     It  is  highly  probable  that  Lieutenant  C will  soon 

be  forced  to  vacate  his  point  of  observation.  If  he  now  boldly 
advances  via  Kaltfliesz,  he  may  still  be  able  to  reach  a  point 
of  observation  on  the  enemy's  flank  and  count  his  battalions 
and  batteries — an  achievement  for  which  under  similar  con- 
ditions in  maneuvers  he  probably  already  has  been  highly 
praised.  Even  the  Field  Sendee  Regulations  emphasize  the 
importance    of    obtaining    accurate    figures    of    the    enemy's 

strength. *     Who  knows  if  Lieutenant  C will  again  have 

this  opportunity?  It  is  only  necessary  for  the  enemy  to  halt 
in  the  vicinity  of  Jonkendorf  or  Mondtken,  and  the  opportunity 
is  gone. 

We  here  have  a  case  where  it  is  possible  to  obtain  clearness 
on  one  of  the  duties  of  reconnoitering  bodies  that  is  left  in  semi- 
obscurity  by  the  uncertain  light  of  maneuver  experiences. 

If  the  patrol-leader  an  hour  ago  felt  very  dubious  about 
advancing  any  farther  with  his  entire  patrol,  without  at  first 
having  some  assurance  as  to  the  safety  of  his  line  of  retreat, 
his  farther  advance  now  would  be  a  bold  venture,  challenging 
fate.  Even  should  he  reach  the  Redigkainer-see,  it  cannot  be 
hoped  that  later  he  would  still  find  the  crossing  at  Kaltfliesz 
unguarded  by  the  enemy.  He  would  have  to  retreat  via  Redig- 
kainen,  and  it  would  be  too  much  to  expect  fortune  to  keep 
open  the  route  via  Braunswalde  to  Kainen  or  Bergfriede. 
Even  if  the  adroit  officer's  well-known  cunning  should  save 
him  from  capture,  it  may  be  assumed  that  he  would  have  to 

*See  par.  79,  F.  S.  R. 


124  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

make  a  detour  of  many  miles  beyond  the  Alle  to  get  back. 
And,  after  that,  would  there  be  a  single  horse  in  condition  to 
get  a  message  on  time  through  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  the 
Passarge  ? 

But  all  these  objections  would  be  swept  aside  were  it 
certain  that  the  results  would  warrant  the  venture. 

The  scout  sent  ahead  almost  established  the  fact  that 
hostile  infantry  is  approaching,  and  we  doubtless  shall  soon 
be  able  to  verify  this  point  from  where  the  patrol  now  is.  Of 
what  particular  value  would  it  be  if  we  could  count  a  number 
of  battalions  and  batteries  on  the  highway  at  Gottkendorf? 
Imagine  yourself  in  the  commander-in-chief's  position,  who 
receives  this  information  late  in  the  evening  or  during  the 
night.  Doubtless  it  is  important  for  him  to  know  that  at 
noon  hostile  infantry  appeared  at  Gottkendorf.  But  of  what 
value  for  him  is  the  information  that  there  were  2  or  4  bat- 
talions followed  by  3  or  6  batteries?  In  rear  of  these  there 
might  be  a  great  many  more  battalions  and  batteries;  in  the 
prospective  encounter  of  the  two  large  armies  this  would  be 
highly  probable  on  such  a  fine  road  as  the  one  through  Gott- 
kendorf, even  if  Lieutenant  C had  seen  but  a  single  com- 
pany or  battalion.  Should  patrols  attempt  to  let  the  whole 
hostile  column  pass  so  they  can  count  every  man  and  gun? 

The  highly  praiseworthy  and  arduous  efforts  of  the  (Ger- 
man) Great  General  Staff  to  draw  attention  to  the  service  of 
information  of  the  cavalry  during  grand  maneuvers  of  recent 
years  expose  certain  illusions  we  largely  ha'd  entertained,  and 
point  the  way  to  a  rational  method  and  judicious  action.  The 
reports  of  the  General  Staff  with  painstaking  accuracy  follow 
the  experiences  of  almost  every  patrol,  and  enable  us  to  form 
an  unprejudiced  opinion.  A  majority  of  the  patrol-leaders 
looked  upon  the  problem  as  a  forced  ride,  which  promptly 
brought  them  in  contact  with  the  hostile  columns,  but  with 
their  horses  used  up,  which  forced  them  to  rest  there  or  even 


Reconnaissance.  125 

in  rear  of  these  columns  in  very  unwarlike  fashion.  No  mat- 
ter how  much  they  saw,  their  superiors  remained  ignorant  of 
it.  The  strength  of  the  horses  had  been  exhausted  and  no 
longer  was  available  for  sending  a  message  which,  besides,  in 
time  of  war,  certainly  would  have  been  captured. 

Thus  it  has  happened  that  the  commander-in-chief  never 
received  a  single  message  informing  him  of  the  approach  of 
numerous  hostile  columns,  although  officer's  patrols  had  been 
sent  out  against  them  in  all  directions,  and  the  commanding 
general's  decisions  materially  depended  on  a  knowledge  of 
the  time  at  which  the  hostile  advance  parties  would  reach  a 
certain  district.  It  was  not  necessary  to  inform  him  that 
these  advance  parties  would  be  followed  on  all  good  roads  by 
long  columns;  and  he  never  would  have  been  able  to  cal- 
culate the  strength  of  these  columns  from  the  most  careful 
compilation  of  his  patrols'  reports.  It  is  a  vain  and  dan- 
gerous undertaking  for  them  to  try  to  deliver  a  strength  re- 
port of  the  enemy  to  their  commander-in-chief.  They  should 
rather  remember  the  admonition  that  the  best  reconnaissance 
is  worthless  if  information  gained  by  it  reaches  the  commander 
too  late  or  not  at  all.  In  smaller  maneuvers,  such  as  those 
carried  on  by  brigades  and  divisions,  the  efforts  of  patrols 
to  learn  the  strength,  composition,  and  direction  of  march  of 
hostile  columns,  and,  if  possible,  also  the  intention  of  the  hos- 
tile commander,  often  are  successful,  and  result  in  exhaustive 
reports  (spoiling  the  commanding  officers)  that  owe  their  ac- 
curacy almost  entirely  to  the  fact  that  in  time  of  peace  no 
prisoners  are  captured  and  blank  cartridges  are  used. 

And,  finally,  to  take  cognizance  of  another  point,  Lieu- 
tenant C 's  situation  reminds  us  of  the  advice  of  the  Field 

Service  Regulations,  which  is  that  "occasionally  it  will  be  ad- 
visable for  the  leader  to  leave  his  patrol  in  a  place  of  con- 
cealment, and  continue  his  observation  with  one  or  two  com- 


126  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

panions;  in  the  case  of  cavalry,  the  leader  and  the  men  thus 
detached  should  be  well  mounted."* 

Anyone  well  versed  in  the  Regulations  very  properly 
might  ask  if  this  should  not  have  been  done  when  Lieutenant 

C sent  the  sergeant  out  past  Kaltfleisz,  and  if  even  now 

more  might  not  be  accomplished  in  this  way  than  by  waiting 
in  the  edge  of  the  woods  near  Mondtken. 

It  may  often  happen  that  the  officer's  superior  judgment 
and  the  greater  speed  and  endurance  of  his  horse  may  have 
to  be  utilized  as  suggested  by  the  Field  Service  Regulations. 
But  this  will  mostly  be  where  the  distance  under  considera- 
tion is  short — a  few  thousand  yards — to  save  the  entire  pa- 
trol's going  over  this  distance,  and  but  seldom  on  account  of 
trying  to  remain  concealed.  In  the  open  country  even  a  single 
horseman  would  be  visible,  and  where  one  can  be  concealed 
there  is  always  cover  for  several.  If  the  leader  goes  too  far 
from  his  men,  or  places  obstacles  between  them  and  him- 
self, such  as  a  stream  or  marshy  ground,  there  is  danger  of 
becoming  permanently  separated  from  them.     If  Lieutenant 

C ,  instead  of  the  sergeant,  had  gone  to  Redigkainen-see, 

how  easily  might  he  have  been  pushed  back  from  Kaltfleisz 
and  forced  to  retreat  via  Redigkainen !  And  how  easily  might 
hostile  troopers  have  driven  the  remainder  of  his  patrol  out 
of  the  grove  near  Mondtken!  In  neither  case  is  it  likely  that 
the  officer  would  have  found  his  patrol  again.  He  would 
have  been  unable  to  carry  out  his  orders,  presumably  the  re- 
sults thus  far  attained  would  have  been  lost,  and  there  would 
have  been  nothing  left  for  him  to  do  but  to  attempt  retreat- 
ing alone  over  the  long  and  dangerous  road  to  Kallisten.  A 
consideration  of  this  possibility  surely  would  have  induced 
him  not  to  go  without  an  escort,  and  if  he  took  one  or  two 
men,  he  might  as  well  have  taken  the  whole  patrol. 

*See  par.  79,  F.  S.  R. 


Reconnaissance.  127 

But  there  are  other  reasons  why  it  is  inadvisable  for  the 
officer  to  go  entirely  alone,  even  if  he  can  fully  depend  on  his 
horse  and  his  horsemanship.  The  slightest  mishap  might 
render  him  helpless,  or  the  neighing  of  his  horse  going  by 
itself  might  disclose  his  presence. 

Should  the  sergeant  not  have  returned,  there  was  nothing 
to  prevent  a  continuance  of  the  reconnaissance.  But  the  loss 
of  the  leader  robs  the  patrol  of  its  mainstay  and  endangers 
its  further  usefulness.  Imagine  the  situation  of  the  sergeant, 
without  map  or  field-glasses  in  the  grove  near  Mondtken,  if 
his  lieutenant  did  not  return  after  half  an  hour  or  an  hour, 
or  if  he  himself  were  forced  by  hostile  detachments  to  retreat 
into  Allenstein  Beech  woods.  It  would  have  been  right  and 
proper  for  him  to  consider  it  his  duty  to  make  every  effort 
to  find  his  officer  again.  He  would  not  have  been  justified  to 
ignore  the  lieutenant's  fate  and  to  solely  think  of  continuing 
the  reconnaissance.  These  reasons  will  more  strongly  influ- 
ence the  lieutenant  and  decide  him  not  to  separate  himself 
from  his  patrol,  but  to  continue  in  observation  from  his  pres- 
ent hiding-place. 

About  1  p.  m.  troops  appear  at  the  Gottkendorf  railway 
station,  which  are  readily  recognized  as  infantry,  and  detach- 
ments of  about  half  a  battalion  each,  with  advanced  parties, 
march  from  there  towards  Kaltfliesz  and  Wilhelmsthal.  Lieu- 
tenant   C withdraws    into    Allenstein    Beechwoods,    and 

thence  watches  the  placing  of  outposts  on  Height  131  north 
of  Wilhelmsthal  and  at  the  edge  of  the  woods  east  of  Mondtken. 

Lieutenant  C continues  to  retreat  before  hostile  infantry 

patrols,  at  first  towards  Polleicken,  and,  while  riding  west  of 
Buchwalder-see  towards  Gr.  Buchwalde,  he  is  fired  on  from 
the  heights  east  of  the  lake,  thereby  having  one  horse  wounded. 
At  3.30  p.  m.,  from  the  grove  east  of  Neu-Garschen,  he  is 
able  to  distinguish  hostile  infantry  establishing  outposts  close 
to  the  village  and  sending  out  patrols.     Individual  horsemen 


128  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

are  visible  between  Rosengarth  and  Gr.  Buchwalde  and  near 
Neu-Garschen. 

What  does  Lieutenant  C think  of  the  situation 

AT  3.30  P.  M.,  AND  WHAT  ORDERS  DOES  HE  GIVE? 

It  is  true  that  Lieutenant  C has  not  seen  any  long 

columns  of  troops,  and  he  is  not  likely  to  do  so.  But  he 
will  conclude  that  the  discovery  of  hostile  infantry  outposts 
will  be  just  as  important  for  his  headquarters.  In  a  ma- 
neuver further  procedure  would  be  quite  simple:  a  message 
would  be  written  and  sent  back  by  a  man  on  a  good  horse 
with  orders  to  follow  the  easily-found  road  via  Neu-Garschen- 
Blankenberg-Schlitt  to  Kallisten,  where,  if  he  did  not  find 
the  regiment,  he  at  least  would  find  ways  and  means  to  have 
the  message  taken  farther.  The  patrol  commander,  whose 
horses  have  traveled  only  about  25  miles  to-day,  mindful  of 
the  regulations  which  specify  that  every  patrol  upon  obtain- 
ing touch  with  the  enemy  must  retain  it,  could  devote  him- 
self to  the  duty;  could  further  observe  the  enemy  with  the 
object  of  discovering  the  bivouac  of  some  large  body;  also 
could  investigate  the  state  of  affairs  at  Miinsterberg;  and, 
after  sending  a  last  message  late  in  the  afternoon,  could,  with 
the  consciousness  of  an  energetic  performance  of  duty  with 
good  results,  take  shelter  in  one  of  the  numerous  farm-houses 
in  front  of  the  enemy's  position,  and  the  following  morning, 
still  having  1  non-commissioned  officer  and  6  men,  could  re- 
sume his  duties  with  renewed  energy. 

But  he  does  not  find  things  as  smooth  as  this  in  time 
of  war.  A  single  trooper  surely  would  not  succeed  in  carry- 
ing the  message.  Even  2  men  hardly  would  succeed.  Even 
sending  a  duplicate  message  by  two  different  routes  may  not 
be  successful  and  would  take  4  troopers.  It  would  be  out  of 
the  question  for  the  messengers  to  follow  the  traveled  roads, 
where  they  almost  certainly  would  be  captured.     Presumably, 


RECONNAISSANCE.  1 29 

Kloben  and  Kallisten  are  occupied  by  the  enemy,  so  that  the 
messengers  would  have  to  go  towards  Sackstein  or  Pittehnen 
to  cross  the  Passarge.  How  will  they  find  their  way  across 
country  through  woods  and  marshes  without  a  map? 

These  thoughts  assail  the  officer  as  he,  to  avoid  the  next 
danger — i.  e.,  a  hostile  infantry  patrol — works  his  way  to  the 
western  edge  of  the  grove,  and,  leaving  Neu-Garschen  to  the 
left,  finds  safety  in  the  southeast  corner  of  the  woods  through 
which  the  Neu-Garschen-Ankendorf  road  runs.  He  is  con- 
vinced that  he  alone,  with  the  aid  of  map  and  field-glasses, 
may  still  be  able  to  get  the  important  message  to  its  destina- 
tion, and  that  to  accomplish  this  he  will  need  all  his  caution 
and  experience  and  possibly  the  fighting  strength  of  his  men. 
He  debates  for  a  moment  whether  it  would  not  do  to  go  with 
but  5  men,  leaving  the  sergeant  and  3  men  behind  to  retain 
touch  with  the  enemy.  In  this  way  he  would  carry  out  the 
letter  of  the  instructions  of  the  Field  Service  Regulations,  but 
only  the  letter.  It  simply  would  be  a  subterfuge  to  avoid 
reproach.  The  sergeant  would  be  able  to  accomplish  but 
little.  In  the  midst  of  hostile  cavalry,  he  would  be  con- 
stantly on  the  move,  seeking  for  hiding-places,  and  the  little 
that  he  might  see  he  would  be  unable  to  report  upon. 

As  soon  as  night  fell,  observation  and  reports  would  cease, 
and  the  following  morning  would  not  improve  matters  for 
the  small  tired  group,  which,  without  a  map,  would  have  to 
depend  on  information  received  from  occupants  of  isolated 
habitations  to  keep  from  getting  lost. 

But  possibly  9  men  will  enable  Lieutenant  C to  over- 
come hostile  opposition  attempting  to  bar  his  way,  when  5 
men  would  not  suffice.  The  stronger  he  remains,  the  more 
likely  is  he  to  succeed  in  capturing  hostile  messengers  on 
their  way  back. 

If  Lieutenant  C is  satisfied  that  he  must  himself  take 

back  the  message,  and  with  his  whole  patrol,  he  will  finally 


130  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

consider  whether  he  cannot  add  to  it.  A  knowledge  of  the 
extent  of  the  enemy's  front  would  be  of  great  importance, 
and  if  he  could  determine  whether  or  not  Mimsterberg  is  oc- 
cupied by  infantry,  it  undoubtedly  would  be  of  decided  ad- 
vantage. The  horses,  having  traveled  only  about  25  miles, 
and  having  been  singly  watered  and  fed  during  the  numerous 
halts,  surely  are  not  yet  tired  out.  But  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  the  ride  would  require  more  than  an  hour  and 
largely  would  be  across  open  country.  New  and  increased 
dangers  would  threaten  the  important  message  giving  infor- 
mation of  the  hostile  outposts  at  Mondtken  and  Gr.  Buch- 
walde,  and  the  later  it  arrives  at  Mohrungen  the  less  valuable 
it  would  be. 

This  doubt  may  turn  the  scale;  and,  besides,  the  officer 
has  a  right  to  hope  that  Troop  A,  reconnoitering  towards 
Miinsterberg-Guttstadt,  and  the  rest  of  the  regiment,  have 
accomplished  results  that  make  his  work  in  that  direction  un- 
necessary. But  it  would  not  be  wrong  or  censurable  if  his 
endurance  and  love  of  action  should  induce  him  to  round  out 
his  fine  day's  work  by  a  ride  to  Miinsterberg.  If  he  should 
conclude  to  go  back  at  once,  it  would  be  advisable  (after  ex- 
changing the  wounded  horse  for  the  captured  led  horse  and 
turning  the  former  adrift  as  soon  as  it  became  bothersome) 
to  go  along  the  eastern  edge  of  the  woods  which  the  patrol 
has  just  entered,  then  passing  through  the  northern  part  to 
the  northwest  corner  of  the  same  and  from  here  force  his  way 
to  Kallisten  or  Sackstein. 


Notwithstanding  the  diversity  of  instructions  given  to 
the  patrols  we  have  followed,  none  of  them  was  decidedly 
what  is  sometimes  called  a  "strategical  patrol."  Even  those 
that  went  farthest  cooperated  with  the  main  body  of  the 
troop,  which  acted  as  their  support  and  on  which  they  would 


Reconnaissance.  131 

fall  back.  It  simply  required  a  varying  number  of  hours  to 
execute  their  orders,  and  these  did  not  keep  them  out  until 

the  following  day.     Possibly  Lieutenant  C 's  instructions 

to  reconnoiter  via  Briickendorf  towards  Jonkendorf-Gr.  Buch- 
walde  might  be  looked  upon  as  passing  beyond  the  sphere  of 
minor  into  that  of  great  operations  of  war,  and  we  might 
look  upon  his  patrol  and  upon  that  of  Lieutenant  B— — -,  sent 

by   Captain    E from   Pittehnen   via    Freymarkt   towards 

Heilsberg  (see  page  89),  as  "strategical  patrols  " — anyway, 
the  name  does  not  matter ;  our  Regulations  do  not  contain  it, 
and  it  is  merely  a  handy,  easily  understood  term  for  a  not 
easily  described  idea.  For  there  is  no  sharp  line  of  demark- 
ation  between  "ordinary"  or  "small"  and  "strategical"  pa- 
trols. But  it  will  pay  to  examine  the  conditions  under  which 
a  patrol-leader  would  operate  in  the  sphere  of  the  strategical 
activity  of  cavalry,  considering  that  theory  sets  great  store  by 
such  patrols,  which  are  called  "the  eyes  of  the  commander- 
in-chief." 

Although  there  are  several  successful  long-distance  pa- 
trol rides  on  record  from  our  campaigns  of  1866  and  1870-71, 
still,  German  Army  headquarters  were  not  informed  in  time 
of  the  movements  of  the  French  army  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Mosel  the  16th  of  August,  1870,  or  of  the  extent  of  the 
French  line  of  battle  west  of  Metz  on  the  17th  of  August; 
and  the  decision  to  turn  to  the  right,  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Meuse,  towards  Beaumont  and  Sedan,  had  to  be  made  be- 
fore reliable  and  conclusive  information  had  been  received  (of 
the  movements  of  MacMahon's  army).  Moreover,  the  Aus- 
trian cavalry  in  Bohemia  (in  1866)  was  not  used  in  a  way 
that  would  have  completely  blocked  the  way  of  our  patrols, 
and  the  French  cavalry  (in  1870-71)  practically  offered  no 
opposition  to  German  reconnaissance.  Therefore,  at  the  time 
in  the  field  and  later  in  discussions  many  complaints  were 
heard  that  our  patrols  in  distant  reconnaissances,  as  a  rule, 


132  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

did  not  accomplish  what  had  been  expected  of  them.  Gen- 
eral Goeben,  too,  as  he  personally  has  told  me,  belonged  to 
these  dissatisfied  ones.  The  above-named  experiences  in  grand 
maneuvers  in  Germany  indicate  that,  in  spite  of  years  of 
earnest  endeavor  in  time  of  peace,  Army  headquarters  to-day 
cannot  depend  on  being  furnished  with  good  information  by 
1 '  strategical ' '  patrols. 

One  of  the  patrols  (so  far  but  casually  mentioned  in  our 
study)  received  comprehensive  instructions  of  a  strategical 
nature.  A  discussion  of  the  movements  of  this  patrol  might 
help  to  an  understanding  of  the  reasons  that  cause  the  above- 
named  deficiency. 

As  early  as  the  afternoon  of  May  3d,  Lieutenant  D , 

1st  Cavalry,  with  10  troopers  on  selected  horses,  left  Marien- 
berg.  He  had  received  orders  from  the  commanding  general 
to  reconnoiter  in  the  general  direction  of  Heilsberg-Barten- 
stein.  On  the  same  day  he  reached  Pr.  Holland,  28  miles 
away,  rested  here  a  few  hours,  and  started  again  at  4  a.  m. 
May  4th.  At  8  a.  m.  he  arrived  at  Wormditt,  22  miles  away, 
and  reported  thence  by  wire  that  so  far  he  had  seen  nothing 
of  the  enemy.  This  information  was  of  no  special  value  to 
the  commanding  general,  who  could  have  obtained  it  from 
the  telegraph  operator  without  the  patrol.  It  is  true  that  in 
the  enemy's  country,  where  the  telegraph  would  not  be  avail- 
able, this  information  would  have  been  of  some  consequence. 

But  it  is  doubtful  if  Lieutenant  D would  have  sent  one 

of  his  men  to  Saalfeld  on  account  of  this  information.  It  is 
more  than  31  miles  from  Wormditt  to  Saalfeld.  Therefore, 
the  messenger  would  have  traveled  53  miles  since  leaving  Pr. 
Holland  and  81  miles  since  leaving  Marienberg,  and  hardly 
would  have  arrived  (at  Saalfeld)  before  3  or  4  p.  m.  on  May 
4th.  To  know  that  the  enemy  was  not  at  Wormditt  at  8 
a.  m.  would  be  no  criterion  for  the  commanding  general  as 
to  how  matters  stood  there  or  at  Mehlsack  or  Liebstadt  sev- 


Reconnaissance.  133 

eral  hours  later.     Lieutenant  D had  a  right  to  assume 

that  it  would  not  be  his  duty  to  reconnoiter  this  district, 
lying  so  near  the  field  of  operations  of  the  army — at  least, 
not  in  so  far  as  it  related  to  matters  of  minor  importance. 
If  he  was  in  doubt  on  this  point,  the  blame  partly  would  lie 
in  the  wording  of  his  instructions,  which  very  properly  might 
have  included  a  statement  to  the  effect  that  his  reconnais- 
sance should  be  of  a  general  nature  only.  Reference  also 
should  have  been  made  to  the  intentions  of  the  corps  and 
army  commanders,  so  that  Lieutenant  D could  act  in  har- 
mony with  the  ideas  of  the  higher  commanders,  and  could 
send  his  messages  in  the  right  directions.  He  should  have 
known  that  the  army  corps  would  reach  the  vicinity  of  Saal- 
feld,  May  4th,  and  presumably  would  march  towards  Mohr- 
ungen  on  the  5th,  if  the  corps  commander  could  have  given 
this  information  as  early  as  the  3d.  Let  us  assume  that  Lieu- 
tenant D received  the  additional  information  at  the  latest 

upon  his  telegraphic  inquiry  from  Wormditt,  where  arrange- 
ments should  at  once  be  made  to  destroy  the  tape  records 
of  telegrams. 

In  view  of  the  already  mentioned  requirement  of  the  Field 
Service  Regulations  (that  a  patrol's  orders  must  state  clearly 
what  information  is  desired    [see    page  33]  ),   it  would  still 

seem  that  Lieutenant  D 's  instructions  are  too  general. 

But  if  we  imagine  ourselves  in  the  position  of  the  command- 
ing general,  who,  at  Marienburg,  on  May  3d,  only  knows  that 
a  hostile  army  is  approaching  from  the  east,  we  can  appre- 
ciate the  order,  to  which  only  might  have  been  added  how 
far  telegraphic  communication  still  existed  on  this  day.  Even 
had  it  been  possible  approximately  to  guess  where  the  enemy 
was  on  May  2d,  his  movements  for  May  3d,  4th,  and  5th  could 
not  have  been  foreseen.  A  more  definite  order  to  the  patrol — 
for  example,  that  it  should  locate  the  enemy's  right  flank — 
would  have  been  an  error.       It  was  uncertain  whether  the  pa- 


134  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

trol  would  find  the  enemy's  right  flank  in  the  direction  of 
Heilsberg-Bartenstein.  The  hostile  army  might  have  kept 
much  farther  to  the  south,  so  that  the  enemy  would  not  have 
been  found  at  Heilsberg  or  Bartenstein.  Again,  the  enemy 
might  have  moved  in  a  northwesterly  direction,  so  that  the 
patrol  would  have  encountered  the  enemy's  front.  To  this 
might  be  objected  that  it  would  have  been  better  to  let  the 
officer  choose  his  own  route,  and  simply  order  him  to  locate 
the  hostile  flank.  What  a  difficult  task  for  the  young  officer 
and  his  little  group  of  men!  The  commander-in-chief  him- 
self would  have  to  go  to  accomplish  this.  Is  hostile  cavalry 
to  be  regarded  as  the  enemy's  flank?  Where  is  the  flank  in 
question  if  the  enemy  is  not  advancing  on  a  closed  front,  but 
by  detachments?  Which  way  should  the  patrol  go  if  it  learns 
that  hostile  detachments  have  arrived  at  Pr.  Eylau?  Should 
these  be  looked  upon  as  the  hostile  flank,  or  be  ignored  on 
the  plea  that  presumably  they  are  detached  to  invest  or  ob- 
serve the  fortress  of  Konigsberg?  We  can  readily  see  that 
the  uncertainty  of  the  situation  made  it  impossible  for  the 
commanding  general  on  the  3d  of  May  to  say  any  more  to 
the  patrol-leader  than  that  he  should  reconnoiter.  It  is  ex- 
pected that  the  latter's  messages  will  form  a  basis  for  more 
definite  instructions  to  be  given  the  cavalry  of  the  army  corps. 
It  seems  fitting  that  the  commanding  general  should  have 

sent  Lieutenant  D in  the  general  direction  where  it  was 

expected  the  hostile  flank  would  be  found,  if  surmises  were 
correct.  In  this  way  he  prevented  an  aimless  wandering  about 
of  the  patrol,  and  formed  a  sort  of  tentacle  on  an  avenue  near 
one  flank  of  the  army.  Had  not  the  field  of  reconnaissance 
of  Konigsberg  included  Pr.  Eylau,  Uomnau,  and  Friedland, 
doubtless  a  patrol  would  have  been  sent  via  Mehlsack-Lands- 
berg-Pr.  Eylau,  but  this  would  not  have  influenced  the  move- 
ments of  Lieutenant  D ,  which  we  now  shall  follow. 


Reconnaissance:.  135 

It  is  noteworthy  that  apparently  the  commanding  gen- 
eral does  not  expect  Lieutenant  D 's  explorations  to  have 

any  influence  on  the  movements  of  the  army  until  after  May 
5th.  The  movements  for  May  5th  certainly  will  be  ordered 
from  Army  headquarters,  at  the  latest  by  the  afternoon  of 
May  4th — i.  e.,  at  a  time  when  the  patrol  may  have  reached 
the  vicinty  of  Heilsberg,  but  not  yet  have  been  able  to  send 
any  report.  Only  in  case  the  patrol  should  encounter  the 
enemy  on  the  morning  of  May  4th  near  Wormditt  and  be  able 
to  send  a  detailed  report  by  wire,  would  it  be  practicable  to 
make  any  changes  in  the  proposed  march  of  the  army  for  the 
5th.  If  telegraphic  communication  were  not  available,  then 
such  report  probably  would  arrive  too  late  to  change  the  di- 
rection of  march  of  the  army  on  the  5th. 

The  patrol  rested  at  Wormditt,  naturally  exercising  every 
precaution.  Such  duties  are  made  easier  in  friendly  territory, 
because  courageous  inhabitants  always  can  be  found  who  are 
willing  to  watch  from  church-towers  or  hilltops.     During  this 

halt  Lieutenant  D made  telegraphic  inquiry  of  Liebstadt, 

Mehlsack,  Zinten,  Landsberg,  Pr.  Eylau,  Heilsberg,  Barten- 
stein,  and  Guttstadt.  In  this  way  he  found  out  that  the  en- 
emy had  not  appeared  at  Liebstadt,  Guttstadt,  Mehlsack,  Zin- 
ten, or  Landsberg.  But  Landsberg  reported  that  communi- 
cation with  Heilsberg  had  been  interrupted  since  7  a.  m.  All 
this  information  was  wired  to  corps  headquarters.  Up  to  9.30 
p.  m.  no  reply  had  been  received  to  the  message  sent  Pr.  Ey- 
lau via  Konigsberg.  The  telegraph  operator  at  the  latter  place 
stated  that  he  had  informed  the  military  governor  of  the 
message. 

Lieutenant  D decides  not  to  await  information  con- 
cerning Pr.  Eylau.  It  is  evident  from  the  message  from  Lands- 
berg that  he  is  approaching  the  enemy,  and  he  might  have  to 
wait  too  long  to  get  news  from  the  governor  of  Konigsberg. 
He  decides  to  go  towards  Heilsberg  past  Frauendorf,  but,  as 


136  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

far  as  possible,  to  keep  off  the  highway.  Therefore,  he  rides 
via  Thalbach-Kaschaunen.  As  he  omits  sending  scouts  to 
the  edges  of  woods  to  save  his  horses,  he  does  not  get  an  ex- 
tended view  again  until  he  reaches  Kaschaunen.  He  is  more 
anxious  not  to  be  discovered  or  delayed  than  he  is  to  dis- 
cover every  hostile  patrol.  He  hopes  in  a  way  to  make  good 
the  deficiencies  of  his  reconnaissance  by  questioning  the  farm- 
ers. Of  course  he  might  meet  hostile  patrols  on  the  wood- 
roads,  but  he  hopes  to  avoid  being  surprised  by  keeping  a 
sharp  lookout  to  the  front  and  flanks  and  having  the  point 
well  in  advance  of  the  main  body  of  the  patrol.  The  dense 
woods  would  quickly  hide  him  again  from  the  enemy,  and  his 
map  would  help  him  along. 

Nothing  has  been  seen  of  the  enemy  at  Kaschaunen.  The 
patrol  continues  on  its  way  south  of  the  Drewenz  River,  and 
about  1  p.  m.  arrives  near  Bogen.  From  Height  114,  north- 
east of  the  village,  5  or  6  hostile  troopers  are  visible  at  the 
wind-mill  northeast  of  Raunau. 

What  Are  Lieutenant  D 's  Reflections  Concerning 

Further  Action  on  His  Part? 

The  officer  sent  off  on  a  reconnaissance  of  several  days' 
duration  has  to  consider  the  conduct  of  his  patrol  on  meeting 
hostile  patrols,  the  same  as  we  have  seen  was  the  case  with 

Lieutenants  C and  F .     His  messages  are  in  greater 

danger  than  those  of  patrols  sent  out  but  a  short  distance,  if 
hostile  troopers  penetrate  between  him  and  his  army,  for  the 
longer  road  increases  the  dangers  besetting  messengers.  "Stra- 
tegical" patrols,  too,  can  help  screen  the  movements  of  their 
army  by  destroying  or  capturing  hostile  patrols;  can  help  to 
interfere  with  the  enemy's  messenger  service;  and  for  them, 
also,  the  answers  of  prisoners  are  of  great  importance — often 
clearing  up  the  situation  better  than  prolonged  personal  ob- 
servation. It  is,  of  course,  necessary  that  at  least  one  member 
of  such  patrol  be  able  to  speak  the  enemy's  language. 


Reconnaissance.  137 

And  yet  conditions  are  different  from  those  of  patrols 
working  in  a  more  restricted  area.  The  farther  away  a  pa- 
trol is  from  its  army,  the  harder  it  is  to  bear  losses  incident 
to  engagements,  which  cripple  further  activity  of  the  patrol 
or  stop  it  altogether.  Unless  it  is  a  question  of  individual 
hostile  troopers,  the  easiest  and  most  successful  feat  of  arms 
will  be  of  no  value,  but  simply  will  call  up  a  swarm  of  ene- 
mies. As  a  rule,  it  seems  inadvisable  to  forcibly  penetrate 
the  hostile  screen.  We  know  that  the  screen  has  wide  gaps, 
and  that  in  field  warfare  the  cloud  of  patrols,  as  a  rule,  passes 
but  once  or  twice  over  the  ground.  Waiting  in  a  good  hiding- 
place  until  the  vicinity  is  again  free  from  patrols  offers  better 
chances,  because  even  a  successful  fight  cannot  keep  the  road 
to  the  rear  open  for  messengers.  This  is  more  readily  accom- 
plished nearer  the  army  by  the  mutual  support  of  the  denser 
network  of  patrols.  Messengers  from  "strategical"  patrols 
are  always  instructed  to  make  use  of  remote  trails  and  skillful 
dodging,  and  always  will  be  exposed  to  the  dangers  of  the 
solitary  ride  within  reach  of  the  enemy. 

Nevertheless,  even  this  class  of  patrols,  on  principle,  must 
not  invariably  avoid  an  engagement,  and  certainly  must  not 
let  slip  any  chance  to  capture  hostile  messengers.  But  they 
must  very  carefully  consider  the  probable  outcome  of  an  en- 
gagement, and,  in  case  of  doubt,  preferably  turn  aside  and 
continue  on  their  way  unseen. 

As  telegraphic  communication  between  Heilsberg  and 
Landsberg  has  been  interrupted  since  early  in  the  morning, 
Lieutenant  D has  not  to  deal  with  individual  hostile  sol- 
diers that  might  prove  an  easy  and  tempting  capture,  and  so 
he  decides,  for  the  present,  to  wait  and  watch  the  Heilsberg- 
Frauendorf  highway.  He  succeds  in  fording  the  Drewenz  at 
a  covered  spot  and  in  hiding  himself  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
Nickelsberg. 

Should  he  send  back  a  message? 
—10 — 


i^S  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

It  is  true  that  the  Field  Service  Regulations  state  that 
"as  soon  as  it  is  certain  that  the  enemy  has  been  discovered 

a   message  should  be   sent";*  still   Lieutenant  D has  a 

right  to  doubt  whether  he  would  perform  any  noteworthy  ser- 
vice for  the  commanding  general  were  he  to  report  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  hostile  patrol  at  Raunau.  It  was  easy  to  infer 
at  Saalfeld  that  the  enemy  had  reached  the  vicinty  of  Heils- 
berg,  from  the  telegram  stating  that  telegraphic  communica- 
tion between  Landsberg  and  Heilsberg  had  been  interrupted. 
Therefore,  the  message  would  not  relate  anything  new,  and 
would  cost  the  officer  at  least  one  man.  The  officer  has  a 
right  to  hope  that  he  soon  will  be  able  to  report  other  and 
more  important  facts. 

After  the  hostile  patrol  near  Raunau  had  ridden  back  to- 
wards this  village  and  disappeared,  Lieutenant  D con- 
tinued his  ride  via  Krug  and  Workeim  to  near  Neuendorf, 
where  he  arrived  at  about  3  p.  m.  Nothing  was  known  of  the 
enemy  in  Workeim.  A  single  hostile  trooper  is  seen  trotting 
along  the  road  from  F.f  Grossendorf  towards  Heilsberg;  but 
the  intervening  marshy  meadows  interfere  with  an  attempt  to 
capture  him.  People  at  Neuendorf  state  that  at  various  times 
during  the  day  hostile  troopers  passed  through  the  hamlet, 
some  going  towards  Petershagen  and  others  towards  Heils- 
berg. This  adds  to  the  probability  that  detachments  of  hos- 
tile cavalry  are  at  Heilsberg,  and  Lieutenant  D ,  remem- 
bering the  teachings  of  times  of  peace,  decides  to  go  farther 
around  the  enemy's  flank  if  possible,  to  get  a  view  of  the 
Heilsberg-Bartenstein  road,  or  to  find  out  something  more 
definite  from  the  inhabitants  about  the  enemy  at  Heilsberg. 
He  reaches  Grossendorf  Woods  (Grossendorf er  Wald),  but 
then,  to  avoid  a  hostile  patrol  which  appeared  at  Grossendorf, 
he  went  via  Jegothen  to  Gunten,  where  he  arrived  at  4.30  p. 

*See  par.  79,  F.  S.  R. 

fAbbreviation  for  Forsterei,  "Ranger's  house." 


Reconnaissance.  139 

m.,  and  halted  at  Height  94.  The  inhabitants  of  neither  of 
the  two  places  know  anything  definite  about  the  enemy;  they 
simply  know  of  a  rumor  that  there  is  hostile  cavalry  at  Bart- 
enstein  and  Heilsberg. 

From  Pr.  Holland  to  Gunten  the  patrol  came  43  miles, 
and  during  the  past  24  hours  it  has  traveled  over  70  miles. 
Most  of  the  horses  are  tired  out,  and  a  continuation  of  the 
ride  to-day  would  completely  use  them  up;  therefore,  they 
absolutely  need  a  good  rest. 

What  arrangements  does  Lieutenant  D make  at 

4.30  p.  m.  May  4TH? 

The  estate  of  Gunten  is  too  extensive  to  use  as  quarters 
for  the  patrol,  because  the  latter  could  not  properly  guard  it, 
and,  being  at  a  cross-roads,  it  might  receive  sudden  visits 
from  hostile  patrols.  The  patrol  will  be  able  to  rest  only  at 
a  remote  point;  the  best  place  would  be  in  the  woods  south 
of  Gunten,  far  from  the  road.  Being  in  friendly  territory, 
where  there  is  no  danger  of  treachery,  one  of  the  farms  south- 
west of  Borchertsdorf  might  be  used  in  case  of  bad  weather. 
Although  the  nights  during  May  still  are  quite  cool  in  East 
Prussia,  the  officer  doubtless  will  prefer  the  woods,  where, 
under  protection  of  a  sentry-post,  the  horses  can  be  fed  and 
watered  in  a  creek  flowing  into  the  Elm  River.  Feed  would 
be  taken  along  from  Gunten,  or  would  be  carried  from  there 
after  dark. 

He  now  considers  it  necessary  to  send  off  a  message,  and 
composes  the  following: 

4  May,  5  p.  m. 
To  Telegraph  Station,  Saalfeld: 

At  1  p.  m.  while  riding  from  Wormditt  via  Kaschaunen  and  Bogen, 
I  noticed  5  or  6  hostile  troopers  at  Raunau.  Later  I  saw  a  mounted  mes- 
senger on  the  Neuendorf-Heilsberg  highway;  and  I  went  via  Jegothen 
to  avoid  a  hostile  patrol  that  appeared  near  Grossendorf.  Farmers  say 
that  during  the  day  patrols  have  frequently  come  through  Neuendorf, 
some  going  towards  Heilsberg  and  some  the  opposite  way.  Apparently 
Landsberg,  Heilsberg,  and  Bartenstein  are  occupied  by  hostile  cavalry. 

D , 

Lientetiant. 


140  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

How  shall  the  message  be  forwarded?  The  condition  of 
the  horses  and  the  numerous  hostile  patrols  that  are  abroad 
preclude  its  being  sent  towards  Saalfeld.  An  effort  must  be 
made  to  reach  a  telegraph  station  that  still  is  in  communi- 
cation with  the  district  occupied  by  our  army.  The  best  op- 
portunity to  do  this  seems  to  be  on  the  Landsberg-Zinten  rail- 
way. Landsberg,  which  seems  to  be  occupied  by  the  enemy, 
must  be  avoided,  and  the  message  sent  say  from  Sangnitten 
or  Arnstein,  or  even  farther  north. 

In  friendly  territory,  where  information  from  the  inhab- 
itants helps  out,  a  single  horseman  may  thus  be  able  to  avoid 
the  enemy  and  get  through;  and,  in  view  of  the  small  number 

of  his  men,  Lieutenant  D may  consider  it  permissible  to 

send  but  one  man,  because  the  message  apparently  is  not  of 
great  importance.  The  messenger  will  have  to  go  18  miles 
or  more  to  the  desired  telegraph  station.  Even  the  best  horse 
would  not  be  able  to  stand  this  after  the  exertions  of  the  last 
24  hours.  But  in  the  horse-country  of  East  Prussia  it  ought 
to  be  possible  to  find  a  suitable  saddle-horse,  even  after  the 
drain  upon  it  for  war  purposes.  Otherwise,  the  sending  of 
the  message  must  be  deferred  until  the  messenger's  horse  has 
rested  sufficiently.  The  day's  experience  will  induce  Lieu- 
tenant D ,  if  there  is  still  an  opportunity,  to  take  a  horse 

from  the  owner  of  the  estate  or  from  some  farmer,  as  a  pre- 
cautionary measure,  giving  a  receipt  therefor,  and  have  it 
taken  along  as  a  remount  together  with  the  horse  the  mes- 
senger leaves  behind.  A  reminder  that  the  enemy  surely  will 
requisition  all  serviceable  horses,  and  probably  without  giving 
receipts,  may  induce  the  owner  to  give  up  a  horse  more  readily. 
If  the  spare  horse  becomes  troublesome,  it  can  be  let  loose 
at  any  time. 

The  messenger  will  be  told  that  after  seeing  that  the 
message  is  sent  by  wire  he  must  try  to  reach  the  army  corps, 
going  in  the  general  direction  of  Mohrungen,  and  calling  on 


Reconnaissance.  141 

village  authorities  to  supply  him  with  a  new  mount  when- 
ever necessary.  He  is  to  keep  the  original  copy  of  the  mes- 
sage until  he  reaches  his  command  again,  unless  he  should  be 
obliged  to  destroy  it  on  account  of  imminent  danger.  Anything 
of  importance  that  he  might  learn  of  the  enemy  during  his 
ride  he  is  to  add  to  the  telegram  over  his  own  signature.  Un- 
der this  heading  would  come  any  information  as  to  whether 
or  not  Landsberg  is  occupied  by  the  enemy. 

It  might  be  added,  concerning  the  wording  of  the  mes- 
sage, that  the  address,  'Chief  of  Staff,  1st  Army  Corps,"  is 
purposely  omitted ;  likewise  the  name  of  the  place  where  Lieu- 
tenant D is  and  route  he  expects  to  follow  after  resting. 

It  is  intended  that  the  message  should  disclose  as  little  as 
possible,  should  it  fall  into  the  enemy's  hands.  The  scanti- 
ness of  information  received  from  inhabitants  of  the  country 
by  patrol-leaders  belies  the  experience  of  time  of  peace.  While 
during  maneuvers  the  appearance  of  a  body  of  troops  at  Heils- 
berg  would  be  known  in  a  couple  of  hours  in  all  the  surround- 
ing habitations,  Lieutenant  D obtains  nothing  but  un- 
reliable rumors,  except  in  the  villages  where  the  enemy  actu- 
ally has  been  seen.  During  maneuvers,  travel  on  the  country 
roads  becomes  more  active  than  in  ordinary  times.  Wagons, 
cyclists,  horsemen  travel  from  place  to  place.  Not  a  single 
movement  of  troops  escapes  the  curiosity  and  interest  of  the 
inhabitants,  and  a  wide-awake  patrol-leader  often  can  better 
inform  himself  about  the  march  of  a  hostile  body  of  horse- 
men from  the  statements  of  country  people  than  if  he  had 
seen  it  himself ;  but  it  is  otherwise  in  time  of  war.  The  towns- 
man and  the  countryman,  the  tradesman  and  the  official,  all 
are  kept  home  by  duty  or  apprehension,  unless  a  panic  should 
drive  them  into  the  woods.  Women  and  children,  who  dur- 
ing maneuvers  are  attracted  in  multitudes  by  the  noise  of 
arms,  hoof-beats,  drum  and  trumpet,  in  war  hide  themselves 
in  excessive  fear  of  the  approaching  enemy  of   their   coun- 


142  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

try.  Therefore,  even  in  friendly  territory,  patrol-leaders  must 
be  prepared  to  find  out  much  less  about  the  enemy  than  they 
do  during  time  of  peace. 

Granted  that  the  messenger  can  be  furnished  a  good  horse 
of  fair  gait — a  badly-broken,  obstinate  brute  cannot  be  used 
in  this  case,  even  by  an  excellent  rider — he  hardly  could  leave 
before  5.30  p.  m.  He  would  give  Landsberg  a  wide  berth, 
possibly  going  via  Eichhorn,  Worienen,  Schonwiese.  Prob- 
ably the  telegraph  stations  at  Sangnitten  and  Arnstein  have 
been  abandoned,  even  if  the  enemy  has  not  yet  arrived  there. 
He  probably  will  have  to  go  as  far  as  Zinten,  a  distance  of 
25  to  28  miles,  before  finding  an  office  that  is  still  open,  and 
it  will  be  late  in  the  evening  before  the  telegram  is  received 
at  Saalfeld. 

Lieutenant  D will  not  get  much  information  in  his 

hiding-place  during  the  remainder  of  the  afternoon  and  even- 
ing. If  he  wishes  to  remain  concealed,  he  must  remain  quiet. 
Not  until  after  dark  will  he  try  to  obtain  information  from 
neighboring  farms  through  countrymen.  It  is  true  that  these 
people  thereby  would  risk  their  necks,  but  doubtless  some 
can  be  found  who  are  willing  to  do  this  service,  even  if  they 
did  not  go  as  far  as  the  enemy's  lines. 

In  this  way  Lieutenant  D learns  that  Heilsberg  act- 
ually is  occupied  by  the  enemy,  and  that  from  Settau,  where 
a  hostile  patrol  was  seen  during  the  day,  several  troops  of 
cavalry  were  seen,  which  early  in  the  evening  rode  through 
Roggenhausen  towards  Heilsberg.  Nothing  had  been  seen  of 
the  enemy  at  Borchertsdorf. 

What  are  Lieutenant  D 's  further  intentions? 

Lieutenant   D 's   orders   direct  him  towards   Barten- 

stein,  and  the  rumor  seems  plausible  that  hostile  cavalry  had 
reached  that  point,  presumably  the  main  body  of  the  ad- 
vanced detachments  known  to  be  at  Landsberg  and  Heils- 


Reconnaissance.  t43 

berg.     Therefore,  Lieutenant  D takes  Bartenstein  as  his 

next  objective.  The  endeavor  to  remain  on  the  outer  flank 
of  the  enemy,  as  well  as  solicitude  for  his  messenger-route 
(which  must  continue  towards  telegraph  stations  situated  at 
the  north  or  northwest),  make  it  desirable  to  remain  north 
of  the  Alle.  And,  not  to  run  into  the  arms  of  hostile  detach- 
ments on  the  straight  and  convenient  Bartenstein-Reddenau 
road,  the  officer  intends  to  cross  this  road  and  for  the  present 
ride  past  Albrechtsdorf  towards  Pilwen.  At  Albrechtsdorf  he 
may  be  able  to  get  more  definite  information  about  hostile 
detachments  supposed  to  be  at  L,andsberg;  and  there,  as  well 
as  at  Pilwen,  something  definite  may  be  learned  about  Bart- 
enstein. He  wishes  to  cross  the  Bartenstein-Albrechtsdorf 
road  before  daylight,  and  therefore  orders  the  patrol  to  start 
at  i  a.  m.  May  5th.  A  countryman  on  horseback  is  taken 
along  as  guide.  There  is  no  necessity  to  send  back  any  further 
message.  By  1  a.  m.  the  horses  have  rested  8  hours,  and 
doubtless  have  had  an  abundance  of  feed.  And  presumably 
the  men  were  passably  well  provided  for,  as  food  could  be 
obtained  from  neighboring  farms  and  from  Gunten  at  night. 
Of  course,  the  guard  and  the  officer  obtained  very  little  rest, 
but  a  few  hours'  sleep  in  the  grass  are  sufficient  to  provide 
new  strength. 

At  a  farm  near  Albrechtsdorf  the  officer  learns  that  about 
15  horsemen  passed  the  place  the  day  before,  going  towards 
Landsberg.  After  reaching  Pilwen  at  about  3  a.  m.,  where 
nothing  is  known  of  hostile  troops  being  in  Bartenstein,  the 
patrol  cautiously  continued  its  reconnaissance,  and  found  out 
that  the  town  actually  was  not  occupied  by  the  enemy.  In 
the  outer  houses  the  officer  learns  that  yesterday  afternoon 
the  hostile  5th  Dragoons,  coming  from  Schippenbeil,  passed 
through  the  town,  towards  Heilsberg.  Since  then  only  oc- 
casionally had  single  hostile  troopers  passed  through  the  town. 
The  mayor,  who  had  been  sent  for,  verifies  this  report,  and 


M4  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

adds  that  yesterday  afternoon  several  baggage-wagons  passed 
through  the  town  and  that  on  the  order  of  the  hostile  com- 
mander, who  spoke  German,  he  had  sent  ten  wagon-loads  of 
oats  to  Sehonbruch  and  Langheim  (near  Korschen),  respect- 
ively, where  they  were  to  report  to  army  officials.  The  mayor 
had  heard  nothing  more  about  the  grain.  He  did  not  know 
how  matters  stood  in  Schippenbeil,  but  yesterday  evening 
there  was  no  enemy  in  Legienen,  Wehrwillen,  Sandlack,  or 
Plensen.  Telegraphic  communication  with  Pr.  Eylau  and 
Korschen  has  been  interrupted.  The  telegraph  instruments 
of  the  Postal  Telegraph  and  of  the  railway  station  of  Bart- 
enstein  have  been  destroyed. 

What  ark  Lieutenant  D 's  reflections  and  de- 
cisions   CONCERNING    FURTHER    ACTION?        (It    is    nOW    about 

4.15  a.  m.) 

The  justified  assumption  that  the  enemy's  main  body 
would  be  found  at  Bartenstein  has  proven  erroneous.  In  time 
of  war  things  often  turn  out  differently  from  what  was  an- 
ticipated. Were  there  a  large  hostile  force  at  Schippenbeil, 
there  would  be  more  traffic  through  Bartenstein.  But  it  may 
be  assumed  that  hostile  troops  are  at  Sehonbruch  and  Lang- 
heim, for  it  is  improbable  that  army  officials  whould  be  sent 
to  these  points  in  hostile  territory  without  being  accompanied 
by  troops.  The  direction  whence  they  came  to  Sehonbruch 
will  give  a  clue  to  the  enemy's  intentions,  and  this  may  be 
more  easily  found  out  on  the  Schippenbeil-Schonbruch  road 
than  at  Sehonbruch  itself,  where  hostile  outposts  certainly 
would  prevent  near  approach.     As  it  is  only  about  six  miles 

to  Langanken,  Lieutenant  D will  not  send  a  message  until 

he  has  reached  this  point.  Possibly  he  will  find  out  something 
about  Schippenbeil  at  Langanken. 

At  5.45  a.  m.  the  patrol  approaches  the  highway  at  Lang- 
anken, on  which  there  is  a  convoy  of  army  and  civilian  wag- 


Reconnaissance.  145 

ons,  guarded  by  dragoons  moving  towards  Schonbruch.  Lieu- 
tenant D counts  30  wagons.     He  lets  them  pass  and  they 

disappear  in  the  woods  north  of  Woduhnkeim;  then  he  sends 
a  party  to  Langanken.  Here  he  finds  out  that  yesterday  a 
hostile  regiment  of  dragoons,  coming  from  Schippenbeil,  passed 
by  and  halted  for  the  night  north  of  Schonbruch.  Its  train, 
which  has  just  passed  by,  halted  for  the  night  at  Langanken 
and  Woduhnkeim.  A  sick  officer,  unable  to  travel,  remained 
at  the  Langanken  estate.  He  understands  some  German,  but 
refuses  to  give  any  information.  He  belongs  to  the  4th  Dra- 
goons. His  servant  hid  himself  upon  the  approach  of  our 
patrol,  and  cannot  be  found. 

Nothing  is  known  at  Langanken  about  Schippenbeil. 

To  find  out  something  more  definite  about  the  where- 
abouts and  line  of  march  of  the  hostile  cavalry,  Lieutenant 
D sends  2  troopers  towards  Gahlkeim  and  2  others  to- 
wards Schippenbeil,  while  he,  with  the  remainder  of  his  pa- 
trol, conceals  himself  in  a  grove  west  of  Langanken. 

By  8.30  a.  m.  it  is  learned  that  the  hostile  cavalry  reg- 
iment left  Schonbruch  at  5  a.  m.  and  marched  towards  Dom- 
nu  along  the  highway,  and  that  the  train  is  following  it  on 
this  road.  The  troopers  sent  towards  Schippenbeil  were  fired 
upon  from  the  northwest  exit  of  the  town,  but  they,  as  well 
as  the  two  sent  to  Galkeim,  returned  unharmed.  The  inhab- 
itants of  Thorms  stated  that,  with  the  exception  of  a  ford 
at  Hoschenen,  there  is  no  place  of  crossing  over  the  Alle  be- 
tween Bartenstein  and  Schippenbeil. 

What  are  Lieutenant  D 's  further  arrangements 

AND  INTENTIONS? 

The  hostile  regiment  of  cavalry  either  is  marching  to- 
wards Konigsberg  or  is  making  so  wide  a  circuit  around  the 
flank  of  our  army  that  it  is  useless  to  follow  it.  The  im- 
portant thing  is  to  find  the  hostile  columns  of  infantry,  and 


146  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

it  is  questionable  if  the  patrol  will  do  so  in  the  direction  it 
has  so  far  gone.  The  Schippenbeil-Bartenstein  road,  on  which 
the  hostile  5th  Dragoons  marched  yesterday,  apparently  is 
deserted  to-day.  The  road  south  of  the  Alle  has  not  yet  been 
seen,  nevertheless  the  march  of  a  column  there  would  have 
become  evident:  Bartenstein  would  not  have  been  found  un- 
occupied by  the  enemy,  and  at  Schippenbeil  more  would  have 
been  noted  than  the  whistle  of  a  few  bullets  fired  by  con- 
cealed men.  And  if  hostile  columns  were  approaching  Schip- 
penbeil from  the  east,  their  advance  detachments  already 
would  have  been  felt.  These  points  are  not  conclusive  evi- 
dence, but  they  are  indications  which,  though  not  proving 
anything  mathematically,  when  considered  together  have  a 
certain  weight.  Positive  information  can  be  obtained  by 
riding  a  few  miles  farther  east.  The  Alle  probably  can  be 
crossed  at  Stolzenfeld  or  Massaunen;  and  even  information 
that  the  enemy  was  not  encountered  on  the  roads  east  of 
Schippenbeil  will  help  clear  up  the  situation  for  headquarters. 

But  military  instinct  warns  the  patrol-leader  against  fol- 
lowing this  plan.  If,  contrary  to  expectation,  hostile  infantry 
columns  should  be  on  the  march  to  Schippenbeil,  they  hardly 
could  get  any  farther  than  Bartenstein  to-day,  and  to-morrow 
but  little  beyond  the  line  Landsberg-Heilsberg.  But  only  on 
this  line  they  become  of  importance  to  our  army,  whose  left 
wing  to-day,  May  5th,  is  expected  to  reach  Mohrungen.  There- 
fore, if  they  find  out  this  evening  at  Mohrungen  that  up  to 
this  morning  only  the  hostile  5th  Dragoons  have  come  along 
the  Schippenbeil-Bartenstein-Heilsberg  road,  this  in  itself  will 
form  a  basis  for  judging  the  situation. 

If  the  patrol  clings  any  longer  to  the  Heilsberg-Barten- 
stein-Schippenbeil  road  and  its  eastern  prolongation,  it  may 
sacrifice  important  affirmative  information  in  favor  of  nega- 
tive information.  Should  the  5th  Dragoons  simply  be  a  flank 
guard,  and  should  the  enemy's  main  columns  already  be  march- 


Reconnaissance.  H7 

ing  on  the  roads  through  Bischofstein  and  Seeburg,  there  would 
be  danger  in  the  delay.  Information  of  this  could  be  sent 
promptly  enough,  as  the  heads  of  these  columns  might  en- 
counter our  own  as  early  as  the  6th.  But  if  the  enemy  is  not 
on  these  roads,  timely  information  of  this  fact  probably  will 
be  more  welcome  than  any  news  from  the  district  east  of 
Schippenbeil.  To  be  sure,  many  doubts  still  remain.  If  the 
heads  of  the  enemy's  main  columns  have  not  yet  advanced 
as  far  as  the  line  Schippenbeil-Bischofsburg,  the  patrol,  in 
going  south,  might  get  in  front  of  the  hostile  army  and  lay 
itself  open  to  the  charge  of  neglecting  the  important  duty  of 

locating  the  enemy's  flank.     And  Lieutenant  D can  safely 

assume  that  his  regimental  commander  will  have  the  district 
east  of  Guttstadt  reconnoitered,  so  that  his  own  work  in  the 
vicinity  of  Bischofstein  and  Seeburg  would  be  superfluous  or 
of  minor  importance.  And,  finally,  the  officer  cannot  under- 
estimate the  obstacles  there  would  be  to  the  forwarding  of 
his  messages  should  he  go  south,  for  in  this  case  he  would 
give  up  the  use  of  the  telegraph. 

The  decision  requires  such  a  deep  insight  into  the  require- 
ments of  greater  operations  of  war  that  it  can  but  seldom  be 
found  in  officers  of  limited  experience.  Prudence,  therefore, 
demands  that  commanders-in-chief  should  not  set  their  ex- 
pectations too  high,  for  many  a  patrol  will  fail  simply  because 
it  is  unable  to  hit  upon  the  right  thing  to  do  in  such  com- 
plicated situations.  And  yet  it  is  very  seldom  that  these  ' '  stra- 
tegical" patrols,  these  "eyes  of  the  commander-in-chief,"  can 
be  explicitly  told  just  what  to  do.  They  are  permanently 
thrown  on  their  own  resources  concerning  the  objective  of 
their  trip.     No  instructions,  no  matter  how  thoroughly  thought 

out  or  carefully  weighed,  given  Lieutenant  D on  the  3d 

of  May,  could  have  simplified  the  weighty  decision  for  him 
that  he  must  now  make — a  decision  that  finally  results  in  fa- 
vor of  turning  south,  because,  reaching  the  flank  of  the  hostile 


148  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

columns,  he  would  be  able  to  see  much  more  than  would  the 
patrols  sent  from  Guttstadt  against  the  heads  of  these  columns. 

The  patrol  must  ford  the  Alle  at  Hoschenen,  and  pre- 
sumably at  Louisenhof  will  be  able  to  find  out  something  more 
definite  about  the  garrison  of  Schippenbeil.  Then  the  patrol 
will  ride  to  Gr.  Schwansfeld. 

But  before  crossing  the  Alle  a  message  must  be  sent  to 
the  commanding  general.  What  was  discovered  early  this 
morning  is  of  sufficient  importance,  and  this  may  be  the  last 
opportunity  to  use  the  telegraph  line.  It  is  not  advisable  to 
wait  until  after  crossing  the  stream  before  sending  the  mes- 
sage. It  is  not  expedient  to  send  single  horsemen  through  a 
swollen  stream,  and  at  Bartenstein  they  might  unexpectedly 
run  into  the  enemy  without  being  able  to  get  away. 

What  shall  the  message  contain  and  how  shall  it  be  for- 
warded ? 

Near  Schippenbeil,  5  May,  9  a.m. 
To  Telegraph  Station,  Saalfcld: 

Yesterday  at  noon  the  hostile  5th  Dragoons  coming  from  Schippen- 
beil passed  through  Bartenstein  towards  Heilsberg.  At  4  a.  m.  to-day 
there  was  no  enemy  in  Bartenstein  and  so  far  no  other  troops  have  followed 
the  5th  Dragoons.  Yesterday  the  mayor  of  Bartenstein  wTas  forced  to 
send  10  wagon -loads  of  oats  to  Schonbruch  and  Langheim,  respectively. 

The  hostile  4th  Dragoons  camped  last  night  at  Schonbruch  whither 
it  marched  from  Schippenbeil.  At  5  a.  m.  to-day  it  left  for  Domnau. 
Several  shots  were  fired  at  my  men  from  Schippenbeil.  No  troops  were 
visible  there  and,  therefore  I  think  the  place  contains  but  few  of  the  enemy. 

I  shall  not  follow  the  hostile  cavalry  that  apparently  is  marching 
towards  Konigsberg,  and,  as  apparently  hostile  columns  will  not  use  the 
Schippenbeil-Bartenstein-Heilsberg  road,  I  shall  turn  south  towards  the 
roads  passing  through  Bischofstein  and  Seeburg. 

D , 

Lieutenant. 

It  is  unlikely  that  a  telegraph  office  will  be  found  in  op- 
eration in  Pr.  Eylau  or  on  the  Pr.  Eylau-Konigsberg  railway. 
This  district  is  too  near  the  4th  Dragoons.  Besides,  a  mes- 
sage sent  in  that  direction  easily  might  fall  into  the  enemy's 
hands.  It  is  more  promising  to  have  the  messenger  follow 
the  same  route  as  did  the  one  of  yesterday— viz.,  towards  the 


Reconnaissance:.  149 

Landsberg-Zinten  railway.  The  wooded  country  between  the 
two  lines  of  railway  will  favor  the  messenger's  slipping  through. 
But  the  way  is  long  and  hard  to  find.  Too  many  obstacles 
threaten  a  single  horseman,  and  the  importance  of  the  message 
justifies  sending  2  men,  even  though  this  will  reduce  the  pa- 
trol to  7  men. 

Will  the  message  escape  the  danger  of  the  road?  Even 
if  the  messengers  are  given  remounts,  or  if  such  are  obtained 
during  the  trip,  these  are  not  accustomed  to  great  exertions, 
and  easily  may  give  out.  It  is  31  miles  to  Zinten  by  direct 
route;  who  knows  what  detours  the  messengers  will  have  to 
make,  or  number  of  wrong  roads  they  will  take,  as  they  must 
avoid  the  highways,  keep  to  the  woods,  and  solely  depend  on 
statements  of  inhabitants,  who  seldom  can  give  accurate  in- 
formation about  roads  to  distant  points.  The  troopers  for 
nearly  two  days  have  been  engaged  in  very  fatiguing  nervous 
work  and  constantly  in  the  saddle,  except  during  short  pauses. 
Weariness  and  the  opportunity  to  rest  and  refresh  themselves 
en  route  will  delay  the  ride,  so  that  the  messengers  hardly  will 
arrive  at  Zinten  before  4  p.  m. 

The  hostile  cavalry  at  Schonbruch  surely  sent  a  detach- 
ment as  far  as  Pr.  Eylau,  and  the  latter  naturally  will  cut  off 
telegraphic  communication  to-day  between  Konigsberg  and 
the  western  parts  of  the  province.  If,  as  we  know,  the  rail- 
way and  telegraph  were  destroyed  at  Wormditt  on  the  evening 
of  May  4th,  we  may  certainly  expect  the  same  thing  to  hap- 
pen to-day  at  Zinten,  which  is  only  16  miles  from  Pr.  Eylau. 
Therefore,  it  cannot  be  expected  that  the  message  ciai  be  sent 
from  Zinten,  and  it  would  be  useless  to  make  further  search 
along  the  road  either  towards  Mehlsack  or  Konigsberg.  The 
happy  thought  to  ride  to  Heiligenbeil  might  accomplish  the 
desired  object.     Will  this  saving  thought  occur  to  the  two 

troopers,  or  will  Lieutenant  D have  sufficient  forethought 

to  direct  them  to  this  point  before  their  departure,  in  case 


150  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

they  find  the  telegraph  line  no  longer  working  at  Zinten?  It 
is  only  too  likely  that  the  message  either  never  arrives  at 
headquarters  of  the  1st  Army  Corps  or  arrives  so  late  that 
the  chief  of  staff  will  place  it  with  the  retained  papers  marked 
"Obsolete."  But  granted  that  by  luck  or  chance  it  reaches 
headquarters  at  Mohrungen  on  May  5th,  whither  it  certainly 
would  be  forwarded  from  Saalfeld,  it  could  hardly  influence 
the  arrangements  made  at  Army  headquarters  for  May  6th. 
It  would  be  of  but  slight  advantage  even  for  the  commanding 
general,  1st  Army  Corps,  no  matter  how  important  it  may 
have  seemed  to  the  sending  officer. 

The  general  has  the  right  to  assume  that  larger  bodies 
of  hostile  cavalry  will  not  appear  on  his  left  flank  on  May  6th, 
and,  if  in  addition  he  can  feel  sure  that  there  are  no  hostile 
columns  approaching  Heilsberg  from  Bartenstein,  he  still  does 
not  know  whether  such  columns  have  reached  Heilsberg  from 
Bischofstein.  Notwithstanding  every  exertion  of  horse  and 
rider,  and  the  leader's  unusual  caution,  and  unusual  good 
luck  which  saved  the  patrol  from  mistakes  and  errors,  false 
information  and  the  bullets  and  sabers  of  the  enemy,  and  the 
advantage  of  operating  in  friendly  territoty,  and  the  favor- 
able season,  good  weather,  good  roads,  the  faithfulness  of  tel- 
egraph operators  in  clinging  to  threatened  stations,  and  the 
supply  of  suitable  horses  for  the  messengers — in  short,  not- 
withstanding a  succession  of  favoring  incidents,  all  of  which 
could  hardly  be  expected  to  happen,  the  message  that  finally 
reaches  its  destination  contains  nothing  that  could  point  out 
the  way  to  Army  headquarters. 

If  we  assume  that  the  goddess  of  fortune  further  favors 

Lieutenant  D ,  he  may  be  able  to  ford  the  Alle  without 

accident  at  Hoschenen,  and  learn  at  Louisenhof  that  Schip- 
penbeil  is  occupied  by  a  small  detachment  of  cavalry,  a  sort 
of  connecting-post,  and  that  the  place  was  occupied  the  night 
of  May  3d~4th  by  the  5th  Dragoons,  while  the  4th  Dragoons, 


Reconnaissance.  151 

coming  from  Romsdorf,  marched  through  the  town  May  4th, 
going  towards  Schonbruch.  About  noon  the  patrol  may 
reach  the  Bartenstein-Langheim  highway  at  Gr.  Schwansfeld, 
and  find  out  that  so  far  nothing  but  patrols  have  passed  over 
it.  The  further  information  that  the  railway  center,  Kors- 
chen,  has  been  occupied  by  the  enemy  since  May  3d,  will 
save  the  patrol-leader  from  the  erroneous  assumption  that  on 
the  5th,  at  Schwansfeld,  he  still  is  ahead  of  advance  detach- 
ments of  the  hostile  army,  and  therefore  must  return  to  the 
Bartenstein  -  Schippenbeil  road.  After  obtaining  some  rest, 
which  is  much  needed  after  the  30-miles  ride  of  to-day,  he 
may  be  able  to  find  out  by  4  or  5  p.  m.  whether  or  not,  and 
from  what  direction,  hostile  columns  have  come  to  Bischofstein. 

In  either  case  the  news  would  be  of  great  value  to  the 
commanding  general  of  the  1st  Army  Corps,  although  no 
change  could  be  made  in  the  orders  issued  for  May  6th.  But 
how  difficult  it  becomes  to  forward  the  message!  The  tele- 
graph stations  that  still  are  in  operation  are  so  distant  that 
it  would  not  pay  to  look  for  one  of  them.  The  remaining 
strength  of  their  horses  must  carry  the  messengers  back  to 
within  reach  of  our  troops.  If  the  enemy  has  not  marched 
through  Bischofstein,  the  effort  can  be  made  to  send  the  mes- 
sage directly  back  via  Blumenau-Reichenberg-Sperlings-Gro- 
nau-Pittehnen.  Otherwise,  it  must  be  sent  in  a  wide  circuit 
northwards,  possibly  crossing  the  Alle  at  Katzen,  as  hostile 
detachments  surely  would  have  possession  of  the  bridges  at 
Heilsberg. 

The  patrol  has  covered  more  than  37  miles  to-day,  over 
140  miles  in  the  last  48  hours,  and  now  from  35  to  50  miles 
more  are  required. 

Even  if  the  messengers  should  be  fortunate  enough  to 
find  remounts,  it  is  too  much  to  expect  that  they  would  find 
their  way,  going  the  long  distance  through  an  unknown  re- 
gion, and  also  escape  from  the  midst  of  hostile  cavalry.     The 


152  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

attempt  would  be  absolutely  hopeless  on  their  own  overworked 
horses. 

If  our  imagination  carries  us  a  step  farther  on  the  route 

that  Lieutenant  D has  mapped  out  for  himself,  on  the 

supposition  that  he  will  find  Bischofstein  unoccupied  by  the 
enemy,  we  possibly  shall  see  him  the  evening  of  May  5th — 
after  a  50-miles  ride  that  day  and  125  miles  from  Marienburg, 
mostly  traveled  across  country  with  many  a  detour,  frequently 
going  at  a  rapid  gait,  and  under  constant  nervous  strain — op- 
posed by  hostile  infantry  outposts;  or  at  Bautern,  watching 
hostile  wagon-trains  pass  by. 

At  the  same  time  we  shall  see  him  in  despair  at  not  being 
able  to  send  back  a  report  in  time  of  what  he  has  seen. 

Thanks  to  good  luck  and  his  perseverance  and  prudence, 
he  has  succeeded  in  carrying  out  the  ideal  requirement  of  pass- 
ing around  the  enemy's  flank  and  through  the  latter's  cavalry 
screen  to  the  flank  of  his  main  columns  before  the  main  battle 
is  fought. 

But  of  what  use  is  this  to  the  commander-in-chief,  whose 
forces  now  have  approached  within  a  day's  march  of  the  heads 
of  the  hostile  columns,  which  presumably  have  reached  the  Alle. 

The  Army  Corps  must  have  received  their  orders  some 
time  ago  for  the  coming  day,  which  will  lead  them  against  the 
enemy  and  decide  the  role  they  must  play  in  the  coming  bat- 
tle. And  yet  there  lie  between  the  patrol  and  its  nearest  out- 
posts 30  to  40  miles,  two  rivers,  and  the  entire  zone  of  the 
hostile  reconnoitering  and  protecting  force.  What  a  slight 
chance  there  is  to  overcome  these  obstacles,  even  by  the  fore- 
noon of  May  6th ! — and  by  that  time  the  information  will  have 
been  overtaken  by  the  events  it  foreshadowed,  and,  in  the  din 
of  battle,  will  be  relegated  to  the  scrap-heap. 

The  officer  was  not  confronted  by  adverse  circumstances. 
We  are  satisfied  that  fortune  rode  at  his  side.  And  we  can- 
not reply  in  extenuation  that  he  took  the  wrong  road  and 


Reconnaissance:.  153 

thus  took  too  much  time.  But,  on  the  contrary,  we  can  con- 
fidently assert  that  he  acted  judiciously,  and,  guided  a  little 
by  me,  took  the  right  direction  a  little  more  promptly  than 
if  he  had  been  left  entirely  to  his  own  inspirations. 

How  many  patrol-leaders  would  have  followed  the  hostile 
cavalry  that  was  discovered  near  Schonbruch ;  how  many  would 
have  gone  east  beyond  Schippenbeil ;  how  many  would  have 
gone  from  Schippenbeil  towards  Korschen ! 

There  is  nothing  unusual  in  finding  hostile  cavalry  from 
12  to  15  miles  beyond  the  flank  of  an  army.  Moreover,  it 
was  fortunate  for  Lieutenant  D that  this  flank  guard  con- 
sisted only  of  cavalry.  And  he  did  not  proceed  in  a  leisurely 
manner,  but  spared  neither  horse  nor  rider.  Notwithstanding 
the  progress  made  by  our  cavalry  in  long-distance  and  endur- 
ance rides,  and  however  great  may  be  the  number  of  miles 
that  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  now  and  then  have 
ridden  on  good  horses,  the  number  of  voices  is  increasing  that 
warns  against  overdoing  and  illusions.  Quite  a  number  of 
horses  failed  to  come  up  to  expectations  or  succumbed  before 
reaching  the  goal. 

If  we  consider  that  a  troop-horse  already  at  the  time  of 
mobilization  and  concentration  is  subjected  to  unusual  exer- 
tions, long  journeys  by  rail,  etc. ;  often  is  poorly  sheltered  and 
fed  at  irregular  times;  that  besides  rider  and  accouterments  it 
must  carry  a  heavy  pack ;  and  that  even  in  a  troop  of  selected 
horses  we  can  count  only  on  average  results  where  the  weakest 

sets  the  pace,  we  must  look  upon  Lieutenant  D 's  ride  as 

an  unusual  achievement  that  but  seldom  would  be  possible 
during  a  long  campaign. 

The  indifferent  success  of  the  patrol  was  not  due  to  mis- 
takes of  the  leader  or  his  men,  but  to  the  difficulties  of  the 
task,  which  are  emphasized  in  the  example  we  have  minutely 
followed.  Had  patrols  been  sent  from  Marienburg  towards 
Guttstadt  and  Landsberg  as  well  as  via  Heilsberg-Bartenstein, 
—11— 


154  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

the  result  would  have  been  practically  the  same.  The  patrol 
sent  through  Guttstadt  would  have  met  the  hostile  advance 
detachments  and  would  have  been  driven  back,  the  one  sent 
through  Landsberg  simply  would  have  been  able  to  locate 
the  hostile  cavalry  marching  towards  Konigsberg.     As  things 

turned  out,  only  Lieutenant  D 's  patrol  was  so  situated 

as  to  get  a  glimpse  of  the  movement  of  the  hostile  army,  and 
therefore  a  discussion  of  its  experiences  was  the  most  instructive. 


Although  Lieutenant  D had  to  overcome  many  dif- 
ficulties, they  don't  compare  with  the  obstacles  that  are  met 
while  reconnoitering  in  the  enemy's  country.  How  many  ex- 
pedients available  in  a  friendly  territory  are  denied  the  patrol- 
leader  upon  crossing  the  boundary!  He  must  find  his  way 
with  a  poor  map  or  possibly  without  any.  It  becomes  more 
difficult  to  understand  the  inhabitants — is  practically  impos- 
sible for  a  single  man — and  the  inhabitants'  statements  con- 
cerning roads  and  the  enemy  can  be  accepted  only  with  mis- 
giving, even  if  the  population  is  not  wrought  up  and  guerrilla 
warfare  does  not  threaten  the  life  of  individual  men. 

No  habitation  should  be  entered  without  extreme  cau- 
tion ;  only  force  will  procure  food  for  men  and  horses ;  no  place 
of  concealment  is  safe,  because  treachery  lurks  everywhere. 
In  friendly  territory  the  people  freely  give  information  about 
the  enemy  to  the  reconnoitering  cavalry;  in  the  enemy's  coun- 
try very  little  that  is  true  and  much  that  is  false  will  be  heard, 
and  no  telegraph  office  will  be  found  outside  the  field  of  op- 
erations of  your  own  forces  to  assist  in  forwarding  messages. 

To  properly  appreciate  the  increased  difficulties,  I  would, 
in  conclusion,  call  the  attention  of  my  patient  readers  to  the 
hostile  patrol  that  spent  the  night  of  May  4th~5th  at  Wormditt 
(sec  page  28). 


Reconnaissance.  .      155 

This  patrol  presumably  was  sent  from  Schippenbeil  early 
on  May  4th,  with  instructions  to  destroy  the  Seeburg-Lands- 
berg  railway  near  Heilsberg  and  the  railway  between  Worm- 
ditt  and  Mehlsaek.  After  completing  this  work,  it  presuma- 
bly will  be  expected  to  reconnoiter  via  Pr.  Holland  towards 
Marienberg-Saalfeld,  as  the  detaining  of  troops  on  the  Vistula 
(Weichsel)  probably  has  not  remained  a  secret.  Possibly  it 
also  has  orders  to  cut  the  railway  farther  west. 

The  patrol's  orders  are  so  important  and  carry  it  so  far 
into  hostile  territory  that  it  will  consist  of  at  least  2  officers, 
2  non-commissioned  officers,  and  20  men;  of  these,  1  officer 
and  1  non-commissioned  officer  speak  German  a  little.  As 
the  army  intends  assuming  the  offensive,  and  later  expects 
to  make  use  of  the  railways,  it  cannot  be  the  intention  to 
completely  destroy  the  railways,  but  simply  to  block  them 
for  a  few  days,  so  that  technical  troops  can  repair  damages 
in  a  short  time.  Therefore,  it  will  be  sufficient  if  the  patrol 
has  a  number  of  dynamite  cartridges,  so  it  can  destroy  rails 
and  switches.  As  1  cartridge  is  sufficient  to  destroy  a  rail, 
40  cartridges  would  enable  the  patrol  to  do  considerable 
work.  Therefore,  each  man  must  carry  2  cartridges,  for  which 
room  can  be  made  by  leaving  behind  other  articles  of  the 
pack;  or  2  led  horses  might  be  loaded  with  the  cartridges, 
thus  furnishing  valuable  remounts  in  case  of  necessity,  al- 
though they  might  somewhat  delay  progress  across  country. 
Naturally,  the  patrol  must  destroy  all  telegraph  lines,  and  is 
equipped  with  instruments  to  tap  the  line. 

At  Bartenstein  and  Heilsberg  the  patrol  found  the  tele- 
graph offices  abandoned,  so  that  there  was  no  chance  to  in- 
tercept any  messages.  At  the  Heilsberg  railway  station  the 
patrol  commander  limited  himself  to  destroying  two  railway 
switches,  but  consumed  some  time  in  destroying  neighboring 
telegraph   offices.     Neither   in   Heilsberg  nor   in    Bartenstein 


156  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

could  the  telegraph  instruments  be  found,  as  they  had  been 
removed. 

Late  in  the  afternoon,  after  a  ride  of  about  50  miles  (in- 
cluding side  trips),  the  patrol  arrived  at  Wormditt,  and  sur- 
prised the  telegraph  offices  in  the  town  and  at  the  railway  sta- 
tion. The  two  German-speaking  members  of  the  patrol  (an 
officer  and  a  non-commissioned  officer),  who  also  know  how 
to  telegraph,  will  have  tried  to  utilize  the  telegraph  line,  and 
force  the  operator  to  make  inquiries  in  various  directions. 
But  it  is  hardly  to  be  expected  that  this  ruse  will  succeed 
under  present  conditions.  The  nature"  of  the  inquiries  would 
arouse  suspicion,  and  the  results  are  more  likely  to  mislead 
than  enlighten.  And  even  listening  to  messages  coming  over 
the  wires  would  not  lead  to  any  important  results,  as  care 
would  be  taken  not  to  send  valuable  news  to  outlying  sta- 
tions. At  the  most,  Saalfeld  or  Maldeuten  might  ask  Worm- 
ditt for  news  about  the  enemy.  This  would  be  dangerous  only 
in  case,  as  in  time  of  peace,  the  imposing  title  of  the  sending 
authority  adorned  the  heading  of  the  telegram. 

The  situation  of  a  small  detachment  of  horsemen  in  a 
large  hostile  settlement  is  endangered  by  a  prolonged  stay  and 
the  keeping  up  of  telegraphic  communication,  which  can  be 
but  imperfectly  controlled,  and  easily,  by  some  pre-arranged 
signal,  may  reveal  the  presence  of  the  detachment.  There- 
fore, efforts  to  get  information  over  the  wire  will  soon  be 
stopped  and  the  instruments  be  destroyed.  Searching  the  re- 
tained copies  of  recently-received  telegrams,  which  the  oper- 
ator may  be  forced  to  translate  under  threat  of  death,  and 
seizing  the  letters  and  newspapers  found  at  the  post-office, 
might  reveal  valuable  information;  but  this  would  be  very  te- 
dious work  for  one  only  superficially  versed  in  the  language  of 
the  country.  Nevertheless,  during  the  night  of  May  4th-5th, 
the  patrol  in  this  way  might  discover  something  about  the  de- 
training of  troops  at  Marienburg  on  May  3d.     This  informa- 


Reconnaissance.  157 

tion  might  reach  HeUsberg  the  morning  of  May  5th,  and  by- 
noon  of  the  same  day  the  higher  commanders,  supplementing 
similar  information  received  from  other  sources. 

In  destroying  telegraph  lines  one  thing  must  be  remem- 
bered by  an  isolated  patrol,  the  neglect  of  which  might  ab- 
ruptly end  its  career:  Interference  with  a  line  will  soon  be 
noticed  by  the  neighboring  stations  and  will  be  reported  by 
them  to  stations  farther  back,  so  that  any  opposing  troops 
that  may  be  near  at  hand  can  receive  the  news  and  come  to 
the  rescue.  Therefore,  prudence  dictates  that  the  line  be  de- 
stroyed in  several  places  to  increase  the  space  in  which  the 
enemy  must  hunt  for  the  offenders  and  make  it  more  difficult 
for  him  to  find  them.  The  railway  demolitions  at  the  Worm- 
ditt  station  will  be  more  extensive  than  at  Heilsberg,  and  will 
require  at  least  8  or  10  cartridges. 

An  undisturbed  night's  rest  cannot  be  expected  at  Worm- 
ditt.  It  was  a  mistake  that  the  patrol  remained  there.  It 
should  have  left  the  place  as  soon  as  it  had  accomplished  its 
object,  and  spent  the  night  at  some  isolated  spot.  But  pos- 
sibly it  was  delayed  by  its  efforts  at  the  telegraph  office  and 
the  investigation  of  mail-matter.  It  also  was  a  mistake  for 
the  patrol  to  ride  along  the  Wormditt-Aiken  highway  early  on 
the  5th;  but  possibly  the  patrol  was  forced  to  do  this  by  the 
darkness  and  the  absence  of  a  good  map,  which  in  the  ene- 
my's country  cannot  be  replaced  by  information  obtained  from 
the  inhabitants. 

The  patrol,  leaving  at  1  a.  m.,  with  horses  fairly  rested, 
and  cautiously  working  its  way  past  habitations,  at  7  a.  m. 
reaches  Pr.  Holland,  after  successfully  avoiding  several  hostile 
troopers,  and  finds  the  town  and  railway  station  occupied  by 
hostile  infantry.  It  is  doubtful  if  the  patrol  will  learn  that  the 
garrison  consists  of  organized  militia  (see  page  10).  At  any  rate, 
considerable  time  will  be  consumed  in  reconnoitering  the 
town;  and  in  the  attempt  to  pass  to  the  north  and  south  of 


158  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

the  town  it  is  discovered  that  the  entire  line  of  railway  is 
guarded.  It  will  not  be  until  9  a.  m.  that  the  patrol-leader 
will  be  able  to  send  back  a  message  concerning  the  situation 
t  Pr.  Holland.  The  messenger  has  to  go  more  than  30  miles 
to  reach  Guttstadt.  His  horse,  after  5  or  6  hours'  rest  at 
Wormditt,  has  traveled  over  50  miles  and  the  day  before  trav- 
eled about  50  miles,  or  over  100  miles  in  a  day  and  a  half. 
It  will  be  5  or  6  p.  m.  before  he  can  reach  Guttstadt,  going 
the  shortest  way — i.  e.,  via  Liebstadt,  and  we  know  what  dan- 
gers threaten  on  the  way,  should  he  find  it.  As  the  higher 
commanders  probably  are  not  in  telegraphic  communication 
with  the  advanced  cavalry,  the  message  will  not  be  received 
by  them  until  late  at  night  on  May  5th,  and  it  might  confuse 
instead  of  enlighten  them,  should  the  patrol  not  have  discov- 
ered that  the  garrison  of  Pr.  Holland  consists  of  organized 
militia. 

If  this  patrol,  in  its  efforts  to  locate  and  turn  the  hostile  left 
flank,  makes  a  circuit  to  the  north  towards  Elbing,  its  further 
efforts  would  be  in  vain.  Should  it  break  through  the  line  of 
railway  guards  south  of  Pr.  Holland,  to  get  a  glimpse  behind 
the  screen  of  organized  militia,  it  is  doubtful  if  any  messenger 
would  succeed  in  repassing  the  line.  Only  in  case  it  turned 
south  towards  the  road  between  Maldeuten  and  Mohrungen  is 
there  any  prospect  of  a  profitable  reconnaissance,  although 
the  flank  guard  of  the  1st  Army  Corps  would  interfere  with 
the  patrol's  activity.  But  it  would  be  phenomenal  if  informa- 
tion, say  of  blue  outposts  being  established  at  Steinsdorf,  Roll- 
enau,  and  Wiese,  should  get  through  the  district  covered  by 
the  1st  Cavalry,  or,  passing  around  this  via  Wormditt,  should 
reach  headquarters  before  the  morning  of  May  6th.  And,  then, 
what  would  have  been  gained?  Considering  that  the  com- 
mander-in-chief had  learned  that  blue  cavalry  had  been  en- 
countered between  the  Alle  and  the  Passarge  during  May  5th, 
and  blue  patrols  had  appeared  in  front  of  his  infantry  at  Jonk- 


Reconnaissance.  159 

cndorf  and  Gr.  Buchwalde,  he  will  not  be  surprised  to  learn 
that  blue  infantry  was  found  at  Mohrungen  on  this  day,  and 
only  positive  information  that  the  enemy  did  not  appear  on 
the  Pr.  Holland-Liebstadt  road  during  the  afternoon  would 
justify  him  in  concluding  that  the  flank  of  the  blue  army  was 
at  Mohrungen.  Even  if  the  message  gave  conclusive  informa- 
tion on  the  subject,  no  changes  could  be  made  in  the  move- 
ments of  the  army,  which  would  have  to  proceed  in  accord- 
ance with  orders  formulated  the  day  before.  Only  detailed 
orders  for  the  troops  on  the  flank  might  be  changed  by  it. 

Let  us  assume  a  more  favorable  case  for  the  patrol — one 
on  which  regulations  and  theories  greatly  count — viz.,  that  the 
patrol,  making  a  wide  circuit  around  the  flank,  is  able  to  watch 
the  march  of  hostile  columns.  Let  us  imagine  that  the  or- 
ganized militia  on  the  Maldeuten-Elbing  railway  does  not  ex- 
ist, and  that  the  way  is  open  for  the  patrol  via  Pr.  Holland 
to  the  west.  Let  us  even  assume  that  the  patrol  received  in- 
formation at  Pr.  Holland  that  obviates  a  groping  about  and 
saves  long  detours,  so  that,  crossing  the  overland  canal  (Ober- 
landischen  Kanal),  it  reaches  the  vicinity  of  Gr.  Arnsdorf  as 
early  as  10  a.  m.,  and  discovers  the  1st  Army  Corps  march- 
ing on  the  Saalfeld-Maldeuten  road — which,  of  course,  pre- 
supposes criminal  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  Army  Corps. 
The  distance  traveled  from  Wormditt  was  from  35  to  40  miles, 
and  the  messenger  would  have  to  cover  about  45  miles  on  un- 
known roads  back  to  Guttstadt,  if  he  wishes  to  avoid  the  dense 
zone  of  protection  of  the  1st  Army  Corps.  When  will  he  ar- 
rive? when  will  headquarters,  located  possibly  at  Wartenburg 
or  Bischofsburg,  receive  the  message? 

The  enemy  would  have  succeeded  no  better  than  the  blue 
force  in  sending  out  several  "strategical"  patrols  to  clear  up 
the  situation  on  the  northern  flank.  A  patrol  coming  via  Lieb- 
stadt  either  would  have  been  forced  on  to  the  route  of  the  one 
whose  fortunes  we  have  followed,  which  came  via  Wormditt, 


i6d  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

or  it  •would  have  met  the  ist  Cavalry;  and  a  third  patrol, 
coming  via  Mehlsack,  would  have  obtained  nothing  but  neg- 
ative results.  Only  by  the  rarest  of  good  luck  might  it  have 
happened  to  catch  an  important  message  on  the  Miihlhausen- 
Braunsberg  telegraph  line.  But  even  such  a  message  would 
have  been  belated  in  reaching  Wartenburg  or  Bischofsburg. 

It  might  be  objected  to  the  "situation"  assumed  in  the 
foregoing  study,  and  the  conclusions  drawn  as  to  the  results 
of  patrols  working  over  an  extended  territory,  that  there  was 
not  enough  room  allowed  for  strategical  reconnoitering ;  that 
both  parties  should  have  sent  out  their  patrols  on  May  ist  or 
2d,  and  not  as  late  as  May  3d  or  4th.  Whoever  takes  the 
trouble  to  carefully  examine  the  case  will  find  that  the  pros- 
pects would  not  materially  change  for  either  party.  The  pa- 
trols simply  would  encounter  the  opposing  cavalry  one  or  two 
days  earlier,  behind  which  the  main  columns  of  the  army 
would  still  be  able  to  make  considerable  lateral  movements; 
the  messenger  routes  would  become  longer  and  more  danger- 
ous; the  powers  of  horse  and  man  would  be  more  greatly 
taxed;  and  all  too  soon  the  small  band  would  melt  away, 
whose  connection  with  its  army  would  constantly  become 
more  precarious,  and  whose  conduct  would  become  more  dif- 
ficult the  farther  it  advanced. 

Should  Lieutenant  D 's  blue  patrol  reach  the  vicinity 

of  Schippenbeil  the  morning  of  May  4th  instead  of  May  5th, 
it  would  come  within  reach  of  the  5th  Dragoons,  who  remained 
there  the  night  of  May  4th~5th.  Should  the  patrol  succeed 
in  avoiding  the  5th  Dragoons,  it  might  encounter  the  4th  Dra- 
goons, who  later  turned  off  towards  Schonbruch,  and,  to  defi- 
nitely ascertain  the  direction  of  march  of  the  latter,  the  patrol 
might  have  to  tarry  in  observation  until  the  morning  of  May 
5th,  so  that  no  time  would  have  been  gained  for  the  recon- 
naissance of  the  roads  to  the  south.  However,  if  a  lucky  in- 
spiration sent  Lieutenant  D to  the  north  more  promptly, 


Reconnaissance.  161 

he  presumably  would  have  met  hostile  patrols  and  flank  guards 
on  the  afternoon  of  May  4th  in  the  vicinity  of  Bischofstein 
that  would  have  prevented  further  insight  on  this  day,  whose 
advance  to  the  Alle  on  May  5th,  however,  would  have  enabled 
him  to  penetrate  beyond  Bischofstein  to  the  Bautern-Seeburg 
road.  A  message  received  at  the  headquarters  of  the  blue 
army  on  the  morning  of  May  5th,  concerning  hostile  advance 
troops  at  Bischofstein,  in  no  wise  would  have  cleared  up  the 
situation,  as  everything  would  have  depended  on  whether  the 
columns  in  rear  of  them  would  have  marched  to  Seeburg  or 
Heilsberg  on  the  5th. 

Of  course,  Lieutenant  D could  not  have  guessed  this 

on  May  4th,  and  could  not  have  transmitted  this  important 
information  any  earlier  than  the  morning  of  May  5th,  which 
would  have  been  too  late  to  use  as  a  basis  for  the  commander- 
in-chief's  decision  for  May  6th. 

In  the  same  way  the  unchangeable  laws  of  time  and  space 
would  have  prevented  the  hostile  patrol  sent  via  Wormditt 
(had  it  not  reached  this  point  on  the  4th,  but  as  early  as  the 
3d  or  2d  of  May)  from  sending  its  commander-in-chief  infor- 
mation that  would  have  removed  all  doubt  and  have  informed 
him  on  the  4th  or  5th  what  roads  the  hostile  columns  would 
follow  on  this  day,  so  that  he  could  have  regulated  his  own 
movements  accordingly.  Even  if  the  patrol  on  May  4th  had 
discovered  blue  cavalry  at  Maldeuten  or  infantry  outposts  near 
Saalfeld,  and  even  if  this  information  miraculously  had  been 
sent  back  the  68  miles  to  Bischofsburg  in  time  to  reach  head- 
quarters on  the  evening  of  May  5th,  he  never  would  be  able 
to  guess  whether  the  enemy  on  the  5th  would  march  to  Mohr- 
ungen  or  Liebstadt,  and  whether  on  the  5th  the  flank  column 
of  the  blue  army  would  not  appear  on  the  Pr.  Holland-Lieb- 
stadt  road. 


1 62  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 


RETROSPECT. 

This  clipping  from  the  life  of  the  cavalry  sendee  does  not 
begin  to  exhaust  the  variety  of  situations  constantly  present- 
ing themselves  in  surprising  shapes  to  those  called  upon  to 
decide  and  act.  The  situations  are  very  different  for  recon- 
noitering  cavalry  when  the  army  to  be  screened  is  engaged  in 
a  flank  march,  or  a  retreat,  or  is  awaiting  an  attack  in  a  pre- 
pared position;  or  in  minor  warfare.  And  the  customary 
method  of  having  the  mass  of  cavalry  several  days'  march 
ahead  will  be  greatly  changed  if,  before  the  beginning  of  hos- 
tilities, both  armies  concentrate  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of 
the  frontier. 

It  was  not  the  object  of  my  work  to  devise  rules  of  con- 
duct for  all  these  cases,  to  which  might  be  added  a  great  many 
others,  such  as  operations  in  a  mountainous  country,  in  deso- 
late regions,  in  winter,  besieging  and  defending  large  fortresses, 
etc.  I  simply  aimed  to  assist  in  coming  to  a  correct  decision 
under  various  conditions;  and  the  discussion  of  my  simple 
"special  situation"  will  show  what  great  demands  the  recon- 
naissance service  makes  on  the  capacity  of  troops,  the  in- 
telligence, energy,  and  endurance  of  leaders  as  well  as  of  in- 
dividual troopers.  Judicious  deliberation  and  boldness  tem- 
pered by  caution  are  the  guiding  stars  of  a  cavalryman,  who 
always  must  have  a  remedy  at  hand,  scent  danger  from  afar, 
whose  sharp  eye  must  see  for  miles,  and  whose  nerves  must 
never  relax,  if  he  wishes  to  retain  his  aim.  The  best  precepts 
and  theories  fail  if  practice  and  experience  do  not  hold  sway. 

There  is  room  for  only  a  few  noteworthy  hints  of  a  gen- 
eral character. 

The  Field  Service  Regulations  state  that  the  strength  of 
a  patrol  will  depend  on  circumstances,*  and  that  single  men 

*See  par.  74,  F.  S.  R. 


Reconnaissance.  163 

or  a  small  group  of  men  are  best  for  purposes  of  observa- 
tion only. 

What  has  gone  before  shows  that  an  officer's  patrol  sent 
to  a  great  distance  must  not  be  too  small,  otherwise  it  would 
soon  have  to  discontinue  its  messenger  service,  and  its  ex- 
plorations would  be  useless.  As  we  have  seen,  it  must  have 
a  certain  fighting  power  and  must  be  able  to  furnish  reliefs 
for  guards  at  night.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  demand 
that  details  be  economized  to  avoid  scattering  the  strength  of 
a  force  and  insuring  superiority  of  numbers  at  the  decisive 
point.  Our  study  will  have  demonstrated  that  important  pa- 
trols cannot  get  along  with  5  or  6  men,  and  that  even  10  men 
seldom  will  suffice. 

Lieutenant  F 's  valuable  message  of  7.35  a.  m.,  re- 
porting the  presence  of  assembled  hostile  cavalry  at  Glottau 
(see  page  56)  was  lost.  Sent  via  Sackstein,  it  presumably 
fell  into  the  hands  of   the   hostile   patrol  which   Lieutenant 

F discovered  early  in  the  morning  near  Lettau,  and  which 

he  allowed  to  pass  unmolested,  although  its  defeat  was  prac- 
ticable. The  same  patrol  probably  also  intercepted  the  mes- 
sage of  Lieutenant  F 's  lance  corporal  who  was  sent  to 

Sackstein;  and  we  know  that  it  delayed  Captain  E for 

some  time  near  Wuchsnig.  Who  knows  what  it  saw  and  re- 
ported from  Teufelsberg,  where  it  doubtless  viewed  the  coun- 
try.    It  is  true  that  Lieutenant  F 's  message  was  carefully 

worded,  but  if  it  could  not  be  destroyed,  it  still  would  reveal 
a  number  of  noteworthy  things — among  others,  the  number  of 
the  blue  cavalry  regiment. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  see  considerable  advantage  re- 
sulting from  Lieutenant  C 's  fight  near  Kammersdorf  (see 

page  62).  It  assured  him  a  clear  road  to  the  front  and  for 
some  time  a  safe  messenger-route  to  the  rear.  It  for  a  while 
stopped  hostile  reconnaissance  in  this  vicinity,  and  superior 


1 64  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

authority  probably  derived  some  advantage  from  questioning 
the  prisoners. 

Although  these  two  examples  may  be  objected  to  on  the 
plea  that  they  owe  their  existence  to  the  imagination  and 
bias,  still  they  may  serve  to  recall  other  cases  from  maneu- 
vers and  kriegsspiel,  and  thus  clear  up  matters.  In  my  opin- 
ion, the  seriousness  of  war  does  not  justify  a  turning  aside, 
advocated  by  theory,  that  endangers  the  messenger  service 
and  freely  permits  a  hostile  patrol  to  get  a  view  of  our  columns. 

Our  troopers  not  only  should  have  recourse  to  arms  when 
forced  to  do  so,  or  when  fortuitous  circumstances  suggest  this 
course,  but  they  should  systematically  make  life  a  burden  to 
hostile  patrols  and  to  shrewdly  and  cunningly  devise  ambus- 
cades for  them.  Reconnaissance  service  will  be  a  very  dif- 
ferent affair  if  danger  threatens  the  hostile  advance  detach- 
ments from  behind  every  bush,  and  if  the  superiority  of  our 
patrols  in  minor  warfare  forces  the  enemy  to  hold  back  from 
our  front. 

Time  thus  consumed  would  be  regained,  and  it  would 
be  unwarranted  to  assume  that  in  such  a  method  of  proced- 
ure our  men  would  be  losers.  Such  an  objection  might  be 
raised  against  any  skirmish  or  battle.  If  we  cannot  hope  for 
victory,  we  should  not  go  to  war.  But  even  this  principle 
must  not  be  accepted  as  a  model  for  invariable  use;  and  it 
would  be  unreasonable  were  every  patrol,  regardless  of  every- 
thing, to  charge  the  enemy  with  a  loud  hurrah  whenever  seen. 

The  events  of  a  few  hours  that  in  our  study  are  culled 
from  the  course  of  a  campaign  do  not  permit  an  appreciation 

of  the  advantages  of  intrusting  Captain  E with  the  entire 

reconnaissance  in  front  of  the  regiment  in  contradistinction  to 
the  system  of  a  large  number  of  patrols  sent  out  by  the  higher 
commander  (colonel).  A  consideration  of  an  episode  of  sev- 
eral days  would  show  the  advantages  in  a  clearer  light.  We 
would  more  readily  see  that  great  difficulties  are  encountered 


Reconnaissance.  165 

by  a  higher  commander  in  directing  patrols;  that  touch  with 
them  is  easily  lost;  that  their  members  and  capacity  are  soon 
exhausted;  and  that  it  hardly  would  be  practicable  to  fill  gaps 
in  time.  Every  change  in  the  situation  that  would  necessitate 
a  change  of  route  or  produce  a  new  task  for  troops  would  cause 
patrols  to  wander  about  in  wrong  directions,  ignorant  of  the 
condition  of  affairs  in  front  of  the  army;  and  the  threads  to 
guide  this  tangled  net  would  soon  slip  from  the  commander 
in  spite  of  the  invention  of  "message  assembly  stations,"  which 
is  a  fragile  makeshift  that  would  work  hardly  a  single  day. 
Even  the  reconnaissance  of  troops  sent  forward  to  supplement 
the  activity  of  the  patrols  will  help  out  the  defects  of  this 
system  very  little.  A  troop  commander  hardly  will  know  the 
number  and  duties  of  the  patrols  and  will  be  unable  to  keep 
touch  with  them.  Then,  how  can  he  support  them  and  sup- 
plement their  activity? 

Notwithstanding  the  bad  luck  that  I  purposely  placed  in 

Captain  E 's  way,  to  present  a  convincing  case,  we  see 

how  he  passably  well  controlled  his  patrols  on  a  broad  front, 
and  how  his  military  judgment  and  the  fighting  power  of  his 
troop  assured  the  continued  progress  of  the  reconnaissance. 
This  would  have  been  more  clearly  shown  had  Lieutenant 

F ,  at  5  a.  m.,  attacked  and  dispersed  the  hostile  patrol 

near  Lettau. 

The  obstacle  formed  by  the  Passarge  and  the  encounter 
with  the  hostile  troop  at  Pittehnen  would  have  thwarted  in- 
dividual patrols  not  under  the  captain's  orders,  or  would  have 
forced  them  to  make  wide  detours,  in  which  case  their  mes- 
sengers would  have  been  unable  to  find  their  way  back.  The 
captain  would  have  found  out  something  from  one  or  the  other 
of  these  patrols  by  chance  only ;  and  it  hardly  would  have  been 
possible  to  newly  organize  the  system  of  reconnaissance  after 
crossing  the  Passarge,  unless  he,  on  his  own  authority  and  in 
excess  of  his  orders,  had  assumed  the  role  that,  to  my  notion, 


1 66  Studies  ix  Applied  Tactics. 

fundamentally  belongs  to  a  "reconnaissance  troop."  A  "re- 
connaissance troop"  should  be  intrusted  with  the  full  duties 
that  the  name  implies,  thus  at  the  same  time  forming  a  living 
and  permanent  "message  assembly  station."  There  is  noth- 
ing to  prevent  a  superior  commander,  if  he  sees  fit,  from  send- 
ing out  other  patrols  with  special  missions — a  means  that  can 
be  successfully  employed  even  by  the  commander-in-chief  of 
an  army  without  his  feeling  obliged  to  personally  direct  the 
general  patrol-service  in  front  of  the  army. 

The  results  accomplished  by  the  patrols  sent  out  for  stra- 
tegical purposes  during  the  course  of  this  study  seem  to  be 
in  sharp  contrast  with  what  in  many  quarters  is  hoped  from 
them.  Nevertheless,  our  examples  might  have  some  effect 
on  those  who  are  less  skeptical,  and,  imbued  with  enthusi- 
asm for  their  branch  of  the  service,  look  upon  the  officer's 
patrol  as  destined  to  point  out  the  way  to  victory  to  the 
commander-in-chief. 

Our  two  strategical  patrols  promised  the  best  results,  as 
their  efforts  were  directed  against  and  around  the  flank  of  the 
hostile  army.  They  had  no  unusual  obstacles  to  overcome. 
I  rather  exerted  myself  to  smooth  their  way,  to  show  how 
thorny  and  rocky  it  is  even  under  favorable  circumstances. 
Even  at  the  grand  maneuvers  we  have  strategical  patrols  fail 
us;  how  vastly  less  can  we  expect  of  them  in  time  of  war. 
How  often  will  their  messages,  if  they  escape  capture,  arrive 
too  late  and  have  no  effect  on  the  movements  of  the  army! 
And  should  instruments  be  invented  that  would  enable  pa- 
trols to  communicate  by  wireless  telegraphy,  reliable  messages 
could  be  hoped  for  in  this  way  only  if  the  enemy  should  be 
unable  to  read  them  too,  and  if  he  by  the  same  means  should 
not  be  able  to  deceive  our  headquarters. 

I  do  not  believe  that  I  have  exaggerated  the  difficulties 
and  dangers  or  the  exhausting  effect  of  patrol-service,  or  un- 
derestimated the  number  of  miles  that  horsemen  can  be  ex- 


Reconnaissance.  167 

pected  to  go.  To  corroborate  my  statements,  I  shall  refer  to 
a  few  examples  from  actual  war  that  happened  on  the  classieal 
ground  of  our  study. 

When,  early  in  1807,  Benningsen,  the  Russian  commander- 
in-chief,  surprised  the  French  in  their  winter  quarters,  and 
Marshal  Ney,  who  was  first  attacked,  had  provisionally  brought 
his  threatened  troops  into  safety  in  the  Guttstadt-Allenstein 
district,  he  (Ney)  sent  word  from  Allenstein  of  what  had  hap- 
pened on  the  evening  of  January  2 2d  to  Blbing,  the  head- 
quarters of  Bernadotte's  corps,  which  was  next  to  him.  The 
distance  was  56  miles,  and  it  took  24  hours  to  carry  the  mes- 
sage. The  "operation  order"  which  Napoleon  sent  January 
31st  from  Willenberg  to  Bernadotte  at  Lobau  was  intercepted 
by  the  Russians,  and,  notwithstanding  the  Emperor's  efforts, 
communication]  between  him  and  Bernadotte  continued  in- 
terrupted. Even  on  February  7th,  the  eve  of  the  battle  of 
Pr.  Eylau,  the  Emperor  was  ignorant  of  the  whereabouts  of 
Bernadotte's  corps,  although  the  latter  general  sent  messages 
January  30th  from  Lobau,  February  1st,  2d,  and  3d  from 
Strasburg,  the  5th  again  from  Lobau,  and  the  6th  from  Os- 
terode;  all  these  arrived  afterwards.  The  distances  between 
Bernadotte  and  imperial  headquarters  were  about  75  miles 
at  Strasburg  and  from  50  to  60  miles  at  Lobau  and  Osterode. 

Marshal  Ney  received  the  "operation  orders"  on  January 
31st,  at  Gilgenburg,  and  the  Emperor  had  to  wait  until  Feb- 
ruary 2d  for  the  anxiously-hoped-for  information  that  Ney 
had  begun  his  march,  although  the  Emperor  had  sent  him  one 
messenger  after  another,  and  the  distance  was  only  between 
35  and  45  miles. 

Several  days  later,  on  February  5th,  Ney  fought  the  Prus- 
sians between  the  Passarge  and  Narien-see,  and  occupied  Lieb- 
stadt  in  the  afternoon  of  that  day.  The  Emperor,  who  had 
spent  the  preceding  night  with  the  Marshal  at  Schlitt,  did  not 
receive  Ney's  report  of  the  action  at  his  new  headquarters  at 


i6S  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Arnsdorf,  about  8£  miles  from  Liebstadt,  until  the  morning 
of  February  6th. 

In  the  summer  campaign  of  the  same  year,  which  also 
began  unexpectedly  for  the  French,  it  took  over  24  hours  for 
a  report  of  the  first  encounter  (which  occurred  on  June  4th, 
at  Spanden  on  the  Passarge)  to  reach  the  Emperor's  head- 
quarters, 37  miles  away;  though  a  message  received  at  the 
same  time  from  Ney  at  Guttstadt,  50  miles  away,  came  through 
in  9  hours.  A  letter  that  the  Emperor,  on  the  evening  of 
June  6th,  sent  from  Finkenstein  to  Davoust,  who  was  40  miles 
away,  reached  its  destination  in  13  hours. 

Napoleon  laid  great  stress  on  rapid  and  safe  systems  of 
communication,  which  were  well  organized  in  his  armies. 

All  the  above-named  dispatches  were  carried  by  officers 
and  within  the  French  field  of  operations  passed  over  well- 
known  roads.  And  although,  especially  in  the  winter  cam- 
paign, the  roads  were  far  from  what  might  have  been  desired, 
the  couriers  were  not  limited  to  riding  horseback,  but,  accord- 
ing to  circumstances,  made  use  of  wagons  and  sleighs,  for 
which  purpose  villages  furnished  the  necessary  teams. 

The  Emperor's  aides  knew  his  strict  ideas  concerning  their 
duties  in  carrying  messages,  and  extensive  experience  in  war 
had  familiarized  them  with  all  expedients  for  overcoming  ob- 
stacles. It  is  true  that  maps  were  defective,  but  communi- 
cation with  the  inhabitants  was  simplified  by  interpreters, 
furnished  by  German  auxiliaries  serving  with  the  French. 
And,  besides,  Napoleon's  officers  already  had  been  through  a 
number  of  campaigns  on  German  soil. 

If,  in  spite  of  all  this,  the  transmission  of  orders  and  the 
messenger  service  generally  was  greatly  handicapped  by  all 
manner  of  friction,  we  must  be  all  the  more  careful  in  esti- 
mating the  capacity  of  patrols  sent  far  ahead  into  the  field  of 
operations  of  the  enemy.  An  appreciation  of  the  obstacles 
and  dangers  surrounding  them  will  not  paralyze  the  energy 


Reconnaissance.  169 

of  their  leaders,  but  urge  them  to  greater  exertions  than  if 
they  had  to  be  aroused  from  their  illusion  by  stern  realities 
of  each  case. 

Large  armies  do  not  always  encounter  each  other  along 
a  serried  front.  If  strategical  patrols  move  against  the  flanks 
of  hostile  columns,  or  into  intervals  between  hostile  columns, 
there  may  be  opportunities  for  more  profitable  employment 
than  in  the  case  assumed  by  our  study.  The  two  campaigns 
of  1807  in  Prussia  furnish  proof  of  this. 

At  the  same  time  that  Ney  sent  the  above-named  message 
of  January  2 2d  to  Bernadotte,  he  sent  a  message  to  Berthier 
at  Warsaw,  which  was  intercepted  by  a  Russian  patrol  south 
of  Allenstein,  and  was  delivered  to  Russian  headquarters  at 
Bischof stein  the  evening  of  January  23d.  It  contained  a  state- 
ment of  the  location  of  the  Marshal's  troops,  his  intentions 
and  optimistic  view  of  the  situation.  The  copy  of  the  opera- 
tion ordeis  sent  by  Napoleon  to  Bernadotte  on  January  31st 
was  intercepted  by  Cossacks,  and  the  same  day  was  sent  from 
Dt.  Eylau,  by  Prince  Bagration,  to  Benningsen,  at  Mohrungen, 
where  it  arrived  late  in  the  evening  of  February  1st. 

In  both  cases  the  Russian  commander-in-chief,  had  he  been 
equal  to  the  occasion,  would  have  derived  incalculable  ad- 
vantage from  the  knowledge  of  the  opponent's  situation  that 
the  papers  conveyed. 

And  in  our  own  times  similar  rewards  beckon  to  the  en- 
terprising patrol-leader,  as  is  shown  by  the  already  mentioned 
case  of  the  capture  of  the  French  General  Staff  officer  near 
Beaumont,  August  28,  1870,  whose  order-case  contained  Mac- 
Mahon's  operation  orders. 

In  all  three  cases  the  enemy's  flank  and  his  line  of  com- 
munications lay  in  the  direction  of  the  patrols'  march  and  of- 
fered a  nearer  and  more  convenient  objective  than  if  the  hos- 
tile flank  had  to  be  reached  by  a  wide  detour.  But  I  wish  to 
call  attention  to  this  fact,  as  emphasizing  what  has  been  said 
—12— 


170  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

above:  not  one  of  the  important  documents  would  have  been 
captured  from  the  enemy  had  the  bearer  been  allowed  to  pass 
on  unmolested.  Of  course,  the  most  ardent  advocate  of  the 
theory  that  patrols  should  simply  see  and  not  fight  would  not 
mean  that  such  valuable  prizes  should  be  allowed  to  slip  away. 
But  who  will  be  able  to  guess  whether  hostile  troopers,  dis- 
covered by  the  patrol-leader's  sharp  eyes,  are  carrying  such 
treasures  in  their  saddle-bags  or  not. 

The  grand  prize  in  the  shape  of  the  enemy's  operation 
orders  will  not  daily  fall  into  the  commander-in-chief's  lap 
and  relieve  him  from  the  burden  of  uncertainty.  Notwith- 
standing the  most  self-sacrificing  activity  and  brilliant  endow- 
ment of  his  patrol-leaders,  his  own  sagacity,  groping  in  the 
dark,  must  know  how  to  find  the  right  way.  The  reconnoiter- 
ing  bodies  cannot  relieve  him  of  his  office  as  guide,  but  they 
can  assist  him,  and  they  can  do  this  the  more  successfully  the 
better  they  understand  their  business  and  the  more  their  efforts 
surpass  those  of  the  enemy. 

Lieutenant  C 's  patrol  (of  those  sent  due  east  from 

the  ist  Cavalry)  was  quite  successful  after  overcoming  the  ob- 
stacle presented  by  the  Passarge. 

It  is  quite  likely  that  the  result  of  his  reconnaissance  (the 
principal  value  of  which  consists  in  the  discovery  of  the  loca- 
tion of  hostile  infantry  outposts)  will  be  carried  back  by  Lieu- 
tenant C before  dark.  It  also  may  be  assumed  that  Cap- 
tain E 's  arrangements,  by  early  in  the  afternoon,   will 

clear  up  the  situation  in  the  vicinity  of  Guttstadt.  It  is  quite 
possible  that  by  evening  Army  headquarters  can  be  wired  from 
Gr.  Hermenau  concerning  the  state  of  affairs  on  the  Alle,  and 
that,  although  the  orders  for  May  6th  will  have  been  issued, 
some  changes  may  still  be  made,  suitable  to  the  changed  sit- 
uation. Of  course,  in  the  enemy's  country  we  cannot  count 
on  such  prompt  telegraphic  communication.  The  headquar- 
ters of  the  ist  Army  Corps  undoubtedly  will  derive  benefit 


Reconnaissance.  171 

from  the  messages,  and  the  service  done  by  the  1st  Cavalry 
during  the  forenoon  of  May  5th  entitles  it  to  due  credit,  even 
if  the  achievements  have  not  been  brilliant.  The  service  was 
in  accordance  with  the  capabilities  of  the  regiment  and  such 
as  could  be  expected  by  headquarter^.  The  comparatively 
favorable  results  no  doubt  in  part  were  due  to  the  fact  that 
until  noon  no  large  bodies  of  hostile  cavalry  had  been  encoun- 
tered, and  that  there  were  gaps  in  the  hostile  cavalry  screen, 
through  which  our  patrols  and  troops  could  either  slip  or 
force  their  way. 

If  my  narrative,  based  on  experience  in  campaigns,  his- 
tory, and  imagination,  at  all  conforms  to  the  manner  in  which 
reconnaissance  should  be  carried  on,  then  there  is  a  vast  dif- 
ference between  the  way  this  sendee  is  performed  in  peace 
and  in  war.  For  a  fact,  it  is  very  difficult  to  organize  this 
service  on  a  war  basis  in  time  of  peace.  Even  in  the  school 
of  the  troop  it  is  hardly  possible  for  the  captain  to  observe 
all  his  patrols,  and  it  is  quite  likely  that  some  of  the  regula- 
tions that  prescribe  a  pacific  demeanor  for  patrols  are  due  to 
the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  reconnaissance  in  time  of  peace. 

And  yet  this  duty  is  the  foremost  and  most  important 
devolving  on  cavalry.  If  it  is  not  to  prove  a  failure  in  war; 
if  our  troopers  are  not  to  become  helpless  and  useless  the  mo- 
ment they  encounter  a  real  enemy  instead  of  a  maneuver- 
opponent  who  does  not  shoot,  cut,  or  make  prisoners;  if  our 
commanders  are  not  to  become  bitterly  disappointed  at  the 
non-receipt  of  messages  that  in  time  of  peace  arrive  with  sur- 
prising regularity,  we  must  find  the  way  to  a  proper  training 
for  war. 

In  time  of  peace  great  care  is  taken  to  check  anything 
done  by  infantry  or  artillery  that  is  inconsistent  with  war 
conditions.  No  mounted  man  is  allowed  to  show  himself  in 
the  fire-swept  zone;  no  order  or  message  may  be  delivered 
that  would  not  reach  its  destination  in  time  of  war;  officers 


172  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

and  men  alike  must  take  advantage  of  cover  and  conform  to 
difficulties  of  command  incident  thereto.  Only  the  cavalry 
patrols  ride  as  and  where  they  wish,  as  if  the  grayish  helmet- 
cover  were  a  "hood  of  darkness"  (tarnkappc),  not  only  ren- 
dering the  wearer  invisible,  but  also  invulnerable;  and  their 
messengers  go  unharmed  through  the  midst  of  the  enemy  by 
the  shortest  and  best  roads. 

We  sometimes  hear  this  justified  on  the  plea  that  the  dash 
and  hardihood  of  cavalry  must  not  be  interfered  with,  and 
that  whistling  bullets  would  soon  enough  produce  the  neces- 
sary sobering  effect.  We  might  on  the  same  grounds  forbid 
infantry  and  artillery  to  take  advantage  of  shelter  on  the 
ground  and  construct  artificial  cover  in  time  of  peace.  It  might 
only  too  easily  happen  that  this  hardihood  of  peace  would 
change  into  its  opposite  if  the  soldier  in  time  of  war  unex- 
pectedly encountered  dangers  and  obstacles  he  has  not  learned 
to  overcome.  My  own  experience  justifies  me  in  this  misgiv- 
ing. If  we  remove  the  obstacles  that  the  trooper  encounters 
at  every  turn,  and  if,  on  account  of  the  difficulty  to  observe  and 
instruct  him  in  extended  territory,  we  do  not  give  him  any 
chance  to  acquire  and  practice  caution,  adroitness,  and  power 
of  decision,  which  alone  will  carry  a  patrol  through  all  vicissi- 
tudes to  its  objective  and  the  message  back,  the  smooth  and 
successful  course  of  peace  maneuvers  will  be  founded  on  self- 
delusion.  These  important  attributes  will  not  be  produced 
by  a  twist  of  the  wrist  upon  declaration  of  war. 

It  is  equally  true  of  the  cavalry  as  of  the  other  arms,  that 
only  such  troops  are  well  trained  as  in  war  need  change  noth- 
ing they  learned  in  time  of  peace. 

In  addition  to  giving  instruction  on  the  map  through 
problems  and  kriegsspiel,  which  also  is  suitable  for  non-com- 
missioned officers,  I  consider  it  essential  to  increase  and  im- 
prove the  means  of  troop-leading  in  field  exercises.  If  a  large 
number  of  well-trained  umpires  (some  of  whom  may  be  non- 


Reconnaissance;.  173 

commissioned  officers)  watch  the  conduct  of  reconnoitering 
bodies,  the  commander  will  be  able  to  control  and  properly 
instruct  patrols  without  adopting  any  measures  contrary  to 
practice  in  war.  A  knowledge  that  unskillful  action,  inatten- 
tion, and  indecision  will  lead  to  failure  as  in  war ;  that  patrols 
which  are  surprised  or  receive  effective  fire  will  be  ruled  out 
of  action  the  same  as  infantry  and  artillery;  that  messengers 
falling  into  the  enemy's  hands  will  remain  prisoners  and  must 
give  up  their  messages  as  in  war,  will  be  the  best  school- 
mistress. To  insure  a  decision  when  no  umpire  happens  to 
be  present,  it  might  be  ordered  that  the  senior  commander 
of  the  two  opposing  bodies  render  the  decision.  It  does  not 
matter  if  this  decision  should  be  slightly  biased.  In  larger 
operations  the  officers  detailed  as  umpires  should  each  have 
several  assistants  to  look  after  patrols,  who,  under  the  direc- 
tion and  supervision  of  their  superiors,  surely  would  give  to 
reconnaissance  on  a  large  scale  the  similitude  of  war. 

The  entire  service  will  benefit  by  the  experience  gained 
by  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  as  umpires. 

I  conclude  these  pages  with  the  wish  that  the  reader,  who 
has  entrusted  himself  to  my  guidance,  may  receive  benefit 
from  his  work,  and  that  I  may  have  succeeded  in  impressing 
some  of  the  realities  of  war  upon  him  who  has  not  yet  expe- 
rienced it. 

Whoever  may  not  be  fully  satisfied  with  my  solutions 
should  remember  that  no  one  is  born  a  master,  that  many 
roads  lead  to  Rome,  and  that,  fortunately,  the  enemy  also 
makes  mistakes. 


Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 


PART   II. 

CAVALRY  OUTPOSTS,  MARCHES  AND 
COMBINED  OUTPOSTS. 


PREFACE  TO  PART  II. 


The  Preface  to  Part  I.  of  these  studies  gives  information 
as  to  its  object  and  plan  and  the  method  in  which  it  should 
be  studied.  A  conviction  that  the  only  sure  way  to  become 
a  troop-leader  is  by  practice,  and  an  effort  to  present  realistic 
material  for  my  readers  to  think  about,  are  my  guiding-stars. 

Service  can  only  be  properly  performed  in  the  predom- 
inant branches  of  the  Army — the  Infantry  and  Artillery — if 
everyone  has  a  clear  idea  of  the  powers  and  limitations  of  cav- 
alry. Therefore,  the  first  part  of  this  work  is  devoted  to  cav- 
alry reconnaissance,  and  the  second  part  first  deals  with  cav- 
alry outposts,  which  are  intimately  related  to  reconnaissance, 
and  later  with  marches  and  outposts  of  the  arms  combined. 

It  is  intended  later  to  make  use  of  the  understanding 
hereby  established  between  the  reader  and  myself  by  discuss- 
ing operations  and  battles. 

Georg  von  Alten. 

Berlin,  August,  1904. 


CAVALRY  OUTPOSTS. 
Selection  and  Occupation  of  the  Night  Position. 

The  "situation"  is  a  continuation  of  that  discussed  in 
the  first  part  of  this  work.  A  blue  army  is  moving  from  the 
Vistula  (Weichsel)  on  the  front  Gilgenburg-Saalfeld  against  a 
hostile  (red)  army  coming  from  the  east.  The  two  cavalry 
divisions  (ist  and  2d)  of  the  blue  army  are  united  on  the  right 
flank  of  the  army.  The  left  wing  of  this  army  consists  of  the 
1st  Army  Corps,  to  which  the  ist  Cavalry  has  been  attached 
from  the  1st  Cavalry  Division.  The  fortress  of  Konigsberg 
has  its  full  armament  and  is  garrisoned  by  (blue)  organized 
militia.  The  orders  issued  on  the  evening  of  May  4th  from 
headquarters  of  the  ist  Army  Corps  at  Saalfeld  provide  that 
on  the  following  day  the  corps  will  continue  its  march  via 
Maldeuten  towards  Mohrungen,  while  the  1st  Cavalry  will  re- 
connoiter  to  the  front  and  left  flank. 

Subsequently  the  corps  commander  ordered  that  3  troops 
of  the  3d  Cavalry,  under  Major  D ,  of  the  divisional  cav- 
alry of  the  two  divisions  of  the  corps,  take  charge  of  the  re- 
connaissance south  of  Narien-see  towards  Jonkendorf-Miin- 
sterberg.  The  1st  Cavalry  had  left  Gr.  Wilmsdorf  at  5  a.  m., 
May  5th.  At  10  a.  m.  its  advance  guard  reached  Pittehnen 
and  its  main  body  Reichenthal. 

Part  I.  tells  of  the  regiment's  experience  to  this  point 
and  gives  the  arrangements  of  the  regimental  commander  and 
subordinates,  as  well  as  the  contents  of  messages  received,  in 
so  far  as  they  are  of  importance  to  the  situation.  Our  im- 
agination will  now  further  accompany  the  regiment. 

At  10  a.  m.  the  colonel  had  received  from  Captain  E , 

who  had  advanced  with  Troop  E  via  Kleinefeld  towards  Wal- 

177 


178  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

tersmiihl,  the  message  of  Lieutenant  F (who,  for  several 

hours,  had  been  in  the  vicinity  of  Komalmen),  stating  that 
at  8.35  a.  m.  5  hostile  troops  of  cavalry  were  marching  along 
the  Glottau-Queetz  highway  towards  Heiligenthal.     Colonel 

A temporarily  remained  at  Reichenthal  awaiting  further 

developments.  Contradictory  reports  detained  him  longer  than 
he  wished.  The  information  received,  that  several  hostile 
troops  had  crossed  the  Passarge  at  Kallisten  and  had  gone 
towards  Waltersdorf,  was  soon  modified  by  further  informa- 
tion that  only  1  troop  had  gone  towards  Waltersdorf,  halting 
at  Mathildenberg.  Some  of  the  blue  patrols  west  of  the  Pas- 
sarge had  to  fall  back  before  the  enemy,  and  had  lost  sight 
of  the  Passarge  valley  at  Kallisten.     It  was  not  until  1 1  a.  m. 

that  a  message  from  Captain  E cleared  up  the  situation. 

At  10.20  a.  m.,  from  Height  140,  south  of  Waltersmiihl,  he 
had  discovered  several  hostile  troops  dismounted  near  Deppen, 
while  nothing  had  been  seen  of  the  enemy  on  the  highway 
between  Heiligenthal  and  Glottau  since  9  a.  m. 

Thereupon  the  regiment  resumed  its  march  via  Hlditten 
and  Kleinefeld,  and  at  12.30  p.  m.  arrived  north  of  Walters- 
miihl.    Captain   E reported   that   several  hostile   troops 

were  advancing  from  Deppen.  While  the  regiment  was  form- 
ing for  action  at  Waltersmiihl  the  enemy  halted  south  of  the 
creek  flowing  from  Komalmen  past  Waltersmiihl,  which  forms 
a  serious  obstacle.  After  vainly  waiting  for  some  time,  the 
regimental  commander  decided  to  advance  via  Komalmen. 

Thereupon  the  enemy,  from  whom  the  movement  could 
not  be  concealed,  fell  back;  while  doing  so  it  was  possible  to 
estimate  his  strength,  which  was  placed  at  7  or  8  troops.  The 
regiment  advanced  via  Ankendorf,  with  the  idea  of  cutting 
off  the  enemy's  retreat;  but  the  latter  could  not  be  overtaken, 
as  he  branched  off  via  Alt-Garschen,  where,  at  2  p.  m.,  it  gained 

touch  with  Major  D ,  who  had  taken  2  troops  of  the  3d 

Cavalry  to  Schlitt.     The  colonel  learned  from  the  major,  who 


Cavalry  Outposts.  179 

rode  up,  that  he  had  vainly  tried  to  capture  the  bridge  at 
Briiekendorf  by  dismounted  action,  in  which  his  men  had  ex- 
pended most  of  their  ammunition.  He  then  had  ridden  north 
and  crossed  at  Kloben,  after  a  hostile  troop  had  retired  from 
there  via  Schlitt  towards  Blankenberg.  He  estimated  that 
at  least  200  rifles  had  been  opposed  to  him  at  Briiekendorf 
station  (marked  "H.St."  east  of  Briiekendorf  on  map).  His 
casualties  were  3  dead  and  14  wounded;  the  latter  were  left 
at  Briiekendorf.     Troop  E,  3d  Cavalry,  which  belongs  to  the 

2d  Division,  has  not  yet  joined.     Major  D has  sent  it 

word  to  watch  the  enemy  near  Briiekendorf  and  prevent  his 
reconnoitering  towards  Mohrungen.  He  himself  intends  going 
towards  Jonkendorf-Gr.  Buchwalde  with  Troops  A  and  B.  The 
major  stated  that  he  already  had  sent  patrols  in  this  direction, 
but  that  his  command  needed  some  rest. 

The  colonel  explained  the  situation  to  the  major  and  ar- 
ranged with  him  that  the  1st  Cavalry  would  return  to  the 
Heiligenthal-Guttstadt  road,  and  reconnoiter  towards  the  Alle 

north  of  Miinsterberg,  while  Major  D would  reconnoiter 

towards  Gr.  Buchwalde-Jonkendorf  and  farther  south  with 
his  2  troops. 

In  the  meantime  the  hostile  troops  had  continued  their 
retreat  via  Blankenberg  towards  Steinberg. 

At  2.  30  p.  m.  the  regiment  arrived  at  Heiligenthal,  where, 
at  2.50  p.  m.,  word  was  received  from  Troop  A,  1st  Cavalry, 
that  the  enemy  had  not  been  seen  at  Gut+stadt  up  to  11.30 
a.  m.,  or  at  Knopen  up  to  noon;  that  an  officer's  patrol  was 
going  beyond  Guttstadt  to  reconnoiter  towards  Freudenberg- 
Tollack;  that  another  patrol  had  been  sent  up  the  Alle  via 
Knopen- Althof-Lower  (Unter)  Kapkeim;  and  that  the  troop 
for  the  present  would  remain  at  Queetz,  sending  small  patrols 
towards  Schwuben,  Miinsterberg,  and  Rosengarth. 

The  colonel  sent  Troop  G  to  Rosengarth  to  reconnoiter 
towards  Miinsterberg-Gr.  Buchwalde,  and  as  a  means  of  pro- 


180  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

tection.  The  regiment  took  post  west  of  Heiligenthal  and 
dismounted. 

To  protect  his  own  messenger  route  and  to  block  it  for 
the  hostile  patrols  remaining  on  the  left  of  the  Passarge,  Colonel 

A increased  the  post  at  Pittehnen  to  i  officer  and  15  men, 

then  placed  a  non-commissioned  officer  and  10  men  at  Sack- 
stein,  and  later  sent  a  platoon  of  Troop  H  to  Deppen  with 
orders  also  to  occupy  the  bridge  at  Kloben. 

Several  prisoners  have  been  brought  in  whose  statements, 
partly  corroborated  by  inhabitants,  reveal  the  following:  The 
hostile  5th  Dragoons,*  which  spent  the  preceding  night  at 
Heilsberg,  this  morning  came  via  Guttstadt  to  Kallisten,  where 
it  joined  the  6th  Dragoons,*  which  was  at  Allenstein  the  pre- 
ceding night.  The  two  regiments  belong  to  different  brigades, 
but  both  belong  to  the  2d  Cavalry  Division  and  are  with  the 
2d  Army  Corps.  During  the  night  of  May  3d-4th  the  5th 
Dragoons  was  alone  at  Schippenbeil.  It  could  not  be  deter- 
mined where  the  6th  Dragoons  was  during  the  same  night. 
But  the  prisoner  from  the  regiment  says  that  his  troop  camped 
beside  the  railway,  and  that  on  the  forenoon  of  May  4th  he 
was  sent  back  to  this  railway  with  a  message,  which  he  de- 
livered to  an  infantryman  at  the  place  where  he  had  camped 
the  night  before ;  that  on  the  afternoon  of  May  4th,  constantly 
riding  along  the  railway,  he  had  returned  to  his  troop  at 
Allenstein;  that  he  estimated  the  distance  from  his  former 
camping-place  to  Allenstein  to  be  25  versts  (about  16  miles); 
that  he  had  seen  no  troops  during  this  ride;  and  that  the  rail- 
way was  double-tracked. 

In  addition,  two  messages  had  been  captured.  The  first 
is  as  follows: 


*In  this  translation  the  enemy's  (red)  cavalry  regiments  are  sup- 
posed to  consist  of  600  sabers  each,  which  conforms  to  the  strength  of 
European  regiments,  and  is  only  half  that  of  our  own.  But  the  red 
troop  is  taken  at  100  men,  corresponding  to  our  own. — Translator, 


Cavalry  Outposts.  181 

Tomlack  Woods,*  South  of  Willnau, 

5  May,  11-30  a.  m. 

To  Colonel  M : 

The  two  hostile  troops  reported  by  me  at  8-30  a.  m.  as  advancing 
from  Mohrungen  via  Pfeilings  forced  me  back  into  the  woods,  and  are 
now  followed  by  a  third  troop,  which  has  reached  Horn  railway  station 
and  is  trotting  east  along  the  track.  The  2  troops  first  reported  have  ad- 
vanced via  Gubitten.  After  10  a.  m.  we  heard  small-arms  fire  from  the 
direction  of  Briickendorf.  There  are  hostile  patrols  at  Gallinden  and 
Willnau. 

N , 

Lieut.  $th  Dragoons. 

The  messenger  was  captured  at  Seubersdorf  by  a  patrol 
of  Troop  C,  3d  Cavalry.  His  comrade  escaped.  Nothing  has 
been  learned  concerning  the  whereabouts  of  the  hostile  officer's 
patrol. 

The  second  captured  message  is  as  follows: 

TeuFELSBERG,  South  of  Herzogswalde, 

5  May,  1 1-30  a.  m. 

To  Colonel  M : 

Circling  around  Waltersdorf,  and  avoiding  a  hostile  patrol,  I  arrived 
here,  after  4  or  5  troopers,  who  had  occupied  this  knoll,  had  retreated 
towards  Alt-Bolitten.  Nothing  suspicious  can  be  seen  from  the  Teufels- 
berg.     I  shall  continue  towards  Gr.  Hermenau. 

M , 

Lieut.  5th  Dragoons. 

The  two  bearers  of  this  message  carelessly  approached 
Kallisten  after  it  was  occupied  by  a  platoon  of  Troop  H,  1st 
Cavalry.  The  vedette  at  the  western  exit  shot  down  one  of 
the  men;  the  second,  whose  horse  was  killed,  was  captured. 

At  4.30  p.  m.  Lieutenant  C ,   1st  Cavalry  (see  page 

130),  arrived  at  Heiligenthal  and  reported  the  result  of  his 
reconnaissance.  Riding  along  the  edge  of  the  woods  west  of 
Rosengarth,  he  recognized  Troop  G  of  his  regiment  en  route 
to  Rosengarth  and  verbally  reported  the  situation  to  its 
captain. 

The  gist  of  his  report  is  that  during  the  forenoon  a  hostile 
cavalry  regiment  advanced  from  Jonkendorf,  the  greater  part 
going  via  Pupkeim  towards  Schlitt  and  about  one-fourth  going 

*"Tomlacker  Wald"  on  map. 


1 82  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

via  Gottken-Ballingen;  that  between  i  and  2  p.  m.  hostile 
infantry  outposts  were  posted  at  Wilhelmsthal  and  east  of 
Mondtken;  and  that  about  3.30  p.  m.  infantry  outposts  also 

were  posted  at  Gr.  Buchwalde.     Lieutenant  C had  seen 

nothing  of  the  hostile  cavalry  that  according  to  another  report 
had  retreated  via  Blankenberg  towards  Steinberg. 

About  5  p.  m.  a  message  is  received  from  Major  D , 

dated  4.30  p.  m.,  in  which  he  states  that  the  enemy  has  with- 
drawn! from  Briickendorf,  Troop  E,  3d  Cavalry,  then  crossing 
at  this  point  and  advancing  towards  Pupkeim ;  that  the  enemy 
had  taken  along  3  wounded  of  the  3d  Cavalry  and  the  officials 
of  Briickendorf  station  on  wagons  via  Kl.  Gemmern,  leaving 
behind  13  seriously  wounded  and  6  dead  of  his  own,  most  of 
whom  belonged  to  the  6th  and  a  few  to  the  3d  Dragoons ;  that 
the  hostile  troops  at  3.30  p.  m.  had  left  Steinberg  for  Poll- 
eicken;  and  that  the  major  would  follow  towards  Pupkeim 
with  Troops  A  and  B. 

Troop  G,  1st  Cavalry,  reports  from  Height  166  north- 
west of  Rosengarth  that  individual  infantrymen  have  been 
seen  at  the  edge  of  the  woods  east  of  Rosengarth,  near  the 
Rosengarth-Miinsterberg  road,  and  on  the  Rosenberg-Gr. 
Buchwalde  road,  who  fired  at  long  range  on  our  patrols;  and 
that  shots  also  were  fired  from  New  Garschen. 

Troop  A,  1st  Cavalry,  is  at  Oueetz.  It  reports  that  as 
late  as  3.30  p.  m.  the  enemy  had  not  appeared  at  Knopen,  or 
at  Guttstadt,  where  a  picket  under  a  non-commissioned  officer 
is  stationed.  The  inhabitants  of  Guttstadt  state  that  no  hos- 
tile troops  have  passed  through  that  town  excepting  the  5th 
Dragoons.  May  4th  a  strong  hostile  patrol  destroyed  the 
telegraph  line  and  railway  switches  at  the  station.  A  patrol 
of  Troop  A,  1st  Cavalry,  which  advanced  through  Schwuben 
fell  back  at  4  p.  m.  before  at  least  a  company  of  hostile  infantry 
which  came  fromKlutken  mill  ("Klutken  M."  on  map)  and  oc- 
cupied Height  113  near  Schwuben.     The  patrol  also  -claims  to 


Cavalry  Outposts,  183 

have  seen  hostile  infantry  on  Podonnenberg  near  Munsterberg. 
The  enemy  has  not  been  seen  at  Knopen  as  late  as  4  p.  m.  A 
patrol  sent  south  via  Battatron  was  fired  upon  from  Klutken, 
mill  and  from  the  height  northeast  of  Lower  (Unt.)  Kapkeim, 
and  discovered  an  infantry  post  a  few  hundred  yards  north  of 
this  village  on  the  highway  leading  through  Battatron. 

The  connecting-post  at  Pittehnen  compiled  a  report  from 
the  messages  there  received,  from  which  it  appears  that  Lieu- 
tenant B (who  was  sent  via  Freymarkt  towards  Heilsberg 

in  the  forenoon  by  Captain  E ,  Troop  A,  1st  Cavalry)  at 

11.20  a.  m.  arrived  at  Freymarkt  without  seeing  anything  of 
the  enemy,  and  continued  his  reconnaissance  towards  Launau; 

that  Sergeant  K ,  Troop  A,  1st  Cavalry,  following  the  troop 

defeated  by  Captain  E ,  lost  track  of  it  north  of  Sportehnen 

and  rode  towards  Wormditt;  and  that  Sergeant  L ,  Troop 

A,  1st  Cavalry,  reports  from  Liebstadt  that  Gr.  Hermenau  has 
been  occupied  by  a  battalion  of  the  1st  Infantry. 

Hostile  cavalry  patrols  are  no  longer  visible  anywhere 
except  near  Neu-Garschen  and  Blankenberg. 

Colonel  A sent  word  to  the  commanding  general  of 

the  1  st  Army  Corps,  via  Kallisten  and  the  telegraph  station 
at  Gr.  Hermenau,  of  the  events  happening  up  to  3  p.  m. :  the 
appearance  of  the  two  hostile  cavalry  regiments,  their  with- 
drawal towards  Blankenberg,  his  meeting  Major  D ,  and 

that  the  enemy  had  not  appeared  at  Guttstadt  up  to  11.30 
a.  m.  or  at  Knopen  up  to  12  noon. 

At  5  p.  m.  3  troopers  from  the  connecting-post  at  Gr. 
Hermenau  arrived  with  the  following  telegram: 

Headquarters  1st  Army  Corps,  Mohrungen, 

5  May,  1  p.  m. 
To  the  Comdg.  Officer,  1st  Cavalry: 

The  1st  Division  will  be  quartered  for  the  night  at  Himmelforth, 
Pfeilings,  Horn,  and  Kranthau,  the  2d  Division  at  Mohrungen  and  Gr. 
Bestendorf,  corps  headquarters  at  Mohrungen.  Your  orders  remain  un- 
changed.    So  far  no  reports  received  here  sufficiently  clear  up  the  situa- 


184  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

tion  east  of  the  Passarge.  Last  message  received  from  you  is  dated 
Pittehnen,  11  a.  m. 

By  command  of  Lieutenant-General  G. : 

E.  S , 

Chief  of  Staff. 

The  commander  of   the  connecting-post  has  added  the 

following : 

Gr.  Hermenau, 
5  May,  1-30  p.  m. 
The  importance  of  the  enclosed  telegram  and  the  insecurity  of  the 
road  induced  me  to  send  it  by  3  men.  A  strong  hostile  patrol  was  seen 
near  Herzogswalde  at  11  a.  m.  We  still  have  telegraphic  communica- 
tion with  Liebstadt,  where,  so  far,  nothing  has  been  seen  of  the  enemy. 
A  battalion  of  the  1st  Infantry  has  occupied  Gr.  Hermenau. 

H , 

Sergt.  Troop  C,  1st  Cav. 

The  bearers  of  the  message  came  via  Alt-Bolitten,  where 

Corporal  M ,  Troop  A,  1st  Cavalry,  joined  them  and  rode 

with  them  to  Teufelsberg,  whence  he  had  been  driven  at  1 1 
a.  m.  by  a  hostile  patrol.  At  Sanglau  they  were  obliged  to 
hide  themselves  from  hostile  troopers  until  the  latter  rode 
back  towards  Seubersdorf,  and  thus  they  were  considerably 
delayed.  It  was  not  until  they  reached  Waltersdorf  that  they 
were  able  to  continue  on  their  way  undisturbed  to  Kallisten, 
where  they  found  the  platoon  of  Troop  H,  1st  Cavalry. 

The  1st  Cavalry,  leaving  Maldeuten  at  5  a.  m.,  has  come 
about  33  miles.  It  fed  at  Herzogswalde  from  8  to  9.35  a.  m., 
rested  at  Reichenthal-Pittehnen  from  10  to  11  a.  m.,  and  has 
been  at  Heiligenthal  about  2  hours,  during  which  time  the 
troops  were  able  to  water  in  succession. 

Discussion  of  the  Situation  of  the  Regiment;  Intention 
and  Arrangements  of  Its  Commander  at  5  p.  m. 
At  last,  word  is  being  received  about  the  enemy's  infantry. 
The  colonel  has  a  right  to  hope  that  the  report  he  is  about  to 
send,  and  which  ought  to  arrive  at  Mohrtmgen  by  8  p.  m.,  will 
clear  up  the  situation  for  the  commanding  general  as  far  as 
this  is  possible  up  to  date.     Hostile  infantry  outposts  are  es- 


Cavalry  Outposts.  185 

tablished  all  along  the  line  from  Schwuben  via  Gr.  Buchwalde 
and  Mondtken  to  west  of  Wilhelmsthal.  It  may  be  confidently 
assumed  that,  in  rear  of  these,  columns  have  followed  as  far 
as  the  Alle.  The  fact  that  so  far  we  have  had  to  deal  only 
with  cavalry  belonging  to  the  2d  (red)  Army  Corps  justifies 
the  surmise  that  this  corps  has  occupied  the  line  of  the  Alle — ■ 
but  only  the  surmise.  It  would  be  of  no  advantage  to  lead 
the  regiment  against  the  hostile  outposts  to  find  out  further 
particulars.  We  could  not  find  out  for  certain  even  if  we  suc- 
ceeded in  penetrating  the  line  at  great  cost.  The  Alle  would 
check  further  progress.  And  of  what  advantage  would  it  be 
to  know  that  at  some  point  there  are  a  few  battalions  of  the  2d 
Army  Corps?  It  is  sufficient  for  the  commanding  general  to 
know  that  the  advance  of  the  hostile  infantry  has  crossed  the 
Alle. 

But  it  would  be  of  great  importance  if  corps  headquarters 
could  be  informed  where  the  northern  flank  of  the  enemy  is. 
The  message  concerning  hostile  outposts  at  Klutken  mill  and 
Lower  Kapkeim  is  a  pointer  on  this  subject.  But  a  definite 
conclusion  cannot  yet  be  drawn,  for  we  still  have  no  news  about 
the  roads  leading  east  from  Guttstadt  on  which  hostile  infantry 
also  might  be  found. 

The  reconnaissance  of  the  1st  Cavalry  probably  will  no 
longer  have  any  influence  on  the  decision  of  the  army  com- 
mander, but  it  will  serve  the  commanding  general  1st  Army 
Corps,  and  possibly  of  the  2d  Army  Corps  also,  as  a  basis  for 
orders  on  May  6th,  and  may  even  be  of  use  for  their  orders  to 
be  issued  on  the  evening  of  May  5th.  In  Part  I.  attention  was 
called  to  the  fact  that  too  much  must  not  be  expected  from 
cavalry  reconnaissance;  and  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  1st 
Cavalry  did  not  encounter  any  unusual  difficulties.  On  the 
contrary,  it  was  favored  by  the  unexpected  weakness  and  the 
withdrawal  of  the  hostile  cavalry;  and  if  the  hostile  infantry 
had  arrived  later,  its  presence  might  not  have  been  detected 
—13— 


1 86  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

until  evening,  so  that  a  report  about  this  might  not  have  been 
received  at  Mohrungen  until  early  the  following  day. 

So  Colonel  A may  look  upon  his  day's  work  with  con- 
siderable satisfaction.  But  how  much  still  remains  to  be  done, 
and  how  much  is  still  enveloped  in  darkness! 

Minor  uncertainties,  such  as  the  enigmatical  appearance 
of  two  hostile  regiments  of  two  different  brigades  and  the  ab- 
sence of  all  information  about  the  remainder  of  the  2d  Cavalry 
Division,  or  the  appearance  of  a  part  of  the  3d  Dragoons  at 
Briickendorf,  which,  according  to  the  well-known  organiza- 
tion of  the  hostile  army,  belongs  to  the  1st  Army  Corps,*  are 
of  small  moment.  It  is  possible  that  the  cavalry  of  the  neigh- 
boring army  corps,  coming  from  the  south,  assisted  the  6th 
Dragoons  at  Briickendorf — but  it  would  not  pay  to  bother 
about  such  details.  It  is  of  far  greater  importance  to  find  out 
definitely  how  far  the  front  of  the  hostile  army  extends  to  the 
north;  and  nobody  knows  if  late  in  the  day  a  hostile  column 
may  not  reach  Guttstadt  or  vicinity,  to  prolong  the  front  early 
in  the  morning  and  envelop  our  flank. 

It  is  true  that  Captain  E as  a  precautionary  measure 

has  sent  an  officer's  patrol  to  the  east  via  Guttstadt,  but  how 
easily  can  a  patrol  be  captured  or  forced  aside;  how  little 
would  be  gained  could  it  report  that  it  was  fired  on  by  hostile 
outposts  at  Klingerswalde  or  Eschenau.  For  it  is  possible 
that  there  or  even  at  Nosberg  the  troops  encountered  simply 
might  be  hostile  covering  detachments. 

Were  it  not  5  p.  m.,  and  had  the  regiment  not  already 
covered  a  distance  of  over  30  miles,  it  would  be  an  easy  matter 
to  clear  up  the  mystery.  The  way  is  open  and  a  ride  to  Gutt- 
stadt would  bring  the  regiment  to  the  commanding  point 
on  the  enemy's  flank.     It  may  very  properly  be  asked :    Why 

*The  German  General  Staff  has  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the  ordre 
de  bataille  of  all  foreign  armies — including  the  names  of  the  commanders 
of  all  larger  organizations. — Translator. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  187 

did  not  the  regiment  continue  its  march  towards  Gr.  Buch- 
walde  or  Guttstadt  as  early  as  2  or  3  p.  m.  ?  This  was  im- 
practicable both  on  account  of  the  necessity  for  a  prolonged 
rest  and  the  uncertainty  that  prevailed  at  the  time.  It  was 
possible  that  a  march  to  Buchwalde  would  bring  the  regiment 
immediately  in  front  of  the  enemy  and  prevent  a  reconnais- 
sance of  his  flank ;  and  a  march  to  Guttstadt  might  be  a  wild- 
goose  chase.  It  is  not  until  5  p.  m.  that  the  messages  received 
justify  a  consideration  of  Guttstadt  as  the  next  objective. 

But  can  Colonel  A expect  this  further  effort  from  his 

command  late  in  the  afternoon  of  May  5th?  To-day's  march 
has  not  demanded  unusual  exertions.  The  main  body  of  the 
regiment  marched  at  an  ordinary  gait;  there  was  no  gallop- 
ing to  strain  lungs  or  sinews  of  the  horses;  prolonged  halts 
afforded  opportunities  to  rest;  it  was  practicable  to  feed  at 
Herzogswalde,  and,  during  the  past  two  hours,  it  was  possible 
to  water  at  Heiligenthal ;  there  were  no  scorching  sun's  rays. 

Critically  examining  his  command,  Colonel  A surely  would 

conclude  that  its  strength  is  far  from  exhausted.  The  8  miles 
to  Guttstadt  could  be  traveled  without  any  harm  if  it  only 
were  possible  to  rest  there.  But  there  energetic  reconnais- 
sance would  have  to  begin,  and  at  that  exposed  point,  only 
3  miles  from  the  hostile  outposts  at  Schwuben,  it  would  be 
impossible  to  unsaddle,  water,  and  feed.  How  would  it  be 
with  the  efficiency  of  the  regiment  on  May  6th,  the  probable 
day  of  battle  ?  Will  it  be  able  to  give  a  good  account  of  itself ; 
will  it  be  able  to  give  efficient  assistance  after  covering  40 
miles  on  May  5th  and  passing  a  restless  night  under  a  frosty 
sky?  Would  it  not  be  with  a  last  gasp  of  horse  and  man  that 
it  would  deliver  its  decisive  attack  on  May  6th  to  cover  a  re- 
treat or  to  pursue  the  enemy,  if  throughout  the  preceding 
night  there  should  be  ceaseless  activity,  as  if  May  6th  were  to 
be  the  last  day  of  maneuver,  when  the  "general"  would  be 
sounded  and  peace  and  quiet  spread  over  the  land.     French's 


188  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

cavalry  division  may  serve  as  a  warning,  which  in  the  late 
Boer  war  rode  into  Kimberley  and  as  the  result  of  a  single  day's 
overexertion  was  hors  de  combat  for  a  long  time  afterwards. 

Months  may  pass  before  peace  is  restored  and  every  day 
in  the  meantime  may  bring  new  work,  new  exertions.  This 
must  be  taken  into  consideration  by  every  commander.  And 
yet  there  is  none  who  would  hesitate  to  do  his  utmost,  to  shed 
every  drop  of  blood,  if  necessary.     Has  this  moment  arrived 

for  Colonel  A on  the  afternoon  of  May  5th?     Is  what  he 

hopes  to  accomplish  by  riding  to  Guttstadt  worth  the  risk  of 
materially  reducing  the  efficiency  of  his  regiment  for  the  fol- 
lowing day? 

It  would  be  different  if  it  we  forenoon  and  we  were  at 
Heiligenthal  after  a  12-  to  15-mile  ride.  Arriving  at  Guttstadt 
in  good  shape,  reconnaissance  might  be  successfully  undertaken 
on  the  right  of  the  Alle.  Daylight  would  enable  us  to  get  an 
extended  view  from  the  heights  east  and  southeast  of  the  town, 
troops  could  be  sent  forward  as  far  as  Nosberg  and  Eschenau, 
and  Guttstadt  could  be  abandoned  in  time  for  a  safer  place  in 
case  of  the  advance  of  hostile  columns. 

As  matters  now  stand,  the  regiment  would  arrive  at  Gutt- 
stadt as  the  sun  is  setting,  approaching  darkness  would  make 
an  extended  view  impossible,  no  conclusion  could  be  drawn 
from  the  picket-firing  of  different  posts,  and  no  columns  on 
the  march  would  be  discovered. 

If,  on  the  evening  of  May  5th,  the  regiment  wishes  to  get 
into  safe  quarters  from  Guttstadt,  the  40  miles  it  has  marched 
would  be  increased  to  45  or  50,  to  which  at  least  5  to  10  miles 
more  must  be  added  for  the  reconnoitering  troops. 

Should  the  regiment  remain  at  Guttstadt,  it  would  assume 
the  role  of  a  reconnoitering-patrol  close  to  the  hostile  outposts 
without  the  advantages  of  mobilty  and  ease  of  concealment 
of  such  patrol.  A  hostile  platoon  of  infantry  stealthily  ap- 
proaching along  the  railway  could  attack  it  with  impunity 
and  force  it  to  fall  back  in  the  dark. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  189 

The  colonel  must  see  that  the  regiment  at  Guttstadt  virtu- 
ally could  accomplish  no  more  than  the  patrols  that  have  al- 
ready been  sent  out,  and  that  the  march  thither  would  un- 
necessarily tire  and  expose  it,  and  unnecessarily  reduce  its 
strength  for  May  6th. 

If  the  colonel  decides  not  to  advance  to  Guttstadt  to-day, 
the  next  thing  to  consider  is  a  place  to  spend  the  night.  If  it 
is  impracticable  to  continue  the  reconnaissance  against  the 
enemy's  flank,  every  other  exertion  seems  useless.  It  would 
seem,  then,  that  the  only  thing  to  do  would  be  to  gain  new 
strength  for  to-morrow's  duties  and  to  otherwise  carefully 
prepare  for  these. 

It  would  be  most  convenient  for  the  regiment  to  remain 
at  Heiligenthal  and  Ankendorf.  The  two  towns  surely  could 
provide  most  of  the  food  necessary  for  the  1,200  horses  and 
men,  and  whatever  may  be  lacking  can  be  brought  from  Ko- 
malmen,  Waltersmiihl,  Kallisten,  Deppen,  and  Alt-Garschen. 
Even  if  the  baggage- train,  which  is  still  at  Mohrungen,  15 
miles  away,  has  to  be  dispensed  with,  the  troops  very  quickly 
could  make  themselves  comfortable.  It  may  even  be  pos- 
sible to  obtain  straw,  something  unusual  when  bivouacking 
in  the  face  of  the  enemy.  For  it  must  be  a  bivouac,  be  it 
never  so  cold,  or  should  the  rain  descend  in  torrents. 

It  would  be  rash  to  place  the  horses  under  cover  only  3 
to  3J  miles  from  the  enemy's  outposts  at  Neu-Garschen  and 
near  Rosengarth,  and  half  a  day's  march  from  our  own  in- 
fantry. It  is  even  possible  that  the  hostile  cavalry,  probably 
assembled  near  Neu-Garschen,  might  make  a  sudden  attack. 

Extensive  preparations  would  have  to  be  made  for  de- 
fense at  the  edge  of  the  woods  southeast  of  Ankendorf  and 
Heiligenthal  and  to  keep  the  roads  thence  under  observation, 
and  to  resist  the  advance  of  the  enemy  from  the  line  Alt- 
Garschen-Height  168  (southeast  of  Ankendorf),  on  the  high- 
way towards  Queetz  and  on  the  one  towards  Komalmen. 


190  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

The  protection  of  the  bivouac,  for  which  purpose  it  might 
be  necessary  to  detail  strong  interior  and  exterior  guards  in  ad- 
dition, might  take  half  of  the  men,  while  at  least  one  troop 
would  have  to  form  a  detached  post  at  Guttstadt,  so  that  re- 
connaissance beyond  the  latter  point  might  continue.  As  with 
a  bivouac  at  Guttstadt,  so  also  one  at  Heiligenthal  would  re- 
sult in  using  up  strength  instead  of  conserving  it. 

Cavalry  finds  most  complete  rest  with  the  least  expendi- 
ture of  strength  in  rear  of  a  natural  obstacle.  There  is  a  quiet 
night's  rest  in  store  on  the  left  of  the  Passarge  if  the  crossings 
at  Kloben,  Deppen,  and  Sackstein  are  held.  Even  the  bag- 
gage train  can  be  brought  up  to  the  quarters  by  10  or  n 
p.  m.,  and  the  pickets  at  the  bridges  will  have  an  easy  time 
and  mostly  be  able  to  place  their  horses  under  cover.  A  troop 
on  outpost  at  Sackstein,  another  at  Kallisten  (left  bank  of  the 
Passarge)  with  vedettes  on  the  crest  near  Deppen,  a  troop 
at  Kloben,  the  remainder  of  the  regiment  at  Mathildenburg, 
Wenglitten,  R.  G.*  Seubersdorf  and  Seubersdorf — such  a  dis- 
position would  insure  the  regiment's  appearing  on  the  scene 
May  6th  rested,  refreshed,  and  spick  and  span.  It  would  be 
an  arrangement  that  would  render  communication  safe  with 
the  Army  Corps,  and  in  conjunction  with  pickets  at  Pittehnen 
and  Gr.  Hermenau  would  prevent  hostile  patrols  gaining  any 
insight  of  the  situation  of  the  ist  Army  Corps  during  the  re- 
mainder of  the  day  and  during  the  night. 

In  this  case,  too,  at  least  one  troop  would  have  to  form  a 
detached  post  towards  the  enemy  to  keep  touch  with  him  and 
watch  the  roads  on  the  right  of  the  Alle  leading  towards  Gutt- 
stadt. Were  this  task  allotted  exclusively  to  the  patrols  al- 
ready in  front,  we  would  jeopardize  communication  with  them, 
which,  for  example,  might  be  completely  severed  by  a  hostile 

*"R.  G."   is  an  abbreviation  for  Ritter-Gut,  knight's  manor. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  191 

troop  or  a  platoon  of  infantry  advancing  to  Queetz,  Glottau, 
or  Guttstadt. 

But  11  troops  would  be  well  taken  care  of  on  the  left  of 
the  Passarge,  and  an  early  start  on  May  6th  still  might  bring 
the  refreshed  and  invigorated  regiment  on  time  into  the  vicin- 
ity of  Guttstadt. 

Finally,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  colonel  as  yet 
does  not  know  anything  of  the  plans  of  headquarters  for  the 
6th,  and  that  the  regiment  in  its  quarters  near  Kallisten  will 
remain  well  in  the  commanding  general's  control,  so  that  thence 
he  can  send  it  whichever  way  he  will.  He  may  desire  to  have 
the  march  of  his  corps  screened  by  the  cavalry  regiment  whether 
the  corps  turns  south  past  Narien-see  towards  Briickendorf- 
Kallisten,  or  past  the  north  end  of  the  lake  (see)  via  Sack- 
stein-Pittehnen ;  and  this  small  cavalry  force  can  in  no  way 
perform  this  task  better  than  by  blocking  the  crossings  of  the 
Passarge. 

But  should  the  commanding  general  desire  the  cavalry  to 
advance  farther,  it  would  not  have  interfered  with  his  plans. 
It  could  just  as  well  advance  towards  Guttstadt  or  Wormditt, 
towards  Miinsterberg,  Gr.  Buchwalde,  or  Jonkendorf,  depend- 
ing on  the  inportance  that  the  commanding  general  places  on 
one  or  the  other  direction.  He  may  have  received  informa- 
tion or  orders  calling  for  an  entirely  different  view  of  the  situa- 
tion from  that  acquired  by  the  colonel  from  his  reconnaissance. 

There  are  good  reasons  for  adopting  the  plan  just  de- 
scribed. No  one  could  censure  the  colonel,  should  he  decide 
in  its  favor.  Nevertheless,  there  not  only  arises  the  inevitable 
"but"  with  which  every  decision  has  to  contend — for  there 
is  none  that  answers  all  requirements — there  also  arises  a  doubt 
in  the  colonel's  mind  whether,  in  spite  of  all  this,  there  is  not 
a  better  solution. 

irst  of  all,  it  may  be  the  experienced  leader's  natural  aver- 
sion to  a  plan  that  so  completely  meets  all  requirements  for 


192  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

feed  and  rest  as  to  remind  him  of  field-maneuver  methods. 
Then,  too,  his  knightly  sensitiveness  rebels  against  the  com- 
mand to  retreat  that  he  must  issue  if  the  good  quarters  behind 
the  Passarge  are  to  be  occupied. 

It  is  true  that  quite  often  during  a  campaign  the  cavalry 
far  in  advance  of  an  army,  after  a  day's  work  is  completed, 
finds  it  necessary  to  go  back  a  step  to  be  able  to  pass  the  night 
in  a  protected  spot  where  outpost  duty  will  be  lessened  and 
sufficient  supplies  can  be  found.  But  here  conditions  are  dif- 
ferent. The  regiment  is  almost  toe  to  toe  with  the  enemy  on 
the  ground  vacated  only  a  few  hours  since  by  the  hostile  cav- 
alry, which,  avoiding  an  engagement,  acknowledged  our  superi- 
orhy  and  surrendered  to  the  regiment  and  its  patrols  the  con- 
trol of  the  territory  between  the  two  opponents.  Ought  the 
regiment  now  of  its  own  accord  relinquish  this  control  and 
enable  the  hostile  cavalry  by  a  quick  movement  to  gain  its 
lost  ground  and  thus  make  amends  for  the  mistake  of  earlier 
in  the  day?  It  would  be  very  easy  to  do  so.  For  example, 
if  the  hostile  cavalry  is  on  the  Gr.  Buchwalde-Rosengarth  road, 
behind  the  forest  screen  held  by  the  infantry  outposts,  and 
learns  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  ist  Cavalry  towards  Kallisten 
(which  hardly  would  remain  concealed  after  Major  D 's  de- 
parture), it  would  only  take  about  an  hour  for  said  cavalry 
again  to  be  at  Alt-Garschen  or  Heiligenthal.  The  Passarge 
also  would  protect  it  against  a  sudden  attack  if  it  should  place 
adequate  outposts  opposite  Kloben  and  Deppen;  and  the  fol- 
lowing morning  the  ist  Cavalry  would  have  to  force  a  defile 
before  it  could  advance  unmolested. 

The  regiment  might  remain  at  Heiligenthal  until  dark, 
in  the  meantime  having  quarters  prepared  on  the  left  of  the 
Passarge.  This  would  prevent  the  enemy's  promptly  discover- 
ing the  withdrawal,  but  he  nevertheless  might  accidentally 
reach  Heiligenthal  before  the  ist  Cavalry  again  regained  the 
right  bank  of  the  Passarge  on  the  morning  of  May  6th.     We 


Cavalry  Outposts.  193 

would  be  trusting  to  luck  instead  of  taking  no  chances,  and 
would  be  sacrificing  valuable  time  that  should  be  devoted  to 
rest  and  for  which  reason  the  step  backwards  would  have  taken 
place. 

It  would  be  quite  a  long  step,  for  some  of  the  troops  now 
at  Heiligenthal  must  march  back  more  than  4  miles.  The 
thirty-odd  miles  traveled  by  them  and  by  those  to  be  sent  to 
Kloben  and  Sackstein  would  be  increased  to  nearly  40  miles; 
and  it  is  pertinent  to  ask  whether,  as  it  seems  necessary  to  go 
a  few  miles  farther  for  suitable  quarters,  it  would  not  be  pos- 
sible to  find  some  more  suitable  place  than  the  hiding-place 
behind  the  Passarge. 

Such  place  cannot  be  found  on  the  Deppen-Guttstadt 
highway.  Queetz  and  Glottau  are  even  more  exposed  than 
Guttstadt  and  Heiligenthal.  Komalmen  is  too  small.  Wal- 
tersmiihl  lies  in  a  narrow  valley  close  to  the  Passarge  meadows, 
which  restrict  freedom  of  action. 

But  Scharnick  seems  to  offer  what  the  colonel  wants. 
Situated  on  the  Liebstadt-Guttstadt  highway,  in  close  com- 
munication with  the  telegraph  system,  near  enough  to  Gutt- 
stadt to  closely  watch  it,  far  ahead  of  our  own  and  near  the 
enemy's  flank,  the  regiment  here  would  be  at  an  advantageous 
spot  ready  for  service  early  in  the  morning. 

Only  a  few  miles  would  separate  the  regiment  from  the 
bridges  across  the  Alle  at  Schmolainen,  Kossen,  Guttstadt,  or 
Knopen,  should  it  wish  to  get  a  view  beyond  the  river.  A 
hostile  advance  towards  the  Passarge  would  not  escape  the 
notice  of  the  regiment,  which  would  constantly  be  in  a  position 
to  report  progress  of  the  hostile  wing.  It  is  true  that  the  com- 
manding general  has  not  yet  issued  his  orders  for  May  6th,  but 
even  if  the  directions  of  1 1  a.  m.  were  not  at  hand,  which  repeat 
the  general  instructions  and  allow  the  colonel  freedom  of  action, 
he  in  this  contingency  would  have  to  decide  for  himself  as  to 
what  he  thought  best  for  the  regiment  and  most  useful  for  the 


194  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

army  corps  and  army.  He  practically  would  discontinue  his 
reconnaissance  against  the  hostile  front,  for,  although  several 
patrols  would  remain  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Alle  in  front  of 
the  hostile  outposts,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  they  will  be  forced 
back  early  on  May  6th  at  the  latest.  They  would  be  able  to 
see  little  of  what  happens  behind  the  hostile  screen  of  outposts. 
The  regiment  even  would  open  the  way  for  the  hostile  cavalry 
to  and  across  the  Passarge,  as  the  weak  posts  of  observation  at 
the  bridges  easily  could  be  overpowered.  If  the  colonel  pictures 
to  himself  the  corps  commander's  thoughts,  in  so  far  as  this  is 
possible  without  knowing  what  orders  have  been  received  from 
army  headquarters  or  what  information  has  come  from  the 
front  through  other  channels  than  the  ist  Cavalry,  he  must 
feel  satisfied  that  the  disadvantages  he  would  voluntarily  incur 
would  be  of  slight  importance  compared  with  the  advantage 
of  constantly  remaining  in  touch  with  what  is  taking  place  on 
the  enemy's  outer  flank.  It  is  quite  likely  that  nowhere  else 
would  it  still  be  practicable  to  discover  and  report  upon  the 
depth  of  the  hostile  columns  before  they  form  up  and  come 
into  action.  Nowhere  else  could  the  regiment  so  effectively 
and  successfully  employ  its  fighting  strength,  either  to  relieve 
our  own  front,  support  the  decisive  attack,  cover  a  retreat,  or 
follow  in  pursuit. 

It  still  would  be  doubtful  whether  the  regiment  would 
reach  the  Guttstadt-Liebstadt  highway  in  time  from  quarters 
at  Kallisten  and  Seubersdorf,  even  if  there  were  no  opposition 
to  crossing  at  Deppen.  We  must  count  on  the  possibility  of 
other  hostile  heads  of  columns  arriving  at  Guttstadt  on  the  after- 
noon of  the  5th  of  May  and  by  their  advance  on  the  morning  of 
the  6th  blocking  the  road  to  Pittehnen.  The  good  line  of  com- 
munication gained  at  Scharnick  via  Licbstadt  with  corps  head- 
quarters at  Mohrungen  would  always  make  it  possible  to  comply 
with  an  order  of  the  commanding  general  sending  the  regiment 
in  different   directions  from  those  so  far  considered  correct. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  195 

Judging  by  the  map,  the  ground  at  Scharniek  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent favors  a  night's  rest.  To  be  sure,  we  shall  not  find  the 
same  ideal  security  and  comfort  as  behind  the  Passarge,  still, 
Zaun-see  and  the  former  Lingnau-Lake("Ehe-maliger  Lingnauer 
od.  Sawangen-see  "  on  map)  cover  a  part  of  the  front,  in  rear 
of  which  the  two  Scharniek  estates  A  and  B,  and  the  village 
of  Lingnau  can  be  utilized  for  shelter.  It  is  true  that  the 
count  ry  is  quite  open  towards  the  east  and  north,  and  although 
so  far  there  is  no  indication  of  danger  threatening  from  these 
directions,  the  service  of  security  must  not  be  neglected  there 
and  will  require  some  strength. 

The  last  objection  that  excited  nerves  might  offer — viz., 
that  the  missing  regiments  of  the  hostile  2d  Cavalry  Division 
may  be  expected  at  Guttstadt  in  the  evening,  and  that  the 
enemy's  superior  numbers  in  the  end  might  force  the  1st  Cav- 
alry from  its  commanding  place  on  the  hostile  flank — is  pushed 
aside  by  the  fearlessness  of  the  soldier  who  does  not  allow  him- 
self to  be  frightened.  In  the  face  of  such  untoward  circum- 
stances, which  so  far  have  in  nowise  been  foreshadowed,  the 
regiment  still  would  be  more  advantageously  placed  at  Schar- 
niek than  at  any  other  point.  The  only  change  that  might 
take  place  is  that  the  cantonment  at  Scharniek  and  Lingnau 
probably  would  be  changed  into  a  bivouac  at  Wolfsdorf  or 
Elditten. 

The  colonel  will  issue  his  orders  happy  to  think  that  it  is 
not  necessary  for  him  to  have  his  regiment  fall  back,  but  that 
the  miles  that  lie  between  him  and  his  quarters  lead  forward. 


Considerable  space  was  allotted  these  reflections  because 
it  seemed  a  favorable  opportunity  to  elucidate  certain  princi- 
ples concerning  the  conduct  of  independent  cavalry  as  well  as 
to  show  the  reasoning  that  may  precede  the  taking  of  an  im- 
portant step.  Many  of  my  readers  may  have  encountered 
difficulties  in  attempting  to  put  themselves  in  Colonel  A 's 


196  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

place,  and  deduce  for  him  a  suitable  and  practicable  plan  out 
of  the  various  possibilities  presenting  themselves.  And  yet 
the  situation  is  not  complicated  or  enigmatical,  but  compar- 
atively simple.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  problem  has  developed 
itself  naturally  before  the  reader's  eyes  during  the  progress  of 
events  narrated,  and  is  less  obscure  than  is  usually  the  case 
with  scholastic  problems  in  tactics  that  have  to  draw  more 
extensively  on  the  imagination  to  produce  the  "situation" 
desired.  The  problem  does  not  call  for  an  ingenious  solution 
and  is  not  intended  to  test  the  student's  ability  to  discover  and 
correctly  apply  a  military  principle  presented  in  a  vague  and 
indefinite  form.  The  regiment  is  not  in  an  unusual  stiuation 
which  only  a  genius  could  fathom.  On  the  contrary,  the  cir- 
cumstances are  not  at  all  unusual,  but  such  as  often  occur  in 
war.  In  my  opinion,  the  difficulty  mainly  lies  in  the  lack  of 
opportunity  to  become  familiar  with  the  operations  of  larger 
bodies  of  cavalry  in  time  of  peace — particularly  with  the  ques- 
tions of  quarters  and  outposts  for  independent  cavalry.  There 
are  few  generals  in  the  German  Army  who  as  staff  officers  have 
not  drafted  orders  for  detachments,  advance  guards,  and  out- 
posts of  the  combined  arms  in  maneuvers,  and  who  have  not 
solved  such  problems  in  staff  rides  and  kriegsspiel.  But  how 
seldom  is  it  possible  in  time  of  peace  to  obtain  practical  ex- 
perience in  the  command  of  larger  bodies  of  cavalry  forming 
part  of  an  army  operating  in  the  field  on  a  war  footing  against 
an  opponent  similarly  organized.  The  expenses  of  such  exer- 
cises would  be  too  great,  and  it  would  be  out  of  the  question 
to  call  out  army  corps  for  the  sake  of  cavalry  instruction  who 
in  the  resulting  maneuvers  would  do  nothing  for  some  days 
but  march  along  in  rear  of  the  cavalry.  Unfortunately,  the 
few  opportunities  during  grand  maneuvers  (Kaisermanover) 
often  are  circumscribed  and  spoiled  by  the  necessity  of  com- 
plying with  peace  conditions,  so  that  entire  fieedom  of  action 
and  decision  but  seldom  obtains.     The  obstacles  in  the  way  of 


Cavalry  Outposts.  197 

organizing  and  carrying  on  reconnaissance  on  a  war  footing, 
and  of  taking  the  effect  of  fire  into  consideration  (as  explained 
in  Part  I.)  add  to  the  difficulties  of  command  in  this  branch 
of  the  service. 

Military  history  furnishes  but  few  examples  illustrative 
of  these  principles  as  taught  in  maneuvers.  The  Napoleonic 
era  dates  back  so  far  and  dealt  with  such  radically  different 
conditions  that  its  examples  but  indifferently  serve  our  purpose. 
Neither  will  Stuart's  celebrated  cavalry  operations  during  the 
Civil  War  in  America  help  us  out  of  the  dilemma  because  they 
took  place  in  a  different  kind  of  country  and  had  different  ob- 
jectives from  what  would  be  the  case  with  cavalry  in  Europe. 
Nor  will  our  own  campaigns  of  1866  and  1870,  the  Russo- 
Turkish  War,  or  the  campaign  in  South  Africa  afford  us  suf- 
ficient instruction,  as  in  no  case  the  cavalry  on  both  sides  per- 
formed the  part  that  must  be  expected  of  it  in  the  wars  of  the 
future. 

It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  if  things  do  not  run  smoothly 
in  theoretical  instruction,  if  it  does  not  receive  adequate  atten- 
tion on  staff-rides  and  at  kriegsspiel.  On  account  of  lack  of 
personal  experience  in  the  field  and  in  maneuvers,  the  instructor 
hesitates  to  touch  a  subject  where  he  must  draw  too  much  on 
his  imagination.  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  we  would  take 
a  long  step  in  the  right  direction  if  annually  we  could  have 
cavalry  maneuvers  of  several  days'  duration  under  war  condi- 
tions where  regiment  would  operate  against  regiment  and  bri- 
gade against  brigade;  and  if,  whenever  possible,  cavalry  divi- 
sions not  only  operated  alone,  but  against  each  other  under 
war  conditions.  The  armies  covered  need  not  actually  exist; 
they  could  be  imaginary.  The  chief  umpires  soon  would  gain 
sufficient  skill  and  experience  to  substitute  messages  for  the 
actual   appearance   and  co-operation   of  these  bodies.*     The 

*We  have  devised  exercises  for  field  artillery  where  the  infantry 
and  cavalry  are  imaginary.     A  similar  arrangement  could  all  the  better 


198  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

extensive  employment  of  a  large  number  of  well-trained,  active, 
strict  umpires  would  be  a  prerequisite ;  also  the  adoption  of 
rules  based  on  the  realities  of  war  with  reference  to  capture  of 
prisoners,  placing  out  of  action,  interception  of  messages,  etc., 
as  well  as  the  use  of  the  telegraph  between  commanders  and 
umpires.  As  long  as  we  lack  the  necessary  experience  we  must 
all  the  more  carefully  and  thoroughly  think  the  subject  over. 
The  detailed  discussion  that  I  introduced  concerning  the  situa- 
tion of  the  regiment  was  prompted  by  this  fact.  It  also  was 
intended  as  an  object-lesson  for  the  inexperienced — showing 
that  by  picking  to  pieces  and  testing  the  pros  and  cons  of 
various  propositions  ideas  can  be  shifted  and  a  useful  decision 
can  be  arrived  at.  The  method  is  not  infallible,  but  it  some- 
times answers  the  purpose  when  quick  intuition  fails  and  when 
no  war  experience  fitting  the  case  comes  to  mind.  The  method 
in  itself  does  not  insure  a  correct  decision ;  but  the  more  often 
such  cases  are  thoroughly  thought  out,  the  more  readily  and 
easily  a  practicable  path  will  be  found.  But  even  the  most 
gifted  should  carefully  verify  a  quick  decision.  It  is  a  myth 
that  the  art  of  troop-leading  is  based  on  sudden  inspirations, 
and  that  campaigns  and  battles  are  nnconsciously  won  by 
heaven-inspired  genius.  The  very  greatest  of  our  generals 
have  borne  witness  that  their  decisions  have  been  the  result  of 
strenuous  thought.  All  the  more  will  careful,  conscientious 
thought  be  necessary  from  lesser  lights. 

But  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  imagine  that  it  was  the  right 
and  duty  of  a  leader  in  a  certain  measure  to  ask  for  time  so 

be  made  for  cavalry,  because  it,  as  a  rule,  is  not  in  close  contact  with 
other  branches  of  the  service.  The  difficulties  of  obtaining  forage  would 
not  prove  insurmountable  if  all  the  villages  in  the  maneuver  area  kept 
such  supply  on  hand  as  they  were  able  to  spare,  of  which  troops  could 
buy  for  cash  what  they  needed.  Whatever  was  not  used  would  remain 
the  property  of  the  community.  There  would  be  no  difficulty  in  pro- 
curing the  necessary  food  for  the  relatively  small  number  of  troopers 
from  the  villages.  This  manner  of  supplying  food  and  forage  would  not 
be  out  of  the  way,  because  in  time  of  war  the  cavalry  would  have  to 
live  off  the  country. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  199 

that  he  alone  or  with  the  help  of  an  assistant  may  think  over 
the  situation,  when  called  upon  to  make  a  decision  in  the  field. 
The  mental  superiority  of  a  commander  more  particularly 
shows  itself  in  an  emergency  by  the  cool  methodical  way  in 
which  he  works.  But  it  is  seldom  that  at  the  last  decisive 
moment  there  would  be  time  for  such  a  methodical  analysis  as 
is  contained  in  the  foregoing  pages,  and  it  would  be  dangerous 
to  have  the  appearance  of  being  in  doubt. 

Before  the  moment  calling  for  action  is  the  time  for  clear- 
sighted thought,  which  prepares  for  possibilities  so  that  you 
may  not  be  surprised  by  the  unexpected  and  taken  at  a  dis- 
advantage. The  more  carefully  and  correctly  every  change 
in  the  situation  and  every  report  is  tested  and  considered,  the 
more  you  accustom  yourself  to  look  far  ahead  and  weigh  the 
arrangements  that  may  be  demanded  in  the  future,  the  better 
will  your  mind  be  prepared  for  rapid  decision. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Colonel  A was  not  suddenly  called 

upon  to  come  to  a  decision.  The  panorama  of  the  situation 
was  gradually  unrolled  before  him,  and  long  before  the  receipt 
of  the  last  information  (at  5  p.  m.)  he  held  council  with  him- 
self on  the  significance  of  details  obtained  from  Major  D , 

the  messages  from  his  own  patrols  and  of  those  intercepted 
from  the  enemy,  the  prisoners,  and  inhabitants.  Even  before 
Lieutenant  C personally  brought  information  of  the  dis- 
covery of  hostile  infantry  outposts,  Colonel  A concluded 

that  hostile  infantry  would  to-day  reach  the  Alle,  on  account  of 
the  statement  of  the  prisoner  captured  from  the  6th  Dragoons 
who  yesterday  delivered  a  message  to  an  infantry  major  only 
1 5  miles  from  Allenstein.  There  was  no  more  danger  of  Lieu- 
tenant C 's  message  misleading  Colonel  A into  believ- 
ing that  the  hostile  flank  was  located  at  Gr.  Buchwalde,  than 

there  was  of  Colonel  C 's  message  about  hostile  infantry 

at  Schwuben  and  Kapkeim  inducing  him  to  believe  that  there 
was  no  possibility  of  Guttstadt  being  occupied  later  by  the 


200  Studies  in  AppuEd  Tactics. 

enemy.  While  the  regiment  was  resting  and  watering,  filling 
nose-bags,  and  obtaining  supplies  generally  at  Heiligenthal, 
the  colonel,  presumably  on  Knoll  170,  had  two  hours'  time  to 
think  about  the  situation.  It  would  have  been  during  this 
period,  in  time  of  war,  that  most  of  the  deliberation  would  have 
taken  place  which  the  student  of  the  problems  in  this  work  can 
undertake  only  as  the  latter  are  presented  in  quick  succession 
by  the  author. 

Colonel  A could  have  come  to  a  decision  based  on 

Lieutenant  C 's  message  received  at  4.30  p.  m.     But  he  did 

well  to  delay,  for,  if  it  proved  true  that  the  enemy's  left  flank 
actually  was  at  Gr.  Buchwalde,  there  would  be  no  need  to  go 
farther  north.  In  this  case  he  would  have  been  on  the  enemy's 
outer  flank  on  the  Kallisten-Guttstadt  highway,  and,  being 
more  than  6  miles  from  the  enemy's  infantry,  could  remain 
where  he  was.  The  message  received  at  5  p.  m.,  concerning 
the  hostile  company  at  Schwuben,  at  once  enabled  the  colonel 
to  decide  what  to  do,  as  he  already  had  thoroughly  gone  over 
everything  that  had  been  received  before. 

It  will  be  somewhat  of  a  relief  for  junior  officers  to  realize 
that  as  a  rule  the  necessity  to  come  to  a  decision  does  not  pre- 
sent itself  as  suddenly  as  in  practice  problems.  At  the  same 
time  it  must  be  remembered  that  in  a  campaign  a  commander 
must  constantly  tax  his  mental  powers  so  as  not  to  be  surprised 
by  occurrences,  but  to  be  prepared  for  the  worst.  As  Hamlet 
says,  "the  readiness  is  all." 

The  careful  reader  of  military  history  often  is  surprised  at 
the  almost  resigned  air  in  Napoleon's  letters  written  to  confi- 
dential friends  on  the  eve  of  battles,  as  if  this  great  optimist 
and  believer  in  his  star  and  power  wished  to  have  a  clear  idea 
of  the  means  of  safety  at  hand  in  case  the  planned  blow  should 
fail.  I  also  can  refer  you  to  Goeben,  the  general  of  unchal- 
lenged, dauntless  determination,  who  told  me  that  the  night 
before  the  battle  of  St.  Quentin  he  did  not  sleep,  but  for  hours 


Cavalry  Outposts.  201 

thought  over  the  situation  while  referring  to  a  map  so  as  not  to 
overlook  a  single  chance  presenting  itself  to  him  or  the  enemy, 
either  for  victory  or  defeat. 

Not  only  the  last  drop  of  blood  and  the  last  breath  of  horse 
and  man  must  be  risked  to  gain  the  end  in  view,  but  also  the 
last  particle  of  brain-fiber. 

Exigencies  of  the  service  often  not  only  demand  that  jun- 
iors implicitly  follow  the  orders  of  their  superiors,  but  also  that 
they  willingly  accept  the  latters'  plans  and  views  even  if  con- 
trary to  their  own.  It  therefore  would  be  no  waste  of  energy 
if  any  reader,  who  came  to  radically  different  conclusions  from 

my  own   regarding    Colonel   A 's   situation,  would   accept 

my  own,  and,  based  upon  them,  write  out  the  arrangements 

to  be  made  by  Colonel  A at  5  p.  m.,  before  consulting  the 

following : 

Arrangements  Made  by  the  Regimental  Commander  at 

5  p.  m. 
After  word  had  been  sent  to  the  lieutenant-colonel   and 
squadron  commanders  to  report  to  the  colonel,  the  latter  dic- 
tated the  following  report  to  three  officers  of  his  staff: 

1 .  Heiligenthal, 

5  May,  5  p.  m. 
To  the  Chief  of  Staff,  ist  Army  Corps,  Mohrungen: 

From  1  to  4  p.  m.  to-day  the  enemy  established  infantry  outposts 
on  the  line  Wilhelmsthal-Mondtken-Gr.  Buchwalde—Miinsterberg-Schwu- 
ben;  also  at  Klutken  mill  and  Lower  (Unt.)  Kapkeim.  So  far  nothing 
has  been  seen  of  the  enemy  at  Knapen,  Guttstadt,  or  Kossen.  No  word 
has  yet  been  received  from  the  reconnaissance  to  the  east  via  Guttstadt. 
No  enemy  was  found  at  Freymarkt  at  11-20  a.  m.;  an  officer  is  now 
riding  thence  towards  Heilsberg.  Only  the  5th  Dragoons  came  through 
Guttstadt,  who,  in  conjunction  with  the  6th   Dragoons,  at  3-20  p.  m., 

went  from  Steinberg  towards  Polleicken.     Major  D left  Schlitt  for 

Pupkeim  at  4-30  p.  m.,  with  2  troops  of  the  3d  Cavalry,  to  join  Troop  E, 
3d  Cavalry,  which  crossed  the  Passarge  at  Bnickendorf.  At  Briicken- 
dorf,  in  addition  to  wounded  of  the  6th  Dragoons,  there  also  were  found 
some  belonging  to  the  3d  Dragoons. 

I  am  taking  the  regiment  to  Scharnick  and  Lingnau,  where  I  intend 
to  pass  the  night,  and  would  request  orders  and  information  be  sent  me 
via  Liebstadt  to  Lingnau.     There  are  connecting-posts  at  Liebstadt  and 
—14— 


202  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Pittehnen.     Small  detachments  will  be  left  at  Sackstein,  Kallisten,  and 
Kloben. 

I  would  request  that  Lieutenant  G be  retained  at  corps  head- 
quarters to-morrow  as  observer. 

The  colonel  then  dictates  orders  (2  and  3)  to  Lieutenant 
G and  the  regimental  adjutant : 


To  the  Platoon  Commander,  Troop  H,  1st  Cavalry,  Kallisten: 

The  regiment  will  go  to  Scharnick  and  Lingnau  for  the  night.  Your 
platoon  will  continue  to  hold  the  crossings  at  Kallisten  and  Kloben,  and 
will  be  directly  under  my  orders.  Your  messenger  route  will  be  via  Heil- 
igenthal-Komalmen  or  via  Sackstein- Kleinefeld-Wolfsdorf.  The  detach- 
ment at  Sackstein  will  remain  there  for  the  night. 

3- 
To  the  Commander,  Baggage  Train,  1st  Cavalry,  Mohrungen: 

The  train  will  at  once  move  to  Liebstadt,  where  it  will  go  into  can- 
tonment for  the  night  and  attend  to  its  own  safety.  Report  your  de- 
parture from  Mohrungen  to  me  by  wire  via  Liebstadt  to  Lingnau,  and 
your  arrival  at  Liebstadt  via  connecting-post  at  Pittehnen.  Lieutenant 
G has  authority  to  change  or  add  to  these  instructions. 

Lieutenant  G ,  who  was  one  of  the  officers  copying 

the  report  for  corps  headquarters,  receives  the  following  verbal 
instructions : 

"You  will  take  5  troopers  and  ride  to  corps  headquarters 
via  Kallisten  and  Willnau  to  deliver  the  report  (No.  1).  At 
Kallisten  you  will  give  the  commander  of  the  platoon  Troop  H, 
1st  Cavalry,  this  order  (No.  2). 

"West  of  Willnau  you  may  find  outposts  of  the  1st  Divi- 
sion. You  will  acquaint  the  outpost  and  advance-guard  com- 
manders with  the  contents  of  the  report  (No.  1)  as  far  as  this 
is  possible  without  losing  time.  You  will  take  along  two 
copies  of  the  report  (No.  1) ;  carrying  one  copy  yourself  and 
having  one  of  your  escort  carry  the  other.  You  will  take  ad- 
vantage of  every  opportunity  offered  to  send  the  report  ahead 
more  rapidly  (cyclists  or  telegraph).  I  expect  you  to  reach 
Mohrungen  by  8  o'clock  this  evening. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  203 

"I  will  give  you  this  order  (No.  3)  for  the  baggage 
train,  which  ought  to  be  at  the  Mohrungen  railway  station. 
You  may  modify  this  order  as  may  seem  best  to  you." 

Lieutenant  G departs  after  repeating  his  verbal  in- 
structions, and  after  the  colonel  is  satisfied  that  the  officer  is 
familiar  with  what  has  happened  during  the  day.  The  colonel 
may  possibly  add  some  instructions  as  to  what  he  expects  the 
officer  to  do  next  day. 

The  lieutenant-colonel  and  squadron  commanders  having 
arrived,  the  colonel  gives  them  the  following  verbal  instruc- 
tions in  the  presence  of  the  squadron  adjutants,  who  make 
the  necessary  notes: 

4.  "The  1st  Army  Corps  will  remain  at  Mohrungen, 
Pfeilings,  Horn,  and  Kranthau  to-night. 

"The  enemy  has  established  infantry  outposts  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Alle  from  Schwuben  via  Gr.  Buchwalde  and  Mondt- 
ken  to  near  Wilhelmsthal ;  and  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Alle 
at  Klutken  mill,  north  and  northeast  of  Lower  Kapkeim,  as 
far  as  has  been  determined.  Until  quite  recently  the  enemy 
had  not  appeared  at  Knopen,  Guttstadt,  or  Kossen.  Troop 
A,  1st  Cavalry,  now  at  Queetz,  sent  an  officer's  patrol  via 
Guttstadt  towards  Freudenberg-Tollack,  but  no  report  has  yet 

been  received  from  the  latter.     Lieutenant  B at   11.20 

a.  m.  found  Freymarkt  unoccupied  by  the  enemy  and  then 
proceeded  via  Launau  towards  Heilsberg.  At  3.30  p.  m.  hos- 
tile cavalry  that  was  opposed  to  us  left  Steinberg,  going  to- 
wards Polleicken.  Major  D ,  with  2  troops  of  the  3d  Cav- 
alry, is  en  route  from  Schlitt  to  Pupkeim  to  join  a  third  troop 
of  the  3d  Cavalry,  which  crossed  the  Passarge  at  Briickendorf. 

"The  troop  of  the  hostile  5th  Dragoons  which  this  morn- 
ing retreated  via  Klogehnen  from  before  Captain  E gained 

the  right  bank  of  the  Passarge  at  Sportehnen.     At  this  point 

Sergeant  K ,  who  was  following,  lost  trace  of  it  and  went 

to  Wormditt. 


204  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

"I  intend  having  the  regiment  spend  the  night  at  Schar- 
nick  and  Lingnau,  starting  thither  shortly  via  Komalmen. 
The  ist  Squadron  will  lead  and  will  be  charged  with  the  protec- 
tion of  the  column  towards  the  north,  northeast,  and  east. 
It  will  occupy  Lingnau  and  will  make  arrangements  for  the 
protection  of  this  place  as  well  as  of  the  cantonment  of  the 
entire  regiment  on  a  front  extending  from  the  former  Lingnau- 
lake  (inclusive),  to  the  Beiswalde  and  Neuendorf  railway,  and 
thence  to  a  point  on  the  creek  between  Beiswalde  and  the 
Scharnick-Regerteln  highway  southwest  of  Beiswalde. 

"Troop  A  for  the  present  will  continue  as  reconnaissance 
troop  under  my  immediate  orders,  and  provisionally  will  go 
to  Neuendorf;  but  probably  will  spend  the  night  with  the 
squadron  at  Lingnau. 

"The  i st  Squadron  is  charged  with  watching  the  crossings 
of  the  Alle  below  Kossen,  especially  the  two  bridges  at  Schmol- 
ainen,  as  well  as  the  roads  leading  to  Liewenberg,  Sperlings, 
and  Launau.  Requisition  may  be  made  on  Beiswalde  and, 
if  necessary,  also  on  Regerteln  and  Neuendorf. 

"The  remainder  of  the  regiment,  under  the  lieutenant- 
colonel,  will  occupy  Scharnick.  It  will  follow  the  ist  Squad- 
ron, and  is  charged  with  the  protection  of  the  column  towards 
the  northwest,  west,  and  south.  Later  it  will  protect  the  front 
of  the  regiment  from  the  former  Lingnau-lake  (exclusive) ,  past 
the  north  end  of  Zaun-see,  across  the  Seharnick-Heiligenthal 
highway  to  the  Lingnau-Wolfsdorf  road,  and  thence  across 
the  Scharnick-Regerteln  road,  joining  the  outpost  of  the  ist 
Squadron  southwest  of  Beiswalde.  In  front  of  the  outpost, 
the  roads  to  Freymarkt  and  Wormditt  and  the  Guttstadt- 
Kallisten  highway  must  be  carefully  watched.  This  part  of 
the  regiment  also  will  keep  up  the  conneeting-posts  with  Pit- 
tehnen.  Requisition  may  be  made  on  Komalmen,  Warlack, 
and  Wolfsdorf.     Troop  G  will  receive  separate  orders  and  will 


Cavalry  Outposts.  205 

continue  in  observation  of  the  hostile  outposts.  Provision  will 
be  made  for  quarters  for  it  at  Scharnick. 

"The  detachments  at  Liebstadt,  Pittehnen,  Sackstein, 
and  Kallisten  will  remain  in  position  and  will  receive  orders 
from  me. 

"The  1st  Squadron  will  reserve  quarters  in  Lingnau  for 
regimental  headquarters. 

"The  baggage  train  has  been  ordered  to  Liebstadt.  It 
will  not  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  troops.  The  1st  Squadron 
may  start  in  15  minutes,  provisionally  going  only  as  far  as  the 
north  end  of  Zaun-see.  The  column  must  keep  off  the  parts 
of  the  highways  that  are  visible  from  the  east. 

"All  detachments  necessary  to  provide  for  the  service  of 
security  and  information  of  the  regiment  and  for  preparation 
of  quarters  will  be  sent  out  at  once. 

"In  case  of  attack,  the  quarters  occupied  will  be  defended." 

The  lieutenant-colonel  and  commander  of  the  1st  Squad- 
ron will  require  some  time  to  think  about  the  new  situa- 
tion and  their  instructions,  and  to  compose  their  orders,  so 
that  more  than  15  minutes  will  pass  before  the  column  can 
start.  The  regimental  commander  has  time  to  make  further 
arrangements. 

He  dictates  the  following  orders : 

5.  Heiligenthal, 

5  May,  5-25  p.  m. 
To  Commanding  Officer,  Troop  G,  ist  Cavalry,  at  Rosengarth;  and 
Commanding  Officer,  Troop  A,  ist  Cavalry,  at  Queetz: 

At  4  p.  111.  a  hostile  company  of  infantry  established  an  outpost 
at  Sehwuben. 

The  regiment  is  about  to  march  to  Scharnick  and  Lingnau  to  pass 
the  night. 

Troop  G  for  the  present  will  continue  as  reconnaissance  troop  under 
my  immediate  orders,  and  will  watch  the  hostile  outposts.  Unless  cir- 
cumstances should  forbid,  it  may  take  quarters  for  the  night  at  Schar- 
nick, but  will  be  responsible  that  touch  is  retained  with  the  enemy  from 
Wolken  to  the  vicinity  of  Steinberg.  A  platoon  of  Troop  H  is  at  Kal- 
listen and  Kloben. 


2o6  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

The  ist  Squadron  will  provide  for  protection  at  Lingnau  and  Beis- 
walde.  At  6  p.  m.  Troop  A  will  proceed  from  Queetz  to  Neuendorf  under 
cover,  and  will  continue  as  reconnaissance  troop  under  my  immediate 
orders.  It  may  take  quarters  for  the  night  at  Lingnau,  but  will  be  re- 
sponsible that  touch  is  maintained  with  the  enemy  to  the  north  of  Wolken 
on  both  banks  of  the  Alle. 

I  shall  expect  a  report  from  both  troops  at  Lingnau  not  later  than 
8  o'clock  this  evening. 

I  shall  attend  to  the  detachments  at  Herzogswalde,  Liebstadt,  and 
Pittehnen. 

The  crossings  of  the  Alle  north  of  Kossen  and  the  roads  to  Liewen- 
berg  and  Launau  will  be  looked  after  by  the  ist  Squadron. 


To  the  Connecting  Post,  Pittehnen: 

Read  the  inclosure  and  promptly  forward  it  to  Liebstadt. 

Inclosure : 

To  the  Connecting-Post,  Liebstadt: 

The  sub-joined  telegram  for  corps  headquarters  to  be  wired  at  once- 
The  connecting-post  at  Liebstadt  will  see  that  the  detachments  of  the 
ist  Cavalry  at  Gr.  Hermenau  and  Herzogswalde  will  at  once  come  to 
Lingnau  via  Pittehnen. 

The  connecting-posts  at  Liebstadt  and  Pittehnen  will  continue  their 
present  duty. 

By  order  of  Colonel  A : 

B , 

Adjutant. 

Telegram  to  corps  headquarters,  Mohrungen: 

Near  Heiligenthal, 
5  May,  5-30  p.  m. 
There  are   hostile   infantry  outposts    at   Lower   (Unt.)    Kapkeim, 
Schwuben,  Miinsterberg,  Gr.  Buchwalde,  and  Mondtken.     Enemy  not  at 
Knopen,  Guttstadt,  or  Kossen.     To-night  the  regiment  will  remain  at 
Lingnau.     Request  orders  via  Liebstadt. 

A , 

Colonel. 

7.  Near  Heiligenthal, 

5  May,  5-35  p.  m 
To  Detachment,  at  Sackstein: 

The  regiment  goes  to  Lingnau.  The  detachments  at  Pittehnen, 
Sackstein,  and  Kallisten  will  remain  in  place. 

Numbers  6  and  7  are  prepared  in  duplicate  and  No.  5  in 
triplicate,  so  the  regimental  adjutant  will  have  a  retained  copy. 
They  will  be  forwarded  by  messengers,  preferably  such  as  know 
the  way.      To  attain  this  end  and  to  save  men,  it  is  usually 


Cavalry  Outposts.  207 

advisable  not  at  once  to  send  back  men  who  have  come  with 
messages,  but  to  hold  them  until  they  can  carry  back  a  mes- 
sage or  an  order. 

Numbers  6  and  7  will  be  taken  by  one  man,  who  will  con- 
tinue on  his  way  from  Sackstein  to  Pittehnen. 

Finally,  the  colonel  will  send  a  non-commissioned  officer 

and  3  men  of  Troop  H  to  look  for  Major  D ,  3d  Cavalry, 

in  the  vicinity  of  Pupkeim,  and  verbally  tell  the  latter  that 
the  1  st  Army  Corps  will  pass  the  night  at  Mohrungen,  Pfeil- 
ings,  and  Horn,  while  the  regiment  will  stay  at  Lingnau  and 
Scharnick,  leaving  a  platoon  at  Kallisten  and  Kloben.  Should 
the  major  not  be  found  at  Pupkeim,  then  the  non-commissioned 
officer  is  to  ride  via  Neu-Kockendorf  to  Briickendorf,  where 
presumably  there  is  a  connecting-post.  The  non-commis- 
sioned officer  is  to  inquire  where  the  major  will  stay  for  the 
night  and  what  further  information  has  been  received.  Then 
he  is  to  ride  to  Kallisten  and  join  the  platoon  of  his  troop  at 
that  point.  A  written  report  from  the  non-commissioned 
officer  is  to  be  sent  to  Lingnau. 


It  can  be  confidently  asserted  that  every  single  case  deal- 
ing with  the  conclusion  of  a  day's  work  of  a  body  of  cavalry, 
in  the  future  coming  to  any  reader's  notice,  will  differ  from 
the  one  above  described.     It  therefore  would  be  a  loss  of  time 

to  study  Colonel  A 's  arrangements  as  prospective  models. 

But  it  will  pay  to  examine  the  wherefore  of  some  of  these  ar- 
rangements, so  as  to  derive  mental  benefit  from  such  examina- 
tion of  the  reasons. 

The  first  thing  to  be  done  was  to  send  a  report  to  corps 
headquarters.  The  earlier  they  know  about  the  situation  at 
corps  headquarters,  the  better  can  commands  be  issued  to 
suit  the  case.  A  colonel  reports  in  a  different  way  from  a 
patrol-leader.     He  summarizes  results  while,  as  a  rule,  a  young 


208  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

officer  or  a  non-comniissioned  officer  is  limited  to  reporting  on 
individual  cases. 

Colonel  A included  in  his  report  several  pieces  of 

information   concerning    Major  D ,   and  possibly  already 

reported  by  the  latter.     Major  D 's  further  advance  that 

afternoon  notwithstanding  the  exhaustion  of  his  troops,  and 
the  appearance  of  troops  from  the  3d  Dragoons,  whose  pres- 
ence heretofore  had  not  been  suspected,  make  it  highly  prob- 
able that  he  will  meet  with  difficulties  and  that  there  might 
be  trouble  about  his  messages  getting  through  to  headquarters. 

On   this  account  Colonel  A 's  addition  to  his    report 

will  be  welcome  at  Mohrungen.  One  of  the  regimental  staff 
officers  is  to  carry  the  report,  not  only  because  he  will  be  able 
to  give  the  commanding  general  further  details  about  the  events 
of  the  day,  but  also  to  insure  orders  later  going  back  to  Ling- 
nau  and  to  furnish  instructions  to  the  baggage  train.     Ceriain 

details  omitted  by  Colonel  A because  he  thought  them  a 

side  issue  might  be  of  importance  to  the  commanding  general ; 

and  while  Colonel  A does  ask  that  orders  for  him  be  sent 

over  a  certain  route,  still,  he  has  a  right  to  expect  more  de- 
tailed accounts  of  what  is  worth  while  for  him  to  know,  if  sent 
by  his  special  representative.  During  the  evening  of  May  5th 
there  is  so  much  to  be  done  at  corps  headquarters  that  in  the 
bustling  activity  something  of  importance  to  the  regiment 
easily  might  be  overlooked  and  fail  to  reach  it  in  time  on  the 
6th,  as  an  early  start  must  be  made.  The  officer  is  to  remain 
at  corps  headquarters  May  6th  and  see  that  the  regiment  is 
informed  of  everything  of  importance  for  it.  It  is  not  custom- 
ary to  have  observers  with  superiors;  they  are  more  necessary 
with  neighboring  commands  not  under  an  immediate  superior, 
for  the  personal  interest  of  a  superior  is  closely  enough  inter- 
woven with  that   of   his  subordinates.     And   Colonel   A 

would  not  have  taken  this  step  had  he  not  anyway  been  obliged 
to  send  an  officer  to  headquarters  with  a  strong  escort  who 


Cavalry  Outposts.  209 

would  not  be  able  to  get  back  to  the  regiment  in  time  and  who 
at  the  same  time  has  sufficient  authority  and  discernment  to 
judiciously  direct  the  baggage  train. 

The  colonel  abandons  the  idea  of  having  the  train  join  the 
regiment.  The  staff  officer  will  be  unable  to  deliver  the  report 
at  corps  headquarters  before  8  p.  m.,  and  the  train  cannot  be 
counted  on  leaving  before  9  p.  m.,  probably  not  reaching  Lieb- 
stadt  before  midnight.  It  would  be  3  a.  m.  before  the  train 
could  arrive  at  Scharnick  and  Lingnau,  an  hour  at  which  the 
regiment,  owing  to  the  strained  situation,  no  longer  would  be 
able  to  make  use  of  the  facilities  offered  by  it.  Very  likely 
any  orders  for  the  train  to  join  the  troops  in  their  cantonment 
would  have  to  be  revoked  and  this  might  necessitate  special 
arrangements  for  protection. 

But  it  seems  right  and  proper  that  the  train  should  be 
ordered  away  from  Mohrungen,  where  it  is  in  the  midst  of  the 
troops  of  the  army  corps.  This  seems  a  favorable  opportunity 
to  examine  what  the  train  has  accomplished  during  the  day. 

To  be  sure,  it  did  not  assemble  at  Maldeuten  until  6  a.  m. , 
but  as  the  regiment  left  at  5  a.  m.  the  train  began  its  work 
long  before  this.  The  escort  certainly  did  not  get  up  any  later 
than  the  members  of  troops,  and  in  most  instances  the  horses, 
too,  were  harnessed  before  5  a.  m.  Since  9  or  10  a.  m.  the 
column  has  halted  on  the  road  at  Mohrungen,  to  continue  its 
march  late  in  the  evening.  It  was  impossible  to  obtain  any 
real  rest  during  the  long  wait.  Although  men  and  animals 
were  able  to  obtain  the  necessary  food,  it  was  not  possible  to 
unharness  the  animals.  The  commander  and  non-commis- 
sioned officers  had  the  difficult  task  of  maintaining  order;  and 
every  officer  of  experience  knows  what  that  means  with  an 
army  corps  marching  by  and  a  neighboring  town  to  encourage 
infraction  of  orders.  It  is  not  too  much  to  assert  that  a  halt 
of  nearly  12  hours  at  Mohrungen  under  such  conditions  is  more 
wearing  than  would  have  been  an  additional  march  of  12  miles 


210  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

on  the  smooth  highway.  Arriving  at  Liebstadt  at  midnight, 
the  train  will  be  nearly  at  the  end  of  its  tether,  although  in  more 
than  18  hours  it  traveled  only  about  18.5  miles  on  a  good  road. 
The  baggage  trains  of  all  troops  almost  daily  encounter  similar 
discomfort,  and  unfavorable  weather  and  bad  roads  increase 
the  difficulties  in  a  high  degree.  Although  the  regiment  in 
this  case  has  the  prospect  of  obtaining  food  and  forage  in  the 
neighboring  localities,  and  thus  is  not  dependent  on  the  sup- 
plies carried  in  the  baggage  train,  I  wish  to  call  attention  to 
the  difficulties  that  might  arise  under  other  conditions.  Lack 
of  supplies  can  destroy  the  best  of  plans  and  dampen  the  enter- 
prise of  the  most  intrepid  leader,  particularly  in  the  cavalry, 
where  efficiency  of  the  horses  depends  so  much  on  forage. 

A  cavalry  commander  especially  must  think  of  supplies, 
because  this  matter  does  not  concern  him  in  time  of  peace,  and 
because  the  system  of  forwarding  supplies  and  the  training  of 
the  personnel  in  all  European  armies  undoubtedly  are  not  up 
to  date.  While  all  other  appliances  of  war  have  been  greatly 
improved  by  taking  advantage  of  modern  inventions,  we  are, 
as  far  as  forwarding  of  supplies  is  concerned,  almost  on  a 
mediaeval  basis,  once  the  support  of  railways  fails  us;  for  we 
depend  almost  entirely  on  the  many  thousand  wagons,  none 
of  which  can  go  much  farther  than  18  miles  a  day,  and  carry 
comparatively  small  loads. 

The  colonel  gives  his  instructions  verbally  to  the  lieuten- 
ant-colonel and  squadron  commanders;  dictation  would  take 
too  long  and  is  not  really  necessary,  as  any  misunderstanding 
readily  could  be  rectified  almost  at  any  time. 

Everything  about  the  situation  might  be  omitted  that  is 
already  known  to  these  commanders. 

Different  arrangements  for  the  march  and  the  night  posi- 
tion might  be  ordered  and  still  answer  the  purpose.  The 
reader  who  took  the  trouble  to  work  them  out  will  have  recog- 
nized the  difficulties  of  the  case  notwithstanding  its  appearing 


Cavalry  Outposts.  211 

very  simple  at  the  first  glance.  I  have  attempted  to  so  arrange 
the  duties  that  the  colonel  would  have  nothing  more  to  do  with 
details,  and  to  shorten  the  line  of  outposts  as  much  as  pos- 
sible, so  that  a  minimum  number  of  men  would  be  needed. 

The  colonel  waits  with  issuing  orders  for  the  troops  to 
occupy  their  quarters.  He  provisionally  has  the  regiment 
go  as  far  as  the  north  end  of  Jaun-see,  because  he  is  not  yet 
certain  that  he  can  carry  out  his  intentions.  Further  infor- 
mation about  the  enemy  at  the  last  moment  might  necessitate 
a  change.  But  the  detachments  to  prepare  for  the  occupation 
are  to  be  sent  out  at  once,  so  that  the  reconnoitering  and  pro- 
tecting screen  may  be  formed  in  the  new  direction  before  dark 
and  prevent  any  farther  delay  in  the  regiment's  going  to  rest. 

The  colonel  already  has  decided  what  to  do  in  case  of 
alarm,  because  the  orders  for  the  squadrons  in  part  depend  on 
this.  They  would  have  to  make  very  different  arrangements 
if,  in  case  of  sudden  attack,  the  troops  were  not  to  defend  the 
villages,  but  had  to  assemble  beyond  them.  It  is  easy  to  see 
why  the  colonel  decided  not  to  assemble  his  men  in  case  of 
attack.  The  whole  regiment  in  a  way  is  on  outpost-duty  and 
so  near  the  enemy  that  in  case  of  a  sudden  attack  there  hardly 
would  be  time  to  get  out  the  horses.  As  the  effort  presumably 
would  have  to  be  made  under  fire,  it  would  result  in  confusion 
and  interfere  with  the  efficiency  of  the  men  in  the  dark.  If 
there  is  timely  warning  of  an  attack — if  plenty  of  time  will  be 
available — there  is  nothing  to  prevent  the  colonel's  subse- 
quently ordering  the  men  to  mount,  should  he  consider  it 
advantageous.  It  would  be  inadvisable  to  designate  a  place 
of  assembly  for  the  entire  regiment  even  if  it  seemed  certain 
that  under  all  circumstances  the  men  would  act  mounted. 
The  colonel  would  thereby  unnecessarily  tie  his  hands.  Any- 
way he  would  have  to  send  the  order  to  assemble  to  part  of 
the  regiment  not  in  the  first  line,  and  it  is  just  as  well  to  wait 
until  then  before  informing  the  men  where  the  place  of  assembly 


212  Studies  in  Appued  Tactics. 

is.  Even  with  troops  quartered  in  a  single  village,  it  is  advis- 
able to  have  different  places  of  assembly  for  smaller  units. 
Scharniek,  which  is  more  protected  and  seemingly  more  com- 
fortable, is  not  selected  for  regimental  headquarters,  but  Ling- 
nau,  so  the  headquarters  may  be  nearer  at  hand  to  receive 
information  from  the  outpost  and  guards. 

It  anyway  is  out  of  the  question  for  the  colonel  to  expect 
a  quiet  and  comfortable  night. 

As  the  colonel  by  his  orders  to  his  subordinates  has  rid 
himself  of  the  details  of  protection,  he  can  the  more  completely 
give  his  attention  to  watching  the  enemy,  and  the  terrain,  and 
supervising  the  movements  of  the  two  reconnaissance  troops. 
The  services  of  the  latter  cannot  yet  be  dispensed  with  and 
must  not  be  disturbed.  Relieving  them  just  now  would  cause 
confusion  in  reconnaissance  work,  no  matter  how  much  it  is 
to  be  desired  that  Troop  A  be  relieved  and  allowed  to  rest ;  a 
better  opportunity  must  be  awaited.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
contemplated  to  have  both  troops  join  their  respective  squad- 
rons for  the  night,  so  they  may  be  relieved  at  least  from  the 
care  of  providing  for  their  own  protection.  But  it  will  depend 
on  the  enemy  whether  or  not  they  can  take  advantage  o  this 
favor. 

A  joint  order  was  drawn  up  for  the  two  troops,  so  they 
might  mutually  understand  their  orders  and  co-operate  in 
carrying  them  out. 

The  connecting-post  had  to  have  orders  in  any  event,  and 
this  opportunity  to  send  a  copy  of  the  report  to  corps  head- 
quarters by  wire  could  not  be  missed. 

Touch  with  Major  D is  somewhat  relaxed  by  the 

regiment's  departure;  hence  a  non-commissioned  officer  is 
sent  to  Pupkeim,  but  without  any  written  communication, 
because  there  is  considerable  danger  of  a  written  message  fall- 
ing into  the  enemy's  hands.  As  elsewhere  in  this  study,  so 
also  here,  the  length  and  number  of  orders  and  arrangements 


Cavalry  Outposts.  213 

may  cause  surprise.  It  certainly  would  be  desirable  to  shorten 
and  reduce  the  number,  but  I  did  not  succeed  in  doing  it.  In 
my  opinion,  any  attempt  at  this  would  open  the  door  to  con- 
fusion and  misunderstandings.  The  time  required  might  be 
somewhat  shortened  by  the  discovery  of  various  expedients 
during  the  routine  of  a  campaign.  For  example,  the  com- 
mander might  permanently  intrust  a  capable  officer  of  his 
staff  with  looking  out  for  communication  to  the  rear  and  to 
the  flanks  and  with  preparing  and  suggesting  all  arrangements 
to  this  end.  In  the  present  case  this  officer  might  have  drawn 
up  the  orders  for  the  detachments  at  Kallisten,  Sackstein, 
Pittehnen,  and  Liebstadt,  and  might  have  suggested  the  send- 
ing of  a  telegram  to  corps  headquarters  and  of  a  patrol  to 

Major  D . 

In  view  of  the  number  and  length  of  the  instructions  that 
a  cavalry  commander  must  order  and  dictate  at  such  a  time, 
it  is  interesting  to  imagine  to  what  extent  his  work  would 
accumulate  should  he  wish  to  retain  the  actual  reconnaissance 
work  in  his  own  control.  It  would  be  almost  hopeless  to  make 
all  the  arrangements  now  necessary  for  sending  information 
of  the  new  situation  to  the  officers'  patrols  far  ahead,  for  clos- 
ing the  gaps  in  the  screen,  and  for  providing  the  additional 
patrols  to  be  sent  out  with  suitable  instructions.  Five  or  six 
additional  orders  would  be  necessary,  and  even  then  there 
would  be  no  certainty  that  provision  had  been  made  for  ob- 
serving the  enemy  at  every  point  and  that  protection  was 
assured  the  command.  It  is  simpler  and  surer  to  let  the  recon- 
naissance troops  attend  to  this  matter. 


The  arrangements  of  the  lieutenant-colonel  and  the  com- 
mander of  the  1  st  Squadron,  now  to  be  considered  by  us,  would 
have  to  be  made  by  the  map  even  in  time  of  war.  Therefore, 
the  reader  who  wishes  to  work  out  these  arrangements  is  not 
placed  in  an  unnatural  position  by  not  being  able  to  see  the 


214  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

actual  ground.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  to-day,  May 
5th,  the  weather  is  fine,  while  it  rained  for  several  days  before. 
The  rivers  and  creeks  are  flooded.  The  meadows  in  places 
cannot  be  crossed  by  teams  or  mounted  men.  It  was  learned 
at  Heiligenthal  that  the  bed  of  what  once  was  Lingnau  Lake 
can  only  be  crossed  by  single  footmen  with  experienced  guides. 

What  arrangements  are  made  by  the  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  and  the  Major  commanding  the  First  Squadron 
at  5.30  p.  m.? 

During  the  ride  to  Heiligenthal  these  two  officers  confer 
with  each  other  and  agree  about  the  junction  of  their  re- 
spective outposts  on  the  creek  about  1,100  yards  northeast  of 
Scharnick.  Upon  arriving  at  the  halting-place  of  the  troops, 
the  troop  commanders  are  informed  of  the  situation. 

The  commander  of  the  1st  Squadron,  who  has  also  called 

up  Lieutenant  H ,  Troop  C,  and  Lieutenant  J ,  Troop 

D,  adds  the  following: 

"The  squadron  is  ordered  to  occupy  quarters  at  Lingnau. 
I  shall  give  further  information  on  the  subject  on  the  spot. 

Lieutenant  H will  ride  ahead,  divide  the  village  among 

the  four  troops,  and  select  quarters  for  regimental  and  squad- 
ron headquarters.  To  Troop  B  will  be  assigned  the  buildings 
at  the  exit  towards  Guttstadt;  and  to  Troop  C,  those  at  the 
exit  towards  Wolfsdorf.     The  safest  part  of  the  village  will  be 

reserved  for  Troop  A.     Lieutenant  H will  attend  to  forage 

for  all  the  horses;  and  will  have  the  people  commence  cooking 
in  all  the  dwellings.  If  sufficient  oats  cannot  be  found  at 
Lingnau,  a  further  supply  will  be  requisitioned  from  Beis- 
walde.  The  different  troops  will  let  the  lieutenant  have  the 
necessary  men. 

"Troops  B  and  C  will  be  the  outpost  troops.* 

♦See  par.  190,  F.S.  R. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  215 

"Troop  B's  section  of  outpost  will  extend  from  the  bed 
of  Lingnau  Lake  across  the  Lingnau-Neuendorf  highway  to  the 
railway,  along  this  to  the  Lingnau- Altkirch  road  (exclusive). 

"Troop  C's  section  begins  at  this  road  (inclusive)  and  ex- 
tends west  across  the  Lingnau-Beiswalde  road  to  the  creek 
flowing  from  Scharnick  towards  Regerteln.  At  a  point  on  this 
creek  about  1,100  yards  northeast  of  Scharnick  the  outpost 
will  join  that  of  the  troops  quartered  in  Scharnick.  Each  of 
the  two  troops  will  at  once  send  forward  a  detachment  of  such 
strength  as  may  seem  necessary  to  provide  for  protection. 

' '  Lieutenant  J with  a  platoon  of  Troop  D  will  ride  to 

Altkirch,  beyond  the  line  of  the  outpost,  where  he  will  watch 
the  Guttstadt-Sommerfeld  road,  the  crossings  of  the  Alle  be- 
low Kossen — particularly  the  two  bridges  at  Schmolainen — and 
the  roads  leading  to  Liewenberg,  Sperlings,  and  Launau.  He 
will  remain  at  Altkirch  over  night  and  will  be  under  my  im- 
mediate orders. 

"The  squadron  will  start  immediately  and  at  first  will  go 
via  Komalmen  as  far  as  the  north  end  of  Zaun-see. 

"Troop  B  will  act  as  advance  guard.  It  will  be  followed 
by  Troop  C  and  the  latter  by  Troop  D. 

' '  Parts  of  the  highway  visible  from  the  east  will  be  avoided 
by  turning  to  the  west  of  the  road." 

The  captain  of  Troop  B  is  instructed  to  send  a  patrol  to 
Queetz  to  keep  in  touch  with  Troop  A  and  to  act  as  a  protec- 
tion towards  the  south  and  southeast  in  the  district  between 
Zaun- see  and  the  former  Lingnau- see  until  the  outpost  from 
the  remainder  of  the  regiment  arrives  there. 

The  lieutenant-colonel  also  has  two  lieutenants  present 
when  he  issued  his  orders,  which  are  as  follows: 

"The  2d  and  3d  Squadrons  will  follow  the  1st  in  the  follow- 
ing order:   Troops  E,  F,  H,  and  3d  Squadron.     Troop  M  will 

form  the  rear  guard.     Lieutenant  K ,  Troop  F,  with  one 

platoon  of  his  troop,  will  at  once  proceed  to  Scharnick,  where 


2i 6  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

he  will  provide  quarters  for  my  headquarters,  Troops  E,  F,  G, 
and  the  3d  Squadron.     Troop  E  will  be  located  at  the  north  exit, 

and  Troop  F  at  the  south  exit  of  the  village.     He  (Lieut.  K ) 

will  have  at  least  275  bushels  of  oats  sent  to  Scharnick  from 
Wolfsdorf,  and  prepare  a  supply  of  oats,  hay,  straw,  and  food 
for  the  men,  in  the  various  districts  of  the  town.     Lieutenant 

L ,  with  a  platoon  of  Troop  E,  will  precede  the  regiment 

to  Regerteln,  where  he  will  watch  the  Altkirch-Arnsdorf- 
Wormditt  highway  and  the  roads  leading  to  Gronau,  Frey- 
markt,  Arnsdorf,  and  Dittrichsdorf.  He  will  remain  there 
during  the  night.  Troops  E,  F,  and  H  are  designated  as  out- 
post troops.  Troop  E's  section  of  the  outpost  begins  at  the 
creek  flowing  west  of  Beiswalde  from  Scharnick  towards  Regert- 
eln. The  right  flank  will  join  the  left  flank  of  the  outpost  of 
of  the  1st  Squadron  about  1,100  yards  northeast  of  Scharnick. 
The  outpost  will  extend  along  this  creek  past  the  cross-roads 
north  of  Scharnick  (which  must  be  permanently  held)  and  to 
opposite  the  north  side  of  Scharnick  B,  which  northern  side  it 
must  locally  protect. 

"Troop  F  will  continue  the  line  from  west  of  Scharnick 
B  for  about  900  yards  along  the  creek.  It  will  locally  protect 
the  west,  south,  and  east  sides  of  Scharnick  A  and  B.  It  will 
establish  a  detached  post  at  the  western  exit  of  Wolfsdorf  to 
watch  the  roads  leading  to  Petersdorf ,  Dittrichsdorf,  Kalkstein, 
and  Kleinefeld,  and  keep  up  communication  with  the  connect- 
ing-post at  Pittehnen. 

"Troop  H,  of  which  one  platoon  will  remain  at  Kallisten 
under  the  immediate  orders  ol  the  colonel,  will  form  a  section 
of  the  outpost  extending  from  that  of  the  1st  Squadron  at  the 
south  end  of  the  former  Lingnau-see  past  the  north  end  of 
Zaun-see,  to  the  left  of  Troop  F's  section,  and  will  permanently 
observe  the  Guttstadt-Kallisten  road.  The  captain  will  ride 
ahead  to  his  position  at  the  north  end  of  Zaun- see  and  will  re- 


Cavalry  Outposts.  217 

port  to  me  what  he  intends  doing.  The  troop  may  draw  on 
Komalmen  and  Warlack  for  supplies. 

"The  necessary  detachments  will  be  sent  out  at  once. 

"The  detached  post  of  Troop  F  for  Wolfsdorf  will  ride  via 
Walter smuhl-Kleinef eld  as  a  flank  guard  for  the  regiment." 


Even  less  than  in  former  cases  can  the  commanders'  deci- 
sions be  looked  upon  as  typical.  There  is  entirely  too  much 
room  for  variations.  My  dispositions  are  intended  simply  to 
enable  the  reader  more  readily  to  test  his  own  work.  If,  judg- 
ing by  my  dispositions,  he  concludes  that  his  are  practicable, 
and  contain  everything  necessary,  then  they  are  all  right. 

The  lieutenant-colonel  and  the  commander  of  the  1st 
Squadron  have  deferred  issuing  orders  concerning  the  ways 
and  means  of  providing  shelter  and  the  arrangements  for  de- 
fense. They  will  proceed  to  the  spot  with  the  troop  command- 
ers (ahead  of  the  men)  and  issue  orders  in  accordance  with  the 
nature  of  the  villages  and  their  surroundings.  This  cannot  be 
settled  by  the  map.  In  place  of  this,  some  remarks  will  be  made 
that  somewhat  anticipate  the  regular  course  of  events.  If  the 
quarters  lay  on  the  left  of  the  Passarge,  or  a  long  ways  from 
the  enemy,  the  superior  officers  would  need  to  concern  them- 
selves only  that  men  and  horses  obtained  good  shelter  and 
ample  food  supplies.  Everyone,  with  the  exception  of  a  few 
guards  and  sentries,  could  sleep.  The  proximity  of  the  enemy 
to  Scharnick  and  Lingnau  calls  for  greater  precaution. 

Comprehensive  arrangements  have  been  made  to  watch 
the  enemy  and  his  avenues  of  approach.  A  circle  of  outposts 
will  surround  the  quarters  of  the  regiment.  Still,  sudden  at- 
tacks are  not  precluded.  The  patrols  might  be  pushed  aside 
at  some  point  and  the  outposts  be  surprised.  A  sudden  attack 
from  hostile  infantry,  whose  nearest  bodies  are  at  Schwuben 
5  or  6  miles  away,  is  to  be  feared  only  in  case  parts  of  the  chain 
—15— 


218  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

of  outposts  should  fail.  But  it  is  always  possible  that  under 
cover  of  darkness  hostile  infantry  might  approach  within  sev- 
eral thousand  yards  of  the  quarters  of  the  regiment  without 
being  discovered,  when,  possibly,  the  firing  of  the  pickets 
would  give  the  alarm.  During  daylight  hostile  cavalry,  dis- 
persing the  advanced  detachments,  might  appear  in  front  of 
the  pickets  almost  at  the  same  time  with  the  report  of  this 
advance.  A  sudden  attack  by  cavalry  at  night  is  less  likely, 
because  even  in  open  country  it  would  largely  have  to  advance 
along  roads  and  therefore  be  discovered  in  time. 

But  we  must  not  become  pessimistic;  such  enterprises 
seldom  take  place  on  a  large  scale  in  modern  war.  As  a  rule, 
the  advantages  of  success  do  not  compare  with  the  attending 
dangers ;  and  success  often  depends  on  chance  and  on  such  an 
accurate  knowledge  of  the  enemy  as  is  but  rarely  available. 
And  in  hostile  territory  we  find  the  additional  obstacles  of  un- 
known ground  and  difficulty  of  obtaining  reliable  guides.  Not- 
withstanding all  this,  we  must  be  vigilant ;  a  single  case  of  care- 
lessness may  be  severely  punished.  The  English  repeatedly 
found  this  out  in  South  Africa.  Nevertheless,  the  troops  should 
be  allowed  as  much  rest  as  is  at  all  possible  under  the  circum- 
stances. It  is  difficult  to  find  the  correct  middle  course.  Very 
properly,  therefore,  outpost  duty  is  very  carefully  performed 
in  the  German  Army ;  so  far  only  larger  bodies  of  cavalry  have 
suffered  from  not  having  sufficient  opportunity  in  this  line. 

Apparently  the  village  of  Lingnau  consists  of  a  number  of 
farm-houses  separated  from  the  adjoining  fields  by  picket  or 
board  fences,  and  occasionally  by  a  low  stone  wall.  The  village 
street  is  narrow.  The  northwest  and  southeast  exits  and  the 
east  side  of  the  village  are  most  exposed  to  a  sudden  attack. 
The  provisional  division  of  the  village  among  the  troops  into 
four  approximately  equal  parts  forms  a  good  basis  for  defense- 
The  major  will  order  as  follows: 


Cavalry  Outposts.  219 

"Each  troop  will  be  responsible  for  the  defense  of  its  sec- 
tion of  the  village.  The  horses  will  be  mainly  placed  in  the 
farm  yards  west  of  the  village  street,  each  troop  seeing  that 
exits  to  the  west  exist  from  these  yards.  Sentries  will  con- 
stantly guard  the  perimeter  of  the  village.  Guards  will  be 
located  at  the  eastern  side  and  at  the  exits  of  the  village.  In 
case  of  alarm  the  horses  will  remain  in  place  under  suitable 
guards  previously  designated.  The  remaining  men  will  as- 
semble at  their  respective  troop  assembly-places  armed  only 
with  fire-arms,  and  will  be  handled  by  the  troop  commanders. 
A  platoon  from  each  of  the  two  interior  troops  (A  and  D)  will 
remain  on  the  village  street  at  my  disposal.  Troop  A  will  keep 
a  sentry-post  at  the  farm-yard  about  200  yards  in  front  of  the 
east  side  of  the  village.  The  entrances  to  the  village  will  be 
blocked  by  wagons,  but  in  such  a  way  that  single  horsemen 
may  readily  pass.  As  far  as  practicable,  a  good  lighting  of  the 
street  and  farm-yards  will  be  provided  for  by  means  of  lamps 
and  lanterns.  The  horses  will  be  unsaddled,  unless  there  should 
be  a  change  during  the  evening,  bringing  the  enemy  nearer. 
But  several  horses  must  be  kept  ready  for  immediate  use  in 
each  troop.  The  men  will  not  undress,  and  will  keep  their 
fire-arms  beside  them  for  immediate  use." 

Similar  arrangements  will  be  made  in  Scharnick.  There 
need  be  no  hesitancy  about  placing  the  horses  under  cover  in 
sheds,  barns,  and  stables.  For  here  it  is  not  a  question  of  hav- 
ing the  men  mounted  and  ready  to  move.  On  the  contrary, 
the  better  the  horses  are  provided  for,  the  fewer  men  will  be 
needed  to  guard  them  and  the  better  they  will  be  protected 
from  bullets.  If  we  wish  to  defend  the  quarters,  we  cannot  at 
the  same  time  be  in  the  saddle.  If  we  wish  to  do  the  latter, 
quarters  cannot  be  occupied  at  all,  but  the  command  must 
bivouac  with  horses  saddled  and  bridled,  if  necessary.  This 
might  be  necessary  if,  for  instance,  we  were  opposed  to  superior 
numbers  of  enterprising  cavalry  with  horse  artillery. 


220  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

In  such  a  case  the  defense  of  an  isolated  village  might 
prove  the  ruin  of  the  bravest  cavalry  regiment. 

The  commander  may  choose  between  the  two  alterna- 
tives; a  combination  of  the  two  would  lead  to  half-way  meas- 
ures and  uncertainties. 

Everything  that  has  been  seen  and  heard  of  the  enemy 
during  the  day,  and  the  distance  from  his  outposts,  justify  the 
taking  of  quarters  in  the  two  villages,  so  as  not  to  waste  any 
strength  for  the  coming  day. 

Protection. 
Having  previously  disposed  of  the  subject  of  quartering 
troops  because  it  would  be  difficult  later  to  interweave  this  in 
the  study,  and  because  the  principles  concerned  must  be  familiar 
to  subordinates  if  they  are  to  act  in  conformity  with  the  views 
of  their  superiors,  we  now  can  turn  to  the  duties  of  individual 
troops,  which  afford  an  opportunity  to  discuss  important  ques- 
tions concerning  outposts. 

What  arrangements  does  the  commander  of  Troop 
b  make  after  receiving  the  instructions  of  the  squadron 
COMMANDER  AT  Heiligenthal? 

Troop  B,  as  outpost-troop,  will  take  post  in  Lingnau  at 
the  exit  towards  Guttstadt.  Its  section  of  the  outpost  will 
extend  from  the  bed  of  Lingnau  Lake  across  the  Lingnau- 
Neuendorf  highway  to  the  railway,  and  along  this  to  the  Ling- 
nau-Altkirch  road  (exclusive).  There  is  no  road  across  the 
bed  of  Lingnau  Lake.  According  to  the  map,  the  meadow  in 
this  lake  bed  is  marshy  and  presumably  impassable  for  horse- 
men, and  during  the  night  also  for  footmen.  It  is  unlikely 
that  hostile  troops  will  venture  on  this  uncertain  ground.  The 
troop  commander  probably  will  find  out  the  nature  of  this 
underfeature  at  Heiligenthal.  On  the  supposition  that  the 
information  agrees  with  what  has  been  assumed,  it  will  be 
necessary  only  to  observe  this  meadow,  unless  an  inspection 
should  prove  that  other  measures  are  necessary. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  221 

The  troop  commander,  who  has  explained  the  situation 
to  his  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers,  therefore  orders 
as  follows: 

"The  third  platoon    under  Lieutenant   R ,  will  ride 

ahead  to  Lingnau,  going  along  the  highway  as  far  as  the  north 
end  of  Zaun-see  and  thence  past  Height  141,  will  occupy  the 
exit  towards  Guttstadt,  and  temporarily  will  see  to  the  protec- 
tion of  the  regiment's  quarters  from  the  north  end  of  Lingnau 
Lake  bed  to  the  Lingnau- Altkirch  road  (exclusive),  which  will 
be  occupied  by  Troop  C.     A  strong  picket  will  be  required  on 

the  Lingnau-Neuendorf  highway.     Sergeant  N and  3  men 

of  the  3d  Platoon  will  ride  to  Queetz  and  obtain  touch  with 
Troop  A,  which  at  6  p.  m.  will  go  thence  to  Neuendorf  and 
which  should  be  kept  in  view.  He  will  protect  the  march  of 
the  squadron  towards  the  south  between  Zaun-see  and  former 
Lingnau-see,  and  will  return  to  the  troop  at  Lingnau  as  soon 
as  the  outpost  has  been  established  in  this  region  by  the  re- 
mainder of  the  regiment." 

The  captain  waits  with  giving  orders  about  observing  the 
bed  of  Lingnau-see  until  he  shall  arrive  on  the  ground. 

Lieutenant  R ,  covered  by  a  point,  trots  off  almost  at 

the  same  moment  as  Lieutenant  J ,  Troop  D,  who  is  ordered 

to  Altkirch,  and  as  the  platoon  of  Troop  C  which  is  going  to 
the  north  end  of  Jaun-see  to  act  as  a  protecting  force.  In  this 
way  the  three  officers  have  an  opportunity  mutually  to  discuss 
their  duties  and  plans  and  can  agree  on  a  plan  for  mutual 
support. 

It  will  be  5.50  p.  m.  before  they  reach  Komalmen.  Behind 
them  they  see  their  squadron  following  them  on  the  road  from 
Heiligenthal.  Continuing  their  ride,  they  can  see  Troop  A 
moving  from  Queetz  towards  Neuendorf. 

About  6.30  p.  m.  they  reach  Lingnau.     Lieutenant  R 

proceeds  to  the  slight  elevation  east  of  the  southern  exit  of  the 
village.     From  this  point  he  obtains  quite  an  extended  view. 


222  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

It  is  true  that  Beiswalde  is  hidden  by  Knoll  143  and  133,  but 
to  the  northeast  Altkirch  can  be  seen  and  beyond  to  Schmo- 
lainen  woods  (Schmolainer  Wald).  Almost  all  of  the  highway 
between  Guttstadt  and  Altkirch  can  be  seen,  the  Guttstadt 
railway  station  and  church-tower  can  be  seen  as  well  as  Neuen- 
dorf and  the  greater  part  of  the  railway  from  Guttstadt  to  the 
Lingnau-Altkirch  road.  South  of  the  bed  of  Lingnau-lake 
whose  impassability  for  horsemen  in  the  meantime  has  been 
determined,  the  view  is  limited  by  the  hills  along  the  former 
southern  shore  of  the  lake. 

Lieutenant  R has  half  of  his  platoon  dismount  at  the 

southeast  exit  of  Lingnau  and  with  the  other  half  rides  forward 
along  the  Lingnau-Neuendorf  highway.  The  bend  of  the  road, 
where  a  field-road  leads  north  towards  the  railway,  seems  to 
him  a  suitable  place  for  the  intended  picket,  after  learning  that 
a  ravine  in  his  front,  across  the  highway,  is  an  awkward  obstacle 

for  horsemen.     He  gives  Sergeant  C 12  men  and  instructs 

the  sergeant  as  follows  (the  sergeant  already  has  been  informed 
of  the  situation  in  general  and  instructed  about  the  surround- 
ing country): 

"You  form  picket  No.  1  on  the  Lingnau-Neuendorf  high- 
way to  protect  Lingnau  along  a  front  extending  from  here  to 
the  Lingnau-Altkirch  road  (exclusive).  Your  picket  is  not 
large  enough  to  establish  a  vedette  in  the  ground  north  of  this 
highway.  For  the  present  it  can  be  seen  from  here ;  after  dark 
you  must  send  patrols  along  the  railway  as  far  as  the  road  to 
Altkirch,  which  will  be  watched  by  Troop  C.  I  shall  send  you 
supplies  in  two  wagons,  use  the  latter  to  block  the  bridge  across 
the  ravine  ahead  of  you  as  soon  as  Troop  A,  now  at  Neuendorf, 
returns  to  Lingnau,  but  leave  a  passage-way  for  patrols.  You 
will  inform  Troop  A  of  your  orders  and  location." 

After  Lieutenant  R inspected  the  ground  along  the 

railway,  he  returned  to  Lingnau.  It  is  now  7  p.  m.  The  ser- 
geant whom  he  left  at  Lingnau  posted  several  dismounted  men 


Cavalry  Outposts.  223 

in  the  farm-yards  at  the  village  entrance,  and  has  one  man  as 
a  lookout  in  a  gable-window  affording  a  good  view.     The  horses 

are  in  rear  of  one  of  the  houses.     Sergeant  O (picket  No. 

1)  reports  that  Troop  A  has  learned  nothing  new  about  the 
enemy,  and  that  it  has  orders  to  return  to  Lingnau. 

In  the  meantime  the  squadron  commander,  hastening 
ahead  of  his  command,  has  arrived  at  Lingnau  with  his  troop 
commanders,  and  has  informed  these  of  the  already  described 
arrangements  for  quarters  and  defense. 

The  commander  of  Troop  B,   proceeding  with  his  own 

duties,   has   Lieutenant   R report.     Although  the    space 

between  the  highway  and  the  road  to  Altkirch  is  not  watched 
by  a  vedette,  the  captain  does  not  make  any  change,  because 
it  would  take  9  men  for  a  vedette-post  and  because  he  knows 
that  another  troop  will  establish  a  post  at  the  farm- yard  about 
200  yards  east  of  Lingnau.  He  personally  verifies  the  correct- 
ness of  Lieutenant  R 's  statement,  and  of  the  villagers, 

that  the  bed  of  the  former  Lake  Lingnau  will  not  bear  the 
weight  of  a  horse,  but  can  be  crossed  only  by  single  footmen, 
led  by  a  guide.  After  taking  but  a  few  steps  the  ground  gives 
way  under  his  horse's  feet.  Therefore  the  meadow  insures 
against  an  attack  from  that  direction.  But  it  seems  unfortu- 
nate that  the  squadron's  position  can  be  seen  from  the  hills 
along  the  Queetz-Neuendorf  road.  It  must  seem  very  desir- 
able to  prevent  hostile  patrols  from  obtaining  a  view  from  that 
direction,  and  the  little  wooded  knoll  south  of  Number  116 
seems  to  be  a  good  place  for  a  post  to  prevent  the  approach 
of  hostile  troopers.  But  the  post  would  have  to  be  quite  strong ; 
it  would  not  be  advisable  to  have  less  than  12  men  on  account 
of  its  isolation.  The  captain  is  all  the  more  averse  to  establish- 
ing such  a  post  because  its  line  of  retreat,  which  would  have  to 
be  either  via  Neuendorf  or  past  the  south  end  of  Lingnau  Lake 
bed,  might  easily  be  cut  off.  He  decides  to  chance  it  and  not 
send  anyone  to  the  exposed  point.     But  the  troop  on  the  right 


224  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

is  requested  to  keep  hostile  patrols  away  from  the  former  south 
shore  as  far  as  possible. 

The  captain  sends  word  to  the  picket  on  the  highway  that 
it  must  not  build  any  fire.  In  other  respects  he  makes  no 
changes  in  Lieutenant  R 's  dispositions,  who  with  the  re- 
mainder of  his  platoon  forms  the  exterior  guard  at  the  village 
entrance. 

At  7.40  p.  m.  Troop  A  arrives  at  Lingnau  from  Neuendorf. 
Its  captain  reports  to  the  captain  of  Troop  B  that  no  change 
had  been  noticed  in  the  hostile  position;  that  Kossen,  Schon- 
weise,  Klingerswalde,  Battatron,  and  Knopen  are  not  occupied 
by  the  enemy ;  that  he  had  left  an  officer  with  a  platoon  at  the 
Guttstadt  railway  station,  who  is  to  keep  touch  with  the  enemy 
and  observe  the  roads  to  Schwuben  and  Wolken;  that  he  re- 
cently had  seen  hostile  patrols  near  Glottau  and  Queetz;  and 
that  he  had  informed  the  sergeant  of  Troop  B  on  the  highway 
between  Neuendorf  and  Lingnau  of  these  details. 

The  sun  set  at  7.10  p.  m.  (central  European  time).  Twi- 
light fell  as  the  squadron  located  itself  in  Lingnau.  At  8.30 
p.  m.,  by  which  time  it  was  possible  to  see  only  a  few  paces 
away,  lively  small-arms  fire  is  heard  towards  Neuendorf  and 
the  flash  of  shots  can  be  seen.  The  call  to  arms  is  sounded  at 
Lingnau  and,  as  the  men  hasten  to  their  places  along  the  edge 
of  the  village,  hostile  skirmishers  appear  out  of  the  darkness 
on  and  alongside  the  road  and  are  promptly  fired  upon. 

What  has  happened? 

Sergeant  O ,  commanding  the  picket  at  the  bridge  on 

the  highway,  after  Lieutenant  R left  him,  and  after  he  had 

looked  about  and  posted  two  men  dismounted  at  the  bridge, 
divided  his  picket  in  the  following  way: 

Double  sentry-post  and  reliefs 6  men. 

For  messenger  and  patrol  duty 3  men. 

Horse-holders 3  men. 


Cavalrv  Outposts.  225 

He  designated  a  slight  elevation  about  100  yards  northwest 
of  the  bridge  as  the  place  to  be  occupied  as  dismounted  skir- 
mishers by  the  4  men  forming  the  reliefs  of  the  double  sentry- 
post,  in  case  of  hostile  attack.  Then,  in  accordance  with  Lieu- 
tenant R 's  orders,  he  sent  one  trooper  to  Troop  A  at  Neu- 
endorf and  two  others  to  the  picket  of  Troop  C  on  the  Lingnau- 
Altkirch  road  to  assure  mutual  understanding  and  become 
familiar  with  the  ground  along  the  railway  before  dark.  As  the 
sergeant  has  no  map,  his  instructions  concerning  the  ground  and 
the  enemy  must  be  limited  to  a  short  statement  of  what  he 
has  learned  on  the  subject,  especially  the  direction  where  the 
enemy  is.  Then  he  turned  his  attention  to  the  1  o  horses,  which 
he  placed  in  a  little  depression  near  the  road  and  just  back  of  the 
position  to  be  used  for  firing.  As  any  injuries  the  horses  may 
have  sustained  could  not  be  detected  in  the  dark,  and  it  would  be 
difficult  to  shift  the  saddles  then,  he  hastened  the  necessary  ar- 
rangements and  had  the  horses  watered  by  threes  and  fours  in 
the  ravine  on  the  highway.  The  reliefs  of  the  double  sentry- 
posts  assist  in  this.  A  couple  of  loose  horse-shoes  were  tightened , 
an  inflamed  tendon  was  wrapped  in  a  wet  bandage,  and  a  bruise 
was  treated  according  to  directions.  The  overcoats  were  put 
on  and  the  pockets  filled  with  cartridges,  and,  if  there  were  any 
oats  left  in  the  nose-bags,  the  horses  were  fed  by  threes.  The 
sergeant  must  not  only  superintend,  but  must  here  and  there 
assist.  He  had  not  the  time  to  sharply  reconnoiter  for  the 
enemy,  or  to  carefully  orient  himself,  any  more  than  to  estimate 
and  determine  the  distance  to  various  points.  His  work  was 
interrupted  by  the  passing  of  Troop  A  and  the  receiving  of 
information  from  its  captain,  as  well  as  by  blocking  the  road 
at  the  bridge  with  the  two  wagons  that  came  from  Lingnau. 

Immediately  after  the  return  of  the  patrol  and  messenger 
he  wanted  to  have  their  horses  attended  to;  but   Captain 

E 's  information  about  hostile  patrols  having  appeared 

from  Queetz  and  Glottau  induced  him  to  send  two  troopers 


226  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

to  the  farm  lying  about  1,000  yards  south  of  Neuendorf  to 
look  about  there.  They  returned  very  soon  at  a  rapid  gait 
and  reported  that  south  of  Neuendorf  they  had  encountered 
hostile  patrols.  Fortunately  the.  most  important  work  with 
the  horses — the  shifting  of  saddles  and  watering — had  been 
finished.  But  three  horses  were  unbridled  and  were  eating 
from  their  nose-bags.  The  sergeant  gave  the  order,  ' '  Skirmish- 
ers to  your  post!"  and  rushed  there  himself.  Behind  him  the 
three  horse-holders,  assisted  by  the  members  of  the  patrol, 
were  busy  bridling  the  horses.  The  sergeant's  eyes  were  fixed 
on  the  enemy.  He  saw  horsemen  appear  at  Neuendorf  and 
dismount;  he  promptly  opened  fire  on  them.  Then  he  called 
to  the  members  of  the  patrol  that  two  of  them  should  promptly 
join  him  with  their  rifles.  In  the  meantime  the  enemy,  who 
had  been  able  to  approach  alongside  of  the  road  under  cover 
to  about  300  yards,  opened  fire.  The  led  horses  had  become 
restless  when  the  picket's  firing  began.  They  threatened  to 
stampede  when  several  shots  were  fired  from  the  grove  south 
of  the  highway  and  one  of  the  horses  was  wounded.  The  enemy 
at  this  point  partly  enfiladed  the  position  of  the  eight  men  who 
were  firing.  The  sergeant  therefore  abandoned  the  position 
and  gave  the  order,  "Run  to  your  horses  and  mount!"  On 
account  of  the  approaching  darkness  and  the  enemy's  bullets, 
the  order  was  carried  out  in  some  confusion.  Only  a  part  of 
the  men  succeeded  in  mounting,  and  they  fled  in  a  northwest- 
erly direction,  followed  by  riderless  horses  that  had  escaped 
their  holders. 

The  episode  terminated  in  a  few  minutes,  so  that  the  hos- 
tile skirmishers  soon  thereafter  appeared  in  front  of  Lingnau. 

It  was  some  time  before  the  lively  fusillade  from  the  vil- 
lage could  be  stopped,  notwithstanding  the  officers'  soon  dis- 
covering that  only  a  few  shots  were  fired  in  return;  and  an 
hour  passed  before  Lingnau  and  Scharnick,  which  also  had  been 


Cavalry  Outposts.  227 

alarmed,  again  became  quiet  and  the  picket  at  the  bridge  had 
been  re-established. 

Apparently  a  strong  hostile  patrol  had  caused  the  alarm. 
The  actual  damage  sustained  was  slight.  One  man  and  one 
horse  of  the  picket  had  been  wounded,  and  one  horse  killed. 
Unfortunately,  it  was  quite  likely  that  the  enemy  obtained 
valuable  information  about  the  regiment  from  the  calls  to 
arms  and  the  lively  fire  from  Lingnau. 

If  the  fictitious  account  of  this  sudden  attack  on  a  small 
scale  seems  plausible,  if  it  is  actually  possible  to  so  easily  and 
completely  drive  in  a  picket,  if  it  offers  so  little  protection  that 
a  hostile  patrol  can,  almost  without  opposition,  come  near  the 
quarters  of  the  main  body  and  alarm  the  latter,  then  there  is 
something  that  must  be  remedied. 

The  arrangements  made  for  the  occupation  and  defense 
of  Lingnau,  according  to  the  theoretical  test  just  described, 
have  proven  satisfactory.  On  account  of  the  definite  instruc- 
tions that  in  case  of  alarm  the  village  was  to  be  defended  ex- 
clusively by  fire  action  and  that  nobody  should  mount,  it  may 
be  confidently  assumed  that  the  arrangements  would  have 
sufficed  in  case  of  attack  by  complete  troops.  The  reader 
surely  will  appreciate  the  sanity  of  these  arrangements  if  he 
pictures  to  himself  what  would  have  been  the  state  of  affairs  in 
Lingnau  if  the  squadron  after  the  alarm  had  tried  to  mount  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  if  the  attack  had  not  been  made  by  a 
patrol,  but  by  a  couple  of  troops.  The  most  complete  state  of 
readiness,  depriving  men  and  horses  of  all  rest,  would  not  have 
been  able  to  prevent  great  confusion.  Almost  the  same  dis- 
order would  have  been  produced  by  a  sudden  attack  on  a 
bivouac  west  of  the  village  and  would  have  forced  the  troops 
to  a  retreat  across  country  in  the  dark. 

It  is  self-evident  that  the  main  body  should  not  be  forced 
under  arms  by  every  enterprise  of  an  intrepid  hostile  patrol- 
leader. 


228  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

We  shall  thoroughly  investigate  matters  and  see  whether 

Sergeant  O or  his  superiors  are  to  blame  and  whether  a 

more  careful  observance  of  regulations  could  prevent  the  re- 
currence of  such  a  mishap.  Re-establishing  the  picket-post 
on  the  highway,  after  the  hostile  patrol  has  been  driven  away 
by  bullets  from  Lingnau,  will  probably  take  place  under  the 
protection  of  a  line  of  skirmishers  which  will  advance  as  far  as 
Neuendorf  and  not  be  withdrawn  until  the  picket  has  been 
established  and  instructed  by  the  captain  in  person.  Very 
likely  the  captain  largely  increases  its  strength,  assigning  an 
entire  platoon  under  an  officer  to  this  duty. 

We  usually  take  special  pains  to  cover  a  well  after  a  child 
has  fallen  into  it.  He  would  order  the  picket  commander  con- 
stantly to  keep  patrols  out  in  front,  especially  towards  Glottau, 
and  on  the  road  to  Guttstadt  to  keep  up  communication  with 
the  platoon  of  Troop  A  at  the  railway  station.  Possibly  the 
squadron  and  regimental  commanders  will  approve  of  these 
new  arrangements,  at  the  same  time  not  concealing  their  dis- 
approval that  there  was  not  a  larger  picket  under  an  officer  at 
such  an  important  point  from  the  beginning. 

The  remainder  of  the  night  may  pass  quietly  and  the  un- 
lucky captain  may  resolve  in  the  future  to  place  a  large  picket 
under  an  officer  on  every  highway  and  important  road.  Will 
this  be  a  surety  that  the  unwelcome  incident  will  not  be  re- 
peated? Would  it  have  been  avoided  if  a  platoon  under  an 
officer  had  been  in  the  place  of  Sergeant  O and  12  troopers? 

Both  questions  can  be  answered  in  the  negative  after  very 
little  reflection.  The  result  might  have  been  equally  unfortu- 
nate if  the  hostile  mounted  detachment  sent  against  Lingnau 
had  consisted  of  20  to  30  men,  or  if  a  body  of  10  to  12  troopers 
encountered  a  small  picket  of  the  German  outposts. 

A  smaller  force  of  hostile  troopers  might  have  been  less 
likely  to  attack  the  bridge  on  the  highway,  and  in  so  far  an 
increased   strength  of   the  picket  would  have  insured  greater 


Cavalry  Outposts.  229 

security.  But  the  fire  of  a  small  number  of  skirmishers  was 
sufficient  to  make  the  post  untenable  as  soon  as  the  horses 
came  under  fire.  It  would  have  been  hopeless  to  post  a  pla- 
toon on  every  road  leading  towards  the  enemy  and  use  up  half 
the  regiment  on  outpost.  The  actual  cause  of  the  damage 
did  not  lie  in  a  mistaken  estimate  of  strength.  It  would  be 
driving  out  the  devil  through  Beelzebub  were  we  to  make  the 
protecting  force  so  strong  that  but  little  remained  to  be  pro- 
tected. Were  there  no  way  to  overcome  the  difficulty,  the 
colonel  doubtless  would  have  done  better  to  forego  the  advan- 
tages of  the  Scharniek-Lingnau  position  and  to  have  occupied 
the  safe  quarters  on  the  left  of  the  Passarge.  Even  a  bivouac 
near  Lingnau  with  horses  saddled  and  bridled  would  have  re- 
quired the  same  large  force  for  the  outpost  as  the  occupied 
and  defensible  village. 

A  second  question  is,  whether  the  colonel  possibly  did  not 
make  a  mistake  when  he  ordered  that  Troop  A  should  return 
to  Lingnau  from  Neuendorf.  Had  the  troop  remained  at  Neu- 
endorf, the  picket  at  the  bridge  surely  would  not  have  been 
surprised.  But  in  what  condition  was  this  troop  at  Neuendorf? 
In  the  saddle  since  4  a.  m.  and  reconnoitering  by  means  of 
numerous  patrols  riding  rapidly  in  all  directions,  it  has  exerted 
itself  more  than  any  other  part  of  the  regiment,  and  by  means 

of  detachments  (Lieutenant  B to  Heilsberg,  Sergeant  K 

to  Wormditt,  connecting-posts  at  Liebstadt,  Gr.  Hermenau, 
and  Pittehnen)  has  given  up  a  considerable  number  of  its 
men.  During  the  afternoon  other  patrols  were  sent  out,  for 
the  troop  had  to  continue  the  reconnaissance  around  the  hos- 
tile flank  and  remain  responsible  that  touch  is  kept  with  the 
enemy  in  the  whole  district  north  of  Wolken.  It  probably  did 
not  reach  Neuendorf  with  more  than  40  or  50  men.  If  it  is 
to  spend  the  night  there,  rest  and  recuperation  will  be  out  of 
the  question.  It  will  be  impossible  to  unsaddle  at  this  exposed 
point  in  front  of  the  outpost,  and  while  one-half  of  the  men 


230  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

will  be  required  for  fatiguing  guard  duty,  the  remainder  must 
remain  with  the  horses,  which  it  may  be  impossible  even  to 
feed  and  water.  Nothing  could  be  expected  of  the  troop  the 
following  day.  If  the  troop  at  Neuendorf  affords  the  regiment 
greater  security  from  attack  on  the  Neuendorf-Guttstadt  high- 
way, it  itself  is  the  more  exposed  to  one  and  its  strength 
would  be  totally  exhausted. 

If  the  regiment  were  on  the  left  of  the  Passarge,  a  recon- 
naissance troop  also  would  have  to  remain  between  the  Pas- 
sarge and  the  Alle.  But  this  one  would  be  able  to  select  some 
retired,  easily  defended  place  in  the  woods  or  near  an  isolated 
farm-yard.  We  would  not,  for  the  sake  of  following  the  model 
which  requires  that  a  reconnaissance  troop  be  out  in  front, 
leave  a  troop  a  thousand  yards  in  front  of  the  outpost  and, 
by  confusing  the  objects  of  the  two,  make  a  protecting  detach- 
ment out  of  the  reconnaissance  troop. 

We  doubtless  have  become  convinced  that  the  colonel  made 
no  mistake  in  his  orders  to  Troop  A. 

The  arrangements  for  protection  made  by  the  colonel  and 
his  immediate  subordinates  but  little  resemble  those  described 
in  the  German  Field  Sendee  Regulations  as  normal  formations. 
According  to  the  latter,  the  outpost-troops,  located  in  advance 
of  the  main  body,  are  the  foundation  of  outpost  service — send- 
ing out  pickets  and  vedettes.  The  progressive  decrease  in  size 
of  the  detachments  to  the  front,  as  with  infantry,  is  intended 
to  provide  security  by  a  buffer-like  elasticity.  In  the  present 
case  this  system  was  impracticable.  It  would  have  been  neces- 
sary to  send  out  at  least  three  outpost- troops :  one  each  towards 
Altkirch,  Neuendorf,  and  Queetz;  and  in  addition  to  have 
strong  protecting  bodies  nearer  Scharnick  and  Lingnau  and 
in  these  villages  themselves.  If,  in  addition,  there  were  recon- 
naissance troops  beyond  this  outpost,  probably  not  more  than 
one-fourth  of  the  regiment  would  have  been  able  to  rest — an 
arrangement  that  would  be  condemned  by  any  sensible  man. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  231 

Even  under  normal  conditions — i.  e.,  in  a  cavalry  division — the 
system  of  the  Field  Service  Regulations  would  seldom  be  used. 

As  long  as  a  cavalry  division  is  in  front  of  an  army,  its 
place  of  shelter  for  the  night  will  offer  a  broad  front,  or  flank, 
or  both,  to  the  enemy.  When  the  brigades  of  a  cavalry  divi- 
sion are  located  side  by  side,  only  the  middle  one  will  be  able 
to  get  along  with  a  single  outpost-troop.  The  flank  brigades 
in  addition  will  probably  have  to  employ  one  or  more  troops 
as  a  protection  for  flank  and  rear.  If  the  quartering  of  troops 
is  to  accomplish  its  purpose,  we  must  not  crowd  entire  regiments 
or  brigades  into  single  villages.  Requirements  of  space  and  for- 
age are  very  great  for  mounted  troops.  Let  us  imagine  a  cav- 
alry brigade  (2  regiments)  in  place  of  one  regiment,  and  assign 
it  Waltersmiihl,  Warlack,  Scharnick,  Lingnau,  Wolfsdorf,  and 
Kleinefeld.  Six  or  seven  troops,  about  one-fourth  of  the 
whole  force,  would  be  required  to  provide  for  protection  after 
the  manner  prescribed  in  the  Field  Service  Regulations. 
And  if  Zaun-see  and  the  bed  of  Lingnau-lake  were  not  available 
as  obstacles,  an  eighth  troop  might  be  required.  If  "detached" 
or  reconnaissance  troops  are  added,  we  see  that  such  an  arrange- 
ment would  be  applicable  only  during  short  maneuvers  and  not 
during  a  campaign.  The  disproportion  existing  between  space 
required  for  quarters  and  fighting  strength  of  cavalry  calls  for 
economical  "housekeeping."  This  is  what  was  decided  upon 
in  the  1st  Cavalry.  All  of  the  outpost  troops  except  Troop  H, 
whose  duties  we  are  still  to  examine,  are  quartered  with  the 
main  body,  so  as  to  afford  part  of  their  men  and  horses  some 
rest  and  refreshment  as  well  as  have  the  men  help  in  the  de- 
fense of  the  quarters. 

The  objection  that  outpost-troops  should  not  be  with  the 
main  body  might  be  obviated  by  not  calling  them  by  this  name, 
but  simply  instructing  certain  troops  to  provide  the  protect- 
ing bodies.  Then  the  latter,  on  account  of  the  small  size  of 
the  main  body,  would  take  the  place  of  outpost-troops.     But 


232  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

in  this  event  the  regimental  and  squadron  commanders  would 
dispense  with  the  intelligence  and  experience  of  the  captains, 
the  effectual  assistance  obtainable  within  a  troop,  and  the  op- 
portunity the  troop  might  have  to  do  additional  reconnoiter- 
ing.  Such  an  arrangement  would  help  matters  theoretically, 
but  not  practically. 

The  arrangements  made  by  our  regimental  commander 
and  his  immediate  subordinates  are  based  on  the  solicitude  to 
avoid  scattering  and  prematurely  exhausting  the  strength  of 
the  command;  on  the  urgent  necessity  to  let  the  greater  part 
rest  after  the  exertions  of  the  day,  so  as  not  to  be  obliged  to 
report  on  the  morrow,  as  did  the  German  cavalry  on  August 
15,  1870,  that  the  used-up  condition  of  the  horses  would  pre- 
vent a  charge;  and  finally,  on  the  conviction  that  the  defense 
of  strongly  held  localities  is  the  best  protection  against  night 
attacks.  But  if  we  agree  with  these  officers,  the  question  arises 
whether  they  would  not  have  done  well  to  send  the  pickets 
farther  to  the  front,  so  as  to  enlarge  the  protecting  circle,  in- 
crease the  distance  of  the  troops  in  quarters  from  the  outpost, 
and  increase  the  time  and  space  necessary  in  a  hostile  attack- 
ing force  to  reach  the  place  where  the  troops  are  quartered. 

However  desirable  at  a  first  glance  the  increased  distance 
might  seem,  it  would  not  materially  remedy  the  evil.  The 
location  of  outposts  primarily  depends  on  the  conformation 
of  the  ground. 

The  use  of  the  bed  of  Lingnau-lake  as  an  obstacle  in  itself 
prohibited  placing  the  picket  on  the  Lingnau-Neuendorf  high- 
way any  farther  forward;  and  the  ravine  across  the  road  sim- 
plified the  picket's  duties.  It  would  have  been  necessary  to 
place  the  picket  in  rear  of  this  ravine  even  if  the  latter  had  been 
nearer  Lingnau.  But  a  shortening  of  the  line  of  outposts 
also  is  in  conformity  with  economy  of  men.  lyven  if  the  ravine 
had  not  existed,  it  is  doubtful  if  it  would  have  been  well  to 
push  the  picket  farther  forward. 


Cavalrv  Outposts.  233 

If  twelve  men  at  the  ravine  were  not  a  match  for  the  hos- 
tile patrol,  twice  the  number  would  not  have  answered  the 
purpose  nearer  Neuendorf.  But  had  the  picket  been  placed 
at  Neuendorf,  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  push  forward 
the  pickets  of  Troop  C  and  thus  make  use  of  more  men.  The 
farther  forward  the  pickets  were  placed,  the  easier  could  they 
be  driven  in.  Notwithstanding  their  being  increased  in  strength, 
they  would  not  have  increased  the  security  of  the  troops  covered. 

The  cause  of  the  mishap  at  the  bridge  on  the  highway  is 
no  more  to  be  found  in  the  colonel's  and  squadron  commander's 
arrangements  than  in  the  smallness  of  the  picket.  Perhaps  the 
captain  made  a  mistake  not  to  send  out  a  patrol  beyond  the 
picket,  as  he  must  have  realized  that  the  latter  was  not  strong 
enough  to  do  so.  However,  the  fate  of  the  picket  would  have 
been  changed  but  little  by  sending  a  patrol  towards  Glottau. 
At  the  most  it  would  have  replaced  the  two  troopers  sent  for- 
ward by  the  sergeant,  who  could  do  nothing  but  report  the 
approach  of  the  hostile  patrol ;  unless,  perchance,  by  venturing 
farther  forward,  it  had  been  driven  aside.  It  was  of  no  conse- 
quence whether  the  report  was  received  by  the  sergeant  a  few 
minutes  sooner  or  later.  And  it  was  only  a  question  of  minutes , 
for  in  the  darkness  the  enemy  could  not  be  recognized  until  quite 
near.  Therefore,  the  captain's  omission  did  not  cause  the 
picket's  mishap.  Was  the  conduct  of  the  sergeant  and  his 
men  the  cause? 

We  cannot  accuse  the  sergeant  of  violating  any  provisions 
of  the  Field  Service  Regulations.  On  the  contrary,  we  may 
justly  claim  that  he  displayed  skill  and  discretion  at  his  post. 
There  is  only  one  thing  he  did  not  do :  he  did  not  make  provi- 
sion to  derive  the  utmost  advantage  from  his  fire-arms.  He 
did  not  estimate  or  pace  the  distances  towards  the  enemy  so 
that  every  man  might  use  the  correct  elevation. 

Such  precaution  might  have  been  of  advantage  with  suf- 
ficient light  to  see  the  sights. 

—16— 


234  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

A  court-martial  trying  the  case  justly  would  have  to  take 
into  consideration  the  work  necessary  with  the  horses  that  re- 
quired the  sergeant's  time  and  attention.  The  court  also  would 
consider  that  in  view  of  the  near  approach  of  darkness,  after 
which  these  arrangements  would  have  lost  their  value,  they 
very  properly  had  to  give  way  to  the  care  of  the  horses,  for 
which  purpose  the  remaining  daylight  had  to  be  utilized. 

Upon  the  appearance  of  the  enemy  the  sergeant  promptly 
did  all  he  could.  He  quickly  brought  every  available  rifle  into 
the  firing-line,  so  that  he  was  able  to  open  fire  before  the  enemy. 
He  could  confidently  omit  sending  any  message  to  the  captain. 
The  firing  gave  the  alarm.  It  would  have  taken  time,  would 
have  interfered  with  observing  the  enemy,  and  would  have 
diminished  the  small  number  of  rifles  by  one. 

The  bullets  of  the  alert  picket  presumably  would  have 
quickly  driven  away  any  hostile  patrol  by  chance  coming  as 

far  as  Neuendorf,  and  Sergeant  O surely  would  have  been 

commended  for  his  sensible  and  determined  action.  But  ap- 
parently the  hostile  patrol  attacked  pursuant  to  a  previously 
arranged  plan.  Dismounting  at  Neuendorf  and  enveloping 
the  picket  from  the  south  indicates  this. 

How  should  the  picket  have  acted  under  such  an  attack? 
The  sergeant  had  received  no  special  instructions  for  such  case. 
It  would  be  impossible  to  provide  for  all  possible  contingencies. 
Reason  and  memory  would  fail,  and  surely  some  unforeseen 
factor  would  enter  that  would  upset  the  most  careful  instruc- 
tions. The  picket  knows  that  it  is  to  protect  the  main  body 
against  surprise  and  enable  the  latter  to  prepare  for  action. 
This  is  and  must  be  sufficient  to  act  as  a  guide.  At  the  same 
time  the  one  giving  the  order  as  well  as  the  one  ordered  must 
undei  sti  nd  lhat  it  is  not  the  province  of  outposts  to  indefinitely 
maintain  themselves  against  an  attack  by  superior  numbers. 
Every  part  of  the  outpost  that  is  seriously  attacked  eventu- 
ally must  retreat.     It  is  simply  a  question  of  when  and  how 


Cavalry  Outposts.  235 

the  retreat  will  begin.  But  tactical  instructions  as  well  as 
individual  orders  often  omit  a  consideration  of  this  point  which 
pertains  to  outpost  service. 

Who  would  censure  Sergeant  O for  deciding  to  retreat 

when  he  became  aware  of  the  enemy's  superiority  and  of  the 
flanking  movement  as  shown  by  the  enemy's  bullets  enfilading 
his  line  and  reaching  his  horses.  If  anything,  he  gave  the  order 
to  mount  too  late,  rather  than  too  early.  To  begin  an  engage- 
ment at  all  with  the  enemy  dismounted  and  only  a  few  hundred 
yards  away  was  in  itself  a  very  questionable  proceeding,  because 
the  line  of  retreat  lay  across  an  open  field.  In  such  a  situation 
the  command  to  mount  lifts  the  latch  and  opens  the  door  to 
confusion.  The  very  best  men  might  lose  their  nerve  if,  after 
hastily  firing  for  a  few  minutes,  they  have  to  run  back,  followed 
by  bullets,  to  mount  restless  and  excited  horses ;  and  the  best 
of  horsemen  will  not  be  able  to  control  the  herd-instinct  of  his 
horse,  which  will  impel  it  to  follow  the  other  stampeding  horses. 

Therefore,  the  conclusion  of  my  description  cannot  be 
charged  with  exaggeration.  Even  by  day  the  ending  would 
have  been  the  same.  Darkness  at  least  interfered  with  the 
enemy's  aim.  Daylight  would  have  increased  the  casualties. 
The  longer  the  picket  remained  under  fire  the  worse  became 
its  plight.  The  wounding  of  a  single  horse-holder  might  result 
in  the  escape  of  all  the  led  horses.  The  procedure,  sometimes 
advocated  theoretically,  of  firing  a  few  well-aimed  shots,  then 
quickly  mounting,  and  getting  away,  might  prove  very  danger- 
ous, when  opposed  to  hostile  fire,  if  the  led  horses  are  not  per- 
fectly sheltered  and  if  the  retreat  is  not  covered  in  such  a  way 
that  the  retreating  horsemen  cannot  be  overtaken  by  hostile 
bullets. 

What  was  gained  by  the  troopers'  succeeding,  notwithstand- 
ing all  difficulties,  in  mounting  and,  turning  their  backs  on  the 
enemy,  quickly  disappearing  in  the  darkness.  Did  the  picket 
accomplish  its  object? 


236  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

The  few  shots  that  it  fired  at  the  enemy  surely  did  little 
damage.  Imagine  yourself  in  the  place  of  the  dismounted 
troopers,  whose  leader  from  the  beginning  of  the  skirmish  must 
divide  his  attention  between  the  enemy  and  the  led  horses  and 
must  anxiously  watch  that  he  will  not  give  the  command  to 
mount  half  a  minute  too  late.  What  can  we  expect  of  his  fire- 
control  ?  Will  his  men  use  the  correct  elevation  and  aim  care- 
fully? Their  scattering  fire  will  simply  act  as  a  signal.  A 
few  shots  fired  in  the  air  would  have  done  equally  well.  It 
is  expected  that  the  picket  not  only  will  check  a  patrol,  but  also 
a  larger  detachment.  But  here  a  few  hostile  troopers — less 
than  are  in  the  picket — are  able  to  clear  the  way  in  a  very 
short  time. 

If  we  examine  the  other  parts  of  the  so-called  line  of  pro- 
tection that  envelops  the  regiment,  wTe  shall  find  that  in  but 
few  places  a  sudden  attack  would  have  fared  any  worse.  The 
lack  of  defensive  and  protecting  power  in  the  picket  does  not 
seem  to  havejbeen  an  exception,  but  the  rule.  Likewise,  where 
a  main  body^has  obtained  protection  behind  a  natural  obstacle, 
outposts  as  a  rule  are  sent  out  beyond  the  obstacle.  The  pick- 
ets of  such  outposts  are  in  the  same  situation  as  Sergeant  O 

at  Lingnau,  and  every  "detached"  or  reconnaissance  troop 
camping  by  itself  is  expected  to  protect  itself  by  such  pickets, 
which,  however,  are  such  unreliable  protectors. 

We  have  already  noted  that  a  prolonged  resistance  not 
only  made  mounting  the  horses  very  dangerous,  but  also  might 
have  caused^the^loss^of  f  he  led  horses.  The  stronger  the  picket, 
the  greater  the]  troop's^  clanger.  It  will  be  very  seldom  that  a 
place  for  thelhorses,  protected  from  all  directions,  can  be  found 
in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  place  for  defense.  How  far 
away  is  it  permissible  to  keep  the  horses?  Even  200  or  100 
yards  are  sufficient  to  withdraw  them  from  the  picket  com- 
mander's care.  But  the  skirmishers  must  have  them  close  to 
the  firing-linejf£they  are^to  be  able  to  begin  firing  promptly. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  237 

In  case  of  sudden  attack,  they  must  not  be  required  to  run 
several  hundred  yards  to  get  into  position ;  and  yet  their  services 
cannot  be  spared  in  providing  and  caring  for  the  horses. 

Would  it  have  been  permissible  for  the  sergeant  to  send  his 
horses  back  to  the  troop  to  be  rid  of  them? 

From  one- fourth  to  one-half  of  the  men  are  needed  as 
horse-holders  if  the  led  horses  are  to  be  easily  moved  about, 
which  is  necessary  in  case  it  is  doubtful  if  the  horses  can  remain 
where  the  men  dismounted.  Thus  3  or  4  men  would  be  needed 
as  horse-holders,  reducing  the  total  number  of  men  available 
as  skirmishers  to  9  or  8.  But  what  would  the  captaiu  say  if 
in  such  cases  the  picket's  horses  invariably  were  brought  back 
to  the  troop,  to  be  again  called  for  as  soon  as  the  hostile  patrols 
disappeared?  This  plan  could  only  be  followed  by  day  and 
over  short  distances,  and  would  produce  unbearable  annoyance 
among  the  outposts. 

We  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  sergeant  has  incurred 
no  blame,  and  that  neither  a  strengthening  of  the  picket  nor 
having  it  commanded  by  an  officer  would  have  positively 
averted  the  mishap.  Had  the  picket  commander  foreseen 
the  disastrous  results  of  his  order  to  mount,  he  might  have 
decided  to  abandon  the  horses  to  their  fate  and  stand  fast 
with  his  8  or  9  men  to  save  his  reputation  and  honor.  But 
what  would  be  the  consequences  if  every  hostile  patrol  could 
produce  such  a  dilemma  with  only  a  few  shots? 

That  optimism  brings  but  poor  consolation  which  would 
have  us  believe  that  such  a  surprise  would  seldom  happen  and 
that  our  bullets  are  as  unpleasant  for  the  hostile  patrol  as 
theirs  are  for  us.  Do  we  not  demand  of  our  troopers  that 
they  take  advantage  of  every  means  to  guess  the  enemy's  in- 
tentions? Has  not  the  world  lived  to  see  the  examples  of 
the  American  troopers  and  of  the  Boers,  whose  achievements 
largely  consisted  of  such  surprises.  What  right  have  we  to 
assume  that  our  future  opponents  will  be  lacking  in  similar 
enterprise  and  skill? 


238  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

It  is  precisely  against  sudden  attacks  that  protecting 
bodies  are  to  guard  and,  if  they  are  not  able  to  do  this,  then 
the  whole  outpost  service  is  a  delusion  and  a  snare.  Although 
the  garrison  of  Lingnau  occupied  the  edge  of  the  village  in 
time,  it  was  a  question  of  minutes.  Who  knows  if  it  would 
have  succeeded  had  everyone  but  the  guards  been  asleep.  If 
the  pickets  are  capable  of  no  more  than  of  giving  the  alarm  by 
firing,  there  is  nothing  for  the  cavalry  to  do  but  to  camp  at  a 
distance  from  the  enemy  or  behind  an  obstacle.     Then  Colonel 

A 's  decision  to  spend  the  night  in  Scharnick  and  Lingnau 

was  a  venture  which  placed  the  night's  rest  so  urgently  needed 
for  the  morrow's  efficiency  in  the  hands  of  a  few  venturesome 
hostile  patrols. 

We  hope  that  the  blue  patrols  will  not  be  inferior  to  the 
enemy  in  boldness  and  cunning.  At  Gr.  Buchwalde  and  Mtin- 
sterberg,  at  Schuwben  and  Lower  Kapkeim,  they  will  attempt 
to  see  beyond  the  screen  of  hostile  outposts — wherever  woods 
and  twilight  will  enable  them  to  approach  unobserved.  Why 
should  not  one  or  the  other  of  them  attempt  a  surprise,  like 
the  enemy  at  Lingnau,  to  alarm  the  main  body  and  obtain 
reliable  information  about  his  position? 

The  patrol  would  venture  much  and  gain  little.  A  few 
shots  fired  at  an  outpost*  do  not  disturb  the  hostile  main  body. 
No  call  to  arms  awakens  the  men  from  their  sleep.  Even  the 
attacked  picket  is  not  endangered.  It  continues  firing  and,  if 
necessary,  falls  back  until  the  next  subdivision  of  the  outposts 
comes  to  its  assistance.  The  intrepid  cavalry  patrol  might  con- 
gratulate itself  if  it  escapes  without  serious  loss.  It  has  seen 
and  heard  but  little  more  than  before. 

Lack  of  success  was  not  due  to  superior  efficiency  of  the 
enemy,  but  to  his  having  infantry  on  outpost  which  cannot  be 
harmed  by  a  little  skirmish  firing  and  does  not  have  to  look 
out  for  led  horses. 


*Infantry  outpost  in  t Ills  case. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  239 

The  reader  has  long  ago  guessed  at  what  I  am  aiming. 

If  cavalry  wishes  to  secure  peace  and  quiet  in  its  bivouacs 
and  cantonments,  if  it  wishes  to  be  protected  from  sudden 
attack  and  the  annoyance  of  hostile  patrols,  if  it  wishes  to  be 
able  in  an  important  case  to  halt  for  a  night  near  the  enemy,  it 
must  model  its  service  of  security  after  that  of  the  infantry. 

"Fire-arms  should  be  the  principal  means  of  resistance  in 
all  parts  of  the  outposts."*  This  is  the  main  doctrine  of  the 
German  Field  Service  Regulations  concerning  cavalry  outposts, 
and  in  harmony  with  this  is  the  provision  that  vedettes  as  a 
rule  will  be  dismounted,  f  But  there  is  no  intimation  what 
shall  be  done  with  the  horses  that  now,  when  their  rapid  feet 
can  be  spared  and  the  rider  leaves  the  saddle,  are  everywhere 
in  the  way  and  interfere  with  the  effective  and  prolonged  use 
of  fire-arms.  The  paragraphs  dealing  with  cavalry  outposts 
take  for  granted  that  the  horses  remain  with  the  riders :  ' '  Pick- 
ets and  vedettes  will  not  unsaddle."  .  .  .  "In  exceptional 
cases  men  detailed  to  watch  the  enemy  remain  mounted." 
.  .  .  "The  picket  commander  regulates  the  rest  of  horses  and 
men,  the  unsaddling,  watering,  and  feeding. "J 

It  would  be  exceptional  to  depart  from  these  rules.  But 
we  have  become  convinced  that  as  a  rule  horses  interfere  with 
and  are  an  impediment  to  the  proper  performance  of  picket 
duty.  Energetic  commanders  have  taken  great  pains  and  end- 
less care  in  trying  to  drill  their  horses  so  that  they  could  be  left 
with  very  few  men  during  dismounted  fire  action.  Their  efforts 
have  failed.  Raising  horses  in  the  cultivated  lands  of  Europe 
and  keeping  them  in  farm  and  barrack  stables  seems  to  make 
it  impossible  to  train  them  as  is  done  by  the  Boers  in  South 
Africa,  on  the  pampas  and  prairies  of  America,  and  in  the 
Arabian  deserts.     But  even  if  success  should  follow  continued 


*See  par.  199,  F.  S.  R. 
fSee  par.  195,  F.  S.  R 
JSee  par.  199,  F.  S.  R. 


240  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

effort,  very  little  would  be  gained  for  the  service  of  security. 
We  could  not  prevent  the  horses  of  the  pickets  being  reached 
by  hostile  bullets,  and  they  could  never  be  quietly  led  back 
by  a  few  men  when  under  fire. 

The  only  remedy  is  to  separate  the  dismounted  men  from 
their  horses,  so  that  the  service  of  security  of  cavalry  may 
acquire  the  benefits  of  infantry. 

Of  course  there  are  some  objections  to  this  measure.  If 
a  trooper  is  separated  from  his  horse,  we  relieve  him  of  the  re- 
sponsibility for  the  horse,  which  will  not  be  cared  for  by  a 
strangre  as  it  would  by  its  own  rider.  The  horse  is  no  ma- 
chine. Its  peculiarities,  its  pains  and  sorrows  are  known  to  and 
will  be  respected  by  him  only  who  is  to  ride  and  make  use  of 
its  strength.  And  the  man  whose  horse  is  taken  from  him 
also  loses  control  of  his  horse-equipments,  pack  and  saber. 
The  interior  economy  of  a  troop  is  made  more  difficult  the 
moment  there  is  any  deviation  from  the  principle  that  every 
man  once  and  for  all  belongs  to  his  horse,  that  only  both  to- 
gether represent  a  cavalryman.  This  principle  has  obtained 
with  all  nations  of  riders  and  was  adopted  in  the  service  regu- 
lations and  customs  of  modern  armies,  where,  so  far,  it  has  been 
almost  unqualifiedly  recognized.  The  trooper  who  was  armed 
only  with  saber  or  lance,  and  possibly  with  a  pistol,  when  he 
dismounted,  so  to  speak,  had  to  keep  one  foot  in  the  stirrup ; 
for  only  in  the  saddle  was  he  ready  for  action. 

As  until  quite  recently  only  a  part  of  European  cavalry 
was  armed  with  rifles  or  carbines,  we  find  that  almost  every- 
where cavalry  pickets  and  vedettes  had  to  mount  as  soon  as 
the  enemy  approached ;  for  the  latter,  too,  only  fought  mounted. 

But  to-day  we  no  longer  find  any  cavalryman  without  a 
good  long-range  magazine  fire-arm.  The  dismounted  trooper 
is  no  longer  defenseless.  The  campaigns  in  America  and  South 
Africa  have  plainly  demonstrated  his  fighting  power  with  the 
rifle.     This  has  been  clearly  recognized  in  Europe.     In  the 


Cavalry  Outposts.  241 

armies  of  continental  Europe  great  stress  is  laid  on  increased 
use  of  fire-arms  by  cavalry,  especially  in  outpost  service.  But 
our  cavalry  has  not  yet  derived  the  full  benefit  of  this  powerful 
weapon.  We  still  hesitate  to  have  our  cavalry  act  on  foot  as 
extensively  as  it  might.  Everywhere  we  see  remnants  of  in- 
herited customs  and  rules  that  interfere  with  the  general  use 
of  powder  and  ball. 

The  surprise  at  Lingnau  has  not  fully  demonstrated  all 
of  the  disadvantages  due  to  keeping  the  led  horses  with  the 
pickets.  There  was  continuous  movement  and  noise  at  the 
picket  from  the  moment  it  arrived  at  its  post.  Any  hostile 
scout  soon  must  have  been  able  to  discover  the  location  and 
strength  of  the  picket  from  the  shifting  of  saddles,  feeding  and 
watering  of  horses,  and  departure  and  return  of  messengers 
and  patrols.  A  surprise  is  the  more  easily  planned  and  ex- 
ecuted because  work  with  the  horses  absorbs  the  men's  atten- 
tion. The  horses'  pawing,  neighing,  and  snorting  resounds  far 
into  the  night  and  interferes  with  hearing  sounds  from  a  distance. 
The  stronger  the  picket  the  louder  the  noise  produced.  As 
shifting  of  saddles,  feeding,  and  watering  can  be  attended  to 
for  but  about  one-fourth  of  the  horses  at  a  time,  and  takes  about 
half  an  hour  for  each  party,  a  long  time  is  required  to  complete 
this  work;  and  the  horses  must  again  be  fed  and  watered  be- 
fore sunrise.  There  is  always  something  to  be  attended  to  with 
horses,  if  greater  damage  is  to  be  avoided.  The  men  detailed  as 
horse-holders  cannot  attend  to  their  duties  all  night  long;  but, 
as  a  rule,  only  the  reliefs  of  the  double  sentry-post  and  occa- 
sionally a  messenger  are  available  to  relieve  and  assist  them. 
There  is  hardly  a  man  who  will  find  time  to  sleep.  Tired  and 
sleepy  men  will  be  posted  as  sentries,  and  equally  tired  ones 
will  have  to  look  out  for  the  horses.  Guard  duty  will  suffer 
under  the  continuous  mental  and  physical  strain  and  disturb- 
ances, where  bright  eyes  and  keen  ears  are  so  urgently  needed. 


242  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

And  at  dawn  an  exhausted  man  will  mount  an  equally  exhausted 
horse. 

Now  let  us  imagine  a  picket  whose  horses  have  been  left 
with  the  troop.  Nothing  will  prevent  the  leader  and  his  men 
from  giving  their  entire  attention  to  guard  duty  from  the  first 
and  continuing  to  do  so  to  the  end.  The  sentries  can  easily 
be  concealed — in  case  of  necessity,  a  bush,  a  slight  depression 
in  the  ground,  or  a  roadside  ditch  will  answer.  While  the 
leader  from  an  elevation  is  scanning  the  surrounding  country, 
his  men,  without  being  interrupted  by  other  work,  can  prepare 
the  place  for  defense  and  estimate  distances.  In  a  short  time 
everyone  becomes  familiar  with  the  locality,  and  arrangements 
for  the  night  are  quickly  made.  In  place  of  haste,  noise,  and 
confusion,  we  have  order  and  quiet.  It  will  be  difficult  for 
hostile  patrols  to  discover  the  location  of  the  picket  or  discover 
its  strength.  Their  long-range  fire,  which  might  prove  dan- 
gerous for  led  horses,  will  be  harmless.  If  they  carelessly 
come  too  near,  they  are  more  likely  to  be  hit  by  the  deliberate 
fire  of  the  alert  sentries  or  the  picket  than  by  the  hasty  firing 
of  men  called  away  from  their  horses.  It  also  will  be  more 
difficult  for  the  enemy  to  attack  the  concealed  and  poorly - 
reconnoitered  picket  unexpectedly,  than  would  be  the  case  with 
a  group  of  restless  led  horses  seen  at  a  long  distance.  Should 
the  enemy  nevertheless  proceed  to  the  attack,  he  will  be  met 
by  well-aimed  fire,  and  that  not  only  for  a  few  seconds  or 
minutes.  For,  in  place  of  the  anxiety  about  the  led  horses 
ordinarily  in  the  leader's  mind,  and  which  constantly  made 
him  remember  that  under  no  consideration  must  he  be  too  late 
in  giving  the  command  to  mount,  he  simply  need  endeavor 
to  hold  his  post  as  long  as  possible.  His  picket  will  be  able 
to  offer  a  prolonged  and  obstinate  resistance.  There  is  no 
longer  any  danger  from  surprise.  The  enemy  must  develop 
a  superiority  of  force  and  execute  his  flanking  movements  be- 
yond rifle  range  and  with  a  loss  of  time.     If  the  picket  is  finally 


Cavalry  Outposts.  243 

forced  to  retreat,  its  resistance  is  not  yet  ended.  Its  next  halt 
to  fire  forces  the  enemy  to  halt  again  and  make  new  arrange- 
ments. A  knowledge  of  the  ground  also  will  insure  advantages 
for  the  picket  over  the  assailant. 

It  is  only  under  these  conditions  that  the  picket  com- 
mander can  see  to  it  that  the  troops  in  rear  of  him  are  not 
surprised.  It  is  only  now  that  he  can  insure  them  the  neces- 
sary time  to  get  ready  for  action. 

The  psychological  element  plays  an  important  and  decisive 
part  in  every  branch  of  warfare ;  therefore  it  demands  its  rights 
also  in  outpost  service.  The  most  courageous  patrol-leader, 
the  man  who  in  an  attack  does  not  know  the  meaning  of  fear, 
may  become  timorous  and  vacillating  if,  on  outpost  duty,  he 
does  not  know  whether  he  is  to  stay  and  fight  or  to  mount  and 
ride  away. 

But  there  is  no  longer  any  room  for  doubt  if  the  horses  are 
taken  away.  A  knowledge  of  what  is  expected  of  him  will 
cause  even  the  less  resolute  man  to  follow  the  right  path. 
During  the  course  of  a  protracted  campaign  a  cavalryman  will 
often  be  on  outpost,  and  the  feeling  of  depression  and  lack  of 
confidence  he  there  encounters  must  act  unfavorably  on  his 
morale  and  shake  his  confidence  in  his  leaders.  He  is  similarly 
affected  by  the  nervousness  that  often  enough  prevails  in  the 
main  body  the  moment  firing  is  heard,  when  everyone  knows 
how  little  dependence  can  be  placed  in  the  outposts. 

The  moment  it  is  decided  to  withdraw  the  horses  from  the 
advance  part  of  the  outposts,  these  anxieties  disappear  and 
are  transformed  into  their  opposites.  The  duties  devolving  on 
the  individual  trooper  on  outpost  increase  his  confidence  in 
his  fire-arm  and  in  his  own  power.  The  cavalry  sentry  who 
heretofore  had  to  fear  that  an  alarm  might  be  caused  by  any 
shot  fired,  now  may  cheerfully  fire  on  every  venturesome  foe 
that  comes  within  reach;  knowing  as  he  does  that  a  few  shots 


244  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

no  longer  will  cause  any  commotion.*  But  the  enemy  who 
several  times  has  felt  the  effect  of  well-aimed  bullets  will  stay 
farther  away  and  see  less.  As  there  will  be  fewer  opportunities 
for  successful  surprises,  there  will  be  fewer  occasions  when  the 
night's  rest  will  be  disturbed.  At  times  it  may  be  an  advantage 
to  have  the  pickets  mistaken  for  infantry  and  thus  deceive  the 
enemy  as  to  the  real  state  of  affairs.  We  learned  this  to  our 
sorrow  when  German  patrols  on  August  15,  1870,  reported  the 
existence  of  French  infantry  pickets  on  the  Yron,  north  of 
Mars-la-Tour,  when  for  a  fact  they  consisted  of  dismounted 
cavalry.  This  report  helped  to  confirm  the  German  generals 
in  the  erroneous  impression  that  the  French  Army  of  the  Rhine 
was  retreating  from  Metz  towards  Verdun. 

So  far  duty  with  a  cavalry  picket  kept  the  men  constantly 
occupied.  Those  not  on  post  or  on  patrol  duty  were  busy  with 
the  horses.  If  the  latter  are  taken  away,  the  men  can  obtain 
some  rest  and  the  following  morning  will  be  fairly  ready  for 
duty  on  rested  and  fed  horses. 

If  12  troopers  seemed  too  few  for  the  picket  at  Lingnau, 
this  number  might  be  sufficient  if  only  2  of  them  retained 
their  horses  for  messenger  duty.  Then  10  men  with  rifles  in 
their  hands,  camping  in  the  defensive  position,  will  be  con- 
stantly available  for  fire-action.  The  vedettes  of  3  men  each 
can  be  reduced  to  double  sentry-posts  as  in  the  infantry — quite 
an  appreciable  saving  of  men.  Actual  patrol  duty — the  recon- 
noitering  undertaken  to  increase  the  degree  of  security — will 
continue  to  be  the  province  of  the  outpost  troops  (supports). 
Patrolling  necessary  within  the  outpost  can  be  done  by  men 
on  foot.  This  also  will  increase  the  amount  of  protection  and 
saves  men.  Mounted  men  are  not  suited  for  this  duty  at  night 
off  the  roads  in  diversified  country. 

We  remember  the  misgivings  that  deterred  the  commander 
of  Troop  B  from  placing  a  picket  on  Queetz-Neuendorf  road 

*But  see  par.  130,  '!•'.  S.  R. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  245 

although  it  was  very  desirable  to  prevent  hostile  patrols  from 
getting  a  view  of  the  region  about  Lingnau.  A  mounted  picket 
stationed  there  was  in  too  exposed  a  position. 

But  there  would  seem  to  be  no  objection  to  sending  a  few 
dismounted  men  with  a  guide  across  the  meadow  to  the  grove 
south  of  Number  116,  as  in  case  of  necessity  they  can  return 
the  same  way.  Bullets  from  their  rifles  would,  as  long  as  it 
is  light — i.  e.,  as  long  as  the  view  is  to  be  denied — keep  the 
enemy  at  a  respectable  distance.  Separating  the  horses  from 
the  men  here  also  insures  greater  efficiency  in  command  and 
facilitates  adjusting  means  to  an  end. 

The  swampy  meadow  now  becomes  an  obstacle  for  the 
enemy  alone,  and  not  for  our  own  men. 

According  to  the  principle  of  the  German  Field  Service 
Regulations  that  "the  arrangements  and  instructions  should 
be  regulated  by  the  special  circumstances  of  each  case,"*  there 
is  no  doubt  but  that  the  regulations  permit  the  proposed 
changes.  But  it  is  not  included  in  the  teachings  of  these  regu- 
lations, which  offer  no  inducement  or  means  for  applying  it. 
We  therefore  fear  that  without  additions  to  the  regulations 
the  proposed  change  will  seldom  be  adopted,  possibly  not  at 
all  until  we  have  paid  dearly  for  experience  in  the  field. 

The  evils  with  which  such  a  change  burden  the  interior 
economy  of  an  outpost  troop  are  fully  offset  by  the  extraordi- 
nary advantages  to  be  derived  from  it.  Arrangements  will  be 
possible  whereby  these  evils  can  be  modified,  possibly  by  de- 
tailing the  care-takers  for  the  horses  that  have  been  left  behind 
from  the  same  squad  or  platoon.  If  an  outpost  troop  has  25 
men  on  picket  duty,  only  about  one-third  of  the  men  left  be- 
hind will  have  to  care  for  an  extra  horse.  Thus  the  men  would 
not  be  overworked.  The  slight  inconvenience  that  each  man 
separated  from  his  horse  must  also  give  up  his  pack  can  be 
overcome.     The  overcoat,  canteen,  and  mess  kit  can  be  taken 

*See  par.  12S,  F.  S.  R 


246  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

along,  the  same  as  the  extra  cartridges.  Of  course  there  can 
be  no  cooking  at  the  picket.  Even  the  infantryman  some- 
times is  separated  from  his  pack  without  disadvantage. 
The  troop  officers  will  have  more  to  do  looking  after  horses, 
packs,  and  arms,  but  this  will  be  counterbalanced  by  the  in- 
creased fitness  of  the  rested  horses.  The  trained  cavalry  horse 
is  an  expensive  article  and  hard  to  replace.  Especially  those 
armies  that  make  war  against  an  enemy  superior  in  cavalry 
are  called  upon  to  make  extra  efforts  to  preserve  and  care  for 
the  horse. 

The  proposed  change  will  not  only  benefit  the  horses  on 
outpost,  but  the  entire  cavalry.  For,  more  frequently  than 
not,  even  when  conditions  might  have  required  a  bivouac  in 
snow  or  rain  with  horses  saddled,  the  increased  protection  will 
admit  of  placing  the  horses  under  cover,  or  at  least  protecting 
them  against  the  wind  and  unsaddling  within  inclosures. 

Let  us  briefly  summarize  the  benefits  to  be  expected  from 
the  proposed  change: 

The  stationary  detachments  of  the  advanced  part  of  out- 
posts, and  directly  concerned  with  the  service  of  protection — 
the  pickets,  Cossack  posts,  and  vedettes — as  a  rule,  perform 
their  duty  dismounted.  Their  horses,  sabers,  and  packs  re- 
main with  the  outpost  troop.  The  picket  commander  may 
retain  his  horse  if  it  will  lighten  his  duties.  Such  mounted 
messengers  as  may  be  necessary  will  be  with  each  picket. 
Reconnoitering  towards  the  enemy  is,  as  a  rule,  the  duty  of 
the  outpost  troops  (supports).  Each  vedette,  as  a  rule,  will 
consist  of  2  men.  If  we  wish  to  insure  it  greater  power  of 
resistance,  or  avoid  having  the  reliefs  travel  long  distances, 
it  is  changed  into  a  group  consisting  of  a  leader  and  6  men 
(the  vedette  and  its  reliefs).  The  messengers,  who  also  can 
be  used  as  visiting-patrols  and  for  short  reconnaissances,  will 
mount  whenever  the  picket  prepared  for  action  and  will  take 


Cavalry  Outposts.  247 

charge  of  the  commander's  horse.  They  will  then  act  as  a 
combat-patrol.* 

The  purpose  of  the  attack  of  the  hostile  patrol  on  Lingnau 
calls  attention  to  another  point  that  so  far  has  hardly  been 
mentioned.  Of  course  the  sudden  attack  could  not  have  been 
made  with  the  idea  of  obtaining  any  material  tactical  advant- 
age. It  was  simply  hoped  and  expected  that  the  patrol  would 
find  out  the  location  of  the  1st  Cavalry,  touch  with  which  had 
been  lost.  Presumably  it  would  have  attained  this  object, 
even  if  driven  back  by  the  picket  on  the  highway,  if  at  the 
same  time  every  trumpeter  in  Lingnau  and  Scharnick  had 
sounded  "to  arms."  Not  the  eye,  but  the  ear  of  the  hostile 
patrol-leader  would  have  recognized  the  situation,  and  long 
before  midnight  they  would  have  had  the  desired  information 
at  Miinsterberg.  The  trumpet-calls  also  would  have  alarmed 
all  detachments  sent  out  from  the  regiment  and  possibly  have 
induced  them  to  take  all  manner  of  entirely  unnecessary  meas- 
ures. The  example,  the  same  as  experience  in  war,  shows  the 
disadvantage  of  giving  warning  by  signals,  that,  resounding 
through  the  night,  betray  more  than  by  day.  The  German 
troops  are  drilled  in  still  alarm,  which  on  an  occasion  like  this, 
where  so  many  men  are  awake,  can  be  given  almost  as  quickly 
as  the  alarm  by  trumpet,  and  causing  less  unnecessary  excite- 
ment. It  should  be  habitually  used  with  the  outposts  and  ad- 
vance cavalry,  and  it  would  have  been  no  mistake  if  Colonel 

A had  ordered  that  the  calls  of  "to  horse"  and  "to  arms" 

should  never  be  sounded  except  by  his  express  order. 

We  can  examine  the  case  in  hand  to  see  what  improve- 
ments will  result  from  the  application  of  the  above  principles. 
A  satisfactory  solution  and  criticism  of  an  outpost-problem 
is  possible  only  on  the  terrain;  but  for  our  purpose  a  few  ex- 

*They  remain  mounted,  as  far  as  practicable,  and  on  the  flanks, 
conveying  information  recjuired  by  signals  previously  agreed  upon.  (See 
par.  821,  Cavalry  Drill  Regulations.) 


248  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

planatory  remarks  about  the  map  will  answer.  Knoll  143 
affords  an  extended  view  in  all  directions.  We  can  see  Neuen- 
dorf, the  Guttstadt  railway  station  and  church-tower,  Altkirch, 
Schmolain  Woods,  Regerteln,  Sommerfeld,  Lauterwalde,  and 
Petersdorf.  In  the  immediate  foreground  we  see  Beiswalde 
and  its  cross-roads,  the  road  to  Altkirch  and  the  railway — of 
the  latter  only  a  short  distance  is  hidden  by  the  woods  along 
the  road  to  Altkirch.  We  can  also  see  the  Scharnick- Regerteln 
highway  and  the  creek  between  it  and  the  Lingnau-Beiswalde 
road.  The  creek  forms  an  obstacle  for  horsemen  because  the 
meadows  are  wet  and  marshy.  The  remaining  cultivated  land 
and  meadows  as  far  as  Beiswalde  and  east  of  Lingnau  can  be 
crossed  by  men  on  foot  or  on  horseback,  while  the  large  meadow 
east  of  the  railway  and  north  of  the  road  to  Altkirch  cannot 
be  crossed  by  mounted  men.  The  two  groves  on  this  road 
consist  of  tall  firs  without  undergrowth.  The  small  buildings 
near  the  Lingnau-Beiswalde  road  are  huts  and  sheds  belong- 
ing to  peat-diggers. 

Describe  the  outpost  established  by  Troop  C,  First 
Cavalry. 

Knoll  143  is  by  far  the  best  point  for  a  picket.  Even  by 
night  the  road  to  Beiswalde  can  be  well  watched  from  that 
point.  The  knoll  affords  an  excellent  position  from  which  to 
fire  in  case  of  attack.  But  another  post  will  be  required  on 
the  road  to  Altkirch,  as  otherwise  the  railway  and  the  two 
groves  would  greatly  facilitate  a  stealthy  approach  and  sur- 
prise by  the  enemy. 

A  suitable  arrangement  would  be  as  follows: 

The  troop  will  post  a  picket  of  1  officer,  1  non-commis- 
sioned officer,  and  20  men,  including  2  mounted  messengers, 
at  Knoll  143,  which  will  be  charged  with  the  protection  of  the 
entire  space  from  the  road  to  Altkirch  to  the  creek,  where  the 
next  troop  will  join  with  its  outpost.     The  picket  commander 


Cavalry  Outposts.  249 

places  a  Cossack  post  ( 1  non-commissioned  officer  and  6  men) 
in  the  grove  on  the  road  to  Altkirch,  close  to  the  railway  cross- 
ing, to  watch  the  road  and  railway  and  observe  the  region  to- 
wards Beiswalde. 

The  picket  would  be  posted  on  the  southern  slope  of  Knoll 
143,  with  a  vedette  (2  men)  on  the  knoll  itself.  Communica- 
tion is  established  with  the  outpost  on  the  left  by  means  of 
mounted  messengers  and  they  are  informed  that  the  section 
between  the  road  to  Beiswalde  and  the  creek  will  be  watched 
by  dismounted  patrols.  The  messengers'  horses  will  find  pro- 
tection at  night  in  the  small  building  just  southwest  of  the  knoll. 
The  officer  after  having  inspected  the  terrain,  especially  along 
the  road  to  Altkirch,  can  send  his  horse  back  to  Lingnau.  The 
troop  at  regular  intervals  will  send  out  mounted  patrols  to  the 
front. 

There  is  no  doubt  but  that  the  picket  will  afford  good  pro- 
tection for  the  squadron  at  Lingnau.  Neither  the  Cossack  post 
nor  the  picket  itself  can  be  readily  dispersed.  Every  hostile 
detachment  will  be  detained  for  some  time.  And  if  the  pro- 
tecting bodies  must  retreat  before  superior  numbers,  the  latter 
will  be  prevented  from  rapidly  advancing  by  being  repeatedly 
fired  upon. 

To  prevent  the  retreating  bodies  coming  into  the  line  of 
fire  of  the  outpost  troops  (supports),  they  would  best  move  to- 
wards a  flank  of  the  latter.  Therefore  the  picket  would  retreat 
in  a  westerly  direction  and  the  Cossack  post  through  the  south- 
ern grove. 

As  we  have  seen,  a  mounted  picket  would  have  been  forced 

to   retreat   much  more   promptly.     The   enemy  might  reach 

the  village  with  the  picket.     Caution  would  dictate  that  the 

mounted  picket  would  be  pushed  farther  towards  Beiswalde, 

and  at  least  12  mounted  men  would  have  to  be  posted  in  the 

road  to  Altkirch.     The  picket  itself  could  not  consist  of  less 

than  20  men,  of  which  from  5  to  7  would  have  to  act  as  horse  - 
—17— 


250  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

holders  and  2  as  messengers.  Notwithstanding  the  increased 
number:  32  men  instead  of  20,  and  32  horses  instead  of  2, 
protection  is  less  assured,  and  every  troop  commander  knows 
what  it  will  mean  the  next  day  if  30  of  his  horses  have  been 
with  the  pickets  the  night  before  or  not. 

Another  example  may  be  taken  from  the  duties  assigned 
Troop  H,  which  will  more  nearly  come  under  regulation  forma- 
tions than  was  the  case  with  the  others. 

The  lieutenant-colonel  had  issued  the  following  orders 
(see  page  216) : 

"Troop  H,  of  which  one  platoon  will  remain  at  Kallisten 
under  the  immediate  orders  of  the  colonel,  will  form  a  section 
of  the  outpost  extending  from  that  of  the  1st  Squadron  at  the 
south  end  of  the  former  Lingnau-see,  past  the  north  end  of 
Zaun-see,  to  the  left  of  Troop  F's  section,  and  will  permanently 
observe  the  Guttstadt-Kallisten  road.  The  captain  will  ride 
ahead  to  his  position  and  at  the  north  end  of  Zaun-see  will 
report  to  me  what  he  intends  doing.  The  troops  may  draw  on 
Komalmen  and  Warlack  for  supplies." 

The  captain  knows  that  Troop  F's  section  is  to  extend 
from  west  of  Scharnick  B  about  900  yards  south  along  the 
creek,  and  that  the  bed  of  Lingnau-lake  is  guarded  by  men  of 
the  1st  Squadron.  He  also  knows  that,  for  the  present,  Troop 
D  is  at  Rosengarth  as  reconnaissance  troop.  If  the  latter  goes 
to  Scharnick  for  the  night,  it  will  still  be  responsible  for  keep- 
ing touch  with  the  enemy. 

The  troop  commander  orders  one  of  his  officers  to  take  a 
detachment  and  attend  to  securing  supplies  from  Komalmen 
and  Warlack.  He  ordered  the  commander  of  the  2d  platoon 
to  ride  with  it  to  Height  138  near  Oueetz  (R.  G.)*  and  thence 
to  cover  the  march  of  the  regiment  towards  the  southeast. 
The  captain  with  several  men  rode  around  Zaun-see  and  met 
the  lieutenant-colonel  at  the  north  end  at  6.25  p.  m.     During 

*h'iltcr-Gut,  knight* s  manor. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  251 

his  rapid  ride  he  obtained  only  a  general  idea  of  the  coun- 
try whose  hilly  nature  interfered  with  obtaining  a  good  view. 
From  Knoll  141  there  is  a  view  to  be  had  in  all  directions. 
The  large  village  of  Queetz  is  visible,  but  only  a  small  part  of 
the  Queetz-Ankendorf  highway  east  of  the  latter  village  is 
visible.  To  the  southeast  Knoll  138  near  Queetz  (R.  G.)  and 
the  rise  of  ground  on  the  Queetz-Neuendorf  road  limit  the 
view.  Apparently  only  the  low-lying  parts  of  the  small  strips 
of  meadow  between  Zaun-see  and  the  former  Lingnau-see  are 
impassable  for  horsemen.  But  the  creek  flowing  towards 
Scharnick  from  Zaun-see  partly  has  steep  banks  and  again  is 
bordered  by  swampy  meadows,  so  that  horsemen  are  entirely 
unable  to  cross  it  and  footmen  can  do  so  only  in  a  few  places. 
The  farm  at  the  southern  end  of  Knoll  141  has  a  large  en- 
closure with  several  barns  and  stables. 

The  other  farm-houses  past  which  the  captain  rode  are 
small  and  poorly  built. 

What  arrangements  wile  the  Captain  of  Troop  H 

MAKE  TO   CARRY  OUT  HIS  ORDERS? 

The  reader  is  not  expected  to  rack  his  brains  over  this. 
The  problem  is  quite  simple.  The  solutions  will  be  very  similar 
— viz.,  a  line  of  protection  between  Zaun-see  and  the  former 
Lingnau-see  and  a  picket  on  the  highway  near  the  north  end  of 
Zaun-see.     There  is  no  need  to  go  into  details. 

From  a  number  of  about  equally  good  arrangements  I 
select  the  following: 

Officer.        N.  C.  O.        Privates. 
Picket,  No.  i,  on  the  Scharnick- Komal- 

men  highway,  near  the  north  end  of 

Zaun-see -  i  12 

Picket,  No.  2,  at  the  southern  one  of  the 

two  farm-yards  near  the  southeast 

end  of  Zaun-see 1  1  15 

Cossack  post,  No.  3,  on  the  Scharnick- 

Queetz  road  near  the  farm-yard  at 

the  south  end  of  former  Lingnau-see  -  1  6 

Total 1  3  J3 


252  Studies  in  Appued  Tactics. 

After  deducting  the  platoon  at  Kallisten,  in  addition  to 
the  above,  there  will  be  in  the  troop  about  i  officer  and  40  men. 

Opinions  will  differ  as  to  where  and  how  the  remainder  of 
the  troop  shall  be  located. 

It  should  not  be  too  far  from  the  highway,  because  a  night 
attack  would  confine  itself  to  the  best  roads.  But  there  also  are 
roads  leading  directly  from  the  hostile  position  via  Queetz  to 
Scharnick.  The  troop  must  also  be  ready  to  oppose  the  enemy 
between  Zaun-see  and  former  Lingnau-see.  Therefore  we  must 
look  for  a  place  for  the  troop  in  the  vicinity  of  Knoll  141. 
There  we  can  choose  between  bivouacking  in  the  open  or  can- 
toning in  the  large  farm-yard  at  the  south  end  of  the  knoll.  It 
will  not  be  difficult  for  the  captain  to  decide,  when  he  considers 
what  he  must  do  to  defeat  a  hostile  attack.  He  can  have  no 
doubt  but  that  this  must  be  done  with  his  fire-arms.  How 
many  men  would  be  available  for  the  firing-line  if  he  decided 
to  bivouac?  There  would  be  37  horses  from  the  pickets  in  the 
bivouac  in  addition  to  the  40  of  the  troop  itself.  If  the  horses 
were  to  be  sent  back  to  Scharnick,  not  more  than  20  men  would 
be  left  for  the  firing-line.  But  if  the  captain  decides  to  occupy 
the  farm-yard,  he  can  have  the  horses  tied  in  barns  and  stables, 
leaving  them  in  charge  of  a  small  number  of  men,  and  have 
considerably  more  men  for  the  firing-line ;  either  to  advance  to 
the  assistance  of  his  pickets  or  to  have  them  fall  back  on  his 
own  position. 

In  a  few  minutes  he  would  be  able  to  reinforce  the  picket 
on  the  highway,  for  the  road  can  be  very  effectually  swept  by 
fire  from  the  north  end  of  Zaun-see.  How  long  would  it  have 
taken  him  to  bring  order  out  of  the  confusion  of  his  picket-line 
in  a  bivouac,  and  get  a  few  skirmishers  on  the  firing-line.  He 
would  not  have  to  devote  his  attention  to  the  enemy,  but  to 
his  frightened  tangle  of  horses  and  men  ;  while  a  cantonment  in 
the  farm-yard  would  not  cause  any  delay  in  meeting  the  enemy. 
No  matter  where  he  bivouacked,  hostile-  patrols  could  discover 


^Cavalry  Outposts.  253 

his  location.  But  neither  eye  nor  field-glass  would  be  able  to 
discover  what  is  within  the  farm-yard. 

If  the  captain  understands  that  his  troop  is  to  be  looked 
upon  as  a  body  of  cavalry  that  is  to  fight  on  foot  with  horses 
to  remain  stationary,  he  will  not  hesitate  to  take  advantage  of 
the  protecting  walls  of  the  estate.  And  he  will  not  be  tempted 
to  think  that  under  certain  conditions  he  ought  to  mount. 
Such  action  simply  would  lead  to  half  measures  and  weaken 
the  defense,  which  alone  can  save  the  main  body  from  surprise. 
He  and  his  men  must  not  think  of  their  mounts  until  the  enemy 
has  been  defeated.  The  more  rifles  that  are  brought  into  the 
firing-line  the  quicker  will  this  be  accomplished. 

A  guard  with  a  double  sentry  will  protect  the  troop.  A 
lookout  should  be  placed  in  observation  on  Knoll  141  or  in  a 
dormer  window. 

On  account  of  the  nearness  of  the  troop,  the  pickets  will 
not  have  any  mounted  messengers ;  only  the  officer  command- 
ing picket  No.  2  will  be  permitted  to  keep  a  horse  with  his 
picket.  He  will  constantly  have  a  dismounted  patrol  (patroll- 
ing-post)  of  3  men  on  Knoll  138  near  Oueetz  (R.  G.)  to  observe 
Oueetz  and  the  Guttstadt-Heiligenthal  highway,  and  to  drive 
back  hostile  patrols.  From  time  to  time  the  captain  will  send 
small  mounted  patrols  to  Heiligenthal-Ankendorf  and  to  Oueetz, 
possibly  even  farther,  to  keep  up  communication  with  Troop 
F  or  the  detachment  left  behind  by  that  troop. 

If  the  pickets  are  forced  to  retire  before  superior  numbers, 
they  will  fall  back  firing :  No.  1  towards  Scharnick,  keeping 
west  of  the  highway  to  continually  flank  this,  and  not  to  mask 
the  fire  from  Scharnick.  Picket  No.  2  will  hold  a  position  on 
the  heights  of  the  eastern  shore  of  Zaun- see ;  the  Cossack  post 
will  remain  on  the  Queetz-Scharnick  road.  Picket  No.  1  will 
barricade  the  bridge  on  the  highway  at  the  north  end  of  Zaun- 
see  with  wagons  obtained  from  Warlack. 


254  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

In  estimating  the  strength  of  the  covering  detachments, 
it  was  taken  into  consideration  that  picket  No.  i  would  need  a 
double  sentry-post  and  a  few  men  as  patrols,  and  that  picket 
No.  2,  aside  from  the  permanent  patrol  of  3  men  at  Knoll  138, 
would  be  able  to  get  along  with  a  double  sentry-post.  Our 
system  is  even  better  adapted  to  the  normal  situation  of  the 
troop  at  Zaun-see  than  to  the  unusual  one  at  Lingnau,  where 
part  of  the  outpost  troop  was  quartered  with  the  main  body 
of  the  squadron.  In  the  present  case  the  protecting  bodies 
would  have  to  be  very  negligent  if  a  surprise  should  succeed 
here.  And  in  that  event  this  negligence  would  be  to  blame, 
and  not  the  system.  But  if  we  were  to  think  of  the  pickets — 
possibly  strengthened — with  their  horses  present,  there  need  be 
no  neglect  of  duty  to  enable  a  reckless  hostile  troop  to  break 
through  the  outposts  at  some  point  and  seriously  disturb  the 
regiment's  rest  at  night. 

On  account  of  the  advanced  position  of  his  command,  the 
colonel  considered  it  necessary  to  protect  himself  also  towards 
the  west.  A  careful  investigation  will  show  that  besides  the 
guards  and  sentries  in  Scharnick,  there  will  be  needed  a  picket 
of  1  non-commissioned  officer  and  12  men  at  the  intersection 
of  the  Scharnick-Regerteln  and  the  Wolfsdorf-Lingnau  high- 
ways, and  a  Cossack  post  of  1  non-commissioned  officer  and 
6  men  south  of  Scharnick. 

The  following,  therefore,  would  be  the  force  used  in  the 
service  of  security — i.  e.,  pickets  and  Cossack  posts: 

Officers.        N.  C.  O.         Men.       Horses. 

1st  Squadron ..  i  3  j>S  _i 

2d  and  3d  Squadrons 1  .s  5 '  1 

Total 2  8  89  5 

This  would  be  only  about  8  per  cent  of  the  whole  force — 
a  very  low  figure,  taking  into  consideration  the  proximity 
of  the  enemy  and  the  necessity  for  outposts  all  around  the 
regiment. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  255 

If  the  horses  were  to  remain  with  the  pickets,  from  30  to 
40  additional  men  would  have  been  needed  to  retain  the  same 
number  of  men  in  the  firing-line ;  and  yet  there  would  not  have 
been  the  same  security  as  is  produced  by  the  smaller  number 
without  horses.  Instead  of  5  horses,  there  would  have  been 
from  130  to  140  saddled  and  bridled  in  the  open  during  the 
night. 

A  glance  at  the  detached  bodies,  the  reconnoitering  detach- 
ments, and  detachments  necessary  to  keep  up  connection  with 
the  army  corps  will  show  how  desirable  it  is  to  save  the  reg- 
iment this  expenditure  of  strength. 

There  is  a  platoon  at  the  Guttstadt  railway  station,  another 
at  Altkirch,  and  a  third  at  Regerteln.  Troop  G,  even  if  it  goes 
to  Scharnick  for  the  night,  must  leave  a  platoon  or  several  large 
patrols  out  in  front.  A  platoon  is  divided  between  Kallisten 
and  Sackstein.  There  are  connecting  posts  at  Wolfsdorf,  Pit- 
tehnen,  and  Liebstadt ;  strong  patrols  have  been  sent  via  Gutt- 
stadt towards  Heilsberg  and  Wormditt,  and  an  officer  with 
several  men  has  gone  to  corps  headquarters  at  Mohrungen. 
Altogether,  these  detachments  may  amount  to  about  two 
troops,  whose  horses  will  largely  remain  saddled  and  in  motion. 

The  more  enterprising  the  regimental  commander  is,  and 
the  more  he  aims  to  accomplish,  the  more  gladly  will  he  take 
advantage  of  every  means  to  avoid  unnecessary  expenditure  of 
strength,  and  the  more  welcome  will  be  a  regulation  of  the  daily 
recurring  outpost  service,  which  will  not  only  save  a  number  of 
men  in  the  pickets,  but  also  will  assure  the  main  body  quiet 
nights,  rest,  and  recuperation. 

Detached  Bodies. 
We  shall  more  readily  find  out  whether  the  above  named 
detached  bodies  are   necessary  and  judicious,   whether  their 
strength  has  been  correctly  determined,  and  what  is  the  nature 
of  their  duties,  by  examining  these  duties  in  detail. 


256  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Lieutenant  J has  been  sent  to  Altkircli  with  a  platoon 

of  Troop  D  (3  non-commissioned  officers  and  28  men).  He  is 
ordered  to  watch  the  Guttstadt-Sommerfeld  road,  the  cross- 
ings of  the  Alle  below  Kossen,  particularly  the  two  bridges  at 
Schmolainen,  and  the  roads  to  Liewenberg,  Sperlings,  and 
Launau  in  front  of  the  outpost.  The  platoon  is  to  remain  at 
Altkircli  during  the  night,  and  is  under  the  immediate  orders 
of  the  squadron  commander  (see  page  215  ).  Lieutenant 
J knows  that  Troop  A  will  march  to  Neuendorf  as  recon- 
naissance troop  and  probably  will  spend  the  night  at  Lingnau, 
but  that  at  the  same  time  it  will  be  responsible  for  reconnais- 
sance towards  the  enemy  on  the  front  of  Wolken-Kossen.  He 
also  is  familiar  with  the  orders  of  the  platoon  of  Troop  E  that 
is  going  to  Regerteln.  The  simultaneous  departure  of  both 
these  platoons  and  the  detachments  bound  for  Lingnau,  and 
their  traveling  over  the  same  road  via  Komalmen,  enabled  the 
officers  to  discuss  and  agree  on  a  plan  of  action. 

Lieutenant  J sent  a  lance  corporal  and  1  private  along 

to  Regerteln;  they  are  to  find  out  the  location  of  the  platoon 
at  this  place  and  then  report  to  him  at  Altkirch.  Two  men  of 
the  platoon  of  Troop  E  accompany  Lieutenant  J to  Alt- 
kirch for  a  similar  purpose.  He  sent  a  non-commissioned 
officer  and  1  man  to  Troop  A  at  Neuendorf  with  orders  to 
inform  the  captain  of  the  platoon's  orders  and  to  request  infor- 
mation about  the  troop  and  the  enemy.  The  non-commis- 
sioned officer  is  not  to  leave  Troop  A  until  it  is  decided  whether 
the  troop  will  remain  in  Neuendorf  or  not.  Then  he  is  to  follow 
the  road  leading  from  Neuendorf  to  the  west  exit  of  Altkirch 
and  reconnoiter  the  country  along  this  road,  particularly  the 
water-course,  the  meadow  land,  and  the  bridge. 

At  the  north  end  of  Zaun-see,  Lieutenant  J — ■ — ,  with  the 
other  officers  bound  for  Lingnau,  went  via  Knoll  141  to  the 
road  leading  to  Lingnau.  He  learned  that  the  platoon  of  Troop 
B  intended  posting  a  picket  half  way  between  Lingnau  and 


Cavalry  Outposts.  257 

Neuendorf,  while  the  platoon  of  Troop  C  intended  remaining 
at  Knoll  143  and  sending  forward  a  Cossack  post  on  the  road 
to  Altkirch  as  far  as  the  railway.  The  horses  of  these  pickets 
were  to  be  sent  back  to  their  respective  troops  at  Lingnau. 

Lieutenant  J ,  with  a  point  moving  far  ahead  of  his  platoon, 

continues  his  ride  from  Lingnau  to  Altkirch,  on  a  stretch  of 
road  that  can  be  seen  from  the  heights  along  the  Guttstadt- 
Sommerfeld  highway.  At  6.45  p.  m.  he  arrived  at  the  western 
exit  of  Altkirch  and  views  the  surrounding  country  from  Knoll 
118.  The- point,  which  has  trotted  ahead  to  the  eastern  exit, 
reports  that  nothing  can  be  seen  of  the  enemy.  Through  indi- 
vidual troopers  it  has  been  ascertained  that  the  low  ground 
extending  from  the  former  Lingnau-see  towards  Altkirch  can 
be  crossed  by  horsemen  on  the  bridges  only.  The  village 
president,  who  has  been  called  up,  reports  that  early  in  the 
morning  a  hostile  patrol  coming  from  Schmolainen  rode  through 
the  village  and  went  towards  Sommerfeld ;  and  that  during  the 
forenoon  a  few  more  hostile  troopers  rode  through  the  village. 
He  knows  nothing  more  about  the  enemy.  Upon  inquiry  he 
states  that  at  present  the  Alle  is  an  impassable  obstacle  for 
footmen  and  mounted  men,  being  everywhere  over  9  feet  deep ; 
that  the  wooden  bridges  at  Schmolainen  are  intended  for  light 
teams  and  are  in  good  condition;  that  the  bridge  north  of  the 
Schmolainen  forester's  house  ("Schmolainen  F."  on  map)  is 
a  foot-bridge ;  and  that  while  the  bridges  at  Zechern  and  Laun- 
au  also  are  of  wood,  they  are  adapted  for  heavy  teams.  Wich- 
ertshof  Forest  (Wichertshofer  Forst),  as  well  as  Schmolainen 
Woods  (Schmolainen  Wald) ,  consists  almost  entirely  of  fir-trees. 
The  latter  is  village  property,  the  trees  being  of  various  sizes 
and  with  heavy  undergrowth.  The  meadows  west  of  Win- 
denhof  and  the  drainage  ditches  running  thence  to  the  Alle, 
as  well  as  the  creek  east  of  the  highway,  flowing  southeast, 
are  obstacles  hard  to  overcome  by  cavalrymen. 


258  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Lieutenant  J examines  the  country  in  every  direc- 
tion without  discovering  anything  suspicious. 

What    are    Lieutenant    J 's    arrangements    and 

INTENTIONS? 

Naturally,    Lieutenant   J would   think   of  his   plans 

during  the  ride.  If  he  has  not  had  any  experience  in  war, 
he  may  think  his  problem  not  a  difficult  one.  A  recollection 
of  field  exercises  and  maneuvers  he  has  attended  will  serve  as 
a  foundation  for  his  plans.  In  the  above-named  peace-train- 
ing near  garrisons  the  end  would  be  attained  by  stationing  the 
platoon  at  Altkirch  and  sending  out  patrols,  radiating  in  the 
directions  indicated  to  him.  Possibly  the  officer  also  debated 
whether  it  wrould  not  be  practicable  to  send  these  patrols  ahead 
at  an  increased  gait  so  he  might  the  more  promptly  receive 
their  reports.  But  the  horses  have  had  a  hard  day.  They 
would  have  gained  but  little  headway,  and  a  gallop  would  have 
consumed  too  much  of  the  strength  they  will  need  during  the 
night  and  early  next  morning.  In  thinking  over  the  instruc- 
tions to  be  given  the  patrols,  he  would  remember  that  it  would 
be  necessary  accurately  to  tell  these  where  they  or  their  mes- 
sages would  be  able  to  find  the  platoon.  It  is  true  that  the 
squadron  commander's  orders  designate  Altkirch  as  the  sta- 
tion of  the  platoon,  and  accordingly  in  time  of  peace  there 
would  be  but  little  objection  to  the  platoon  commander's  mak- 
ing arrangements  with  that  in  view  as  soon  as  he  arrived  at  the 
north  end  of  Zaun-see.  Even  should  the  platoon  encounter  the 
enemy  before  reaching  its  destination,  the  provisions  of  the 
Field  Service  Regulations  will  protect  him  from  bodily  harm, 
and  his  patrols  likewise  will  not   get  hurt  by  the  harmless 

maneuver-enemy.     In  spite  of  all  this,  Lieutenant  J would 

be  able  to  reach  the  vicinity  of  Altkirch  and  wait  for  his  patrols. 

In  time  of  war  it  is  doubtful  if  he  would  be  able  to  reach 
Altkirch,  and  still  more  so  whether  he  could  stay  there. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  259 

The  officer  therefore  concluded  to  delay  sending  out  pa- 
trols until  after  arriving  at  Altkirch  and  finding  out  how  mat- 
ters stood  there. 

This  moment  has  arrived  and  the  patrols  can  be  sent  out 
as  soon  as  he  has  decided  where  to  locate  the  platoon. 

But  even  an  officer  experienced  in  war  now  would  encoun- 
ter difficulties  calling  for  Hs  entire  skill.  Shall  he  stay  at  the 
western  exit  of  the  village'  All  the  roads  coming  from  the 
enemy  unite  here,  and  the  messenger  route  to  the  rear  is  well 
protected.  Knoll  1 1 8  affords  a  good  view  limited  only  by  the 
village  close  in  front.  But  at  night  no  view  can  be  had  from 
the  knoll,  and  hostile  detachments  will  be  enabled  to  approach 
under  cover  of  the  village.  A  sentry-post  at  the  eastern  exit 
will  not  prevent  this,  for  there  are  roads  leading  to  the  village 
also  from  the  south  and  the  north.  The  sentry-post  would  be 
nearly  900  yards  from  the  platoon,  would  with  its  reliefs  re- 
quire 6  men,  and  would  not  make  it  possible  to  do  without 
another  double  sentry-post  at  the  western  exit  of  the  village. 
Thus  the  platoon  would  have  to  use  12  of  its  28  men  for  its 
own  protection.  Besides,  the  officer  would  want  to  keep  the 
Guttstadt-Sommerfeld  highway  under  his  personal  observation. 

A  location  at  the  eastern  exit  of  Altkirch  seems  more  ad- 
vantageous and  in  time  of  peace  could  be  selected  without  delay ; 
especially  as  in  all  probability  the  platoon  could  be  quartered 
in  buildings.  Here  a  double  sentry-post  would  provide  the 
necessary  protection  and  the  highway  will  be  so  near  that 
nothing  on  it  will  escape  the  notice  of  the  vigilant  officer. 
In  spite  of  this  he  has  his  doubts.  He  remembers  a  number 
of  instances  in  military  history  where  small  bodies  of  cavalry 
were  surprised,  mainly  because  they  were  located  within  in- 
closures.  Even  by  day  sentry-posts  had  not  always  prevented 
such  surprises.  He  remembers  the  case  of  Count  Zeppelin  at 
the  beginning  of  the  Franco- Prussian  War  and  the  sad  experi- 
ences of  the  English  in  South  Africa.     The  danger  is  greater 


260  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

in  hostile  territory,  but  it  also  exists  here.     If  Lieutenant  J 

and  his  platoon  belonged  to  the  enemy,  and  had  he  from  the 
heights  near  Gronau  observed  a  detachment  of  cavalry  reach 
Altkirch  and  send  out  patrols  from  the  east  end  of  the  village, 
thus  disclosing  the  location  of  the  detachment,  would  he  not 
think  it  practicable  to  surprise  the  detachment?  Might  not 
the  enterprise  bring  him  glory  and  honor  and  be  of  considerable 
advantage  to  his  general?  There  certainly  would  be  some 
prisoners  captured.  Scattering  the  hostile  detachment  would 
clear  the  way  as  far  as  the  hostile  outposts,  would  disturb  the 
rest  of  the  latter,  and  prevent  reconnaissance — an  advanta- 
geous and  sometimes  quite  bloodless  achievement. 

The  village  is  much  too  large  to  enable  the  platoon  to 
watch  all  avenues  of  approach,  and  in  the  darkness  the  enemys' 
attack  would  almost  immediately  follow  his  discovery  and  the 
call  to  arms.  The  sound  of  approaching  horses  would  not 
justify  opening  fire,  for  friends  might  be  approaching  instead 
of  an  enemy.  There  would  be  no  certainty  except  close  at 
hand. 

The  small  farm-yard,  about  200  yards  north  of  the  east- 
ern exit  of  the  village  is  a  better  place.  But  the  village  is  so 
near  that  it  would  have  to  be  kept  under  observation.  And 
the  farm-yard  easily  might  be  surrounded  if  the  enemy  should 
discover  that  the  platoon  went  there. 

It  would  seem  that  one  of  the  small  depressions  in  the  open 
would  be  a  more  suitable  place.  It  is  true  that  such  a  place, 
too,  might  not  escape  the  enemy's  notice,  and  in  hostile  territory 
there  would  be  danger  from  the  inhabitants  of  the  village. 

We  might  expect  the  officer  to  choose  the  expedient  of 
remaining  under  the  cover  of  Altkirch  until  dark  and  not  take 
up  the  position  for  the  night  until  then.  This  position  must  not 
be  too  far  away  from  the  roads  uniting  at  Altkirch;  and  it  will 
become  known  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  village.  Any  careless 
deed  or  word  might  do  harm  even  in  friendly  territory.     There 


Cavalry  Outposts.  261 

are  others  besides  prudent  men  in  the  village.  Communication 
to  the  rear  and  with  your  own  patrols  is  not  absolutely  certain 
in  such  a  retired  place.  Is  it  not  possible  that  some  horsemen 
will  miss  the  way  across  country?  Nevertheless,  in  some  cases 
it  is  a  practicable  scheme,  especially  on  the  score  of  safety,  and 
will  prevent  hostile  scouts  from  discovering  the  place  by  day. 

Let  us  suppose  that  the  officer,  after  leaving  a  non-com- 
missioned officer  and  1  man'on  Knoll  118,  decides  for  the  pres- 
ent to  remain  at  the  eastern  entrance  of  Altkirch,  covered 
by  houses  and  trees  — at  a  point  where  the  village  street  to  the 
rear  can  be  plainly  seen — and  after  dark,  go  to  a  swale  about 
450  yards  north  of  the  village  near  the  wind-mill  alongside 
the  highway.  He  does  not  select  a  position  south  of  the  vil- 
lage, because  movements  there  are  hampered  by  ditches  and 
marshy  meadows,  while  north  of  the  village  even  outside  of 
the  village,  a  horseman  can  easily  reach  Knoll  118  and  the 
road  to  Lingnau.  The  selection  may  not  be  entirely  satis- 
factory to  the  officer,  but  in  case  of  necessity  the  lesser  evil 
must  be  chosen. 

Not  until  now,  when  every  man  knows  where  the  platoon 
can  be  found  at  night,  may  the  patrols  be  sent  out. 

Three  directions  are  to  be  considered:  via  Peterswalde- 
Zechern  towards  Sperlings  and  Launau,  via  Schmolainen  to- 
wards Liewenberg,  and  towards  Kossen-Guttstadt. 

It  is  true  that  Kossen  lies  within  the  district  of  Troop  A, 
but  as  neither  it  nor  Guttstadt  are  permanently  occupied, 
but  are  only  kept  under  observation,  this  direction  must  not 
be  neglected.  In  addition,  the  southern  bridge  across  the  Alle 
near  Schmolainen  should  watched. 

Such  of  my  readers  as  have  worked  out  the  details  of 

Lieutenant  J 's  problem,  including  the  details  of  patrol 

duty,  or  who  may  still  undertake  it,  will  find  that  it  is  a  hard 
nut  to  crack. 


262  Studies  in  Applied  Tactic*. 

The  patrol  sent  via  Zechern  must  reconnoiter  the  vicinity 
of  Sperlings  and  Launau  and  is  expected  to  watch  the  bridges 
across  the  Alle  at  both  these  places.  This  might  be  accom- 
plished if  the  main  body  of  the  patrol  remained  at  Zechern  or 
Peterswalde  and  sent  single  troopers  to  Sperlings  and  Launau, 
who  could  be  relieved  at  intervals. 

At  least  3  men  would  be  necessary  as  main  body,  4  for 
reconnaissance,  and  2  for  messenger  duty.  Thus  1  non-com- 
missioned officer  and  9  men  would  be  the  least  number  per- 
missible, and  their  orders  would  be  about  as  follows:  "You 
will  ride  via  Peterswalde  to  Zechern,  reconnoiter  the  vicinity 
of  Sperlings  and  Launau,  and  permanently  observe  the  bridges 
across  the  Alle  at  both  these  places,  as  well  as  the  roads  lead- 
ing thence  via  Peterswalde  towards  Altkirch.  You  will  remain 
out  all  night  and  report  to  me  where  you  take  station.  Hostile 
patrols  are  to  be  defeated,  if  possible;  prisoners  are  wanted. 
You  will  retreat  to  this  point  before  superior  numbers." 

Notwithstanding  the  comparativelv  large  size  of  the  patrol, 
which  might  be  called  a  detached  post  or  picket,  a  great  deal 
is  expected  of  it.  Its  orders  are  comprehensive;  only  at  rare 
intervals  will  its  members,  with  reins  over  the  arm,  be  able  to 
sit  down  and  rest  awhile.  Sleep  is  entirely  out  of  the  question 
and  feeding  almost  equally  so. 

The  patrol  sent  via  Schmolainen  towards  Liewenberg  can 
be  smaller.  It  is  simply  to  find  out  if  the  place  is  occupied  by 
the  enemy  or  what  is  known  of  him  there.  But  it  is  undesir- 
able to  send  less  than  4  men  if  any  messages  are  expected  from 
it.  It  is  7  miles  to  Liewenberg  and,  both  as  a  precautionary 
measure  and  to  save  the  horses,  the  patrol  would  best  proceed 
at  an  ordinary  gait. 

Then,  too,  the  people  at  Schmolainen  and  the  foresters 
along  the  highway  must  be  questioned.  The  patrol  will  hardly 
reach  Liewenberg  before  9  p.  m.  or  return  before  midnight. 
Is  it  safe  to  leave  the  bridge  across  the  Alle  east  of  Schmolainen 


Cavalry  Outposts.  263 

unguarded  in  the  meantime  and  after  the  patrol's  return?  The 
patrol  during  its  ride  to  Lie  wen  berg  easily  might  be  forced  aside, 
and  there  is  also  a  possibility  of  hostile  parties  approaching 
from  vSternberg  and  Stolzhagen  via  O.  F.*  Wichertshof.  A 
guard  must  be  left  at  the  bridge,  and  it  would  be  folly  to  expect 
2  or  3  men  to  perform  this  duty  from  8  p.  m.  until  morning. 
They  would  fall  asleep  in  spite  of  the  greatest  devotion  to  duty, 
and  a  sleeping  guard  is  worse  than  none.  A  double  sentry  and 
its  reliefs  are  necessary;  i.  e.,  a  leader  and  6  men.  In  case  of 
necessity  they  also  can  be  required  to  watch  the  southern  bridge 
across  the  Alle,  as  the  only  road  over  it  leads  past  Schmolainen. 
Of  course  the  post  is  exposed  to  a  surprise  by  a  hostile  patrol 
coming  from  Schmolainen  woods  or  Guttstadt.  Before  es- 
tablishing itself  at  the  eastern  edge  of  Schmolainen,  two  of  its 
men  can  ride  to  O.  F.  Wichertshof  to  reconnoiter  the  road  to 
that  point  and  get  information  of  the  enemy. 

Then,  two  or  three  times  during  the  night  a  patrol  should 
be  sent  to  Guttstadt  and  Kossen  and  to  keep  up  communica- 
tion with  Troop  A.     Six  men  are  necessary  for  this  purpose. 

This  is  about  what  might  be  Lieutenant  J 's  first  project 

of  what  is  desirable.     In  figuring  up  he  finds  as  follows: 

N.  C.  O.  Men. 

To  be  sent  to  Zechern i  c) 

To  be  sent  to  Lievvenberg -  4 

To  be  sent  to  Schmolainen 1  6 

To  be  sent  to  Kossen-Guttstadt -  6 

Total 2  25 

Only  4  men  of  this  number,  the  second  and  third  reliefs 
of  the  patrol  for  Guttstadt,  will  be  with  the  platoon,  which  thus 
will  consist  of  1  non-commissioned  officer  and  7  men.  Of  this 
small  remnant  there  are,  at  present,  1  non-commissioned  officer 
and  1  man  at  Regerteln,  2  men  at  Neuendorf,  and  2  men  at 
Knoll  118.     The  project  is  impracticable.     During  maneuvers 

*Ober  Forslerei,  head  forester's  house. 


264  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

or  field  exercises  a  remedy  could  easily  be  found.  In  such  a 
case  1  non-commissioned  officer  and  3  men  would  be  sent  to 
Zechern,  2  men  to  Liewenberg,  1  non-commissioned  officer  and 
4  men  to  Schmolainen,  and  4  men  to  Kossen-Guttstadt.  Thus 
there  would  remain  with  the  platoon  2  non-commissioned  offi- 
cers and  17  men;  it  could  post  a  double  sentry  (6  men,  with 
reliefs),  and  the  officer  would  retain  1  non-commissioned  officer 
and  9  men  to  use  as  he  thought  best.  But  such  scantiness  will 
not  do  in  war.  Nowhere  would  there  be  any  assurance  of  an 
orderly  attentive  performance  of  duty. 

If  the  non-commissioned  officer  near  Zechern  stations 
himself  south  of  Dittchen  Krug  and  barricades  the  bridge  across 
the  Alle  west  of  Sperlings  with  a  couple  of  wagons,  a  double 
sentry-post  may  be  able  to  protect  the  remainder  of  the  men 
and  watch  the  bridge.  It  will  also  be  possible  to  watch  the 
Launau-Freymarkt  road.  But,  after  the  day's  exertions,  the 
men  on  sentry  duty  will  not  be  able  to  perform  their  trying 
duty  for  more  than  two  hours.  If  they  are  not  then  relieved, 
they  cease  to  be  of  any  use,  even  if  they  should  manage  to  keep 
on  their  feet.  If  the  detachment  consists  of  9  men,  four  pass- 
ably alert  eyes  and  ears  now  assume  the  duties  and,  after  two 
hours  more,  a  third  relief,  while  the  non-commissioned  officer 
has  three  men  left  to  use  as  messengers  or  for  patrol  duty  to- 
wards Launau  or  Sperlings.  Four  or  five  rifles  are  at  all  times 
ready  to  fire  a  few  shots  to  check  hostile  detachments  or  defeat 
a  patrol. 

The  trouble  is  that  the  power  of  resistance  is  too  weak. 
For  there  is  nothing  gained  by  running  away  from  every  little 
patrol  and  reporting  its  presence  to  regimental  headquarters. 
If  there  is  nothing  following  tbe  patrol,  they  don't  want  to  be 
aroused  at  Lmgnau  or  Scharniek.  But  the  thing  is  to  discover 
larger  bodies  in  time.  How  can  4  men  at  Zechern  or  2  at  Liew- 
enberg  or  4  at  Schmolainen  solve  the  problem? 


Cavalry  Outposts.  265 

If  they  did  not  quit  their  post  on  the  approach  of  every 
hostile  patrol,  but  concealed  themselves  to  allow  such  patrols 
to  pass,  so  as  to  get  a  glimpse  behind  the  latter,  we  could  not 
hope  for  reports.  For  during  the  night  messengers  cannot 
gallop  across  country,  and  the  beaten  track  is  blocked  by  the 
enemy  who  has  passed. 

The  convenient  peace  expedient  of  reducing  the  number 
of  men  of  individual  detachments  cannot  be  used  in  time  of 
war.     We  must  look  for  other  means. 

The  officer  is  right  in  thinking  of  having  stationary  posts 
at  Zechern  and  Schmolainen.  An  occupation  of  the  bridges 
across  the  Alle  would  insure  a  degree  of  safety  not  otherwise 
attainable.  But  if  there  are  not  enough  men  to  establish 
such  posts,  then  the  question  arises  whether  patrols  will  not 
answer.  One  of  these  would  have  to  ride  via  Peterswalde, 
Zechern,  and  Sperlings  to  Launau  and  return  via  Dittchen 
Krug.  It  must  consist  at  least  of  a  leader  and  3  men  if  it 
is  to  be  able  to  continue  its  work  after  sending  back  a  messen- 
ger. A  second  patrol,  sent  via  Schmolainen  to  Liewenberg, 
examining  the  bridge  north  of  F.  Schmolainen  and  returning 
the  same  way,  could  not  be  any  smaller  than  the  first.  In 
addition,  two  patrols  of  3  men  each  would  be  needed,  one 
going  to  O.  F.  Wichertshof — and  possibly  returning  across  the 
bridge  at  Kossen,  the  other  via  Guttstadt-Neuendorf.  That 
will  take  2  non-commissioned  officers  or  lance  corporals  and  12 
men.  After  deducting  6  men  for  a  double  sentry,  the  platoon 
will  have  1  non-commissioned  officer  and  10  men  left. 

The  two  patrols  last  named  may  be  expected  back  after 
1 1  hours,  and  shortly  thereafter  other  men  must  be  sent  out 
in  the  same  direction.  Possibly  this  time  only  4  men  will  be 
sent,  of  whom  2  will  go  as  far  as  Schmolainen  to  watch  the 
bridge  across  the  Alle  until  midnight,  while  the  other  2  will 
watch  and  listen  for  two  hours  at  Weidenhof.  At  midnight 
these  must  be  relieved,  and  at  2  a.  m.  the  6  men  first  sent  out 

—18— 


266  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

will  again  go  on  duty.      The  two  curtailed  reliefs  take  8  of 
the  10  remaining  men  of  the  platoon. 

The  patrols  to  Launau  and  Liewenberg  have  long  distances 
to  go;  the  one  15  miles,  the  other  17  miles.  The  first  may  re- 
turn by  midnight,  the  other  by  1  or  2  a.  m.  At  this  time  it 
will  seem  most  important  to  the  officer  that  reconnaissance  be 
continued  beyond  the  Alle,  but  he  has  only  tired  men  and  horses 
left,  who  either  have  been  on  patrol  duty  or  on  sentry-post 
half  the  night, 

If  the  duty  assigned  the  platoon  is  to  be  carried  out  by 
patrols,  fresh  and  capable  reliefs  must  be  sent  out  before  the 
return  of  the  first  ones.  Otherwise  the  roads  and  bridges  will 
remain  unobserved  for  hours. 

The  reliefs  would  have  to  leave  for  Launau  and  Liewen- 
berg as  early  as  n  a.  m.  But  the  commander  will  be  able  to 
provide  them  only  in  case  he  omits  the  reconnaissance  towards 
Kossen  and  Guttstadt,  and  only  occasionally  sends  2  men  to 
Schmolainen.  In  this  case  there  would  be  18  men  on  the  road 
most  of  the  night  and  only  13  with  the  platoon,  6  of  the  latter 
being  necessary  for  a  double  sentry-post,  and  4  would  form  the 
reliefs  of  the  patrol  sent  to  Schmolainen. 

It  would  be  self-deception  in  the  platoon  commander  to 
expect  better  results  from  such  an  arrangement  than  from  the 
preceding  estimate  based  on  maneuvers  which  he  had  to  reject 
as  being  unsatisfactory.  The  small  patrols  would  have  to 
give  way  before  every  hostile  patrol,  the  same  as  the  small 
stationary  posts.  Whatever  may  be  following  such  hostile 
patrols  will  remain  undiscovered.  The  men  cannot  even  listen 
in  the  saddle.  The  creaking  of  leather,  rattling  of  iron,  breath- 
ing of  horses  drown  all  distant  sounds.  The  entire  force  is  al- 
most constantly  in  motion,  and  if  there  is  any  break  in  the  com- 
plicated apparatus,  if  one  of  the  patrols  remains  out  too  long, 
otl  er  men  must  be  sent  out  who  have  hardly  dismounted. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  267 

The  squadron  commander's  purpose  in  sending  Lieutenant 
—  to  Altkirch  seems  to  fail  on  account  of  the  distances  to 


be  covered.  Apparently  he  has  overestimated  the  capacity  of 
a  single  platoon.  For  an  instant  the  young  officer  regrets  not 
to  have  asked  for  a  larger  force  before  leaving  Heiligenthal. 
But  he  quickly  becomes  consoled.  He  mentally  hears  his  com- 
mander's answer:  "Do  the  best  you  can,  the  remaining  troops 
must  rest,"  and  is  glad  that  he  raised  no  objection.  He  will 
do  the  best  he  can.  He  again  begins  to  consider.  Was  it  in- 
evitable that  his  platoon  would  not  suffice  for  effective  sentry 
duty  on  the  Alle;  that  small  posts  would  be  useless;  and  that 
repeatedly  covering  the  roads  by  small  patrols  would  not  an- 
swer? Then  it  might  be  permissible  to  carry  out  only  the  prin- 
cipal part  of  his  instructions. 

The  platoon  can  furnish  a  picket  at  Schmolainen  and  send 
patrols  every  two  hours  towards  Peterswalde  and  Kossen,  re- 
spectively. In  this  way  it  would  keep  its  horses  in  fairly  good 
shape  and  be  able  to  send  two  patrols  of  three  or  four  men  each 
to  Liewenberg  and  Launau.  At  least  the  two  nearest  bridges 
over  the  Alle  would  be  permanently  guarded  and  the  principal 
part  of  the  orders  would  be  carried  out. 

But  this  solution  does  not  completely  satisfy  Lieutenant 

J 's  ambition  and  sense  of  duty.     He  pictures  to  himself 

the  possibility  of  a  hostile  expedition  coming  within  his  reach ; 
for  example,  that  hostile  troops  of  cavalry  were  to  advance 
that  evening  via  Peterswalde  towards  Altkirch.  In  this  event, 
of  what  service  would  his  platoon  be  to  the  regiment?  Should 
the  enemy  happen  to  meet  one  of  the  patrols  sent  out  every 
two  hours,  he  would  closely  follow  it  to  Altkirch,  where  he  would 
be  able  quickly  to  overcome  the  resistance  of  the  platoon  in  the 
open  and  arrive  shortly  after  it  at  Lingnau.  The  sole  use  of 
the  platoon  would  have  been  the  gain  of  a  few  minutes  for 
preparation  by  the  troops  in  Lingnau  in  addition  to  what  they 
would  otherwise  have  had. 


268  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Was  such  an  expenditure  of  strength  necessary  for  the  sake 
of  such  a  slight  return?  Is  not  the  main  body  sufficiently  pro- 
tected against  surprise  by  its  outposts,  whose  horses  are  not 
with  them?  The  officer  follows  up  this  idea.  The  regimental 
commander  must  have  had  something  else  in  mind  than  a 
second  line  of  outposts  in  front  of  the  first.  The  latter  must 
answer  to  prevent  surprise.  The  detached  bodies  are  to  serve 
another  purpose.  They  are  to  assure  the  colonel  freedom  of 
action,  so  that  he  can  oppose  his  own  enterprise  to  the  enemy's 
and  not  be  limited  to  the  defensive.  If  he  gets  timely  infor- 
mation of  the  enemy's  advance,  it  will  be  for  him  to  choose 
between  receiving  the  enemy  with  dismounted  fire  action, 
avoiding  him,  or  meeting  him  in  counter-attack.  No  one  is 
more  easily  surprised  than  he  who  expects  to  find  the  enemy 
asleep. 

Although  detached  bodies  doubtless  increase  the  security 
of  the  main  body  from  surprise  and  from  annoyance  by  patrols, 
this  alone  would  not  warrant  the  attendant  expenditure  of 
strength.  Half  the  force,  if  with  the  outposts,  would  do  vastly 
more  good  for  protection  than  far  to  the  front,  where  these 
small  bodies  are  exposed  to  the  danger  of  being  destroyed  or  of 
becoming  useless  by  being  pushed  aside.  They  are  not  in- 
tended to  form  a  barrier,  but  to  act  as  eyes,  ears,  and  feelers. 

Lieutenant  J ,  to  whom  this  becomes  clear  after  con- 
siderable thought,  may  finally  ask  himself  why  he  was  not 
ordered  to  find  the  enemy.  If,  instead  of  remaining  at  Alt- 
kirch,  he  were  allowed  to  continue  his  ride,  and,  going  via 
Schmolainen  towards  Uewenberg,  he  should  discover  the  enemy 
there,  while  a  flank  patrol  found  Launau  and  Sperlings  unoc- 
cupied, the  colonel  could  have  word  of  this  shortly  after  mid- 
night, and  the  platoon,  remaining  in  the  vicinity  of  Sperlings, 
might  continue  in  observation  of  the  enemy.  This  positive 
result  would  be  more  valuable  than  the  exhausting  waiting  and 


Cavalry  Outposts.  269 

watching  at  Altkirch  with  its  doubtful  subdivision  into  small 
posts  and  patrols. 

But  should  the  courageously  advancing  platoon  miss  the 
road  on  which  the  enemy  is  approaching?  Suppose  that  the 
enemy,  coming  via  O.  F.  Wichertshof,  arrives  at  Schmolainen 

while  Lieutenant  J trots  to  Liewenberg,  or  that  the  enemy, 

advancing  via  Peterswalde,  pushes  aside  the  flanking  patrol. 
The  colonel  does  not  want  to  know  whether  Liewenberg  or  any 
other  point  is  occupied  by  the  enemy,  but  he  wants  to  have  his 
feelers  on  all  roads  over  which  the  enemy  might  approach. 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  active  reconnaissance  is  also 
desired  towards  Liewenberg.  But,  as  a  rule,  explorations  by 
night  attain  results  only  in  time  of  peace,  when  no  bullets  are 
flying  and  camp-fires  can  be  seen  afar  off.  A  few  shots  that 
blaze  up  somewhere  in  the  darkness,  a  few  riders  whose  horses' 
hoof  beats  are  heard,  do  not  clear  up  the  situation;  it  is  not 
until  dawn  brightens  the  eastern  sky  that  exploring  tours  are 

worth  while.     The  thing  for  Lieutenant  J to  do  until  then 

is  to  detect  hostile  movements  in  his  territory  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible; and  to  report  such  so  promptly  that  the  regimental  com- 
mander may  be  able  to  assemble  his  troops  before  the  enemy 
arrives  in  the  vicinity  of  Lingnau. 

None  of  the  projects  that  the  lieutenant's  ingenuity  so  far 
has  devised  will  answer  this  purpose.  With  tenacious  self- 
control  he  again  thinks  the  matter  over.  As  he  has  become 
satisfied  that  his  platoon  can  accomplish  but  little  if  he  strictly 
confines  himself  to  the  letter  of  his  instructions,  it  may  be  pos- 
sible to  accomplish  more  if,  keeping  only  the  ultimate  object  in 
mind,  he  tries  to  follow  the  spirit  instead  of  the  letter  of  these 
instructions.  Could  not  better  advantage  be  taken  of  the 
opportunities  offered  along  this  part  of  the  Alle  by  carrying 
out  the  instructions  if  the  platoon  were  posted  elsewhere  than 
at  Altkirch?  Should  the  squadron  commander  chance  to  come 
that  way,  would  he  not  approve  an  intelligent  suggestion  by 


2-o  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

his  subordinate  for  a  change  of  location?  To  ask  the  question 
is  to  answer  it  affirmatively.  The  more  the  assurance  prevails 
in  an  army  that  independent  action  will  be  acknowledged  if  it 
furthers  the  object,  the  better  will  it  be  for  the  common  good. 

The  squadron  commander  had  to  decide  by  the  map,  and 
at  the  first  glance  Altkirch,  where  all  the  roads  within  the  pla- 
toon's district  came  together,  seemed  to  him  the  most  suitable 
station.  Should  he  hear  of  the  difficulties  caused  by  this  part 
of  his  orders,  he  surely  would  offer  no  objection  to  a  suitable 
change.  We  can  learn  from  this  that  commanders  of  such 
detachments  should  be  allowed  a  certain  discretion  in  the  choice 
of  the  station  of  their  commands,  and  that  it  would  have  been 
well  if  the  place  had  not  been  so  specifically  named  in  the  orders. 

Being  satisfied  in  his  own  mind  that  it  is  permissible  for 

him  to  deviate  from  his  superior's  orders,  Lieutenant  J 's 

previous  careful  considerations  now  quickly  help  him  to  a  deci- 
sion. He  will  have  the  platoon  stay  at  Schmolainen,  sending 
i  non-commissioned  officer  and  12  men  to  Zechern. 

The  following  arrangements  are  planned  for  Schmolainen : 
the  two  bridges  over  the  Alle  will  be  barricaded,  the  southern 
one  as  securely  as  possible,  the  northern  one  in  such  a  way  as 
to  leave  an  opening  through  which  single  horsemen  can  pass. 
A  dismounted  double  sentry-post  will  be  established  to  guard 
the  latter  bridge.  The  platoon  itself  will  be  located  at  the 
southern  exit  of  the  village.  A  single  sentry,  dismounted,  will 
be  posted  near  it  on  the  small  knoll,  whence  the  northern  and 
western  exits  of  the  village  and  the  short  stretches  of  roads  as 
far  as  the  forest  can  be  seen.  Both  these  exits  are  barricaded 
with  wagons,  leaving  only  small  passageways. 

The  detachment  intended  for  Zechern  accompanies  the 
platoon  as  far  as  Schmolainen,  having  a  patrol  go  from  Altkirch 
to  the  Schmolainen-Peterswalde  road,  where  it  is  again  to  join 
the  detachment.  Thus  the  non-commissioned  officer  learns  by 
personal  observation  where  the  platoon  will  be  located  and  can 


Cavalry  Outposts.  271 

point  out  the  messenger-route  to  his  men.  The  lieutenant  will 
direct  him  to  ride  carefully  and  as  much  hidden  as  possible, 
going  alongside  of  the  roads  and  not  through  Peterswalde,  but 
along  Zechern  woods  in  which  he  can  conceal  himself  at  any 
moment  from  hostile  view.  Only  a  couple  of  troopers  can  be 
sent  through  Peterswalde,  especially  to  find  out  what  the  in- 
habitants know  of  the  enemy.  It  is  important  to  question  the 
inhabitants  of  Zechern  and  Dittchen  Krug  and,  if  possible, 
obtain  information  in  Launau  and  Sperlings  by  means  of  volun- 
tary messengers.  Advantage  can  be  taken  of  such  in  friendly 
territory,  but  cautiously,  for  the  messengers  must  be  reliable 
persons  and  must  not  disclose  anything  about  us.  The  non- 
commissioned officer  is  advised  to  barricade  the  bridge  across 
the  Alle  at  Zechern  in  such  a  way  that  removing  the  obstacles 
would  take  some  time  and  make  some  noise.  The  officer  thinks 
that  the  detachment  might  find  a  good  location  for  itself  north- 
east of  Zechern,  close  by  the  bridge,  with  a  single  or  double 
sentry-post  as  guard.  If  the  non-commissioned  officer  has  a 
few  boards  placed  across  the  small  creek  running  alongside  into 
the  Alle,  dismounted  patrols  would  have  to  go  only  a  short  dis- 
tance to  the  vicinity  of  Dittchen  Krug  to  control  the  road  lead- 
ing to  Launau.  But,  warned  by  his  own  experience,  Lieuten- 
ant J does  not  positively  designate  the  place,  but  authorizes 

the  non-commissioned  officer  to  decide  according  to  circum- 
stances. He  impresses  on  the  latter  that  the  detachment  must 
hold  its  ground  against  small  hostile  detachments;  that  the 
approach  of  larger  detachments  should  be  detected  and  re- 
ported; that  prisoners  are  very  much  wanted;  and  that  the 
discovery  of  the  first  hostile  patrol  must  be  reported,  because 
so  far  the  enemy  has  not  been  seen  in  the  vicinity  of  Sperlings 
and  Launau.  Messages  are  to  be  sent  to  Schmolainen,  but 
messengers  must  be  instructed  to  go  to  Lmgnau  in  case  they 
should  not  find  the  platoon  at  Schmolainen  or  if  they  are 
forced  out  of  the  way.     As  the  detachment  consists  of  12  men, 


2 j2  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

the  instructions  can  be  carried  out,  particularly  if  the  non- 
commissioned officer  can  depend  on  his  own  watchfulness.  If 
the  detachment  is  stationed  close  to  the  bridge,  a  single  sentry- 
post  will  suffice,  for  the  horse-holders  also  are  awake.  Two 
men  are  sufficient  to  constantly  watch  the  highway  at  Dittchen 
Krug.  This  would  leave  8  or  9  rifles  ready  for  action  at  Zech- 
ern  bridge,  for  the  non-commissioned  officer  also  would  use 
his  rifle.    The  detachment  would  obtain  supplies  from  Zechern. 

Lieutenant  J would  have  2  non-commissioned  officers 

and  16  men  at  Schmolainen.  Nine  men  are  needed  as  sentries 
and  their  reliefs.  The  remainder  will  be  sufficient  for  a  recon- 
naissance to  Kossen  and  a  renewal  of  communication  with 
Troop  A  as  well  as  inquiry  at  O.  F.  Wichertsdorf.  In  addition 
a  stealthy  patrol  on  foot  can  go  across  the  Alle  from  time  to 
time  and  observe  the  highway. 

Lieutenant  J sends  a  report  of  his  arrangements  to 

the  squadron  commander  and  requests  that  the  outpost  troops 
watch  the  Guttstadt-Sommerfeld  highway  and  send  their  pa- 
trols as  far  as  Kossen  and  Schmolainen.  The  foot-bridge  north 
of  F.  Schmolainen  is  made  impassable  by  countrymen  under 
supervision  of  a  non-commissioned  officer. 

Lieutenant    J 's    arbitrary    action    was   not   of   great 

moment — he  simply  advanced  his  position  a  little  over  a  mile 
from  Altkirch — and  yet,  much  was  gained  by  it.  Even  now 
the  platoon's  location  has  some  weak  points,  but  it  is  reason- 
ably certain  that  a  hostile  advance  would  be  detected  by  the 
time  it  reached  the  Alle  and  be  checked  for  awhile.  A  report 
of  this  would  be  sent  more  rapidly  over  known  roads  than  the 
enemy  would  be  able  to  advance;  and  the  regimental  com- 
mander would  receive  it  as  promptly  as  would  be  possible 
under  existing  circumstances.  In  place  of  a  division  into  a 
number  of  small  groups  and  patrols  which  could  not  be  super- 
vised, we  have  a  division  into  two  groups  having  some  power 
of  resistance.    It  is  doubtful  if  every  one  of  the  numerous  patrol 


Cavalry  Outposts.  273 

and  post  commanders,  that  would  have  been  needed  under  the 
other  arrangement,  would  have  been  equal  to  the  occasion. 
Now  the  lieutenant  need  intrust  only  the  most  circumspect 
and  reliable  non-commissioned  officer  with  an  independent 
task  of  any  consequence.  Instead  of  continuous  movement 
and  disquiet,  we  have  rest  and  quiet.  Whereas  at  Altkirch  it 
was  almost  impossible  to  conceal  the  position  of  the  platoon 
from  the  view  of  hostile  scouts,  the  platoon  can  now  withdraw 
from  view  into  Schmolainen  Woods,  and  cannot  be  easily  de- 
tected either  at  Schmolainen  or  Zechern.  Although  the  men 
may  not  be  able  to  get  much  sleep,  the  horses  will  not  be  worn 
out  by  morning.  Food  and  the  replenishing  of  nose-bags  are 
assured. 

No  matter  how  thoroughly  convinced  we  may  be  of  the 

wisdom  of  Lieutenant  J 's  final  conclusions,  they  form  but 

a  slight  basis  for  other  cases.  Every  new  case  presents  new 
difficulties.  This  at  once  becomes  evident  if  we  think  of  Lieu- 
tenant L — — 's  task,  who  is  sent  to  Regerteln  with  25  men  of 
Troop  E  to  watch  the  Altkirch-Arnsdorf-Wormditt  highway 
and  the  roads  leading  to  Gronau,  Freymarkt,  Arnsdorf,  and 
Dittrichsdorf .  It  is  true  that  in  one  of  the  farm-yards  of  Regert- 
eln he  will  find  a  suitable  location  for  his  platoon,  and  one  more 

easily  defended  than  that  of  Lieutenant  J at  Schmolainen ; 

but  his  district  is  so  extensive,  the  number  of  roads  to  watch  is 
so  great,  and  they  diverge  so  much  from  each  other  that  he 
must  have  recourse  to  other  means.  He  cannot  take  advantage 
of  an  obstacle  like  the  Alle  River,  to  seize  the  enemy's  avenues 
of  approach  with  one  or  two  groups.  There  probably  will  be 
nothing  left  for  him  to  do  but  to  keep  up  a  system  of  patrols 
in  his  district  from  a  station  at  Regerteln.  Whoever  will  take 
the  trouble  to  examine  just  how  this  service  can  be  performed 
will  become  convinced  that  notwithstanding  the  most  careful 
and  economical  arrangement  and  greatest  self-denial,  but  little 
can  be  done,  and  that  the  following  morning  horses  and  men 


274  Studies  jx  Applied  Tactics. 

will  be  worn  out  and  unable  to  further  exert  themselves.  When 
we  consider  that  the  troopers  can  see  and  hear  but  little  in  the 
darkness,  that  they  and  their  messages  will  be  deflected  if 
hostile  patrols  are  met,  that  they  will  be  late  in  recognizing 
and  reporting  large  hostile  bodies,  and  that  they  will  be  un- 
able to  check  such  bodies,  the  advantage  that  the  lieutenant- 
colonel  hopes  for  in  sending  the  detachment  to  Regerteln  be- 
comes very  doubtful. 

Putting  ourselves  in  the  place  of  Lieutenant  J at 

Schmolainen,  we  realized  his  mental  labor  and  did  not  arrive 
at  a  satisfactory  solution  until  we  ventured  to  change  his  in- 
structions on  the  supposition  that  the  squadron  commander, 
if  he  chanced  to  be  present,  would  approve  of  the  liberal  con- 
struction, the  departure  from  the  letter  of  instructions,  and 
the  advance  of  the  platoon  to  a  point  beyond  Altkirch.  Lieu- 
tenant L at  Regerteln  would  in  vain  look  for  a  similar 

alternative.  He  hardly  would  improve  matters  were  he  to 
advance  to  near  Sommerfeld,  or  even  beyond  that  point.  He 
would  not  be  spared  the  fatiguing  and  largely  purposeless  pa- 
trolling in  various  directions  during  the  night;  and  it  would 
be  more  difficult  to  protect  the  station  of  the  platoon.  And  yet 
there  is  a  way  that  would  better  serve  the  purpose  for  which 
this  detachment  was  made  and  be  in  harmony  with  the  occupa- 
tion of  Schmolainen  and  Zechern  by  Lieutenant  J .     If  the 

officer  could  decide  to  advance  to  Freymarkt,  occupying  one 
of  the  farm-yards  outside  the  village  and  near  the  road,  and 
place  a  picket  under  a  non-commissioned  officer  at  Mawern, 
every  advance  of  the  enemy  by  night  would  be  quickly  detected 
and  checked.  The  road  would  be  barred  for  hostile  patrols 
and  messengers,  and  a  connecting-post  would  be  formed  for 

the  messages  of  Lieutenant  B ,  who  was  sent  towards  Keils- 

berg.  Only  the  roads  leading  northwest  from  Regerteln  would 
remain  unobserved.  But  on  these  nothing  need  be  feared  ex- 
cept the  troop  which  was  defeated  at  Pittehnen  on  the  morning 


Cavalry  Outposts.  275 

of  May  5th,  and  the  outposts  of  the  regiment  would  afford  ample 
protection  against  it,  especially  if  the  outpost  troop  at  Scharnick 
sends  a  picket  to  Arnsdorf  for  the  night. 

But  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that  Lieutenant  L will  so 

radically  change  his  instructions.  Even  if  he  had  sufficient 
discernment  to  see  the  advantages  of  an  advance  to  Freymarkt, 
he  would  hesitate  to  recommend  it  to  his  lieutenant-colonel. 
He  would  have  to  base  his  recommendations  on  general  princi- 
ples, and  not  on  local  conditions  which  his  superior  could  not 
perceive.  No  matter  how  respectful  the  form  might  be,  the 
recommendation  would  convey  criticism.  Do  the  lieutenant- 
colonel's  arrangements  deserve  censure?  The  regimental  com- 
mander's orders  were:  "In  front  of  the  outposts,  the  roads  to 
Freymarkt  and  Wormditt  and  the  Guttstadt-Kallisten  highway 
must  be  carefully  watched."  It  must  be  admitted  that  send- 
ing a  platoon  to  Regerteln,  where  the  roads  from'Gronau,  Frey- 
markt, and  Wormditt  come  together,  seems  to  comply  with  the 
orders  in  a  formal  way  and  conforms  to  peace  practice.  It  is 
true  that  the  lieutenant-colonel  listened  to  the  orders  given  the 
commander  of  the  1st  Squadron  and  knows  that  the  latter  is  to 
watch  the  bridges  over  the  Alle  below  Kossen  as  well  as  the  roads 
to  Liewenberg,  Sperlings,  and  Launau.  But  he  hardly  could 
anticipate  that  this  would  result  in  the  permanent  occupation 
of  the  bridges  at  Schmolainen  and  of  Zechern.  In  discussing 
their  plans  before  leaving  Heiligenthal,  the  commander  of  the 
1st  Squadron  certainly  only  stated  that  he  would  send  a  platoon 
to  Altkirch.  Thus  a  platoon  sent  to  Freymarkt  would  have 
been  considerably  beyond  the  sphere  of  the  regiment,  and  its 
communication  with  Scharnick  could  not  have  been  considered 
safe.  Therefore  no  blame  attaches  to  the  lieutenant-colonel's 
action. 

We  must  look  higher  for  the  cause  of  the  neglect.  Al- 
though the  regimental  commander  was  justified  in  ridding  him- 
self of  the  details  of  the  service  of  security,  still,  the  fundamental 


2-6  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

instructions  for  the  observation  of  the  country  and  roads  north 
of  the  place  of  cantonment  should  have  emanated  from  him. 
We  see  that  he  retained  control  of  the  two  reconnaissance  troops 
sent  respectively  to  Neuendorf  and  Rosengarth.  Only  he  sur- 
veyed the  entire  situation.  Co-operation  among  the  different 
parts  of  the  regiment  in  the  area  of  reconnaissance  could  be 
attained  only  if  his  orders  read:  "The  ist  Squadron  will  take 
charge  of  reconnaissance  towards  Stolzhagen-Heilsberg,  and 
will  send  detachments  of  observation  to  the  crossings  of  the 
Alle  below  Kossen,  particularly  to  Schmolainen  and  Zechern. 
The  2d  and  3d  Squadrons  will  reconnoiter  to  the  north  and 
northwest,  and  will  occupy  Freymarkt  with  a  detached  post, 
commanded  by  an  officer." 

The  lesson  we  learn  from  the  theoretical  examination  of 
a  supposititious  individual  case  probably  would  come  to  the 
colonel  only  with  war  experience,  where  after  a  few  days'  trial 
he  becomes  satisfied  that  his  horses  are  being  worn  out  by  the 
patrolling  at  night,  and  that  this  work  is  of  but  little  value. 
But  we  must  not  too  severely  criticise  his  mistake.  Our  regula- 
tions lay  such  stress  on  the  value  of  supplementing  arrange- 
ments for  protection  by  patrolling,  they  so  greatly  emphasize 
the  necessity  of  also  sending  out  cavalry  patrols  by  night,  they 
so  lighten  the  duty  of  such  patrols  in  peace  maneuvers  by  be- 
littling the  effect  of  hostile  fire,  that  we  cannot  wonder  at  the 
strong  hold  that  peace  training  has.  We  are  so  accustomed  to 
the  appearance  of  hostile  patrols  within  our  reach  that  we  con- 
sider it  unavoidable,  and  underestimate  the  resulting  damage — 
do  not  try  to  avoid  it — and  simply  try  to  do  the  same  with 
reference  to  the  enemy.  In  time  of  peace  3  men  at  Freymarkt 
and  3  men  at  Zechern  accomplish  as  much  as  10  or  20  men, 
and  their  messages  frequently  pass  unmolested  through  the 
opposing  troops.  Of  course,  under  such  favorable  conditions 
a  very  small  number  of  troopers  would  be  able  to  carry  on 
patrolling  by  night  at  Altkirch  or  Regerteln.     Their  tired  horses 


Cavalry  Outposts.  277 

would  remain  with  the  train  the  following  day.  We  do  hear 
complaints  even  at  maneuvers  of  the  large  number  of  horses 
that  have  to  fall  out,  but  the  evil  is  the  more  readily  endured 
during  the  short  period  of  autumn  maneuvers  because,  as  a 
rule,  a  disproportionately  large  force  of  cavalry  is  available, 
and  the  easy  marches  back  to  garrison,  and  the  rest  enjoyed 
there,  usually  mend  the  damage. 

Moreover,  it  is  probable  that  placing  the  platoons  of  Lieu- 
tenants J and  L, but  a  few  thousand  yards  in  front  of 

the  outposts  was  due  to  the  expectation  that  they  would  add 
to  the  security  of  the  regiment  in  its  cantonments.  A  firm 
belief  in  the  protecting  power  of  the  outposts  was  lacking. 
The  platoons  at  Guttstadt  railway-station,  Altkirch,  and  Re- 
gerteln,  respectively,  in  a  certain  measure  form  a  second  line 
of  outposts  catching  the  first  impetus  of  hostile  enterprises. 

The  increased  power  of  resistance  of  outposts  when  rid  of 
their  horses  make  such  subconscious  cautionary  measures  un- 
necessary. We  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  the  one  error  is 
contained  within  the  other.  The  increased  reliability  of  the 
outposts  extends  the  activity  of  the  reconnoitering  bodies,  which 
now  unhesitatingly  may  be  sent  to  important  distant  points. 

They  will  better  answer  the  purpose  of  security  than 
mounted  patrolling  by  night,  and  the  rapid  wearing  out  of 
trained  horses  will  be  checked. 

The  comparatively  sure  night's  rest  for  our  detachments 
at  Schmolainen,  Zechern,  and  Freymarkt  will  make  them  ser- 
viceable for  reconnaissance  work  at  daybreak,  while  keeping 
on  the  road  at  night  would  use  up  their  strength.  They  would 
have  to  be  relieved  in  the  morning  and  would  reduce  the  fight- 
ing strength  of  the  troops. 

It  is  self-evident  that,  as  a  rule,  the  horses  of  reconnoiter- 
ing bodies  cannot  be  placed  in  stables  or  barns ;  that  they  can  be 
fed,  watered  and  have  saddles  shifted  singly,  only,  so  that  the 
detachment  may  be  able  to  quickly  mount  and  get  away. 


278  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Modern  Methods  of  Forwarding  Information  and  Orders. 

Our  attention  has  been  repeatedly  called  to  the  necessity 
of  quickly  and  safely  forwarding  to  higher  authority  the  infor- 
mation gathered  by  the  cavalry,  for  the  most  brilliant  results 
in  reconnaissance  are  of  no  value  if  they  are  not  reported  in 
time.  But  we  also  recognize  the  difficulties  to  be  overcome  in 
accomplishing  this  object.     It  was  not  until  near  5  p.  m.  that 

Colonel  A heard  what  his  reconnaissance  troops  and  patrols 

learned  about  the  enemy  by  3  or  4  p.  m.,  and  his  important 
report  on  the  infantry  outposts  at  Schwuben-Wilhelmsthal  will 
hardly  reach  corps  headquarters  at  Mohrungen  before  8  p.  m. 
And  it  probably  will  be  8  or  9  p.  m.  before  a  report  can  be  sent 
that  will  show  that  the  regiment  actually  is  cantoned  at  Lingnau 
and  Scharnick  and  what  the  situation  until  evening  is  with 
reference  to  the  enemy.  It  is  true  that  connecting-posts  have 
been  established  at  Wolfsdorf  and  Pittehnen  as  a  precautionary 
measure,  and  from  Liebstadt  there  even  is  telegraphic  com- 
munication, but  it  will  be  1 1  p.  m.  or  midnight  before  they  learn 
at  corps  headquarters  how  things  are  at  the  extreme  front. 
Were  we  in  hostile  territory  and  unable  to  make  use  of  the 
telegraph  from  Liebstadt,  the  information  would  be  delayed 
1  \  or  2  hours  more.  A  knowledge  of  whatever  may  happen  at 
Guttstadt  during  the  night  or  early  in  the  morning,  no  matter 
how  important  it  may  be  for  the  commanding  general,  would 
not  reach  Mohrungen  until  after  headquarters  had  departed. 

The  same  unfavorable  conditions  obtain  with  reference  to 
information  or  orders  intended  for  the  1st  Cavalry.  What- 
ever cannot  be  sent  from  Mohrungen  before  midnight  probably 

will  not  reach  it  on  time.     For  Colonel  A will  want  to  get 

up  earlier  than  the  enemy,  and,  when  he  and  his  men  have 
mounted,  a  messenger  probably  would  not  overtake  him  until 
it  would  be  too  late  to  change  the  direction  of  march. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  279 

But  why  resort  to  mounted  messengers?  They  were  used 
as  long  ago  as  the  days  of  Alexander,  Xerxes,  and  the  Pharaohs. 

Why  does  not  Colonel  A make  use  of  the  inventions  of 

modern  times,  the  field  telegraph,  heliograph,  night  lamp,* 
signal  flag,  wireless  telegraphy,  or  bicycle? 

Let  us  see  what  use  the  colonel  could  have  made  of  these. 

Visual  signals  were  out  of  the  question  from  the  beginning. 
Science  has  devised  ingenious  and  very  portable  field  signal 
apparatus  useful  even  in  our  latitude  under  our  cloudy  skies 
and  at  night.  It  is  even  hoped  to  utilize  it  in  connection  with 
officer's  patrols  and  reconnaissance  troops.  But  even  if  Colo- 
nel A had  had  such  apparatus,  it  is  evident  that  a  compli- 
cated and  extensive  system  of  signal  stations  would  have  been 
necessary.  While  under  favorable  conditions  communication 
can  be  had  over  a  distance  of  30  milesf  with  the  signal  lamp,  it  is 
necessary  that  there  be  no  intervening  obstacle  to  the  trans- 
mission of  the  rays  of  light.  Sender  and  receiver  must  be  able 
to  see  each  other.     As  Gr.  Hermenau  could  not  be  seen  even 

from  the  church  tower  of  Mohrungen,  Colonel  A would  have 

needed  three  stations  for  this  short  distance  if  he  had  been  in 
hostile  territory  and  unable  to  make  use  of  the  railway  tele- 
graph. It  is  true  that  in  our  case  the  first  signal  station 
could  have  been  established  at  Gr.  Hermenau.  Continuing  the 
march,  the  Teufelsberg  would  have  been  the  place  for  the  second 
station  if  Gr.  Hermenau  could  be  seen  from  it.  As  the  reg- 
iment advanced  via  Pittehnen,  a  third  station  would  have  been 
necessary  at  Wuchsnig  and  a  fourth  at  Elditten. 

During  the  afternoon,  after  it  had  been  decided  to  advance 
to  Scharnick  and  Lingnau,  a  fifth  station  could  have  been  shifted 

*Acety1ene  lanterns  are  used  by  our  Signal  Corps.  For  an  inter- 
esting description  of  these  and  of  "Field  Equipment  of  Signal  Troops" 
in  general,  see  Major  G.  O.  Squier's  pamphlet  of  the  Infantry  and  Cavalry 
School  on  this  subject. — Translator. 

f"  Heliograph  messages  have  been  sent  over  distances  of  1S0  miles." 
— Squier's  "Field  Equipment  of  Signal  Troops." 


280  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

from  Kleinefeld  to  Wolfsdorf  and  a  sixth  from  Waltersmiihl  to 
Lingnau,  to  establish  communication  with  the  cantonment. 
The  observation  station  at  Teufelsberg  had  to  be  abandoned 
during  the  forenoon  on  account  of  hostile  patrols,  and  it  is 
likely  a  station  at  Wuchsnig  would  have  shared  the  same  fate. 
This  would  have  interrupted  signal  communication  and  it  is 
doubtful  if  it  would  have  been  resumed  again.  Stations  using 
heliograph  or  lantern  within  reach  of  hostile  patrols  are  the 
more  exposed  because  the  light  rays  from  mirror  or  lamp  betray 
their  location  from  far  off.  To  protect  them  from  surprise,  a 
force  would  have  been  necessary  that  could  not  have  been 
spared  by  the  regiment.  If  they  are  to  be  combined  with  con- 
necting-posts, they  would  have  to  be  located  near  good  roads, 
where  it  probably  would  have  been  difficult  to  find  good  view- 
points. 

It  would  have  been  difficult  to  carry  enough  illuminating 
material  on  the  saddle  to  last  more  than  a  few  hours,  which 
therefore  would  have  been  the  length  of  time  during  which  sig- 
nalling could  have  been  carried  on  in  case  there  were  no  sun- 
light. The  Morse  code  is  used  in  signalling.  The  receiving 
station  reads  letters  and  words  from  the  longer  or  shorter  inter- 
ruptions of  rays  of  light.  The  signalmen  must  have  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  code  to  avoid  mistakes.  We  know  how  easily 
in  time  of  peace  errors  and  mutilations  creep  into  telegrams 
that  would  be  fatal  in  time  of  war.  How  much  greater  will  be 
the  danger  if  the  message  must  be  repeated  by  four  or  five  sta- 
tions, and  how  much  time  would  be  consumed  by  this?  Besides, 
it  is  quite  possible  that  a  message  sent,  for  example,  from  the 
heights  near  Kleinefeld  to  Iyingnau  will  be  read  by  the  enemy. 
Remember  that  the  rays  of  light  can  be  seen  30  miles.* 

*In  the  late  war  in  Manchuria  the  Japanese  practically  used  only 
the  field  telephone  and  telegraph  as  a  means  of  communication,  and  with 
most  excellent  results.  Had  the  inhabitants  been  hostile  or  the  Russian 
cavalry  more  enterprising,  some  other  method  of  communication  might 
have  been  necessary. — Translator 


Cavalry  Outposts.  281 

It  takes  too  long  to  explore  a  signal  route,  and  the  ap- 
paratus is  too  uncertain,  complicated,  and  dangerous  for  use 
under  such  conditions  without  also  having  a  system  of  con- 
necting-posts alongside.  But  if  the  latter  had  to  be  estab- 
lished, Colonel  A could  not  assume  the  responsibility  of 

making  further  detachments  to  establish  a  signal  line,  using 
lamp  or  heliograph. 

Still  less  could  signal  flags  have  been  used,  for  on  a  clear 
day  they  could  be  seen  only  from  i^to  2  miles.* 

Visual  communication  was  excluded,  as  well  as  the  carrier 
pigeon,  which  can  be  used  only  in  familiar  territory.  What 
use  could  be  made  of  wireless  telegraphy?  The  apparatus  of 
this  newest  of  implements  has  been  recently  so  much  improved 
that  its  transportation  is  no  longer  difficult,  f  In  Part  I.  I  re- 
ferred to  the  danger  of  the  enemy's  intercepting  wireless  mes- 
sages. This  danger  seems  to  have  been  removed.  It  is  be- 
lieved that  a  remedy  has  been  found  by  changing  the  pitch  of 
the  electric  waves.  Only  an  instrument  of  the  same  pitch  as 
the  sending  station  can  receive  the  message,  and  it  is  possible 
that  the  enemy  will  not  pitch  his  instruments  the  same  as  our 
own.  This  would  be  a  great  step  in  advance.  In  addition  to 
this,  an  understanding  of  the  message  might  be  prevented  or 
made  more  difficult  by  sending  it  in  cipher. 

But  there  are  other  difficulties  that  have  not  been  removed. 
During  an  approaching  thunder-storm  communication  fre- 
quently is  interrupted  and  becomes  dangerous.  But,  above 
all,  messages  dispatched  at  the  same  time  interfere  with  each 

*It  is  not  known  how  large  these  flags  are,  but  our  4-foot  flags  on 
a  1 2-foot  staff  can  be  read  plainly  as  far  as  7  miles  on  a  clear  day.  (See 
page  19,  Squier's  "Field  Equipment  of  Signal  Troops.") — Translator. 

fSets  now  under  construction  for  our  Army,  and  to  be  transported 
on  pack-mules,  "aim  to  still  further  reduce  the  weight  of  the  complete 
equipment,  which  will  be  contained  in  one  small  pack-chest,  made  like  a 
trunk,  *  *  the  weight  being  about  140  pounds,  not  including  the 
small  portable  battery."  (See  page  14,  Squier's  "Field  Equipment  of 
Signal  Troops.") — Translator. 
—19-- 


282  Studies  in  Applikd  Tactics. 

other.  If  the  electric  waves  of  one  instrument  encounter  those 
of  another  (of  the  same  pitch)  both  messages  become  unintel- 
ligible. The  waves  spread  themselves  over  a  distance  of  more 
than  60  miles.*  If  wireless  telegraphy  is  to  be  used,  its  use 
must  be  restricted  to  a  few  stations  and  fixed  hours.  It  there- 
fore can  be  used,  for  the  present,  only  between  higher  com- 
manders. If  patrols  should  be  permitted  to  use  it,  we  should 
open  the  door  to  endless  confusion.  Cavalry  far  in  advance, 
and  having  reached  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy,  probably  would 
make  the  best  use  of  wireless  telegraphy  by  disturbing  the 
enemy's  system  in  case  it  could  not  read  his  messages. 

A  wireless  telegraph  station  must  have  a  wire  projecting 
upwards  several  hundred  yards, f  carried  by  a  balloon  or  kite. 
A  kite  can  be  used  only  in  case  the  wind  is  favorable.  Using 
a  light  wagon  with  the  apparatus,  the  station  becomes  movable 
and  along  roads  can  even  follow  cavalry.  But  what  cavalry 
leader  would  want  to  set  up  such  a  conspicuous  standard  or 
carry  it  about  with  him  announcing  from  afar  to  every  hostile 
scout,  "Look,  here  I  am"?  And  it  would  be  foolish  to  try  to 
deceive  the  enemy  in  this  way. 

Therefore,  aside  from  other  circumstances  that  would  thus 
far  limit  the  usefulness  of  wireless  telegraphy  for  general  appli- 
cation in  an  army,  cavalry  in  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy  would 
be  able  to  use  this  means  of  communication  only  at  night. 
Our  regimental  commander  certainly  would  have  left  a  wagon 

*As  the  distances  to  which  wireless  messages  may  be  sent  depend 
mainly  on  the  power  of  the  transmitting  station,  these  distances  easily 
may  be  vastly  increased.  At  Fort  Leavenworth,  in  1906,  wireless  mes- 
sages were  received  from  ships  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  In  July,  1908,  a 
wireless  message  was  received  at  San  Diego  from  our  fleet  3,000  miles 
away. 

tThe  elevation  of  the  wire  in  part  regulates  the  distance  to  which 
messages  can  be  sent.  For  short  distances  the  elevation  need  not  be  as 
great  as  above  stated.  Major  Squier  discovered  that  a  vigorous  growing 
tree,  preferably  well  covered  with  leaves,  formed  excellent  receiving 
antennae.  A  nail  being  driven  into  the  tree  some  distance  from  the 
ground,  the  nail  is  connected  through  a  small  pocket  electrolytic  receiver 
with  an  iron  pin  driven  in  the  ground. — Translator. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  283 

with  wireless  telegraph  apparatus  with  the  baggage  train,  the 
same  as  wagons  with  canvas  pontoons;  for  movements  across 
country,  whose  direction,  duration,  objective,  and  rapidity  no 
one  can  foresee,  and  which  may  also  result  in  unfavorable  en- 
counters with  the  enemy,  must  not  be  hampered  with  teams. 
Thus,  as  there  would  have  been  no  receiving  station,  there  would 
have  been  no  use  taking  along  apparatus  for  patrols,  aside  from 
the  fact  that  the  kites  of  the  latter  could  be  carried  along  only 
on  wheels,  and  that  it  might  have  been  impossible  to  fly  the 
kites  when  wishing  to  telegraph.  Wireless  telegraphy  in  part 
is  still  a  thing  of  the  future,  and  for  the  present  is  not  suitable 
for  the  use  of  small  bodies  of  cavalry.* 

Communication  by  telegraph  wire  is  more  valuable  and 
has  been  more  thoroughly  tried. 

The  fitting  out  of  cavalry  with  instruments  and  wire  is  in- 
tended more  to  enable  a  rapid  repair  of  existing  lines  than  con- 
struction of  new  ones,  and  must  be  so  considered;  for  only  a 
small  amount  of  material  is  carried  along  and  the  building  of 
a  new  line  would  take  too  much  time  and  would  separate  the 
workmen  and  tools  from  the  troops. 

If  the  line  is  to  fulfil  the  desired  object,  it  must  remain  in 
operation  until  the  departure  of  the  command  from  its  canton- 
ment or  bivouac;  and  who  can  tell  whether  or  where  the  wagons 
with  the  batteries,  instruments,  and  personnel  will  be  again 
found,  if  the  latter  is  obliged  to  take  up  again  the  wire  strung 
the  preceding  day  or  night? 

Anyway,  the  cavalry  of  European  armies  is  equipped  so 
that  it  can  construct  considerable  distances  of  new  line,  and 
devices  have  been  invented  that  make  it  possible  to  construct 
lines  in  a  short  time.  Two  different  kinds  of  apparatus  are 
used  in  Germany:   the  light  field  telegraph,  and  the  patrol 

*This  was  sent  to  press  in  August,  1904.  Since  then  considerable 
progress  has  been  made  in  the  perfection  of  wireless  telegraphy,  as  is 
shown  by  Major  Soulier's  already  mentioned  pamphlet. — Translator. 


284  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

apparatus.  The  former  makes  it  possible  to  use  the  ordinary 
Morse  tape  record*  and  forms  a  reliable  means  of  communica- 
tion. Insulated  wire  is  used  with  this.  According  to  the 
latest  regulations,  each  (German)  cavalry  regiment  (600  sabers) 
carries  along  such  an  apparatus  and  the  prescribed  amount  of 
wire:  about  12  miles  of  wire,  and  400  yards  of  cable  for  use  in 
water;  also  about  18  miles  of  plain  patrol-wire.  All  this  is 
carried  on  a  two-horse  wagon.  The  patrol  apparatus  is  ar- 
ranged only  for  telephone,  microphone,  or  buzzer  service. 

A  thin  uninsulated  wire  is  used  for  the  line.  Each  (Ger- 
man) cavalry  regiment  has  two  such  apparatuses  and  all  told 
about  4  or  5  miles  of  wire  carried  on  horses  and  in  charge  of  a 
telegraph-patrol  (4  non-commissioned  officers  and  4  men). 

A  (German)  cavalry  division  (2  brigades  of  2  regiments 
each)  has  additional  instruments  and  telegraph-wire  in  the 
tool-wagon  of  its  detachment  of  pioneers. 

The  1st  Cavalry  (belonging  to  the  blue  army)  had  no  unus- 
sual  means  of  communication  by  wireless  telegraphy  with  it.f 
The  regiment  could  not  have  carried  along  any  wagons  neces- 
sary for  wireless  or  other  telegraphy.     They  would  have  ham- 

*The  signals  are  received  on  a  strip  of  paper  and  are  recorded  in  ink. 

tin  our  Army  organization  there  is  no  provision  for  permanent 
signal  work  in  a  regiment  of  cavalry  other  than  the  requirement  that  two 
men  in  each  troop  shall  be  instructed  in  signalling.  If  any  men  and  ap- 
paratus of  the  permanent  establishment  were  to  be  with  a  regiment,  they 
would  have  to  be  detached  from  the  mounted  company  of  the  signal 
corps  belonging  to  a  cavalry  division,  or  from  the  company  belonging  to 
an  infantry  division. 

Major  Squier,  in  the  pamphlet  already  quoted,  says:  "It  is  believed 
that  two  of  the  present  cavalry  buzzers  (one  set)  should  be  issued  to 
every  company  of  infantry  and  every  troop  of  cavalry  in  our  service, 
for  use  in  their  own  interior  intercommunication,  in  addition  to  all  other 
methods  of  information  furnished  them  from  the  outside  by  signal  troops. 
*  *  *  This  instrument  is  especially  adapted  for  rapid  field-lines,  such 
as  used  in  service  with  the  cavalry  screen  or  with  outposts,  etc.,  where 
light  field-buzzer  wire,  laid  directly  on  the  ground,  may  be  used."  This 
wire  is  partly  insulated  and  weighs  5  pounds  per  J-mile  coil.  This 
wire  is  "paid  out  or  recovered  from  a  hand  or  breast  reel,  carried  by  a 
mounted  man." — Translator. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  285 

pered  to  movements,  would  have  necessitated  various  measures 
for  their  protection,  and  would  have  been  lost  in  case  of  an 
engagement.  It  would  hardly  be  permissible  to  let  such  wagons 
immediately  follow  a  cavalry  brigade.  The  regiment  was  forced 
to  limit  its  impedimenta  to  the  smallest  possible  amount.  Nei- 
ther telegraph,  pontoon,  nor  ammunition  wagons  could  be 
tolerated,  possibly  not  even  an  ambulance,  although  ambu- 
lances are  protected  by  the  Geneva  convention. 

Therefore  the  field  telegraph  was  not  at  the  disposal  of  the 
regimental  commander  up  to  5  p.  m.  When  at  Heiligenthal 
he  decided  where  to  pass  the  night. 

The  wagons  were  with  the  baggage  train  at  Mohrungen 
and  did  not  receive  his  orders  until  8  p.  m.  They  could  not 
be  expected  at  Liebstadt  before  11  p.  m.  Should  a  line  then 
be  constructed  to  Lingnau?  Under  favorable  conditions,  it 
takes  about  f  hour  per  mile  to  construct  semi-permanent  lines ; 
at  night  it  would  take  longer.  The  distance  is  eleven  miles. 
It  would  be  at  least  7  or  8  a.  m.  on  May  6th  before  communica- 
tion could  be  established  with  Lingnau.  The  regiment  would 
depart  not  later  than  3  a.  m.  Were  it  to  continue  its  advance 
this  day  as  on  May  5th,  no  one  would  suggest  building  the  tele- 
graph line,  unless  there  were  a  certainty  on  May  5th  of  the  direc- 
tion in  which  the  line -construction  would  be  continued  on  May 
6th,  and  that  there  was  no  possibility  of  accomplishing  the 
same  object  by  repairing  an  existing  line.  The  latter  contin- 
gency would  occur,  for  example,  in  continuing  the  march  be- 
yond Guttstadt.  In  this  event  it  would  have  been  better  to 
re-establish  the  railway  telegraph  line  via  Wormditt  than  to 
erect  a  semi-permanent  field  line. 

But  on  May  5th  our  regimental  commander  already  could 
foresee  that  it  would  not  be  a  question  of  continuing  the  advance 
on  May  6th,  the  encounter  of  the  two  armies  being  imminent. 
Therefore  it  is  proper  to  inquire  if  it  would  not  be  advantageous 
to  erect  a  semi-permanent  line  over  part  of  the  distance.     It  is 


286  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

by  no  means  advisable  to  construct  the  line  all  the  way  to 
Lingnau,  for,  as  the  regiment  cannot  tie  itself  to  this,  it  would 
be  the  prey  of  every  hostile  patrol. 

But  west  of  the  Passarge  the  line  would  be  somewhat  pro- 
tected. It  might  be  constructed  as  far  as  Pittehnen  with  the 
hope  that  on  the  morning  of  May  6th  it  might  be  possible  to 
continue  the  work.  This  would  be  a  help  to  the  regimental 
messenger  service  on  the  6th.  But  we  cannot  expect  great 
results  from  this  measure.  It  would  be  3  a.  m.  May  6th  before 
the  line  would  be  ready  from  Liebstadt  to  Pittehnen  and  the 
distance  saved  would  be  only  about  4  miles,  which  could  be 
traversed  by  a  mounted  messenger  in  from  20  to  30  minutes. 
Neither  would  this  enable  us  to  dispense  with  the  connecting- 
post  at  Pittehnen.  Communication  by  wire  too  easily  might 
be  interrupted,  the  terminal  station  would  require  protection 
from  hostile  patrols,  and  telegrams  received  must  be  forwarded 
to  the  regiment. 

In  hostile  territory  it  probably  would  be  necessary  to  repair 
the  Mohrungen-Biebstadt  line  before  there  would  be  any  use 
in  building  the  extension  beyond  the  latter  point ;  and  undoubt- 
edly the  regimental  commander  would  have  begun  such  repairs 
during  the  morning  of  May  5th.  This  would  have  been  a  gain, 
and  this  is  really  the  proper  sphere  of  activity  for  the  cavalry 
telegraph  detachment. 

The  commander  always  will  endeavor  to  construct  or 
repair  telegraph  lines  from  the  rear,  so  as  to  make  the  line  con- 
tinuous. Isolated  or  detached  lines  are  of  no  value  if  they  do 
not  connect  with  the  main  lines.  This  also  is  an  argument 
against  carrying  along  the  wheel  transportation  of  field  tele- 
graph lines  with  the  fighting  part  of  the  cavalry.     Had  Colonel 

A on  the  morning  of  May  5th  been  prevented  from  having 

his  baggage  train  precede  the  1st  Army  Corps  and  been  obliged 
to  have  it  join  that  of  the  1st  Division,  he  presumably  would 


Cavalry  Outposts.  287 

have  had  his  telegraph  and  pontoon  wagons  go  with  the  combat 
train  as  far  as  Mohrungen. 

But  it  is  unlikely  that  he  would  have  taken  them  along 
any  farther,  on  account  of  the  unsettled  condition  of  the  situa- 
tion. He  might  even  have  left  behind  the  light  ammunition 
wagons  assigned  to  his  regiment.  It  would  have  been  suffi- 
cient if  the  troopers  had  taken  extra  ammunition  in  their 
saddle-bags. 

As  already  stated,  every  (German)  cavalry  regiment  has 
a  patrol  equipment  in  addition  to  the  light  field  telegraph  equip- 
ment, and  thus  each  brigade  has  four  patrol  equipments  and 
about  9  miles  of  wire,  carried  and  operated  by  two  telegraph 
patrols.  Only  one  of  these  patrols  is  permanently  organized  in 
each  (German)  cavalry  division  (of  3  brigades).  The  remain- 
ing ones  are  formed  only  in  case  of  necessity,  until  which  time 
the  apparatus  is  carried  on  the  telegraph  wagons.  This  is  a 
wise  provision,  as  otherwise  too  many  non-commissioned  offi- 
cers would  be  permanently  withdrawn  from  the  ranks.  It  is 
of  considerable  importance  whether  a  cavalry  regiment  has 
four  non-commissioned  officers  more  or  less  available  for  duty 
at  the  front.  Service  with  the  regiment  and  fighting  the  enemy 
naturally  takes  precedence  over  techincal  work  of  auxiliary 
branches. 

The  comprehensive  task  in  this  instance  assigned  a  single 
regiment  (blue)  on  one  flank  of  the  army,  doubtless  induced 
the  colonel  not  to  form  a  telegraph  detachment.  The  men 
composing  it,  and  loaded  with  instruments  and  wire,  either 
marching  at  the  end  of  the  column  or  behind  a  troop  formed 
in  line,  and  available  neither  for  attack  nor  for  reconnaissance 
duty,  would  have  been  a  constant  eyesore  to  the  colonel. 

But  assuming  that  a  detachment  of  8  men  had  been  formed 
— carrying  5  miles  of  light  wire — of  what  use  would  the  wire 
have  been? 


288  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

There  would  not  have  been  enough  wire  to  establish  com- 
munication with  Kallisten,  or  even  with  Sackstein.  The  prox- 
imity of  the  enemy  would  have  precluded  laying  a  wire  to  com- 
municate with  the  troop  at  Rosengarth,  aside  from  the  fact  that 
it  also  was  too  distant  and  that  no  one  could  tell  how  long  the 
troop  would  remain  there.  For  similar  reasons  communication 
could  not  have  been  established  with  Altkirch  or  Regerteln. 
It  was  not  worth  the  labor  and  risk  to  lay  a  wire  to  any  of  the 
detached  bodies.  At  the  most  it  would  have  shortened  the 
messenger  route  along  one  line  by  about  half  an  hour;  the  con- 
struction of  the  line  might  have  been  observed,  and  its  opera- 
tion interfered  with  by  any  hostile  patrol,  and  would  have 
required  the  employment  of  8  men  and  8  horses;  and  it  must 
be  remembered  that  communication  by  this  means  is  not  abso- 
lutely assured,  as  it  depends  on  the  ear.  The  trouble  of  re- 
covering the  wire  next  day,  and  the  possible  necessity  of  pro- 
tecting the  party  engaged  in  this  work,  may  interfere  with  the 
regular  work  of  the  regiment,  and  increases  the  misgivings 
against  using  it  in  the  foremost  line. 

The  regimental  commander  might  have  directed  the  tele- 
graph detachment  for  the  present  to  lay  the  light  wire  from 
Liebstadt  to  Pittehnen,  which  might  have  been  completed  by 
about  9  p.  m.,  and  take  it  up  again  after  the  field  telegraph 
had  been  completed  over  this  distance — a  procedure  that  would 
have  been  dearly  paid  for  by  the  loss  of  4  able  non-commis- 
sioned officers  and  8  horses  from  the  ranks  of  the  regiment. 

The  German  cavalry  is  but  scantily  fitted  out  with  cyclists, 
having  but  3  for  600  sabers;  but  this  is  as  it  should  be.  Al- 
though the  bicycle  is  well  suited  to  the  delivery  of  messages 
and  orders  on  fairly  good  roads  and  over  level  country,  and 
largely  saves  horses  with  large  bodies  of  troops,  it  is  not  able  to 
follow  cavalry  across  all  kinds  of  country  in  all  kinds  of  weather. 
Supposing  the  1st  Cavalry  to  have  had  6  cyclists,  these  would 
have  been  able  to  accompany  the  regiment  about  as  far  as  Alt 


Cavalry  Outposts.  289 

Bolitten  on  May  5th.  It  would  have  been  necessary  to  leave 
them  there  temporarily,  and  the  regimental  commander,  upon 
deciding  to  advance  via  Elditten  towards  Waltersmiihl,  would 
have  been  unable  to  give  them  further  instructions.  And  it  is 
doubtful  if  the  colonel,  under  the  strained  conditions  when  he 
was  expecting  to  encounter  the  enemy,  would  have  thought  of 
the  cyclists  or  have  been  willing  to  send  a  trooper  back  after 
them.  If  he  chanced  to  think  of  them  again  at  Heiligenthal 
at  5  p.  m.,  he  probably  would  have  shrugged  his  shoulders  and 
left  them  to  their  fate.  A  single  experience  like  this  would 
induce  him  in  the  future  to  leave  the  cyclists  with  the  baggage 
train — possibly  2  with  the  train  proper  and  4  with  the  pon- 
toon and  telegraph  wagons.  To  unite  cyclists  with  mount- 
ed troops  would  result  in  a  separation  as  soon  as  beaten  paths 
are  left  behind,  and  then  their  services  would  become  illusory, 
while  they  might  be  very  useful  with  the  train,  particularly 
when  late  in  the  day  it  becomes  a  question  of  resuming  connec- 
tion with  the  troops. 

The  regimental  staff  officer  sent  to  corps  headquarters  at 
Mohrungen  certainly  would  have  sent  several  cyclists  via  Lieb- 
stadt  to  Lingnau  shortly  after  8  p.  m.,  intrusting  them  with 
current  orders  from  corps  headquarters  and  everything  else 
worth  knowing.  They  could  be  at  Lingnau  by  11  p.  m.,  and 
the  regimental  commander's  latest  reports  then  could  reach 
corps  headquarters,  via  the  Liebstadt  telegraph  station,  by  1 
a.  m.  Were  there  no  telegraphic  communication  between 
Liebstadt  and  Mohrungen,  the  returning  cyclist  still  could  arrive 
at  Mohrungen  by  3  or  4  a.  m.,  and  the  time  might  be  reduced 
by  using  the  remaining  cyclists  as  relays. 

The  improvements  of  science  apparently  have  made  a  use- 
ful means  of  the  bicycle  for  messenger  work  of  an  army,  includ- 
ing cavalry,  if  cyclists  are  not  precipitately  and  prematurely 
taken  into  a  region  where  they  cannot  follow  the  cavalry  and 
thus  lose  touch  with  it.     The  bicycle  is  useless  in  unfavorable 


290  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

weather,  over  bad  roads,  or  in  a  mountainous  district.  It 
ceases  to  be  a  rapid  means  of  communication  and  leaves  a 
burden. 

Far  more  useful  than  the  bicycle,  propelled  by  the  feeble 
strength  of  man,  is  the  automobile,  whose  construction  has 
reached  a  high  degree  of  perfection  in  recent  years.  The 
automobile  is  but  slightly  affected  by  wind  and  weather,  and 
over  passably  hard  ground  it  can  climb  grades  that  would  be 
prohibitive  to  a  cyclist.  In  places  where  the  latter  would 
have  to  carry  or  push  his  wheel,  the  automobile  is  still  able  to 
proceed  at  a  rapid  rate. 

If  word  is  received  at  Mohrungen  by  8  p.  m.  that  the  ist 
Cavalry  has  reached  Lingnau,  an  officer  from  corps  headquar- 
ters could  reach  the  latter  place  shortly  after  9  p.  m.  on  an  auto- 
mobile, to  consult  with  the  colonel  and  bring  him  orders.  And, 
if  necessary,  the  same  machine  could  pass  over  the  road  once 
or  twice  more  during  the  night.  The  rapidity  and  safety  of 
this  means  of  communication  during  field  operations  is  equalled 
by  neither  wireless  telegraphy  nor  visual  signals.  Only  where 
mountains,  wide  rivers,  or  inlets  of  the  sea  separate  bodies  of 
troops,  will  it  be  occasionally  possible  to  obtain  better  results 
with  wireless  telegraphy  or  visual  signalling. 

Of  course  this  presupposes  that  there  is  no  lack  of  gasoline, 
which  is  the  best  fuel,  and  of  which  about  ^  gallon  will  be 
required  per  mile  on  ordinary  roads.  Therefore  there  should 
be  no  trouble  in  carrying  along  a  sufficient  quantity. 

The  motor-cycle  is  still  more  convenient  and  movable 
than  the  automobile;  almost  being  equal  to  the  latter  in  speed 
and  more  readily  overcoming  terrain  difficulties.  A  skilled 
rider  can  get  along  on  a  foot-path  and  the  lightness  of  the 
machine  (weighing  only  about  120  pounds)  enables  the  rider 
to  carry  it  over  marshy  or  otherwise  unfavorable  ground.* 


♦They  carry  from  1  to  ij  gallons  gasoline,  on  which  they  can  make 
from  100  to  125  miles. — Translator. 


Cavalry  Outposts.  291 

The  time  thus  lost  can  be  regained  by  increased  speed  over 
better  parts  of  the  road. 

While  it  might  have  been  impossible  for  a  heavy  four- 
wheeled  automobile  to  follow  the  cavalry  everywhere,  there 
is  no  doubt  but  what  motor-cycles  could  have  followed. 

If  the  cavalry  had  been  equipped  with  several  such  ma- 
chines, it  would  have  been  able  to  communicate  several  times 
with  corps  headquarters  during  May  5th.  At  corps  headquar- 
ters they  would  have  understood  the  situation  on  the  Alle  by 
6  p.  m. 

Of  course  automobiles  and  motor-cycles  are  exposed  to  the 
attacks  of  hostile  patrols;  but  no  more  so  than  a  mounted  mes- 
senger. On  the  contrary,  their  great  speed  decreases  the  chance 
of  hostile  marksmen  hitting  them,  and  the  enemy  will  hardly 
oppose  them  with  cold  steel. 

In  the  future  the  automobile  and  motor-cycle  must  form 
the  basis  for  communication  between  army  headquarters  and 
the  advance  cavalry.  In  all  probability  they  will  make  the 
cavalry  telegraph  unnecessary  and  will  effect  an  appreciable 
saving  in  men  and  horses  to  the  cavalry.  Detached  bodies  and 
reconnaissance  troops  will  be  more  easily  and  rapidly  kept  in 
communication  with  the  cavalry  commander  by  means  of  motor 
cycles  than  in  any  other  way.  On  level  roads,  under  certain  con- 
ditions, they  even  may  undertake  independent  tours  of  explora- 
tion. It  is  quite  possible  that  two  motor-cyclists  sent  out  from 
Heiligenthal  at  5  p.  m.  might  have  reported  in  Lingnau  by  7 
or  8  p.  m.  whether  or  not  Liewenberg  was  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  and  what  is  known  of  him  in  that  vicinity.  Then  news 
of  this  might  reach  Mohrungen  by  9  p.  m.  In  such  an  under- 
taking the  only  question  is  whether  or  not  the  game  is  worth 
the  candle. 

While  in  Part  I.  I  was  obliged  to  call  attention  to  the  extra- 
ordinary difficulties  that  strategical  patrols  would  encounter 
in  forwarding  their  messages,  I  must  not  omit  now  to  point  out 


292  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

that  unexpectedly  their  value  would  be  greatly  enhanced  if  it 
were  possible  to  assign  several  motor-cycles  to  each  one  of 
them.  In  closely  settled  countries,  where,  by  making  slight 
detours,  it  is  possible  to  travel  great  distances  on  paved  high- 
ways, it  is  possible  to  travel  from  175  to  250  miles  in  a  day  on 
a  motor-cycle.  With  their  assistance  a  patrol  reconnoitering 
the  flank  of  a  hostile  army  might  be  able  to  give  the  commander- 
in-chief  an  insight  into  the  situation  that  never  could  have  been 
possible  with  mounted  messengers  alone.  If  by  force  of  cir- 
cumstances the  motor-cycles  become  separated  from  a  patrol, 
the  latter  will  be  in  no  worse  state  than  heretofore.  But  the 
speed  of  these  cycles  in  many  cases  might  enable  the  cyclists 
to  rejoin  their  patrols  by  a  roundabout  way,  thus  getting  out 
of  reach  of  hostile  fire-arms  if  their  own  will  not  open  the  way. 


THE  ARMY  CORPS  ON  THE  MARCH. 
Arrangements  for  the  March. 

Although  the  reader  from  now  on  will  accompany  the  ist 
Army  Corps  during  its  march  of  May  5th,  still  his  thoughts 
Avill  not  altogether  forsake  the  ist  Cavalry,  which  has  had  his 
attention  so  far.  It  is  rather  to  be  hoped  that  the  services 
rendered  the  corps  by  the  cavalry  will  appear  in  their  correct 
light;  and  the  reader  will  have  an  opportunity  of  viewing  the 
measures  taken  by  the  cavalry  leaders  from  a  different  stand- 
point. 

On  May  4th  the  ist  Army  Corps  was  halted  in  such  a  way, 
near  the  line  of  march,  that  the  ist  Division  occupied  the  space 
between  Drenken  and  Saalfeld,  while  the  last  troops  of  the  2d 
Division  were  quartered  in  Gerswalde.  For  purposes  of  in- 
struction we  shall  not  make  the  conditions  too  favorable  under 
which  the  march  is  to  be  continued  on  May  5th,  and  for  this 
reason  shall  change  the  situation  as  given  in  Part  I.  by  assum- 
ing that  the  organized  militia  is  not  along  the  railway  from 
Maldeuten  through  Pr.  Holland  to  Miihlhausen,  but  has  been 
withdrawn  to  the  line  Riesenburg-Christburg-Elbing.  The 
army  corps  is  marching  on  one  road.  In  this  region  full  of 
lakes  and  devoid  of  roads  it  is  impracticable  to  form  several 
columns  for  the  march  to  Mohrungen.  The  van  guard  of  the 
ist  Division  is  ordered  to  leave  Barten  at  6  a.  m.  The  baggage 
trains  of  corps  headquarters  and  of  the  ist  Division  immedi- 
ately follow  the  ist  Division;  then  comes  the  2d  Division. 

The  ist  Division  is  ordered  to  arrange  for  the  protection 
of  the  left  flank  of  the  column  until  the  2d  Division  can  assume 
this  duty.  The  two  division  commanders  are  to  arrange  the 
details. 

29.I 


294  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Before  the  commander  of  the  ist  Division  was  able  to 
issue   his  orders,   the  corps  commander  ordered   that  Major 

D ,  with  Troops  A,  B,  and  E,  3d  Cavalry,  be  under  his 

immediate  orders  and  should  leave  Drenken  on  reconnaissance 
via  Pfeilings  towards  Miinsterberg-Jonkendorf.  The  corps 
commander  also  gave  notice  that  the  1st  Cavalry  would  ad- 
vance via  Gr.  Hermenau. 

The  1  st  Division*  is  in  cantonment  as  follows  o  n  May  4th : 

Headquarters,  1  st  Division Saalfeld . 

Headquarters,  ist  Brigade Gr.  Arnsdorf. 

ist  Infantry,  )    Gr.  Arnsdorf,  Figaiken,  Drenken; 
2d  Infantry,    >    Ploszen,  Barten,  Posorten; 
3d  Infantry,    )  Terpen,  Gergehnen. 

Headquarters,  2d  Brigade Biindtken. 

4th  Infantry,    ^    Ankern,  Lopittken; 
5th  Infantry,     >■   Sadlauken,  Biindtken; 
6th  Infantry,    j    Kuppen,  Saalfeld. 

Troops  A  and  B,  3d  Cavalry 

Gr.  Arnsdorf,  Figaiken,  Drenken,  Ploszen,  and  Posorten. 

The  following  men  of  Troop  C  are  permanently  detailed 
as  mounted  messengers  :f 

At  Division  Headquarters 8  men. 

2  Brigade  Headquarters 8  men. 

6  Regimental  Headquarters 12  men. 

Baggage  Train 12  men. 


40  men 

The  remainder  of  Troop  C  is  at  Lopittken  and  Ankern. 

Headquarters,  ist  Brigade  Field  Artillery Saalfeld. 

ist  Field  Artillery Barten,  Woritten,  Bundtken,  Kuppen. 

3d  Field  Artillery,  whose  2d  battalion  is  composed  of  heavy  how- 
itzers   Saalfeld. 

1st  Battalion  Engineers Woritten. 

Co.  A  Signal  Corps,  ~| 

3  Field  Hospitals,  [■   Saalfeld . 

Division  Bridge  Train,  J 

*To  adhere  more  nearly  to  the  number  of  troops  of  the  text,  it  is 
assumed  that  the  3d  Brigade  of  the  ist  Division,  2  squadrons  of  cavalry, 
and  a  field  hospital  are  detached;  the  2d  Division  having  its  3  brigades 
present. — Translator. 

t'fhese  probably  would  be  taken  from  the  mounted  orderlies  as- 
signed to  infantry  regiments  under  par.  25,  F.  S.  R. 


The  Corps  on  the  March.  295 

The  baggage  train  is  with  the  regiments;  the  ammunition 
column  is  parked  in  rear  of  the  division. 

Food  and  forage  have  been  replenished  from  the  supply 
column  that  arrived  May  4th  at  Saalfeld. 

The  officers  detailed  to  receive  orders  have  assembled  at 
division  headquarters. 

What  orders  does  the  Commanding  General  of  the 
First  Division  issue  on  the  evening  of  may  4TH?* 

The  ability  continually  to  keep  in  mind  the  entire  situation 
plays  an  important  part  in  the  successful  conduct  of  the  art  of 
war.  Thus  the  commanding  general  of  the  1st  Division  should 
mentally  view  the  picture  that  the  entire  1st  Army  Corps  will 
present  on  the  road  to-morrow,  f  I  am  the  more  willing  to  sketch 
the  outlines  of  this  picture  because  the  greater  part  of  the 
realities  of  war  and  the  retardation  due  to  long  columns  of 
troops  as  well  as  trains  is  not  seen  or  felt  in  time  of  peace. 
When  the  head  of  the  1st  Division  reaches  Gr.  Bestendorf,  the 
tail  of  this  column  of  troops  would  be  near  Woritten.  The 
divisional  trains,  possibly  including  cattle  on  the  hoof,  would 
extend  back  to  near  Saalfeld.  In  rear  of  this  would  come  the 
2d  Division  and  its  trains  extending  back  nearly  to  Finken- 
stein,  followed  by  a  battalion  of  heavy  artillery  if  one  be  with 
the  corps.  If  the  baggage  trains  had  not  been  with  their  re- 
spective commands  on  May  4th,  but  had  been  in  rear  of  the 
troops  of  the  entire  army  corps,  they  would  on  May  5th  begin 
their  march  from  Weinsdorf  when  the  head  of  the  corps  had 
reached  Mohrungen,  its  destination  for  the  day.     Thus  these 


*The  reader  must  not  be  worried  because  only  the  general  map  is 
available  to  show  the  country  in  the  vicinity  of  Saalfeld;  this  often  would 
happen  in  time  of  war. 

|No  effort  was  made  to  figure  road-spaces  from  our  own  Field  Service 
Regulations,  because  it  was  thought  those  given  by  the  author  would 
answer  the  purpose,  even  with  the  substitution  of  our  own  Army  organi- 
zations, as  the  total  number  of  troops  considered  is  about  the  same  as 
in  the  author's  example. — Translator. 


296  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

trains  would  be  about  18  miles  in  rear  and  could  not  reach  the 
leading  troops  for  6  hours  with  rations  and  baggage.  As  a 
rule,  it  would  take  even  longer  than  this,  as  the  march  usually 
suffers  from  delays,  and  any  halt  of  the  troops  checks  all  the 
trains. 

In  rear  of  the  trains  of  the  2d  Division  would  follow  addi- 
tional reserves  of  ammunition,  stores,  equipment,  and  food 
supplies  of  the  army  corps.  Such  an  immense  train  could  not 
march  in  an  unbroken  column,  but  would  be  subdivided  into 
smaller  trains  or  groups;  and  communication  with  magazines  in 
rear  of  the  army  interferes  with  the  movement  of  these  groups. 
Thus  great  gaps  between  them  are  unavoidable.  If  it  is  as- 
sumed that  the  army  corps  has  advanced  via  Marienwerder  and 
Riesenburg,  on  May  4th  its  trains  will  still  cover  the  road  as  far 
as  Marienwerder.  On  May  5th  the  last  loaded  columns  may 
reach  Riesenburg,  while  empty  wagons  on  this  and  subsequent 
days  will  be  loading  new  supplies  at  Marienwerder  or  Riesenburg 
with  the  object  of  carrying  them  after  the  corps.* 

The  commanding  general  of  the  1  st  Division  does  not  need 
to  figure  out  road-spaces;  the  living  reality  is  before  him.  He 
does  not  need  a  pair  of  dividers  to  determine  the  end  of  his 
long-drawn-out  command,  which  is  forcibly  brought  to  mind 
in  his  orders  and  in  his  anxiety  to  replenish  supplies. 

He  therefore  fully  understands  the  need  of  the  corps  com- 
mander's order  to  protect  the  left  flank.  In  fact,  the  order  was 
superfluous,  for  he  would  have  attended  to  the  protection  of 
the  flank  of  his  own  accord.  It  is  fortunate  that  the  army 
corps'  line  of  communications  lies  so  far  to  the  south.  It  would 
be  more  difficult  to  protect  if  it  extended  through  Christburg 
to  Marienburg. 

It  is  known  that  the  1st  Cavalry  is  reconnoitering  towards 
the  front  and  the  left  flank,  and  the  distance  of  the  hostile  col- 

*The  length  of  an  army  corps,  with  all  its  auxiliary  troops  and 
trains,  is  35  miles.     (See  par.  233,  F.  S.  R.) — Translator. 


Thk  Corps  on  the  March.  297 

urans  on  May  5th  makes  an  encounter  with  large  hostile  bodies 
unlikely  on  this  day,  but  we  must  be  prepared  for  the  appear- 
ance of  hostile  cavalry.  It  has  already  been  learnedjat  corps 
and  division  headquarters  that  telegraphic  communication 
with  Bnickendorf,  Guttstadt,  and  Wormditt  was  interrupted 
this  evening  (page  10) ;  but  we  cannot  tell  whether  the  1st  Cav- 
alry will  be  able  to  drive  back  the  hostile  advance  parties  or 
whether  it  will  not  be  forced  to  give  way  before  superior  num- 
bers of  hostile  cavalry.  The  latter  would  not  be  able  long  to 
delay  the  advance  of  the  army  corps  and  would  hardly  be  able 
to  cover  the  distance  quickly  enough  to  threaten  the  flank  of 
the  1st  Division  as  early  as  the  forenoon  of  May  5th.  But  its 
patrols  might  appear  on  the  Overland  Canal  (Oberlandische 
Kanal)  early  in  the  morning,  and  should  they  discover  the  army 
corps  en  route,  they  would  make  the  utmost  effort  to  send  this 
information  back.  Matters  might  shape  themselves  very  dif- 
ferently with  the  cavalry  than  I  have  pictured.  Strong  bodies 
of  hostile  cavalry  might  reach  the  Passarge  early  on  May  5th 
and  forward  by  automobile  the  news  received  by  messenger 
arriving  on  exhausted  steed.  In  this  way  the  hostile  com- 
mander-in-chief might  obtain  it  the  same  afternoon  or  evening. 
The  reader  will  remember  the  hostile  patrol  sent  out  via 
Heilsberg  and  Wormditt,  (pages  157-9),  which,  on  the  supposi- 
tion that  the  Maldeuten-Pr.  Holland  railway  is  not  guarded, 
might  reach  Gr.  Arnsdorf  by  10  a.  m.,  May  5th.  We  saw  that 
under  existing  circumstances  its  report  would  arrive  at  head- 
quarters too  late.  But  it  would  be  very  different  if  the  hostile 
cavalry  gains  the  upper  hand  on  the  Passarge.  Therefore  the 
commanding  general  of  the  1st  Army  Corps  has  every  reason 
to  protect  himself  against  hostile  patrols.  He  knows  only  too 
well  what  it  would  mean  for  him  if  on  the  evening  of  May  5th 
he  received  a  message  making  it  certain  that  on  the  morning  of 
this  day  a  long  column  marched  from  Seeburg  or  Wartenburg 
—20— 


298  Studies  in  Ajppued  Tactics. 

towards  Guttstadt  or  possibly  from  Seeburg  towards  Allenstein. 

In  discussing  the  information  a  hostile  patrol  might  ob- 
tain south  of  the  Overland  Canal  concerning  the  march  of  the 
1st  Army  Corps  (see  page  159),  I  pointed  out  that  this  presup- 
posed criminal  carelessness  on  the  part  of  the  blue  forces.  We 
see  that  the  commander-in-chief  at  Saalfeld  is  not  laying  him- 
self open  to  such  a  charge.  The  commanding  general  himself 
orders  the  protection  of  the  flank  and  thereby  shows  what  value 
he  places  on  the  arrangement,  although  there  can  be  no  real 
danger  in  this  quarter  on  May  5th. 

I  wonder  if  all  my  readers  considered  it  necessary  to  include 
a  provision  for  a  flank  guard  for  the  district  west  of  the  over- 
land canal  in  their  draft  of  field  orders  of  the  1st  Division  the 
evening  of  May  4th;  and  whether  they  would  have  done  so 
without  the  hint  contained  in  Part  I.? 

The  omission  could  easily  be  explained. 

In  the  endeavor  to  place  field  service  on  a  firm  foundation, 
and  to  offer  practical  rules  even  to  the  inexperienced,  our  regu- 
lations have  revived  a  number  of  customs  concerning  subdivi- 
sion of  columns  and  protection  on  the  march  that  had  yellowed 
with  age  and  had  been  abandoned.  Large  bodies  of  independ- 
ent cavalry  escaped  similar  regulations  because  they  were  un- 
known before  the  last  great  epoch  of  war  and  in  whose  case 
therefore  reference  could  not  be  had  to  cherished  memories 
and  recollections.  The  Field  Service  Regulations  dispose  of 
this  subject  with  one  short  sentence,  although  the  cavalry  in 
advance  of  an  army  is  exposed  to  far  greater  dangers  than  the 
infantry:  "Independent  cavalry  chooses  its  formation  and  the 
means  for  security  and  information  according  to  the  nature  of 
the  task  in  hand."* 

In  Part  I.  I  praised  this  scantiness  as  a  piece  of  good  for- 
tune because  it  developed  ingenuity  and  deliberation,  while 
the  stately  array  of  paragraphs  devised  for  the  guidance  of  com- 

*See  par.  68,  F.  S.  R. 


The  Corps  on  the  March.  299 

manders  of  infantry  and  of  the  combined  arms  hamper  inde- 
pendent action  and  give  rise  to  the  error  that  everything  will 
be  all  right  if  the  letter  of  the  regulations  has  been  fulfilled. 
Notwithstanding  the  most  detailed  instructions  concerning  the 
service  of  security  and  information — as  can  be  seen  by  examin- 
ing the  paragraphs  on  this  subject — there  is  hardly  a  reference 
to  the  necessity  for  preventing  hostile  reconnaissance.  The 
deficiency  is  strangely  contrasted  by  the  emphasis  that  is  laid 
on  reconnoitering  the  enemy,  and  the  value  that  higher  com- 
manders place  on  early  and  reliable  information  about  the 
enemy.  The  enemy  will  be  equally  anxious  to  obtain  reliable 
information  about  our  movements. 

Our  cavalry  leaders,  our  mounted  patrols,  naturally  will 
be  forced  to  fight  with  bodies  of  hostile  cavalry  of  various  sizes. 
They  will  but  seldom  be  able  to  carry  out  their  reconnaissance 
or  send  back  messages  without  fighting.  In  acting  thus  they 
will  at  the  same  time  be  warding  off  hostile  reconnaissance. 
But  the  careful  instructions  with  which  our  regulations  fence 
in  and  guide  the  action  of  our  troop  leaders  where  arrangements 
for  marching  and  the  service  of  security  are  concerned,  together 
with  the  baleful  experience  in  our  peace  maneuvers,  where  hos- 
tile scouts  are  visible  everywhere  along  the  edge  of  woods  and 
top  of  hills  (within  reach  of  our  fire-arms),  counting  every  gun 
and  flag,  creates  the  impression  that  this  must  be  so.  Other- 
wise, would  not  the  regulations  insist  that  such  patrols  must  be 
kept  at  a  distance,  and  call  attention  to  the  dangers  arising 
from  this  unchecked  activity? 

Therefore,  in  the  present  case  (it  not  being  a  flank  march), 
who  would  blame  the  commander  of  the  1st  Division  if  he  did 
not  lay  too  much  stress  on  the  corps  commander's  orders  to  pro- 
tect the  left  flank,  and  contented  himself  with  inadequate  meas- 
ures, rather  indicating  his  willingness  to  comply  with  orders 
than  an  appreciation  of  the  importance  of  the  subject? 

After  this  cogitation  there  will  no  longer  be  any  doubt  that 


300  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

a  flank  guard  will  already  be  needed  west  of  the  Overland  Canal 
— the  best  place  probably  being  along  the  Miswalde-Maldeuten 
railway.  The  line  of  railway  easily  can  be  watched,  and  if  hos- 
tile patrols  find  infantry  there,  this  would  look  more  like  a 
railway  guard  than  an  effort  to  protect  the  flank  of  a  marching 
column.  The  division  commander  will  not  assign  this  duty  to 
the  advance  guard.  The  commander  of  the  advance  guard 
could  not  superintend  the  duty  and  would  have  to  send  back 
the  necessary  troops.  Therefore  I  shall  assume  that  two  bat- 
talions of  the  4th  Infantry,  as  left  flank  guard  under  the  im- 
mediate orders  of  the  division  commander,  receive  orders  to 
occupy  the  railway  from  Miswalde  to  Riippertswalde  to  prevent 
hostile  cavalry  from  obtaining  information  of  the  march  of  the 
Army  Corps.  The  two  battalions  will  remain  there  until  fur- 
ther orders.  The  division  commander  will  make  arrangements 
with  the  commander  of  the  2d  Division  concerning  the  relief 
of  the  two  battalions.  And  an  effort  will  be  made  to  get  to- 
gether a  railway  train  which  will  be  able  to  carry  these  battal- 
ions to  Mohrungen  in  the  afternoon.  It  is  likely  that  at  least 
8  troopers  must  be  attached  to  these  two  battalions  notwith- 
standing the  fact  that  there  is  but  little  divisional  cavalry  avail- 
able on  May  5th.  The  flank  guard  must  make  use  of  the  cy- 
clists belonging  to  the  battalions*  and  the  railway  telegraph  for 
sending  messages. 

The  division  commander  would  best  assign  to  the  advance 
guard  commander  the  duty  of  protecting  the  flanks  east  of  the 
Overland  Canal.  At  the  beginning  of  the  march  this  region  is 
situated  ahead  of  the  point.  An  independent  flank  guard  would 
not  be  able  to  fully  co-operate  with  the  advance  guard.  It 
would  require  the  continued  attention  of  the  division  com- 
mander who  thus  in  a  way  would  assume  general  control  of 
the  advance  guard.  Though  naturally  this  division  commander 
has  the  right  to  request  that  the  protection  of  the  flank  east- 

*The  Germans  have  two  cyclists  in  each  infantry  battalion. 


The  Corps  on  the  March.  301 

ward  of  the  Overland  Canal,  incident  to  the  forward  movement 
of  the  advance  guard,  be  continued  until  further  orders.  Ac- 
cordingly, when  the  advance  party  reaches  the  vicinity  of 
Mohrungen,  the  flank  guard  will  resemble  a  thin  outpost  line 
extending  from  Miswalde  via  Ober-Samrodt,  Steinsdorf,  and 
Rollnau  to  Neuhof. 

Of  course  this  is  contrary  to  the  method  frequently  adopted 
in  time  of  peace  of  having  the  flank  guard  on  a  parallel  road 
keep  up  with  the  reserve  of  the  advance  guard  or  with  the  head 
of  the  main  body.  But  it  is  evident  at  a  glance  that  in  the 
latter  way  only  a  very  imperfect  protection  can  be  assured. 

Even  if  an  enterprising  hostile  patrol  commander  should 
discover  the  gradual  advance  of  troops  via  Samrodt  and  Steins- 
dorf, this  would  not  afford  him  or  his  superior,  receiving  the 
report,  a  safe  basis  for  assuming  that  the  army  corps  was  ad- 
vancing. Of  course  the  information  that  on  May  5th  blue 
infantry  was  discovered  at  the  bridge  of  Ruppertswalde  or  at 
Steinsdorf  would  be  of  importance  to  the  hostile  general.  This, 
with  additional  information,  for  example,  that  in  the  after- 
noon fire  had  been  received  from  blue  infantry  at  Pfeilings  or 
Himmelforth,  and  the  action  of  the  cavalry,  might  produce  a 
fairly  correct  impression  at  hostile  headquarters  of  the  true 
situation.  A  knowledge  of  this  creates  a  desire  to  do  more  in 
the  blue  army  to  keep  the  enemy  in  ignorance.  Patrols  are 
more  easily  deceived  in  time  of  war,  where  deadly  bullets  de- 
mand that  a  respectful  distance  be  maintained,  than  in  time 
of  peace.  They  very  seldom  correctly  estimate  the  enemy's 
strength;  often  battalions  and  regiments  are  reported,  where 
there  actually  are  but  small  detachments.  If  it  is  important 
to  oppose  the  enemy's  efforts  to  locate  our  flank — and  this  is 
always  desirable — small  bodies  of  infantry  can  assist  in  this  by 
marching  some  distance  from  the  flank  and  parallel  with  it. 
In  the  present  case,  the  advance  of  the  organized  militia  early 
on  May  5th  from  Christburg-Elbing  towards  Pr.  Holland  might 


302  Studies  tn  Applied  Tactics. 

help  mislead  hostile  reconnoitering  cavalry.  The  same  end 
could  be  attained  by  one  or  two  battalions  of  infantry  with  a 
platoon  of  cavalry  on  May  4th  and  5th  marching  from  Christ - 
burg  towards  Liebstadt  with  companies  divided  among  the 
main  roads.  It  would  insure  greater  protection  to  the  flank 
of  the  army  and  form  a  welcome  support  for  the  cavalry  in 
front.  It  would  not  be  necessary  to  have  the  detachment 
absent  in  the  coming  battle. 

Of  course  any  action  causing  a  detachment  to  depart  so 
far  from  the  line  of  march  would  have  to  be  ordered  from  army 
or  corps  headquarters,  though  a  masterly  division  commander 
need  not  hesitate  to  assume  the  responsibility. 

The  discussion  of  the  protection  of  the  left  flank  has  dealt 
with  and  disposed  of  the  part  of  the  division  commander's  task 
that  would  have  been  out  of  the  ordinary  routine. 

My  readers'  orders  will  differ  somewhat  concerning  the 
flank  guard,  but  I  think  it  very  likely  that  otherwise  they  will 
be  very  much  alike,  because  the  Field  Service  Regulations  give 
such  plain  instructions. 

The  following  draft  is  offered  as  an  example  and  a  basis 
for  discussion: 

Headquarters,  1st  Division,  1st  Army  Corps, 

Field  Orders,  Saalfeld,  4  May  '04, p.  m. 

No.  — . 

1.    (Information  of  the  enemy.) 
Troops.  The   1st  Corps  will  continue  its  march 

to-morrow  on    the   highway  towards 
(a)   Advance  Guard:  Mohrungen. 

Comdg.  Gen.  1st  Brig.  The  2d  Corps  to  our  right  is  marching 

1st  Inf.  via  LiEbemuhl;  the  heads  of  its  col- 

2d  Inf.  umnsareto  reach  LockEN  to-morrow . 

Tr.  C,  3d  Cav.  The  1st  Cavalry  will  leave  Maldeuten 

1st  Bn.  1st  F.  E.  at    5    a.    m.    to-morrow,     going    via 

Co.  A,  Engrs.  Mohrungen  and  Gr.  Hermenau.     It 

1  st  F.  Hosp.  will  reconnoiter  to  our  front  and  left 

flank. 


The  Corps  on  the  March. 


303 


(6)    Main  Body  (in   order  of 
march) : 
3d  Inf. 

2d  Bn.  1st  F.  A. 
Hq.  &  1  st  Bn.  4th  Inf. 
3d  F.  A. 
5th  Inf. 

6th  Inf.  2. 

1  st  Bn.  Engrs.  (less  1  Co.) 
2d  F.  Hosp.  3. 

3d  F.  Hosp. 
Amn.  Col. 
Div.  Br.  Train. 
Left  Flank  Guard. 

Lieut. -Col.  N . 

2d  &  3d  Bns.  4th  Inf. 
8  men  Tr.  C,  3d  Cav. 


(c) 


Major  D ,  with  Troops  A.  B.  and  E, 

3d  Cavalry,  will  leave  DrENKEN  at  5 
a.  m.  to-morrow,  and  will  reconnoiter 
via  Pfeiungs  towards  Munster- 
berg-Jonkendorf.  He  is  under  the 
direct  orders  of  the  corps  commander. 

This  division  will  march  at  the  head  of 
the  corps 

(a)  The  van  guard  will  leave  DrENKEN 
at  6  a.  m.  tomorrow. 

(b)  The  main  body  of  the  division  will 
follow  the  advance  guard  at  1 ,000 
yards.  The  troops  off  the  high- 
way will  join  the  column  at  SEE- 
GERTswalde,  avoiding  detours. 

(c)  [Orders  for  the  protection  of  the 
flank  by  the  2d  and  3d  Battalions, 
4th  Infantry,  west  of  the  Over- 
land Canal.] 

4.  The  baggage  trains,  with  that  of  corps 

headquarters  in  the  lead,  will  join  the 
troops  on  the  Saalfeld-Mohrungen 
highway,  following  immediately  in 
rear  of  the  divisional  bridge  train. 

5.  I  shall  be  with  the  advance  guard. 

By  command  of  Maj.-Gen.  U — — S 

C R , 

Chief  of  Staff 

There  will  not  be  much  trouble  composing  such  an  order. 
It  was  written  off-hand  by  following  regulations  and  did  not 
take  as  long  as  many  of  the  messages  from  patrols  in  these 
pages.  With  the  exception  of  the  flank  guard,  the  situation 
of  the  division  is  so  normal  that  it  would  require  some  termerity 
to  deviate  from  any  one  of  the  printed  rules  in  composing  the 
order.  These  rules  are  so  specific  that  a  candidate  for  a  com- 
mission from  a  military  academy  can  be  expected  to  compose 
a  flawless  order  for  a  division.  Let  us  see  if  the  lessening  of 
mental  effort  and  the  uniformity  of  arrangement  are  of  practical 
value  and  what  purpose  the  convenient  marginal  reference 
serves. 

In  the  first  place,  the  manner  of  issuing  orders  calls  for 
some  remarks. 


304  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Whoever  has  dictated  an  order  or  taken  one  from  dictation 
has  encountered  the  strange  provision  requiring  the  distribu- 
tion of  troops  to  be  written  in  the  margin.  There  is  no  space 
in  the  adjutant's  memorandum-book  for  marginal  writing;  the 
distribution  of  troops  must  be  written  on  some  blank  page  and 
later  it  may  be  difficult  to  tell  to  what  order  it  belongs.  It  is 
a  form  suited  for  printing  and  for  the  office  desk,  but  not  for 
dictation.  It  would  be  better  to  include  the  distribution  of 
troops  with  other  matter  in  the  body  of  the  order. 

Let  us  for  a  moment  put  ourselves  in  the  place  of  the  ad- 
jutant-general, 1st  Brigade,  who  has  just  written  out  the  fore- 
going order.  It  is  after  1 1  p.  m.  The  order  contains  important 
instructions  for  his  superior  and  assigns  cavalry,  artillery,  en- 
gineers, and  a  field  hospital  to  his  command,  at  the  same  time 
taking  away  one  of  his  regiments  of  infantry.  (We  are  assum- 
ing that  a  different  assignment  of  troops  existed  for  May  4th.) 
At  division  headquarters  the  location  of  each  troop  and  battery 
presumably  was  not  known,  as  the  villages  surely  were  assigned 
to  larger  units  (brigades  and  regiments)  and  presumably  the 
officers  assembled  to  receive  orders  could  not  give  complete 
information  on  the  subject.  For  at  division  headquarters  there 
surely  were  only  assembled  the  adjutants-general  of  the  infantry 
and  artillery  brigades,  the  squadron  adjutant,  an  engineer  offi- 
cer, and  an  officer  from  the  field  hospitals.  It  is  unlikely  that 
the  adjutant- general  of  the  artillery  will  be  able  to  say  definitely 
where  the  different  battalion  headquarters  and  the  individual 
batteries  are  located. 

But  the  commanding  general  of  the  1st  Brigade,  who  has 
been  detailed  as  advance  guard  commander,  must  assemble 
the  officers  at  Gr.  Arnsdorf  to  receive  orders  for  the  troops 
placed  under  his  command,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  his  adjut- 
ant-general to  order  them  there,  or,  if  practicable,  bring  them 
with  him.  The  squadron  adjutant  is  going  back  anyway  and  it 
may  be  possible  to  take  the  engineer  officer  along  too.      But  he 


The  Corps  on  the  March.  305 

must  look  up  the  adjutant  of  the  1st  Battalion,  1st  Field  Artil- 
lery. The  latter  may  be  at  his  regimental  headquarters  at  Kup- 
pen,  receiving  orders.  It  is  over  3 h  miles  to  Arnsdorf.  It  will 
be  past  midnight  when  the  officers  arrive  there  for  orders.  The 
brigade  commander,  who  has  been  awakened,  will  require  some 
time  to  think  about  his  instructions,  and  it  will  be  at  least  1  a.  m. 
before  the  advance-guard  order  is  dictated.  It  then  goes  to  the 
next  lower  commanders.  They  also  will  require  time  for  reflec- 
tion, and  it  will  be  3  a.  m.  before  the  troops,  the  companies,  and 
batteries  at  Ploszen,  Biindtken,  Barten,  and  Saalfeld  know 
what  they  are  to  do  in  the  morning. 

The  1st  Field  Hospital  must  leave  at  5  a.  m.  The  adjutant- 
general  can  save  an  officer  of  the  field  hospital  a  trip  to  Arnsdorf 
to  receive  orders  if  he,  in  anticipation  of  his  brigade  command- 
er's approval,  tells  said  officer  that  the  field  hospital  should 
arrive  at  Barten  at  6  a.  m.  He  also  might  send  a  similar  order 
to  the  1  st  Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery.  The  brigade  com- 
mander would  still  be  able  to  assign  the  battalion  to  its  proper 
place  in  the  column  in  the  morning.  There  are  no  difficulties 
involved  in  the  arrangements  for  the  infantry  and  cavalry, 
quartered  as  they  are  in  the  neighboring  villages  of  Lopittken 
and  Ankern.  But  the  problem  is  not  always  so  easily  disposed 
of;  the  adjutant-general,  or  officer  representing  him,  would  not 
always  feel  authorized  to  anticipate  the  commander's  intentions. 
The  division  commander  sometimes  can  obviate  such  amplifica- 
tions by  announcing  a  place  of  assembly  for  the  troops  assigned 
to  the  advance  guard,  leaving  its  commander  simply  to  issue 
the  orders  for  security  and  information. 

But  the  obstacle  here  touched  upon  would  seldom  be  en- 
countered during  a  campaign.  It  is  not  advisable  frequently 
to  change  the  command  and  composition  of  the  advance  guard ; 
the  interests  of  the  service  would  suffer  thereby.  As  a  rule,  the 
assignment  of  troops  holds  for  an  indefinite  period,  and  only  the 
adjutant  or  aide  of  the  advance  guard  commander  would  report 


306  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

for  orders  at  division  headquarters,  and  these  would  then  be  is- 
sued from  the  advance-guard  commander's  quarters  to  the 
troops  under  his  command.  Experience  in  the  field  has  shown 
the  wisdom  of  having  the  same  troops  permanently  detailed  for 
advance-guard  duty,  and  no  experienced  commander  will  change 
this  custom  without  necessity.  The  provision  of  the  Field 
Service  Regulation  specifying  that  the  strength  and  composi- 
tion of  the  advance  guard  will  depend  on  "the  object  of  the 
march,  the  nature  of  the  country,  and  the  strength  of  the  force 
it  is  covering,"*  must  be  interpreted  in  a  general  way.  The 
nature  of  the  theater  of  war,  the  force  of  cavalry  ahead  of  the 
army  and  its  situation  with  reference  to  the  enemy,  the  char- 
acter of  the  enemy,  and  the  intentions  of  the  commander-in 
chief  are  to  be  taken  into  consideration,  and  not  minor  details 
of  daily  occurrence. 

The  attending  results  will  be  the  best  criterion  of  the  scope 
and  utility  of  the  arrangements  made  by  the  foregoing  order 
from  division  headquarters.  Let  us  assume  that  measures  taken 
by  the  commander  and  the  adjutant-general  of  the  ist  Brig- 
ade have  assured  the  timely  assembly  at  Barten  and  Drenken 
of  the  troops  belonging  to  the  advance  guard.  There  the  com- 
mander of  the  advance  guard  will  issue  his  orders  for  the  march. 
At  5.30  a.  m.,  May  5th,  he  arrives  at  the  highway  north  of  Dren- 
ken, where  the  troops  are  already  assembling.  Soon  after,  the 
division  commander  also  arrives  and  gives  the  advance-guard 
commander  the  following  additional  instructions: 

"The  2d  and  3d  Battalions  4th  Infantry  have  occupied  the 
railway  from  Miswalde  to  Riippertswalde  as  a  protection  against 
hostile  cavalry,  and  will  remain  there  until  relieved  by  the  2d 
Division.  They  probably  will  be  sent  to  Mohrungen  by  rail 
this  afternoon. 

"The  advance  guard  will  protect  the  left  flank  east  of  the 
Overland  Canal.     Measures  will  be  taken  to  protect  not  only 

*See  par.  96,  F.  S.  R. 


The  Corps  on  thk  March.  307 

the  main  body  of  the  division  against  hostile  reconnaissance, 
but  also  the  remainder  of  the  corps." 

In  addition  the  division  commander  tells  the  general  of 
the  information  received  during  the  night  at  corps  headquar- 
ters (pages  10,  23  and  93).  The  gist  of  this  is  that  hostile  de- 
tachments reached  Wormditt,  Guttstadt,  and  Briickendorf  yes- 
terday evening;  but  that  early  this  morning  telegraphic  com- 
munication still  existed  with  Liebstadt  and  Horn.  The  divis- 
ion commander  then  goes  to  Barten,  where  the  corps  com- 
mander wishes  to  see  him. 

The  commanders  of  separate  organizations  are  assembled 
at  Drenken. 

What  instructions  does  the  Commanding  General  op 
The  First  Brigade  (advance-guard  commander)  issue  at 
5.40  A.  M.? 

The  order  of  march  of  the  advance  guard  depends  on  the 
arrangements  made  for  the  protection  of  the  flank.  The  avail- 
able cavalry  cannot  be  used  for  this  purpose.  It  is  evident  that 
infantry  must  be  used.  Were  it  simply  a  question  of  protecting 
the  flank  of  the  advance  guard  alone,  small  flanking  detach- 
ments would  suffice,  marching  on  a  line  with  the  reserve.  Or 
small  detachments  (platoons,  for  instance)  might  be  sent  out 
from  the  van  guard  on  roads  branching  off  from  the  line  of 
march,  which,  halting  at  suitable  points,  could  join  the  reserve 
on  receiving  orders  to  do  so.  The  first  scheme  is  seldom  prac- 
ticable, and  here  not  at  all,  because  protection  is  ordered  for 
the  entire  length  of  the  marching  army  corps.  But  there  are 
also  objections  to  the  second  plan.  It  would  be  difficult  to 
make  arrangements  assuring  the  co-operation  of  such  small 
detachments  even  during  the  march  of  the  advance  guard  to 
Mohrungen;  later  the  advance  guard  commander  would  lose 
track  of  them  altogether. 

The  protection  of  the  flank  to  the  north  must  be  turned 


308  Studies  in  Aitlied  Tactics. 

over  to  a  single  body  of  troops  whose  commander  will  be  re- 
sponsible for  the  details.  The  distance  under  consideration — 
from  the  Overland  Canal  to  the  Mohrungen-Pr.  Holland  high- 
way— is  7. j  miles,  so  the  advance-guard  commander  considers 
two  battalions  necessary. 

A  flank  guard  is  also  necessary  south  of  the  line  of  march, 
because  we  know  that  hostile  parties  arrived  at  Briickendorf 
yesterday  and  could  appear  early  to-day  at  Gottswalde  and 
Venedien.  The  line  of  march  of  the  2d  Army  Corps  is  too 
distant  to  justify  our  omitting  the  protection  of  the  right  flank. 
But  the  general  thinks  that  for  the  present  two  companies  will 
be  sufficient,  which,  marching  from  Gr.  Wilmsdorf  via  Venedien 
to  Kl.  Gottswalde,  will  be  able  to  keep  hostile  patrols  at  a  dis- 
tance. But  he  admits  to  himself  that  the  remainder  of  the 
battalion  may  have  to  be  sent  as  a  reinforcement,  possibly 
marching  from  Gr.  Bestendorf  via  Wolla  and  Kuhdiebs  to 
Paradies. 

He  intends  assigning  two  battalions  to  the  van  guard  not- 
withstanding the  ample  flank  guards.  There  is  quite  a  broad 
extent  of  territory  to  the  front  that  may  call  for  various  detach- 
ments, particularly  as  the  cavalry  is  reduced  in  numbers,  and, 
after  reaching  Mohrungen  there  presumably  will  be  considerable 
for  the  vanguard  to  do. 


The  Corps  on  the  March.  309 

In  view  of  these  considerations  he  orders  as  follows:* 

Advance  Guard  Drenken, 

Orders.  5  May  04,  5-40  a.  m. 

1.  (Information  of  the  enemy). 

2.  Distribution  of  troops: 

Advance-guard  cavalry:     Troop  C,  3d  Cav. 
Van  guard:     Lieutenant-Colonel  J . 

1st  and  2d  Bns.  1st  Inf. 

1  n.  c.  o.  and  10  troopers. 

Co.  A,  Engrs. 
Reserve  (in  order  of  march): 

Col.  1  st  Inf. 

3d  Bn.  1st  Inf. 

1  st  Bn.  1st  F.  A. 

Cos.  A  and  B,  2d  Inf. 

1st  F.  Hosp. 
Left  Flank  Guard :     Colonel  K . 

2d  and  3d  Bns.  2d  Inf. 

8  troopers. 
Right  Flank  Guard :     Major  M . 

Cos.  C.  and  D.,  2d  Inf. 

4  troopers. 

3.  The  advance-guard   cavalry  will  depart  at  once,   provisionally  ad- 

vancing as  far  as  the  edge  of  the  woods  between  Gr.  Besten- 
dorf  and  Mohrungen,  and  reconnoitering  via  Mohrungen  to- 
wards Locken,  Briickendorf,  and  Liebstadt,  and  will  establish 
communication  with  the  1st  Cavalry,  which  is  advancing  via 

Gr.  Hermenau,  and  with  Major  D ,  advancing  via  Pfeilings 

towards  Miinchenberg-Jonkendorf. 

4.  The  van  guard  will  depart  at  6  a.  m.  via  Maldeuten  towards  Mohrungen. 
The  reserve  will  follow  at  a  distance  of  1 ,000  yards. 

*The  order  is  given  in  the  body  of  the  text  in  the  form  presented 
by  the  author.  It  has  the  "distribution  of  troops"  embodied  as  par.  2, 
in  accordance  with  his  views. 

The  order  is  herewith  given  in  the  form  prescribed  by  our  instruc- 
tions, "Field  Orders,"  by  Major  E.  Swift: 

Advance  Guard,  1st  Division,  1st  Army  Corps, 
Field  Orders,  Drenken,  5  May  04,  5-40  a.  m. 

No. . 

1.    (Information  of  the  enemy.) 
Troops.  Our  army  corps  will  continue  its  march 

towards  Mohrungen  to-day.     The  2d 
(a)   Advance  Cavalry :  Corps   will   march   on   our   right   via 

Captain  C .  LiEbemuhe;    the  head  of  its  columns 

Tr  C,  3d  Cav.  are  expected  to  reach  Lockex. 

The  1st  Cavalry  and  Major  D with 

3  troops  3d  Cavalry  are  in  our  front. 


3io 


Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 


5.  The  left  flank  guard,  to  protect  the  march  of  the  army  corps  against 

hostile  cavalry,  will  take  position  along  the  line  of  Freywalde- 
Steinshof-Rollnau  and  to  the  Mohrungen-Pr.  Holland  high- 
way south  of  Wiese.  Colonel  K will  receive  special  in- 
structions from  me.  The  left  flank  guard  will  leave  via  Mal- 
deuten  in  advance  of  the  van  guard. 

6.  The  right  flank  guard  at  first  will  march  via  Gr.  Wilmsdorf  and  Ven- 

edien  to  Kl.  Gottswalde.  It  will  leave  immediately  after  the 
left  flank  guard.  Major  M— —  at  once  will  report  to  me  for 
orders. 

7.  The  baggage  train  will  join  the  corps  headquarters  train  immediately 

after  the  division  has  marched  past;  the  highway  will  be  kept 
clear  of  teams  until  then. 

8.  I  shall  be  with  the  van  guard. 

The  order  is  copied  by  the  adjutants. 

The  form  of  this  order  also  strictly  conforms  to  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Field  Service  Regulations.  There  are  no  unusual 
conditions,  any  more  than  with  the  order  from  division  head- 


(6)   Vanguard: 

Lieut. -Col.  J .  2. 

1  st  &  2d  Bns.  1st  Inf. 
1  n.  c.  o.  &  10  men  Tr.  C. 
Co.  A,  1  st  Bn.  Engrs.  3. 


The    advance    guard   will  march  along 
the  highway  via  Maldeuten  towards 

MOHRUNGEN. 


(c)  Reserve  (in  order  of  march) : 

Col.  1st  Inf.  &  Staff. 
3d  Bn.  1st  Inf. 
1st  Bn.  1st  F.  A. 
Cos.  A&B,  2d  Inf. 
1st  F.  Hosp. 

(d)  Left  Flank  Guard: 

Col.  K and  Staff. 

2d  &  3d  Bns.,  2d  Inf. 
8  men  Tr.  C. 


(e)    Right  Flank  Guard : 

Major  M . 

Cos.  C  &  D,  2d  Inf. 
4  men  Tr.  C. 


(a)  The  advance  cavalry  will  depart  at 
once,  provisionally  advancing  as 
far  as  the  edge  of  the  woods  be- 
t  w  e  e  n  Gr.  Bestendork  and 
Mohrungen  and  reconnoitering 
via  Mohrungen  towards  Lock- 
EN,  Bruckendorf,  and  LiEB- 
STADT,  and  will  establish  commu- 
nication with  the  1st  Cavalry, 
which  is  advancing  via  Gr.  Her- 

menau,  and  with   Major   D , 

who  is  advancing  via  Pfeilings 
towards      Munchenberg- 

JONKENDORF. 

(6)    The  van  guard  will  depart  at  6  a.  m. 

(c)  The   reserve  will    follow    at    1,000 

yards. 

(d)  The  left  flank  guard,  to  protect  the 

march  of  the  army  corps  against 
hostile  cavalry,  will  take  position 
along  the  line  of  Freywalde- 
Steinshof-Rollnau  and  to  the 
Mohrungen-Pr.  Holland  high- 
way south  of  Wiese.  Colonel 
K will  receive  special  instruc- 


The  Corps  on  the  March.  311 

quarters.  On  the  contrary,  the  protection  of  the  flanks  is 
always  the  duty  of  the  advance  guard  and  does  not  form  an 
exception  to  the  rule. 

And  yet  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  the  work  of  some  of 
my  readers  will  be  quite  different. 

Those  that  considered  it  necessary,  as  I  have,  to  send  two 
battalions  as  flank  guard  to  the  north  and  at  least  two  com- 
panies for  similar  purposes  to  the  south,  surely  will  have 
some  misgivings  concerning  the  weakness  of  the  reserve  in 
infantry.  If  two  more  companies  should  be  sent  from  Gr. 
Bestendorf  via  Kuhdiebs,  the  reserve  would  consist  of  only  a 
battalion  of  infantry  in  addition  to  the  artillery  (and  field  hos- 
pital). The  matter  might  be  remedied  by  having  but  one  of 
the  battalions  of  infantry  in  the  van  guard  and  the  other  in  the 
reserve,  or  at  least  have  the  company  of  engineers  with  the 
reserve.  But  the  farther  forward  the  engineers  are  the  more 
promptly  can  necessary  repairs  be  made  to  the  road,  and  it 
is  not  considered  advisable  to  have  less  infantry  in  the  van 

tions  from  the  advance-guard 
commander. 
The  left  flank  guard  will  leave  via 
Maldeuten  in  advance  of  the 
van  guard. 
(e)  The  right  flank  guard  at  first  will 
march  via  Gr.  Wilmsdorf  and 
Venedien  to  Kl.  Gottswalde. 
It  will  leave  immediately  after 
the  left  flank  guard. 

Major    M— at   once  will   report 

to  the  advance-guard  commander 
for  orders. 

4.  The  baggage  train  will  join  the  corps 

headquarters  train  immediately  after 
the  division  has  marched  past;  the 
highway  will  be  kept  clear  of  teams 
until  then. 

5.  The  advance-guard  commander  will  be 

with  the  vanguard. 

By  command  of  Brig-Gen.  A : 

B C , 

Adjt.-Gen. 
Copied  by  the  adjutants  of  separate  organizations. 


312  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

guard.  As  soon  as  the  extensive  territory  in' front  of  the  line 
of  march  is  insufficiently  controlled  by  the  reduced  van  guard, 
or  as  soon  as  the  column  approaches  Mohrungen,  the  van 
guard  would  have  to  be  reinforced,  which  would  result  in  loss 
of  time.  It  is  impossible  to  economize  in  the  strength  of  the 
flank  guards.  Be  it  satisfactory  or  not,  we  have  to  content 
ourselves  with  the  proposed  arrangement.  Were  we  to  have 
but  two  companies  in  the  van  guard,  one  subdivision  would 
have  to  be  omitted  in  the  formation--'  and  the  reserve  to  a  cer- 
tain measure  would  assume  the  role  of  support.  This  simply 
would  change  the  form,  and  not  the  substance. 

We  encounter  a  difficulty,  notwithstanding  the  simple 
situation,  which  makes  us  doubt  the  completeness  of  the  divi- 
sion order;  the  question  may  arise,  whether  the  addition  of 
artillery  to  the  advance  guard  was  not  the  cause  of  the  trouble. 
The  advance-guard  commander  would  be  less  hampered  in  his 
arrangements  if  he  had  no  artillery.  For  he  must  have  at  least 
a  battalion  of  infantry  with  the  artillery;  and  this  assignment 
of  artillery  is  the  very  thing  left  to  the  discretion  of  higher 
authority.  But  if  we  remember  that  the  advance  guard  might 
encounter  hostile  cavalry  and  horse  artillery  in  the  vicinity  of 
Mohrungen,  we  shall  not  question  the  suitability  of  the  arrange- 
ment. This  is  just  what  might  have  happened  and  it  would 
have  been  undesirable  to  have  had  the  march  of  the  army  corps 
interrupted  by  the  necessity  of  bringing  forward  artillery  from 
the  main  body  of  the  division.  But  without  artillery  support 
the  infantry  of  the  advance  guard  might  have  suffered  serious 
and  unnecessary  losses  in  advancing  against  the  hostile  artil- 
lery. It  is  for  just  such  a  case  that  artillery  is  very  desirable 
with  the  advance  guard.  It  can  be  more  readily  spared  in 
advancing  to  battle  because  it  is  preferable  not  to  bring  the 
artillery   battalions  into  action   successively.     We  must  also 

♦Presumably  referring  to  the  necessary  omission  of  an  intermediate 
body  between  advance  party  and  support,  as  authorized  for  large  van 
guards  by  the  German  Field|Service^Regulations. — Translator. 


The  Corps  on  the  March.  313 

remember  that  the  distribution  of  troops  is  not  changed  daily, 
and  that  the  advance  guard  will  perform  its  duties  better  the 
more  lasting  the  assignment  of  troops  is  and  the  more  the  com- 
manders and  troops  get  acquainted  with  each  other.  Besides, 
the  necessity  of  providing  quarters  and  supplies  argues  in  favor 
of  mingling  the  different  arms  of  the  service.  If  there  is  no 
artillery  with  the  advance  guard,  there  may  be  vacant  stables 
and  barns  and  surplus  oats  with  it,  whereas  there  may  be  a 
scarcity  of  these  for  the  artillery  with  the  main  body. 

There  is  another  point  in  the  general's  arrangements  that 
attracts  our  attention.  He  has  formed  advance-guard  cavalry 
of  his  remaining  cavalry.  This  is  in  accord  with  the  regulations 
which  state  than  an  advance  guard  will  be  divided  into  reserve, 
van  guard,  and  advance-guard  cavalry. *  Although  the  greater 
part  of  the  divisional  cavalry  is  not  with  the  advance  guard, 
the  regulations  do  not  admit  of  any  different  arrangement.! 
The  inspector  whose  duty  in  time  of  peace  it  might  be  to  pass 
upon  the  arrangements  would  have  to  take  exception  if  the 
advance-guard  commander  had  assigned  the  remainder  of  his 
cavalry  to  the  van  guard.  In  time  of  war  he  (the  inspector) 
probably  would  have  overlooked  it,  being  convinced  that  the 
arrangement  was  judicious.  It  is  only  advisable  to  form  the 
remaining  cavalry  into  an  independent  group  if  it  is  not  kept 
with  the  van  guard,  but  sent  ahead.  The  advance-guard  com- 
mander realized  this  and  ordered  it  for  the  present  to  go  as  far 
as  the  edge  of  the  woods  east  of  Gr.  Bestendorf .  But  he  thereby 
increases  the  difficulties  of  communication  with  the  flank  guards 
while  he  is  marching  through  the  woods  and  deprives  himself 
of  the  ability  to  send  out  patrols  for  hasty  reconnaissance  or  for 
the  capture  of  hostile  troopers.     The  1st  Cavalry  and  Major 

*In  our  Regulations  the  advance-guard  cavalry  is  grouped  with  the 
van  guard.  (See  par.  100,  F.  S.  R.)  But  in  the  model  for  orders  for  an 
advance  guard  this  cavalry,  called  advanced  cavalry,  is  grouped  sep- 
arately.    (See  page  39,  Swift's  "Field  Orders,"  etc.) — Translator. 

fBut  see  par.  102,  F.  S.  R. 
—21— 


314  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

D are  on  the  way  towards  Mohrungen  and  the  region  be- 
yond. Therefore  a  few  sharp  eyes  will  suffice  at  Mohrungen. 
The  remainder  of  the  troop  is  not  needed  there,  but  with  the  in- 
fantry protecting  the  flanks,  where  the  assistance  of  the  horses' 
speed  would  be  greatly  missed. 

The  advance-guard  commander's  order  adheres  closely 
— all  too  closely —  to  the  printed  instructions.  Further  obey- 
ing the  regulations,  he  has  ordered  the  advance-guard  cavalry 
to   restore  communication  with  the   1st  Cavalry  and   Major 

D .*     If  the  division  or  corps  commander  should  inquire 

how  matters  stood  with  the  foremost  cavalry,  the  advance- 
guard  commander  would  be  safe;  he  has  given  the  necessary 
orders  to  his  cavalry.  It  would  not  be  his  fault  if  insufficient 
information  were  received  or  if  it  came  too  late. 

Would  it  be  the  fault  of  the  advance-guard  cavalry? 

We  shall  look  for  the  answer  by  asking: 

What  arrangements  are  made  by  the  Commander  of 
the  advance-guard  cavalry  to  resume  and  retain  com- 
munication  with   the   detached   cavalry? 

It  is  not  a  question  of  a  short  forenoon  of  a  maneuver  day, 
but  of  a  long  day  and  the  night  following,  and  possibly  beyond 
that.  Every  message  will  take  1  or  2  men,  none  of  whom 
will  again  be  sent  to  the  front.  For,  if  communication  is  to  be 
reliable,  it  must  be  carried  back  to  the  higher  commanders;  and 
the  messages  have  long  distances  to  travel.  At  least  15  to  20 
men  should  be  sent  in  each  direction!  and  an  officer  should  be 
in  command.  A  non-commissioned  officer  cannot  be  expected 
to  have  the  coup  d'ceil  and  military  judgment  necessary  for 
the  duty. 

If  these  connecting  bodies  should  succeed  in  overtaking 
the  1st  Cavalry  and  Major  D what  would  be  accomplished 

*The  van  guard  furnishes  "patrols  to  communicate  with  independ- 
ent cavalry,  etc."     (See  par.  100,  F.  S.  R.) — Translator. 

tThat  is,  after  the  1st  Cavalry  and  Major  D . — Translator. 


The  Corps  on  the  March.  315 

thereby?  It  would  be  very  difficult  for  the  colonel  and  the 
major  to  give  the  officers  of  Troop  C  complete  and  lasting  in- 
sight into  the  situation,  and  their  plans,  and  without  this  the 
reports  of  these  officers  would  be  of  little  value;  the  incom- 
pleteness of  the  same  would  cause  confusion  instead  of  clear- 
ness. These  connecting  bodies  can  assist  in  lightening  and 
helping  with  the  transmission  of  information  if  their  own  reports 
are  intrusted  to  the  care  of  mounted  messengers  of  the  1st 
Cavalry  and  of  Major  D .  Nobody  would  think  of  rec- 
ommending sending  back  duplicate  messages  from  the  different 
stations. 

The  task  would  be  equally  different  should  such  communi- 
cation be  limited  to  discovering  and  reporting  on  the  location 
of  our  advanced  bodies  of  cavalry,  and  would  require  the  same 
number  of  men.  Every  separation  of  the  bodies  of  cavalry, 
every  change  of  route,  on  their  part,  would  have  to  be  reported, 
and  the  advance-guard  commander  would  remain  in  the  dark 
concerning  the  object  and  reason  for  such  movements  notwith- 
standing the  costly  mechanism  employed. 

The  commander  of  Troop  C  cannot  think  of  sending  out 
such  large  detachments.  Resignedly  he  will  send  3  men  in 
each  of  the  directions,  so  as  not  to  violate  his  instructions. 
He  will  deplore  the  useless  details  for  it  is  impossible  for  the 
men  to  comply  with  their  instructions.  They  will  tire  out  their 
horses,  and  probably  will  not  be  seen  again  for  several  days. 

The  greater  the  demand,  the  greater  the  deed.  Certainly! 
But  impossible  tasks  are  worse  than  an  injudicious  sparing  of 
troops.  Impracticable  orders  shake  the  confidence,  and  the 
sluggish  make  believe  compliance  with  them  is  avenged  when  a 
difficult  object  presents  itself  that  could  be  attained  by  exer- 
tion to  the  utmost.  The  orders  given  the  captain  of  Troop  C 
would  even  then  have  contained  an  impossible  feature  if  he  had 
received  them  the  preceding  evening  so  that  he  could  have  had 
the  connecting   bodies  join  Colonel  i\ and  Major  D . 


316  Studiks  in  Applied  Tactics. 

In  another  place  we  saw  that  it  is  wrong  on  principle  to 
expect  communication  to  be  maintained  from  rear  to  front. 
Why  devote  time  and  strength  to  wearily  search  for  and  follow 
the  trail  of  the  bodies  in  front  when  these  can  so  easily  keep  up 
communication?  Besides,  experience  shows  that  efficient  com- 
munication can  exist  only  between  commanders.  Only  the 
commander  of  the  cavalry  sent  ahead  can  correctly  judge  the 
situation,  only  his  messages  are  of  any  value;  he  alone  must  be 
responsible  that  the  commander-in-chief  gets  timely  notice  of 
everything  important  and  constantly  knows  where  his  cavalry 
is.  The  cavalry  commander  should  never  be  allowed  to  justify 
himself  by  saying  that  according  to  regulations  the  advance 
guard  of  the  army  corps  is  responsible  that  communication  be 
maintained  with  the  cavalry  in  front. 

Neither  can  we  claim  that  we  here  have  to  deal  with  an 
exceptional  case,  that  as  a  rule  the  division  commander  would 
retain  control  of  all  his  divisional  cavalry,  and  that  he  would 
not -be  lacking  in  troopers  to  keep  up  communication.  Dur- 
ing the  march  dire  necessity  will  force  every  saber  to  the 
front  that  can  possibly  be  spared  in  the  army.  Every  troop 
absent  from  the  front  will  reduce  our  own  and  strengthen  hos- 
tile chances  for  success.  No  army  is  so  well  provided  with 
cavalry  that  it  could  afford  to  leave  a  number  of  troops  of  cav- 
alry with  each  army  corps  who  would  not  be  needed  for  recon- 
naissance or  in  battle  against  hostile  cavalry,  and  who,  march- 
ing along  with  the  infantry  and  acting  as  mounted  messengers, 
could  wait  for  the  rare  opportunities  of  taking  part  in  regular 
battle.  It  is  true  that  while  the  cavalry  divisions  are  clearing 
up  in  front,  the  army  corps  must  be  able  to  reconnoiter  for 
themselves  and  cannot  do  entirely  without  cavalry.  The  as- 
signment of  450  sabers  to  a  (German)  division,  or,  rather,  of 
900  sabers  to  an  army  corps  (2  divisions),  seems  to  comply  with 
this  requirement;  of  course,  assuming  that  the  troopers  are 
mounted  on  perfectly  serviceable  and  trained  horses.     But  this 


The;  Corps  on  the  March.  317 

amount  is  too  great  for  service  with  the  infantry  and  artillery 
columns  en  route  and  with  outposts.  If  this  cavalry  were  to 
be  systematically  excluded  from  the  more  extended  service  of 
information,  valuable  resources  would  be  idle.  At  times  it 
even  would  be  advisable  for  the  army  commander  temporarily 
to  attach  a  part  of  the  divisional  cavalry  to  the  larger  bodies 
of  cavalry;  and  it  is  a  question  if  the  commanding  general,  of 
the  1st  Army  Corps,  would  not  have  done  well  to  have  placed 

Major  D under  the  orders  of  the  commander  of  the  1st 

Cavalry  on  May  5th.  In  this  event  it  is  quite  possible  that  the 
operations  on  the  Passarge  would  have  taken  even  a  more  fa- 
vorable turn.  But  it  was  a  mistake  to  hold  back  the  cavalry 
of  the  army  corps  at  the  beginning,  an  error  that  in  a  way  was 

remedied  by  Colonel  A 's  discernment  and  request  made  to 

corps  headquarters.  The  reader  will  understand  my  object  in 
composing  the  defective  order  first  issued  from  corps  headquar- 
ters on  May  5th.  It  was  expected  that  from  the  course  of 
events  and  personal  judgment  the  reader  would  discover  the 
correct  principle,  which  without  this  means  might  not  have 
been  brought  out  so  clearly. 

Even  if  on  May  4th  a  cavalry  brigade  had  been  at  Maldeu- 
ten,  it  would  have  been  a  mistake  not  to  give  it  the  assistance 
of  the  divisional  cavalry.  Who  could  tell  what  obstacles  might 
be  encountered  on  the  Passarge?  In  a  fight  with  a  hostile  cav- 
alry brigade  the  three  additional  troops  might  have  turned  the 
scales. 

The  commanding  general  of  the  1st  Army  Corps  apparently 
was  of  the  opinion  that  the  divisional  cavalry  could  not  with- 
out detriment  be  separated  from  the  infantry  and  from  the  con- 
trol of  its  division  commander.  He  did  recognize  the  justice 
of  Colonel  A 's  request  to  turn  over  the  reconnaissance  to- 
wards Munch  enberg-Jonkendorf  to  the  divisional  cavalry,  but 
his  preconceived  ideas  interfered  with  a  thoroughly  satisfactory 
measure.     Now,  after  careful  consideration,  we  must  be  satisfied 


318  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

that  there  was  no  good  reason  for  keeping  the  divisional  cavalry 
of  the  second  division  tied  to  the  columns  of  infantry.  At  least 
a  part  of  it  might  have  found  ample  occupation;  and  some 
could  have  been  spared  to  help  the  advance  guard  of  the  ist 
Division.  Even  when  each  division  marches  on  a  separate 
road,  it  may  be  advisable  to  unite  the  cavalry  of  the  whole 
corps.  But  entire  units  of  cavalry  never  belong  in  the  middle 
of  a  column  of  an  army  corps  marching  on  one  road.  The  tem- 
porary separation  of  such  cavalry  from  the  control  of  the  divi- 
sion commander  is  of  small  importance,  considering  that  often 
there  are  greater  deviations  from  the  regular  ordre  de  bataille 
in  inarching  columns. 

In  discussing  cavalry  service  with  army  corps  we  cannot 
neglect  the  squadrons  of  mounted  orderlies.  We  had  assumed 
that  the  following  men  had  been  detailed  from  Troop  A:  divi- 
sion headquarters,  8  men;  each  brigade  headquarters,  4  men; 
each  infantry  regiment,  2  men;  baggage  trains,  12  men;  40 
men  all  told.  The  detail  was  a  liberal  one;  we  could  have 
done  with  less.  It  means  a  great  reduction  in  strength  for  the 
troop.  The  "mounted  orderly  squadrons"  owe  their  existence 
to  the  desire  to  save  the  cavalry  from  this  depletion  incident  to 
orderly  duty.* 

Strictly  speaking,  their  purpose  is  to  increase  the  number 
of  staff  orderlies  and  headquarter  guards,  whose  strength  has 
been  recognized  as  being  inadequate  for  orderly  duty  on  the 
march,  in  camp,  and  in  battle.  The  simplest  remedy  would 
have  been  to  increase  the  mounted  headquarters  guard  of  each 
army  corps  by  about  50  troopers.  These  men  require  trained 
horses,  which  have  to  be  furnished  by  the  cavalry  on  mobiliza- 

*Our  20  mounted^orderlies  per  regiment  of  infantry  (see  par.  25, 
F.  S.  R.)  are  intended  to  accomplish  the  same  purpose. — Translator. 


The  Corps  on  the  March.  319 

tion.     An  increase  of  60  horses  in  the  cavalry  of  an  army  corps 
in  time  of  peace  would  have  accomplished  the  purpose.* 


At  6  a.  m.  the  vanguard  of  the  1st  Division  departed;  the 
reserve  following  at  1,000  yards.  Two  companies  of  the  1st 
Battalion,  1st  Infantry,  march  550  yards  ahead  of  the  support 
of  the  advance  guard  (as  an  intermediate  body) ;  and  in  front 
of  these  are  the  infantry  advance  party  and  cavalry  point. 
The  remainder  of  Troop  C,  as  ordered,  has  trotted  ahead  through 
Gr.  Bestendorf . 

The  advance  guard  commander  is  surprised  to  find  the 
baggage  train  of  the  1st  Cavalry  in  front  of  the  entire  advance 
guard  of  the  army  corps.  The  division  commander  who  hears 
of  this  is  unable  to  refrain  from  criticising  this  arrangement  to 
his  chief  of  staff,  as  he  feels  the  train  should  follow  the  1st  Divi- 
sion.    But,  not  to  interfere  with  the  march,  he  decides  to  let  it 

*But  the  one  who  originated  the  scheme  was  concerned  that  these 
men  should  be  trained  in  their  special  duties  in  time  of  peace,  and  this 
seemed  to  be  possible  only  by  forming  a  separate  organization.  The  plan 
was  conceived  of  assigning  a  "mounted  orderly  squadron"  [In  strength 
such  a  squadron  would  nearly  correspond  to  one  of  our  cavalry  "troops." 
— Translator.]  to  each  division  of  infantry;  and  such  an  organization  will 
be  found  with  most  divisions  under  the  title  of  "squadron  of  mounted 
chasseurs,"  armed  only  with  sword  and  revolver. 

This  is  an  expensive  body  of  selected  men  and  horses,  in  number  far 
exceeding  the  demand  for  orderlies  in  a  division.  It  is,  therefore,  fair  to 
expect  that  the  chasseur  squadron  will  take  the  place  of  at  least  an  equal 
number  of  cavalry  in  an  infantry  division. 

Our  example  offers  an  opportunity  to  test  the  correctness  of  this 
idea,  if  we  assume  that  we  have  a  chasseur  squadron  in  place  of  Troop 
C  with  the  ist  Division. 

No  changes  would  be  necessary  in  the  distribution.  Let  us  as- 
sume that  during  the  march  to  Gr.  Bestendorf  the  advance-guard  com- 
mander learns  that  hostile  patrols  have  been  seen  near  Konigsdorf  and 
Wiese.  He  knows  how  important  it  is  to  prevent  the  enemy's  obtaining 
any  view  of  the  movements  of  the  army  corps.  Therefore,  under  his  in- 
structions, an  officer  and  20  chasseurs  are  sent  from  Obuchshofchen  to 
drive  away  the  hostile  patrols.  Upon  reaching  Neuhof  the  officer  notices 
hostile  troopers  on  Knoll  148,  near  the  Neuhof-Wiese  road.  The  knoll 
is  so  much  higher  than  intervening  elevations  that  the  highway  between 
the  woods  and  Mohrungen  surely  can  be  seen  from  it. 

AVhat  will  the  officer  do? 

Apparently  the  valley  extending  north  from  the  west  end  of  Neuhof 


320  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

alone  as  far  as  Mohrungen.  The  advance  guard  commander 
wishes  to  send  an  officer  to  the  Maldeuten  railway  station  to 
inquire  for  messages  and  see  if  he  can  come  in  telegraphic  com- 
munication with  the  ist  Cavalry  and  Major  D ,  but  learns 

from  the  division  commander  that  corps  headquarters  has  al- 
ready taken  the  necessary  steps  in  this  particular.  Several 
cyclists  of  the  3d  Infantry  had  been  sent  to  the  station  and 
would  forward  to  the  van  guard  any  information  received. 

Upon  inquiry  the  division  commander  further  stated  that 
corps  headquarters  had  established  telegraphic  communication 
with  the  2d  Army  Corps  from  Saalfeld  via  Liebemuhl  and  that 
the  cavalry  of  the  2d  Corps  would  reach  Liebemuhl  about  7  a.  m. 
It  therefore  might  be  assumed  that  hostile  reconnaissance  could 
not  take  place  via  Tharden  and  Liebemuhl. 

At  8.30  a.  m.  when  the  van  guard  reached  Gr.  Bestendorf, 

will  enable"  the  chasseurs  to  advance  under  cover,  and  they  may  reach 
the  south  edge  of  the  woods  near  Knoll  148.  In  the  meantime  the  com- 
mander has  discovered  that  a  strong  patrol  is  on  the  knoll,  6  or  8  men  of 
it  being  dismounted.  He  can't  do  anything  else  but  charge  them.  How 
many  chasseurs  will  be  hit  by  the  enemy's  fire  during  the  650  yards'  ad- 
vance? Or  what  can  he  hope  to  gain  if  15  or  20  horsemen,  armed  with 
lances,  ride  to  meet  him?  How  much  easier  would  20  dragoons  (of  his 
army)  attain  their  object.  Their  lances  or  the  fire  of  1 2  of  their  carbines 
would  much  more  readily  force  the  hostile  patrol  to  retreat. 

Take  another  case:  After  reaching  Mohrungen,  the  van  guard  is 
sent  to  Georgenthal  upon  word  being  received  that  hostile  cavalry  is  riding 
from  Herzogswalde  towards  Gr.  Hermenau.  The  captain  and  50  men  of 
the  chasseur-squadron  hasten  on  ahead  of  the  van  guard.  Arriving  at 
Georgenthal,  the  captain  sees  a  hostile  body  of  cavalry  (about  120  men) 
about  a  mile  ahead  of  him,  while  the  infantry  of  the  van  guard  has  just 
reached  Pfarrsfeldchen.  Dragoons  would  be  able  to  dismount  and  force 
the  enemy  to  halt  by  their  dismounted  fire;  the  chasseurs  are  denied  this 
means  of  defence.  There  would  be  nothing  for  them  to  do  but  get  out 
of  the  way. 

Take  a  third  case:  A  patrol  of  8  chasseurs  has  been  sent  to  Herzogs- 
walde. Returning,  it  encounters  a  hostile  patrol  near  Gr.  Hermenau. 
Three  men  of  the  latter  dismount  at  the  railway  bridge  and  with  their 
fire  command  the  road  to  Narien  mill,  as  well  as  the  highway  east  of  Gr. 
Hermenau.  The  chasseurs  have  important  information,  but  only  by  a 
wide  detour  can  they  get  it  to  Mohrungen.  Dragoons,  uhlans,  cuiras- 
siers, and  hussars  would  have  cleared  the  shortest  way  for  themselves 
with  their  carbines. 

War  will  offer  many  similar  opportunities.     The  chasseur  is  at  a 


The  Corps  on  thk  March.                     321 
the  advance  guard  commander  learned  that  Lieutenant  C 's 


patrol  found  Briickendorf  occupied  by  the  enemy  at  4  a.  m., 
and  that  during  the  night  and  early  in  the  morning  hostile 
patrols  had  been  seen  at  Wormditt  as  well  as  between  the 

Passarge  and  Narien-see;  also  that  Major  D encountered 

hostile  dragoons  near  Pfeilings.  The  general  knows  that  the 
1st  Cavalry  is  advancing  via  Gr.  Hermenau  towards  Herzogs- 

walde,  and  Major  D towards  Briickendorf,  but  considers 

it  advisable  to  send  out  the  remaining  two  companies  of  the 
3d  Battalion,  1st  Infantry,  via  Wolla-Kuhdiebs  towards  Paradies 
as  already  planned.  He  is  uneasy  on  account  of  receiving  no 
news  whatever  from  Eckersdorf.  At  about  10  a.  m.  the  van 
guard  arrives  at  Mohrungen.  Troop  C,  3d  Cavalry,  halts  east 
of  the  town,  the  two  companies  in  advance  of  the  support  are 
nearing  the  southeast  exit.  In  the  meantime  the  corps  corn- 
disadvantage  on  patrol  or  messenger  duty,  outpost  or  escort  of  train  when 
opposed  to  the  better  armed  enemy,  who  will  act  all  the  bolder  the  safer 
he  knows  himself  to  be  from  bullet,  and  arme  blanche.  The  chasseur 
does  not  replace  the  dragoon.  The  cavalry  will  best  gain  relief  by  an 
increase  of  its  numbers. 

Should  the  hostile  patrol  not  discover  the  marching  column  of  the 
army  corps,  the  absence  of  lance  and  carbine,  and  the  presence  of  steel 
helmet  and  yellow  top-boot,  will  betray  the  chasseur  and  positively  in- 
form the  enemy  of  the  presence  of  infantry 

Better  service  may  be  expected  at  headquarters  from  the  well- 
trained  individual  chasseur  than  from  the  average  cavalryman  tempora- 
rily detailed  for  such  duty,  although  the  efficiency  of  the  latter  has  so  far 
always  proved  satisfactory.  But  aside  from  the  fact  that  too  much  must 
not  be  expected  of  mounted  orderlies  in  action,  would  their  efficiency  be 
diminished  by  their  being  armed  with  lance  and  carbine?  Naturally,  a 
good  hunting-knife  would  have  to  take  the  place  of  the  broadsword. 

Thoughts  on  the  seriousness  of  war  have  unintentionally  brought 
us  to  the  question  of  arms  and  equipment.  It  cannot  be  denied  that 
arms  and  clothing  are  of  tactical  importance,  and  although  this  book  may 
not  be  the  place  to  discuss  the  matter,  still,  no  one  will  be  surprised  if  the 
desire  makes  itself  felt  that  military  judgment  and  activity  should  not  be 
obstructed  by  this  sort  of  defects.  They  would  become  manifest  in  the 
first  days  of  a  future  campaign  and  force  the  conviction  that  no  mounted 
man  should  be  defectively  armed  and  that  his  dress  must  not  interfere 
with  the  use  of  his  weapons  or  give  the  enemy  any  advantage  over  him. 

(The  foregoing — translated  from  the  original — contains,  as  will  be 
seen,  a  description  of  a  German  organization,  and  discussion  of  the  same, 
that  is  foreign  to  our  own. —  Translator.) 


322  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

mander,  who  is  with  the  reserve  of  the  advance  guard,  has 
received  vague  information  by  wire  from  Liebetadt  of  an  engage- 
ment of  the  i  st  Cavalry  at  Pittehnen,  and  orders  the  commander 
of  the  ist  Division  promptly  to  send  a  battalion  to  Gr.  Her- 
menau  to  at  once  occupy  the  defile  there  and  act  as  a  support 
for  the  ist  Cavalry.  The  advance  guard  is  to  continue  its 
march  to  Pfeilings,  but  the  main  body  is  provisionally  to  remain 
at  Mohrungen. 

Troop  E,  3d  Cavalry,  en  route  to  Briickendorf  to  join 
Major  D ,  has  trotted  past  the  marching  column  and  re- 
cently passed  Mohrungen.     Major  D has  reported  that, 

aside  from  a  large  patrol  which  was  retreating,  he  has  seen 
nothing  of  the  enemy  as  far  as  Gubitten. 

One  company  of  the  left  flank  guard  is  at  Freywalde,  one 
on  the  Alt-Kelken-Gr.  Sambrodt  road,  one  on  the  Alt-Kelken- 
Hagenau  road,  one  at  Steinsdorf,  and  two  more  at  Rollnau. 
The  remaining  two  are  to  take  up  a  position  in  the  district 
between  the  Neuhof-Weise  road  and  the  Georgenthal  mill. 

Nothing  has  been  seen  of  the  enemy  excepting  a  patrol  at 
Hagenau. 

What  arrangements  are  made  by  the  commanding 
General  of  the*First  Division? 

The  simplest  thing  to  do  would  be  to  transmit  the  instruc- 
tions to  the  advance-guard  commander.  But  the  division 
commander  fully  understands  the  situation  with  the  advance 
guard  and  can  see  that  its  commander  is  able  to  send  nothing 
but  the  ist  Battalion,  ist  Infantry,  now  in  the  van  guard,  to 
Gr.  Hermenau ;  for,  aside  from  the  artillery,  there  is  only  a  bat- 
talion of  infantry  in  the  reserve.  Neither  can  the  required 
force  be  taken  from  the  main  body  of  the  division,  the  head  of 
whose  column  is  now  about  2,000  yards  east  of  Gr.  Bestendorf ; 
it  would  arrive  at  the  designated  point  nearly  an  hour  after 
the  van  guard  could.  There  is  nothing  else  to  do  but  to  send 
a  battalion  from  the  latter  and  to  form  the  advance  guard  anew. 


The  Corps  on  tiik  March.  323 

For  it  will  not  do  to  let  only  the  2d  and  3d  Battalions,  1st  In- 
fantry, and  artillery  march  to  Pfeilings  as  advance  guard. 

Therefore,  the  division  commander  gives  the  following 
order  to  the  advance-guard  commander : 

"The  division  is  ordered  at  once  to  send  a  battalion  of 
infantry  to  Gr.  Hermenau  to  occupy  the  defile  at  that  point 
and  act  as  a  support  for  the  1st  Cavalry. 

"The  1st  Battalion,  1st  Infantry,  is  available  for  this  duty. 
Issue  the  necessary  orders  to  have  this  done.  The  two  com- 
panies marching  through  Mohrungen  for  the  present  can  halt 
at  the  eastern  exit  of  the  town  and  later  follow  their  battalion. 
The  advance  guard  will  be  reinforced  by  the  3d  Infantry  and 
will  advance  to  Pfeilings.  The  main  body  of  the  division  pro- 
visionally will  follow  to  Mohrungen.  But  I  shall  retain  the 
last  two  companies  of  the  regiment  at  the  head  of  the  main 
body  until  further  orders,  so  that  there  may  be  some  infantry 
in  front  of  the  2d  Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery." 

The  measures  to  be  taken  by  the  advance-guard  commander 
are  very  simple.  He  will  form  the  new  van  guard  of  the  2d  and 
3d  Battalions,  1st  Infantry,  Troop  C,  3d  Cavalry,  and  Company 
A,  1st  Battalion  Engineers;  but  will  have  the  1st  Battalion, 
1st  Field  Artillery,  and  the  1st  Field  Hospital  halt  at  the  side 
of  the  highway  to  follow  the  3d  Infantry.  It  would  cause  some 
delay  to  part  of  the  infantry  regiment  if  an  effort  were  made  to 
place  the  artillery  between  parts  of  it;  and  it  is  desirable  to 
avoid  such  delay,  because  some  time  has  been  lost  already  by 
the  new  arrangement  of  the  advance  guard. 

We  can  learn  a  number  of  lessons  from  the  episode. 

Who  has  ever  seen  so  large  a  percentage  of  the  infantry  of 
a  division  in  the  advance  guard  during  peace  maneuvers?  And 
yet  the  first  principle  in  the  matter  of  instruction  is  that  noth- 
ing should  be  taught  in  time  of  peace  that  must  be  discarded  in 
time  of  war.  While  we  are  accustomed  to  make  certain  con- 
cessions in  this  respect  as  far  as  formal  drill  is  concerned,  it  was 
expected  that  all  regulations  relating  to  field  service  would  hold 
good.     Unfortunately  the  division  commander's  appeal  to  them 


324  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

does  not  help  him  out  of  the  dilemma.  Whereas  he  had  no 
idea  yesterday  evening  of  deviating  from  the  regulations,  this 
morning  he  must  do  so  whether  he  wishes  or  not;  and  he  must 
see  that  it  would  have  been  better  if  he  had  done  so  at  the  begin- 
ning. At  the  most  it  might  be  asked  whether  it  would  not 
have  been  sufficient  to  take  only  part  of  the  3d  Infantry,  so  as 
to  keep  more  nearly  to  the  prescribed  proportion.  But  every 
expert  would  have  decided  against  this,  because  a  division  of 
the  regiment  would  have  been  a  greater  evil.  But  we  must 
consider  a  few  additional  circumstances  before  coming  to  a  final 
decision. 

Although  no  particular  danger  threatens  the  1st  Army 
Corps  on  May  5th  from  any  direction, and  although  no  serious  en- 
gagement with  the  enemy  is  probable  on  this  day,  we  still  might 
get  the  idea  that  on  account  of  the  corps  being  on  the  flank  of 
the  army  we  here  have  an  unusual  case  justifying  an  exceptional- 
ly strong  advance  guard,  and  therefore  that  the  general  rule  as  to 
strength  of  advance  guards  would  still  hold  good  for  ordinary 
cases.  But  if  we  look  at  the  neighboring  army  corps,  advanc- 
ing via  Liebemuhl  towards  Locken,  we  see  that  its  advance 
guard  must  send  at  least  two  battalions  via  Tharden-Porsch- 
ken-Reuszen-Eckersdorf  and  two  more  to  the  south  end  of 
Eissing-see.  In  its  advance  guard,  also,  two  regiments  of 
infantry  will  not  be  sufficient.  The  wider  the  space  interven- 
ing between  the  two  lines  of  march,  the  more  extensive  and 
varied  will  be  the  duties  of  the  advance  guards,  and  as  their 
conposition  is  not  arranged  for  a  few  hours  as  on  maneuvers, 
but  for  days  and  weeks  during  which  the  distances  between  the 
roads  are  constantly  changing,  it  will  be  well  to  make  them  so 
strong  that  their  reinforcement  from  the  main  body  will  be 
unnecessary. 

I  wish  to  go  into  further  details  concerning  another  objec- 
tion that  might  be  raised  to  my  train  of  thoughts.  It  can  be 
justly  claimed  that  in  this  case  we  have  to  deal  with  the  advance 


The  Corps  on  the  March.  325 

guard  of  the  1st  Army  Corps  and  not  with  that  of  the  1st  Divi- 
sion; and  that  therefore  a  brigade  as  advance  guard  would  not 
be  out  of  proportion  according  to  the  rule  laid  down  in  the 
Field  Service  Regulations.  But  these  regulations  themselves 
refute  this  objection  by  the  following  sentence:  "In  larger 
forces  the  strength  and  composition  of  the  advance  guard  .... 
depends  on  the  size  of  the  leading  part  of  the  force."  This 
somewhat  elastic  provision  must  have  reference  to  the  largest 
body  usually  marching  on  a  single  road — i.  e.,  to  the  army 
corps.  It  is  intended  to  mean  that  in  an  army  corps  the  lead- 
ing division  furnishes  the  advance  guard  and  does  so  in  accord- 
ance with  its  own  strength,  and  not  that  of  the  army  corps. 
This  regulation  is  based  on  experience  in  war,  where  now  and 
then  special  advance  guards  were  formed  for  armies  and  army 
corps  that  did  not  prove  satisfactory.  For  example,  in  the 
Army  of  the  Elbe  in  1866  an  advance  guard  was  formed  of  rifle 
battalions  which  broke  up  all  troop  organizations  and  suffered 
from  lack  of  supplies  because  its  trains  were  missing;  while  in 
1870  an  advance  guard  of  the  VII.  Army  Corps  formed  of  a 
brigade  of  infantry  with  cavalry  and  artillery  deprived  the  divi- 
sion commander  of  the  control  of  half  his  troops  and  interfered 
with  the  corps  commander's  freedom  of  action. 

The  Field  Service  Regulations  aim  at  preventing  a  recur- 
rence of  such  an  evil  without  thereby  attempting  to  dispose  of 
the  question  of  army  advance  guards,  concerning  which  the 
commander-in-chief  can  best  decide.  It  is  simply  intended  to 
prevent  any  army  or  army  corps  from  organizing  a  peculiar 
advance  guard  of  its  own.  Experience  has  condemned  such 
an  arrangement  as  injudicious,  and  if  the  leading  division  of  an 
army  corps  marching  on  one  road  on  principle  looks  out  for  the 
service  of  security  and  information,  the  requirement  is  best  met. 
It  goes  without  saying  that  the  division  following  may  have  to 
see  to  the  protection  of  its  own  flanks.  Even  a  corps  advance 
guard  would  not  relieve  it  from  this  duty. 


326  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Theoretically,  therefore,  there  is  no  foundation  for  the  last 
named  objection,  for,  according  to  the  wording  of  the  Field 
Service  Regulations,  the  strength  of  the  advance  guard  of  an 
army  corps  should  be  governed  by  the  strength  of  the  leading 
part — i.  e.,  the  leading  division;  but  in  reality  the  objection 
is  authorized.  As  a  rule,  the  great  length  of  column  of  an  army 
corps  calls  for  a  broader  front  of  advance  guard  than  is  neces- 
sary for  a  division,  and  this  requirement  can  be  met  only  by 
the  use  of  a  larger  force.  Where  in  the  past  a  separate  advance 
guard  was  formed  for  an  army  corps,  its  infantry  usually  con- 
sisted of  a  brigade.  (VII.  Army  Corps  in  1870,  York  Corps, 
1813.) 

If  the  divisions  are  marching  beside  each  other  on  parallel 
roads,  they  may  be  able  to  get  along  with  a  smaller  advance 
guard.  But  in  the  vast  armies  of  to-day  this  is  seldom  the 
case.  It  is  very  seldom  that  several  roads  will  permanently 
be  at  the  disposal  of  an  army  corps.  Therefore  nearly  always 
demands  will  be  made  of  the  advance  guard  that  even  during 
the  march  will  call  for  more  than  two  regiments  of  infantry. 
During  the  night's  rest  additional  demands  will  be  made.  Our 
example  will  show  how  much  these  demands  may  increase,  and 
it  not  only  is  unreasonable,  but  also  injudicious,  for  days  and 
weeks  to  have  the  same  troops  perform  outpost  duty  that  have 
charge  of  the  security  of  the  march.* 

During  peace  maneuvers,  where  the  organizations  are 
changed  daily,  men  are  spared  by  forming  small  advance  and 
flank  guards  and  by  cutting  down  the  strength  of  outposts. 
In  time  of  war  a  weak  advance  guard  would  be  unable  to  rotate 
duties  among  the  organizations.  The  same  men  who  from 
early  in  the  morning  until  late  in  the  afternoon  provide  for  the 
security  of  the  march,  and  march  a  number  of  miles  on  bad 

*That  is,  the  author  wishes  the  advance  guard  to  be  strong  enough 
so  the  part  not  in  the  lead  or  on  duty  as  flank  guards  during  the  day- 
will  act  as  outposts  during  the  night. — Translator. 


Thk  Corps  ox  the  March.  327 

roads  or  across  country,  must  go  on  outpost  in  the  evening, 
and  the  following  morning  must  resume  the  wearing  duty  of 
protecting  the  march. 

If  the  leading  division  of  an  army  corps  uses  one  of  its 
brigades  as  advance  guard,*  the  latter  not  only  is  better  pre- 
pared to  meet  unexpected  demands,  but  the  advance-guard 
commander,  who  as  a  rule  also  is  the  brigade  commander,  can 
prevent  a  premature  expenditure  of  strength  by  changing  the 
subdivisions  at  the  right  time.  This  would  be  of  especial  ad- 
vantage if  opposed  to  superior  hostile  cavalry,  and  our  own 
cavalry  did  not  control  the  country  to  the  front. 

And  what  harm  would  there  be  if  the  division  retained 
the  same  advance  guard  even  if  the  other  division  of  the  corps 
had  found  a  parallel  road  and  were  marching  on  it  alongside 
the  first  one?  The  division  will  lose  nothing  in  the  way  of 
security  by  so  large  an  advance  guard.  Is  it  reasonable  to 
think  that  this  would  induce  the  advance-guard  commander 
to  waste  his  strength?  Whatever  less  amount  now  may  be 
needed  for  protection  on  the  march  or  in  camp  will  be  taken 
care  of  just  as  well  as,  or  even  better  than,  if  it  dropped  back 
into  the  main  body  of  the  division. 

And  as  long  as  the  division  commander  marches  with  the 
advance  guard,  as  now  is  customary,  there  is  no  danger  that 
the  advance  guard  will  escape  and  lead  the  division  into  dif- 
ferent paths  from  those  intended  by  the  division  commander. 
On  the  contrary,  with  so  large  a  part  of  his  force  present,  there 
is  more  ground  for  the  superior  commander's  presence  with  the 
advance  guard  than  with  a  smaller  amount.  The  distances 
between  the  parts  of  the  enlarged  advance  guard  can  be  regu- 
lated according  to  circumstances,  the  same  as  before.  The 
commander  can  extend  the  parts  as  much  to  the  front,  or  draw 
them  as  close  together,  as  he  sees  fit. 

*In  the  German  Army  there  are  two  brigades  of  infantry  in  a  division- 


328  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Let  us  examine  in  detail  the  assignment  of  troops  in  the 
ist  Division  that  we  think  would  answer. 

The  advance  guard  should  consist  of  the  entire  ist  Brigade, 
what  is  left  of  Troop  C,  Company  A,  Engineers,  and  a  field  hos- 
pital. Concerning  artillery,  the  question  arises  whether  it  would 
not  be  permissible  to  assign  the  entire  ist  Field  Artillery  to  the 
advance  guard.  I  do  not  hesitate  to  answer  in  the  affirmative 
if  there  is  any  artillery  at  all  necessary  or  authorized  with  it. 
During  a  march  through  extensive  forests  or  mountainous 
country,  where  artillery  could  not  be  used,  or  would  hinder 
the  free  use  of  infantry,  or  where  it  would  be  exposed  to  hostile 
attack,  a  battalion  of  artillery  would  be  as  unsuited  for  the 
advance  guard  as  would  a  regiment.  But  why  should  the 
regimental  organization  be  destroyed  for  weeks  where  the 
assistance  of  guns  would  be  advantageous  in  an  advance-guard 
action,  and  there  is  sufficient  infantry  available  to  support  the 
guns?  Three  batteries  more  or  less  may  exert  a  decisive  influ- 
ence in  an  advance-guard  engagement;  but  if  it  should  be  in- 
tended to  open  an  engagement  with  the  entire  artillery  brigade, 
a  regiment  of  artillery  is  as  easilv  kept  back  as  a  battalion. 
There  is  no  harm  in  separating  the  two  regiments  of  artillery 
in  the  column.  The  brigade  organization  of  artillery  is  of  no 
importance  until  in  battle.  During  the  march  the  brigade 
commander  surely  is  with  the  division  staff. 

Then  the  main  body  of  the  division  would  consist  of  the 
2d  Brigade,  the  3d  Field  Artillery,  the  remaining  engineers 
and  field  hospitals,  the  ammunition  column,  and  the  divisional 
bridge  train. 

If  we  erase  from  the  mind  the  figures  with  which  to  a  cer- 
tain extent  we  are  burdened  by  inheritance,  nothing  question- 
able or  immaterial  will  be  found  in  the  distribution  just  de- 
scribed. On  the  contrary,  it  frees  us  from  a  cumbersome, 
artificial  model  which  is  contrary  to  the  principle  calling  for 
the  preservation  of  tactical  organizations.     It  assures  every 


Thk  Corps  on  the  March.  329 

commander  the  permanent  control  of  the  entire  force  intended 
for  his  command'  by  the  ordre  de  bataille.  During  protracted 
marches  there  is  not  only  a  question  of  field  orders  to  be  con- 
sidered, but  also  such  as  refer  to  the  daily  interior  economy  of 
troops.  How  can  the  commanding  general  of  the  1  st  Brigade  be 
held  responsible  for  the  fighting  and  marching  efficiency  of  his 
entire  brigade  if,  while  advance-guard  commander,  he  has  one 
of  his  regiments  removed  from  his  control?  How  can  he  keep 
in  harmony  and  close  touch  with  his  command  if  for  weeks  he 
fails  to  see  half  of  it  and  is  not  expected  to  concern  himself 
about  it?  Only  1,000  yards  in  rear  of  him  marches  one  of  his 
regiments  which  is  becoming  estranged  from  him,  which  is  not 
learning  to  know  its  brigade  commander,  and  yet  is  expected 
to  be  under  his  command  as  soon  as  the  time  for  battle  arrives. 

It  is  the  same  with  the  commander  of  the  dismembered 
regiment  of  artillery,  who,  tied  to  one  of  the  battalions  during 
the  march,  feels  a  responsibility  for  the  welfare  of  the  other 
one ;  and  feels  like  a  fifth  wheel  with  the  battalion  where  he  is, 
as  it  has  its  own  commander.  Neither  has  the  commander  of 
the  1st  Infantry  a  pleasant  time.  The  brigade  and  advance- 
guard  commander  must  himself  deal  with  the  battalions. 

To  avoid  misunderstandings,  he  must  ignore  the  regiment- 
al commander,  who  considers  himself  unnecessary  and  whose 
efforts  concerning  the  interior  economy  of  the  regiment  en- 
counter obstacles  everywhere,  because  his  battalion  commanders 
are  not  responsible  to  him,  but  to  the  brigade  commander,  for 
the  execution  of  their  orders.  To  give  him  something  to  do, 
the  advance-guard  commander,  at  least  in  our  example,  has 
made  him  commander  of  the  reserve,  where  he  has  only  a  bat- 
talion of  his  own  regiment. 

How  much  better  results  are  obtained  by  the  proposed 
arrangement.  After  considering  the  pros  and  cons,  we  must 
be  convinced  that  such  an  arrangement  is  the  natural  one; 
—22— 


33°  Studies  in  Appued  Tactics. 

that  it  should  form  the  rule,  and  every  other  one  be  considered 
an  unwelcome  exception. 

I  am  not  in  favor  of  changing  the  regulations  by  placing 
another  rule  in  place  of  the  one  now  existing.  But  if  the  com- 
mander of  a  cavalry  division  and  of  every  body  of  independent 
cavalry  is  given  perfect  freedom  in  the  apportioning  of  his 
command,  I  see  no  reason  why  the  commander  of  an  infantry 
division  should  be  fettered  by  definite  instructions  and  figures. 
And  he  is  fettered  even  if  in  the  instructions  the  addition  of 
"as  a  rule"  seems  to  justify  exceptions.  It  is  the  fate  of  all 
rules  to  check  independent  thought.  Man  is  not  inclined  to 
bother  himself  if  a  rule  points  out  a  convenient  path  and  re- 
lieves him  from  responsibility.    . 


A  Temporary  Hai/t. 

Let  us  further  follow  the  march  of  the  ist  Army  Corps. 

It  is  10.30  a.  m.  The  ist  Battalion,  ist  Infantry,  is  on 
the  march  via  Georgenthal  to  Gr.  Hermenau.  The  second  and 
third  battalions,  with  the  remainder  of  Troop  C  and  the  com- 
pany of  engineers,  are  on  the  way  to  Pfeilings.  The  3d  Infantry 
is  approaching  the  Mohrungen  railway  station,  where  the  ist 
Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery,  and  the  field  hospital  are  awaiting 
its  arrival.  The  main  body  of  the  division  has  been  ordered 
to  leave  a  distance  of  1,200  yards  in  rear  of  the  3d  Infantry  for 
the  1st  Battalion,  ist  Field  Artillery. 

The  commanding  general  of  the  ist  Corps  has  gone  to  the 
Mohrungen  railway  station  and  there  receiyed  a  telegram  from 
army  headquarters  stating  that  the  ist  Corps  probably  would 
continue  its  march  from  Mohrungen  in  the  direction  of  Ramten 
and  Locken;  that  the  2d  Corps  already  had  been  diverted  to- 
wards Langgut  and  Podleiken;  and  that  the  ist  Corps  should 
provisionally  halt  at  Mohrungen  to  await  definite  orders. 

The  corps  commander  informs  the  commanding  general 


The  Corps  on  the  March.  331 

of  the  1st  Division,  who  is  in  the  vicinity,  of  the  contents  of 
the  telegram,  and  gives  the  latter  the  following  orders: 

"The  1st  Division  will  halt  at  Mohrungen.  Make  the 
necessary  arrangements  for  continuing  the  march  towards 
Ramten  and  Locken,  and  particularly  look  out  for  the  safety 
of  the  defile  between  Narien-  and  Mahrung-see. 

"I  shall  not  continue  the  march  from  Mohrungen  in  less 
than  two  hours." 

What  instructions  are  given  by  the  Commander  of 
the  First  Division? 

The  tactical  problem  of  making  arrangements  for  continu- 
ing and  protecting  the  march  through  a  district  in  which  hostile 
parties  have  been  encountered  draws  the  division  commander 
to  the  front.  The  care  for  his  main  body,  whose  halt  of  several 
hours'  duration  he  would  like  to  utilize  to  provide  every  pos- 
sible comfort  for  his  troops,  impels  him  to  stay  at  Mohrungen. 

He  now  has  a  sufficiently  strong  advance  guard  to  solve 
the  tactical  problem,  which  properly  may  be  turned  over  to 
the  advance-guard  commander  for  solution.  In  fact,  it  would 
be  wrong  for  the  division  commander  to  interfere  with  details. 
It  therefore  seems  more  important  that  the  division  commander 
should  remain  with  the  main  body  for  the  present. 

Whether  and  where  the  troops  of  the  main  body  possibly 
may  form,  where  they  are  to  halt,  where  to  obtain  water, 
whether  they  shall  cook,  whether  and  how  Mohrungen  and  the 
neighboring  villages  are  to  furnish  food,  how  to  maintain  order 
in  the  town,  all  this  weighs  on  the  division  commander;  for 
there  is  no  commander  of  the  main  body. 

If  there  were  one,  would  the  division  commander  have  any 
doubt  as  to  where  he  should  now  be?  Would  he  fail  to  take 
advantage  of  the  unusually  favorable  opportunity  to  person- 
ally examine  the  ground  where  his  division  may  have  to  fight 
to-morrow?  His  riding  with  the  advance  guard  during  the 
march,  where  he  by  no  means  wishes  to  meddle  with  the  details 


332  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

of  command,  serves  the  purpose  of  promptly  enabling  him 
personally  to  see  the  enemy  and  the  country.  Shall  he  now 
remain  with  the  main  body  on  account  of  its  interior  economy  ? 
A  ride  of  three-quarters  of  an  hour  will  bring  him  to  the  vicinity 
of  Horn.  How  much  more  practical  and  well  founded  will  his 
arrangements  be  if  from  an  elevation  near  that  village  he  him- 
self has  seen  the  surrounding  country  in  broad  daylight  than 
if  he  must  make  them  based  on  the  map  and  messages  received. 
No  great  general,  no  experienced  commander,  has  ever  missed 
an  opportunity  to  make  a  personal  inspection. 

Therefore  the  division  commander  will  not  hesitate  to  obey 
the  voice  calling  him  to  the  front,  to  the  head  of  his  troops. 
Of  course  he  must  not  expose  himself  to  surprise^by  hostile 
troopers.  He  takes  the  remainder  of  Troop  C  along.  There 
are  three  other  troops  ahead  of  him,  and  in  case  of  necessity 
he  will  depend  on  his  swift  horse.  We  shall  often  find  that 
generals  need  swift  horses  even  if  not  in  the  cavalry.  After 
the  division  commander  has  reported  his  decision  to  the  corps 
commander,  he  informs  the  advance-guard  commander  of  the 
new  situation  and  orders  him  to  start  the  advance  guard  to- 
wards Pfeilings  and  then  to  join  the  division  commander  with 
Troop  C  for  the  ride  to  Horn. 

The  main  body  and  baggage  train  are  placed  in  charge  of 
the  commanding  general  of  the  2d  Brigade.  The  latter  is  or- 
dered to  halt  at  Mohrungen,  and  the  division  commander  still 
has  to  give  him  instructions  how  this  shall  be  done. 

There  would  be  no  use  in  having  the  entire  main  body  or 
even  a  part  of  it  form  in  mass.  The  troops  would  have  to  form 
in  marching  column  again  even  if  the  march  should  be  con- 
tinued for  a  short  distance  only.  The  troops  will  be  able  to 
rest  promptly  if  all  halt  in  column  on  the  road;  but  this  must 
not  be  entirely  taken  up  either  by  the  infantry  stacks,  artillery, 
or  teams. 


The  Corps  on  the  March.  333 

It  is  almost  always  impossible  for  large  bodies  of  men  to 
cook  a  meal  during  a  halt  en  route,  on  account  of  scarcity  of 
wood;  and  it  usually  causes  the  men  more  exertion  than  re- 
freshment. In  the  present  case  there  will  be  no  thought  of 
this,  because  the  two  hours'  intermission  would  not  suffice,  and 
with  good  management  the  men  will  have  had  a  good  break- 
fast and  will  have  ample  food  in  the  haversacks.  There  is  no 
objection  to  feeding  the  animals.  It  would  be  a  mistake  not 
to  feed  the  oats  that  have  been  brought  along,  even  if  they  are 
supposed  to  form  an  emergency  ration.  It  is  also  advisable 
to  provide  water  for  men  and  animals,  even  if  there  is  no  sum- 
mer's heat.  The  obtaining  of  water  cannot  be  left  to  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  organizations.  They  would  naturally  interfere 
with  each  other;  in  running  water  the  animals  would  muddy 
the  water  and  make  it  unfit  for  men.  The  taking  of  water 
must  be  regulated  both  as  to  place  and  time. 

Care  must  be  taken  to  systematically  utilize  the  resources 
of  Mohrungen,  Gr.  and  Kl.  Bestendorf,  Gr.  Wilmsdorf,  Obuchs- 
hofchen,  and  Alt  Kelken.  They  at  least  can  supply  water, 
and  possibly  also  bread  and  oats  if  the  commanding  general 
authorizes  this,  taking  into  consideration  the  needs  of  the  2d 
Division,  which  is  following. 

The  division  commander  would  have  to  order  all  these 
things  if  he  did  not  delegate  them  to  the  commanding  general, 
2d  Brigade.  Anyway,  he  must  send  for  the  brigade  commander 
and  must  give  him  general  instructions  as  to  what  is  to  be  done, 
because  the  latter  is  not  familiar  with  his  new  dutiess.  How 
different  it  would  be  if  the  brigade  commander  for  some  time 
had  been  in  command  of  the  main  body  by  virtue  of  the  dis- 
tribution of  troops !  In  this  event  he  would  have  been  at  the 
head  of  the  main  body  and  the  only  thing  necessary  would  have 
been  an  order  (from  the  division  commander):  "The  main 
body  will  halt  for  two  hours  along  the  road  when  the  head  of 
its  column  reaches  Mohrungen."     The  execution  of  this  order 


334  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

would  not  be  difficult  for  the  commander,  who  from  experience 
already  knows  the  needs  of  the  main  body  composed  of  all 
branches  of  the  service  and  who  has  a  full  knowledge  of  the 
situation. 

I  can  find  no  objection  to  permanently  having  a  com- 
mander designated  for  the  main  body,  and  in  practice  have 
come  across  no  case  where  such  action  could  have  been 
detrimental. 

The  objection  can  hardly  be  taken  seriously  that  the  com- 
mander of  the  main  body  might  abuse  his  authority  and  leave 
the  column  without  cause  or  authority.  He  would  rather  be 
be  able  to  prevent  such  action  on  the  part  of  subordinate  com- 
manders; for  example,  a  too  zealous  artilleryman.  But  this 
arrangement  results  in  the  great  advantage  that  in  the  main 
body  there  will  be  a  commander  responsible  for  order  and  pro- 
tection of  the  column.  The  eye  of  the  division  commander, 
who  is  with  the  advance  guard,  does  not  reach  back  to  the 
main  body;  only  exceptionally  will  he  be  able  to  do  the  right 
thing. 

Every  movement  of  a  large  body  of  men  causes  friction 
that  can  be  more  easily  removed  by  a  commander  of  the  whole 
force  on  the  spot.  Only  an  inexperienced  commander  will  feel 
certain  that  the  written  orders  for  the  march  will  control  the 
troops  as  if  these  were  led  on  a  string  and  be  sufficient  to  meet 
all  obstacles  without  having  anyone  present  to  see  that  the 
orders  are  carried  out,  or  able  to  interfere  and  make  any  abso- 
lutely necessary  changes  or  arrangements  against  the  enemy. 
The  Field  Service  Regulations  state  that  it  may  be  advisable 
to  have  small  bodies  of  infantry  march  between  fractions  of  a 
long  column  of  artillery.  Is  this  to  be  done  solely  when  ar- 
ranged for  the  preceding  day  in  the  distribution  of  troops  for 
the  march?  Is  it  not  possible  that  the  utility  of  such  an  ar- 
rangement may  become  evident  only  after  the  march  has  begun? 
In  such  event  must  permission  always  be  obtained  from  the 


The  Corps  on  the  March.  335 

division  commander,  who  is  far  in  advance,  or  is  it  to  be  done 
by  a  friendly  agreement  between  the  infantry  general  and  the 
artillery  colonel,  who  by  rights  have  no  authority  to  change 
the  order  of  march?  Are  not  the  division  commander's  orders, 
addressed  to  the  main  body,  more  likely  to  be  thoroughly  car- 
ried out  if  they  are  addressed  to  its  commander  than  to  its 
component  parts? 

The  astonishing  custom  of  not  designating  a  commander 
for  the  main  body  of  a  division — a  custom,  and  not  a  regula- 
tion— is  a  relic  of  the  time  when  the  division  commander  as  a 
rule  remained  with  the  main  body,  an  historical  tradition  that 
has  saved  itself  from  the  past  and  makes  life  more  difficult 
for  us.  If  the  division  commander  happens  to  be  with  the 
main  body,  its  commander  appointed  by  the  former  will  not 
be  an  obstacle  in  his  way.  We  have  gradually  learned  that 
on  the  march  the  proper  place  of  the  commander-in-chief  is 
very  far  forward  if  he  hopes  to  direct  his  troops  according  to 
his  own  ideas  and  insight.  We  simply  have  failed  to  draw 
correct  inferences  from  this. 

We  might  be  inclined  to  believe  that  the  first  few  days' 
march  in  a  campaign  would  remedy  the  error,  if  for  no  other 
reason  than  because  the  prescribed  rests  en  route  cannot  be 
properly  carried  out  without  a  responsible  commander  present 
with  the  main  body.  This  supposition  is  not  altogether  cor- 
rect. In  time  of  war  halts  of  large  bodies  of  troops  on  the 
march  will  as  far  as  possible  be  omitted.  Let  us  look  at  our 
example.  According  to  regulations,  there  shall  be  a  short  halt 
soon  after  beginning  a  day's  march.*  For  the  ist  Division 
en  route  to  Mohrungen  this  time  would  have  arrived  when  the 
van  guard  had  reached  Seegertswalde  or  Maldeuten.  But  at 
this  moment  a  large  part  of  the  main  body  of  the  ist  Division — 
the  infantry  at  Saalfeld  and  Kuppen,  the  field  hospitals,  and 
the  divisional  bridge  train — would  not  yet  have  begun  the 

*See  par.  234,  F.  S.  R. 


336  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

march.  The  2d  Division,  in  front  of  which  the  ammunition 
column  and  baggage  trains  of  the  1st  Division  still  must  take 
place,  to  a  large  extent  would  still  be  in  its  quarters.  But  if 
the  2d  Division  later  wishes  to  take  advantage  of  the  prsecribed 
halt,  possibly  when  the  head  of  its  column  has  reached  Woritten, 
the  distance  of  100  yards  it  is  to  maintain  from  the  1st  Division 
will  presumably  be  increased  to  1 ,000  yards.  The  division  will 
hardly  have  resumed  its  march  when  the  1st  Division  would 
again  halt.  Its  van  guard,  after  marching  8  or  10  miles,  has 
completed  the  greater  part  of  its  day's  march.  The  time  has 
come  for  it  and  the  leading  part  of  the  1st  Division  to  have  the 
long  halt  of  half  an  hour  or  an  hour.  This  will  force  the  2d 
Division  to  make  a  correspondingly  long  halt  after  its  leading 
troops  have  marched  about  5  miles  and  the  rearmost  ones 
about  2  or  -z\  miles.  The  latter,  after  this  long  halt,  will  still 
have  to  march  12  or  13  miles  if  they  are  to  reach  Gr.  Besten- 
dorf  to-day.  Only  a  small  part  of  the  command  would  derive 
benefit  from  the  halt,  and  this  would  be  impaired  by  the  un- 
avoidable interruptions  of  the  march. 

Theoretically  the  time  for  rest  could  be  regulated  by  mass- 
ing of  the  troops ;  but  there  is  not  always  room  alongside  the 
road  to  thus  form  the  troops,  and,  in  addition,  it  takes  time  and 
strength. 

In  some  armies  a  remedy  is  sought  by  designating  a  fixed 
time  for  halts.  It  is  hoped  that  checks  and  delays  will  be 
avoided  by  specifying  a  certain  hour  when,  without  further 
orders,  everything  on  the  road  will  halt. 

It  is  self-evident  that  but  little  will  be  gained  by  this. 
For  example,  if  in  our  case  10  a.  m.  were  announced  as  the  time 
for  the  one  hour's  halt  to  begin  for  the  entire  corps,  matters 
would  stand  almost  exactly  as  above  described.  The  head  of 
the  1st  Division  would  be  near  the  end  of  its  march,  and  the  tail 
of  the  2d  Division  would  have  but  recently  begun  its  march. 
But  the  commander  very  seldom  can  tell  whether  the  situation 


The  Corps  on  the  March.  337 

at  any  particular  time  will  be  favorable  for  a  halt,  and  it  is  more 
hazardous  and  troublesome  to  make  any  change  in  an  order 
issued  on  the  subject  beforehand  than  to  issue  one  on  the  march. 
An  order  to  halt  issued  to  the  leading  subdivision  of  troops 
will  promptly  bring  the  whole  column  to  a  halt,  as  such  an  order 
quickly  travels  along  the  entire  line. 

Then  there  is  the  regulation  that  "there  should  be  a  halt 
of  ten  minutes  every  hour."*  The  requirements  of  constantly 
changing  conditions  in  an  actual  march  conflict  with  any  such 
mechanical  regulation.  The  march  of  a  long  column  following 
this  rule  will  be  subject  to  checks  and  interruptions ;  though  in 
some  cases  it  would  cause  considerable  hardship  to  omit  the 
customary  halts  prescribed  by  regulations. 

It  is  therefore  to  be  recommended  that  in  the  movement 
of  unusually  large  columns  all  the  troops  make  a  halt  before 
joining  the  column  on  the  main  road,  and  after  that  continue 
without  halting  unless  the  length  of  march,  intensity  of  heat, 
or  other  unfavorable  conditions  force  a  halt.  The  unfavor- 
able influence  exerted  on  operations  by  long  columns  makes 
it  desirable  to  thoroughly  investigate  the  subject. 

At  10  a.m.,  when  the  van  guard  of  the  1st  Division  reaches 
Mohrungen,  the  tail  of  the  2d  Division  is  still  near  Weinsdorf. 
Even  if  there  is  no  long  halt,  and  no  interruption  whatever  of 
the  march,  the  last  troops  of  the  army  corps  will  require  5  or 
6  hours  to  reach  Gr.  Bestendorf.  If  an  engagement  should 
take  place  near  Mohrungen — as  might  be  the  case  under  a 
different  "general  situation" — these  troops  would  not  be  able 
to  take  part  until  about  5  p.  m.,  after  a  march  of  nearly  22 
miles.  The  ammunition  column  and  battalion  of  heavy  artil- 
lery would  not  reach  the  battlefield  until  sunset.  But  in  such 
case  the  situation  of  the  1st  Corps  would  not  be  a  particularly 
unfavorable  one;  in  most  cases,  where  an  army  corps  marches 
on  a  single  road,  conditions  would  be  less  favorable.     If  from 

*Par.  234,  F.  S.  R. 


338  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

this  we  realize  that  when  the  head  of  an  army  corps  encounters 
the  enemy  late  in  the  day  it  will  seldom  happen  that  the  corps 
can  develop  its  full  strength  on  the  same  day,  means  must  be 
adopted  to  shorten  the  length  of  the  column.  Undoubtedly 
the  best  expedient  is  to  use  additional  roads — at  least,  the 
infantry  should,  and  in  so  doing  must  not  hesitate  to  march 
considerably  farther.  But  where,  as  in  our  case,  only  one  road 
is  available,  the  column  can  be  more  crowded .  The  width  of  the 
the  highways  will  permit  the  infantry  to  march  on  a  broader 
front  than  column  of  squads.  It  is  probable  that  on  the  fine 
road  from  Saalfeld  to  Mohrungen  the  artillery  could  march  in 
double-section  column,  two  carriages  alongside  each  other, 
and  the  greater  part  of  the  train  in  the  same  way.  Thus  the 
different  units  as  well  as  the  entire  corps  would  be  able  to  de- 
ploy for  action  more  quickly,  and  the  day's  march  would  be 
shortened. 

It  is  quite  likely  that  many  of  you  with  a  shake  of  the 
head,  as  I  have  often  done,  have  compared  the  narrow  front 
of  our  marching  columns  with  the  broad  space  beside  them 
used  occasionally  only  by  mounted  officers  or  possibly  without 
authority  by  led  horses. 

Of  course  a  space  is  desirable  alongside  the  marching  col- 
umn to  enable  a  rapid  transmission  of  messages  and  orders. 
But  this  does  not  require  half  the  width  of  the  road — a  narrow 
strip  will  do  if  it  only  is  kept  clear — in  time  of  peace.  In  time 
of  war  the  messenger  or  adjutant  often  will  make  his  way  along- 
side the  road.  In  time  of  war,  too,  no  farmers'  teams  or  spec- 
tators' carriages  will  meet  the  column  and  be  entitled  to  room. 
It  is  therefore  not  necessary  to  be  too  insistent  on  a  small  front 
for  the  troops.  In  times  past,  under  Frederick  the  Great  and 
Napoleon,  columns  marched  in  a  much  broader  front,  at  times 
leaving  the  road  for  the  exclusive  use  of  teams.  The  infantry 
marched  in  the  fields  alongside.  Of  course  this  called  for  great 
exertions,  but  these  were  in  part  repaid  by  an  earlier  arrival  at 


The  Corps  on  the  March.  339 

their  destination.  During  1866  and  1870  we  ourselves  seldom 
used  a  column  of  squads  on  the  march.  On  account  of  the 
importance  of  the  subject,  in  every  case  it  should  be  carefully 
considered  whether  a  shorter  march  formation  cannot  be  adopt- 
ed. Careful  commanders  can  forestall  any  delay  at  specially 
narrow  places  by  diverting  the  infantry  to  side  roads  or  across 
open  fields.  Measured  on  the  road  from  Drenken  to  Gerswalde, 
the  space  in  which  the  1st  Army  Corps  camped  on  May  4th  is 
only  about  half  as  long  as  the  marching  column.  This  may 
be  considered  a  mistake  on  the  assumption  that  the  march 
would  be  less  irksome  if  the  troops  were  not  crowded  so  much 
in  quarters.  This  is  theoretically  correct.  If  the  quarters  are 
spread  out  over  the  same  space  as  the  column  of  route,  all  the 
troops  can  start  at  the  same  hour  and  simultaneously  arrive  at 
their  destination  if  their  new  quarters  again  correspond  in  length 
to  that  of  the  army  corps.  But  the  war  conditions,  the  situa- 
tion, the  number  and  size  of  villages  on  the  line  of  march,  will  but 
seldom  permit  this.  In  our  case  the  Finkenstein  Forest  neces- 
sitated a  closing  in  of  the  troops  on  May  4th  unless  we  wished 
to  leave  part  of  them  behind  between  Riesenburg  and  Finken- 
stein; for  the  point,  arriving  at  Finkenstein  on  May  3d,  could 
go  much  farther  than  Barten  and  Drenken  on  the  4th.  But 
it  would  be  contrary  to  the  requirements  of  the  situation  to 
leave  the  tail  of  the  column  in  the  vicinity  of  Saalfeld  and 
Woritten  to  again  occupy  quarters  along  a  length  of  road  cor- 
responding to  the  length  of  the  marching  column.  The  2d 
Division  quartered  at  Mohrungen  (on  May  5th)  can  be  utilized 
early  on  May  6th  either  at  Gr.  Hermenau  or  at  Eckersdorf  and 
Reuszen ;  it  can  even  give  timely  assistance  at  Locken.  Where- 
as troops  quartered  at  Woritten  and  Saalfeld  could  not  be 
counted  upon  for  assistance  on  May  6th.  And,  besides,  the 
depth  of  quarters  would  increase  the  difficulty  of  drawing  upon 
the  supply  columns  in  rear.  Therefore  in  most  cases  the  crowd- 
ing of  troops  in  cantonment  districts  cannot  be  avoided;  at 
least  not  as  long  as  the  army  corps  must  march  closed  up  as 
much  as  possible. 


QUARTERS  AND  COMBINED  OUTPOSTS. 
Shelter  and  Subsistence. 

The  commander  of  the  ist  Division  at  11.30  a.m.  arrived 
at  Knoll  145  northeast  of  Kranthau,  where  he  was  able  to  obtain 
an  extended  view  of  the  country.  Nothing  is  to  be  seen  of  the 
enemy  as  far  as  Reichau,  the  vicinity  east  of  Willnau  (Height 
160),  or  towards  Gubitten.  The  inhabitants  of  Kranthau  know 
only  of  a  hostile  detachment  of  12  to  15  troopers  which  passed 
through  Kranthau  to  Pfeilings  between  6  and  7  a.  m.,  remained 
there  some  time,  and  about  8  a.  m.  trotted  back  to  the  Tomlack 
Forest  via  Horn  railway  station  (H.  St.  Horn). 

But  the  division  commander  noticed  a  large  hostile  patrol 
near  Eckersdorf  and  sent  the  main  body  of  his  troop  after  it, 
retaining  only  10  troopers  with  himself.  The  enemy  promptly 
withdrew  towards  Ramten;  the  troop  remained  at  Eckersdorf. 
The  country  people  claim  a  while  ago  to  have  heard  a  faint 
sound  of  rifle-firing  from  the  east. 

At  12  o'clock,  noon,  the  van  guard  (2d  Battalion,  ist  In- 
fantry, and  Company  A,  ist  Battalion  Engineers)  arrived  at 
Horn  railway  station  and  sent  a  platoon  to  Horn  and  another 
to  Kl.  Luzeinen. 

Riding  back,  the  division  commander  at  12.30  p.  m.  finds 
the  reserve  of  the  advance  guard  (3d  Battalion,  ist  Infantry, 
the  3d  Infantry,  the  battalion  of  artillery,  and  the  field  hos- 
pital) at  Pfeilings  and  learns  that  two  companies  of  the  3d  In- 
fantry are  posted  at  Himmelforth,  two  companies  of  the  3d 
Battalion,  ist  Infantry,  are  at  Paradies,  and  the  other  two  at 
Venedien.  At  the  same  time  he  receives  the  following,  carried 
by  a  cyclist: 

3-P 


Combined  Outposts.  341 

Headquarters,  ist  Army  Corps,  Mohrungen, 
Field  Orders  5  May  04,  11-30  a.  m. 

No.  

1.  Word  has  just  been  received  from  the  ist  Cavalry  that  it  dis- 
persed a  hostile  troop  of  cavalry  at  Pittehnen.  The  district  along  the 
PiTTEHnen-Guttstadt  road  seems  to  be  free  from  the  enemy.  Five 
(5)  hostile  troops  were  seen  near  Heiligenthal  at  8  a.  m.  to-day. 

2.  The  ist  Army  Corps  will  discontinue  its  march  for  to-day.  The 
ist  Division  will  be  cantoned  in  Himmelforth,  Pfeilings,  Horn,  and 
Kranthau;  the  2d  Division  at  Mohrungen,  Neuhof,  Ke.  and  Gr.  Bes- 
TEndorf,  Wolla,  Kuhdiebs,  and  Paradies. 

The  ist  Division  may  call  in  the  troops  employed  by  it  in  protecting 
the  flank  of  the  marching  column.  A  railway  train  is  ready  at  Miswalde 
to  bring  the  two  battalions  west  of  the  Overland  Canal  to  Mohrungen 
The  battalion  at  Gr.  Hermenau  will  remain  there  and  will  be  under  the 
corps  commander's  immediate  orders.  The  main  body  of  the  ist  Divi- 
sion has  been  ordered  to  continue  its  march  to  Himmelforth  at  12-45  P-  rn. 

3.  Officers  will  report  for  orders  at  Mohrungen  at  7  p.  m.  to-day 

By  command,  etc. 

At  12.45  P-  m>  after  the  division  commander  read  this 
order,  two  men  of  Troop  A,  3d  Cavalry,  delivered  the  follow- 
ing message  to  him : 

Near  Sooben, 
5  May,  1 1-40  a.  m. 
To  the  Chief  of  Staff,  ist  Army  Corps: 

After  9  a.  m.  to-day,  I  found  the  Bruckendorf  railway  station  occu- 
pied by  the  enemy  and  attacked  him  dismounted,  but  could  not  dislodge 
him  He  had  at  least  200  men  in  the  firing-line.  I  could  not  tell  whether 
cavalry  alone  or  cavalry  and  infantry  were  opposed  to  me,  as  the  uni- 
forms are  very  much  alike.  Mycasualites  were  3  dead  and  14  wounded; 
the  latter  are  in  Bruckendorf.  I  shall  attempt  to  cross  the  Passarge  at 
Kloben  or  Kallisten  with  Troops  A  and  B  and  reconnoiter  towards  Miins- 
terberg-Jonkendorf.  I  have  ordered  Troop  E  to  watch  the  enemy  at 
Bruckendorf  and  prevent  his  reconnoitering  towards  Mohrungen. 

D 

Major. 

The  message  is  in  an  unsealed  envelope.  The  two  troopers 
state  that  the  engagement  at  Bruckendorf  lasted  over  an  hour; 
and  that  they  met  Troop  E  at  Gubitten,  its  captain  reading 
the  message. 

What  arrangements  does  the  Commander  of  the 
First  Division  make  at  12.45  p.  m.? 

There  will  be  no  difficulty  finding  shelter  for  the  division, 
although  it  might  be  a  little  crowded.     Naturally  the  command- 


342  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

ing  general's  orders  would  not  prohibit  a  slight  extension  of  the 
cantonment  district,  providing  that  no  place  is  occupied  that 
has  been  assigned  to  the  2d  Division.  Although  we  are  not  yet 
certain  how  matters  are  at  the  front,  whether  there  is  not  some 
hostile  cavalry  at  Ramten  or  Locken,  and  whether  or  not  the 
enemy  is  still  at  Bruekcndorf,  there  is  no  reason  for  delaying 
the  troops  in  their  occupation  of  quarters.  Should  hostile 
cavalry  actually  appear  west  of  the  Passarge  to-day,  the  ad- 
vance guard  would  drive  it  back.  There  is  no  reason  for 
shortening  the  period  of  rest  on  this  account;  such  anxiety 
would  be  unmilitary.  Not  counting  detours,  the  advance 
guard  has  marched  over  15 £  miles  and  has  been  astir  since  5 
a.  m.  The  main  body  will  not  reach  Himmelforth  before  2 
p.  m.;  and  an  hour  and  a  half  more  will  be  necessary  before 
all  its  units  reach  their  quarters.  It  will  be  5  p.  m.  before  the 
baggage  train  joins  the  advance  guard.  It  will  be  later  in  the 
evening  before  the  2d  and  3d  Battalions,  2d  Infantry  (now  at 
the  edge  of  the  woods  between  Freywalde  and  Neuhof),  and 
the  two  battalions  of  the  4th  Infantry  (which  are  to  be 
brought  up  by  train  from  Miswalde)  will  join  the  division. 

It  is  evident  that  notwithstanding  the  very  early  arrival 
at  the  destination  and  the  prompt  orders  of  the  corps  com- 
mander, it  will  be  late  before  the  entire  division  can  rest.  And 
it  will  be  instructive  to  cast  a  glance  at  the  2d  Division,  the  head 
of  whose  column  will  be  only  a  short  distance  past  Saalfeld. 
By  the  time  this  reaches  Gr.  Bestendorf  it  will  be  5  o'clock, 
and  its  last  wagons,  following  the  battalion  of  heavy  artillery, 
will  not  reach  the  quarters  before  7  p.  m.  The  rations  consumed 
from  the  baggage  train  must  be  replaced  during  the  night  from 
the  supply  columns.* 

Although  but  few  villages  are  available,  the  division  com- 
mander would  not  think  of  having  part  of  his  men  bivouac. 
The  poorest  shelter  under  roof,  as  a  rule,  is  preferable  to  biv- 

*See  par.  382,  F.  S.  R. 


Combined  Outposts.  343 

ouacking,*  at  least  in  European  countries;  and  our  grand 
maneuvers  serve  to  remind  us  that  a  great  many  men  and 
animals  can  be  sheltered  in  a  small  space.  And  subsistence 
can  be  better  arranged  for  in  quarters  than  in  bivouac.  It 
is  manifest  that  food  supplies  will  be  requisitioned  from  the 
villages  without  waiting  for  the  baggage  trains  ;f  no  division 
order  is  necessary  for  this.  The  method  of  supply  should  be 
regulated;  and  the  very  first  days  of  a  campaign  afford  such 
practical  lessons  in  this  that  it  seems  unnecessary  to  theoreti- 
cally discuss  the  subject.  But  it  is  well  to  remember  that  there 
is  no  danger  of  want  as  long  as  cattle  can  be  obtained  in  the 
country.  It  is  claimed  that  freshly  killed  meat  is  unpalat- 
able or  hurtful.  Large  bodies  of  troops  in  Europe  and  distant 
countries  for  weeks  and  months  have  subsisted  on  freshly 
killed  cattle  without  bad  results. 

Keen  hunger  and  good  cooking  help  to  overcome  its  pecul- 
iar taste.  In  the  same  way,  thoroughly  baked  fresh  bread  may 
be  eaten  as  soon  as  baked.  We  also  prefer  freshly- baked  to 
stale  bread  in  ordinary  life.  Besides,  freshly  baked  bread  very 
readily  spoils  if  loaded  on  wagons.  Bad  water  is  more  harm- 
ful than  fresh  beef  or  bread.  Both  troop  commanders  and 
surgeons  must  carefully  investigate  its  quality. 

Food  supplies  will  be  requisioned  not  only  in  the  villages 
where  the  troops  are  quartered,  but  also  in  neighboring  ones, 
in  so  far  as  they  are  not  assigned  to  other  bodies  of  troops. 
Therefore  there  is  no  danger  of  being  short  of  meat.  Flour 
must  be  obtained,  so  each  man  may  have  a  liberal  supply  of 
bread  the  following. morning,  and  bread  must  be  baked  in  all 
the  ovens.  Sometimes  the  number  of  ovens  is  quite  limited. 
In  addition,  the  soldier's  meat-can  must  help  out  with  cooking 
facilities. 


*See  pars.  593-4,  F.  S.  R. 
fSee  pars.  373-4,  F.  S.  R. 


344  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

It  will  be  more  difficult  to  provide  for  the  large  number  of 
animals  in  the  division  than  for  the  men.  The  barns  will  be 
far  from  full,  only  a  couple  of  months  before  harvest -time.  As 
a  rule,  there  will  be  especially  a  scarcity  of  oats.  So  it  will  be 
necessary  to  use  other  varieties  of  forage,  which  shows  how 
important  it  is  to  accustom  animals  to  them  in  time  of  peace 
and  familiarize  the  keepers  with  the  precautions  to  be  taken  in 
their  use. 

If  we  assume  that  May  5th  is  not  the  first  day  of  the  cam- 
paign, and  that  the  troops  already  are  used  to  camp  life,  the 
division  commander  may  confine  himself  to  the  following  short 
order  at  1  p.m.: 

Headquarters,  1st  Division,  1st  Army  Corps, 

Pfeilings,  5  May,  1  p.  ra. 
Field  Orders 
No.  . 

1.  The  1st  Army  Corps  will  remain  near  Mohrungen;  the  2d 
Division  in  Mohrungen,  Guldenboden,  Paradies,  Kuhdiebs,  Gr. 
Bestendorf,  and  to  the  north. 

Corps  headquarters:  Mohrungen. 

2.  The  1  st  Division  will  be  cantoned  as  follows:  Advance  guard: 
Reussen,  Schwenkendorf,  Horn,  Kranthau,  Kl.  Luzeinen.  Main 
body:  HimmELForth,  Pfeilings,  Gr.  Gottswalde.  Division  bridge 
train:   Sittehnen.     Division  headquarters:   Himmelforth. 

Regimental  headquarters  and  the  2d  Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery, 
will  join  the  advance  guard. 

3.  Information  is  expected  soon  concerning  the  situation  at  Ramten 
and  Locken;  likewise  concerning  the  position  of  Troop  E,  3d  Cavalry. 
The  defile  between  Mahrung-  and  Eissing-seE  must  be  constantly 
watched. 

4.  The  baggage  trains  and  ammunition  column  will  be  brought  to 
Himmelforth,  where  the  former  will  be  at  the  disposition  of  the  com- 
manders of  the  advance  guard  and  main  body. 

5      Officers  will  report  for  orders  at  Himmelforth  at  9  p.  m. 
By  command,  etc. 

A  verbal  order  to  the  adjutants  will  be  sufficient  to  bring 
in  the  detached  troops  and  to  have  the  battalion  of  1st  Infantry 
stay  at  Gr.  Hermenau.  The  chief  surgeon  of  the  division  will 
be  ordered  to  care  for  the  wounded  of  Troops  A  and  B  at  Briick- 
endorf.  The  division  commander  cautions  him  that  if  the 
enemy  is  seen  there,  the  latter  must  not  be  allowed  to  obtain 


Combined  Outposts.  345 

any  information.  The  surgeons  sent  out  are  to  be  instructed 
concerning  their  conduct  and  that  their  supplies  must  be  taken 
along  in  farm  wagons.  The  lettering  on  Army  transportation 
might  give  the  enemy  valuable  information. 

The  baggage  train  of  the  1st  Battalion,  1st  Infantry,  is  sent 
to  Gr.  Hermenau.  The  chief  of  staff  endeavors  to  have  tele- 
graphic communication  restored  between  Horn  railway  station 
and  Mohrungen,  possibly  also  with  Ziegenberg,  and  will  not 
neglect  to  obtain  information  from  the  inhabitants  concerning 
the  enemy  and  the  country,  particularly  concerning  the  nature 
of  the  Passarge  and  its  bridges,  the  meadow  lands  and  roads. 
Provisions,  cattle,  bread  and  forage  will  be  obtained  from  Eck- 
ersdorf  and  Willnau.  It  is  impracticable  to  wait  with  drawing 
supplies  from  neighboring  villages  until  it  is  ascertained  whether 
or  not  the  villages  in  which  troops  are  quartered  have  a  sufficient 
supply.  Any  surplus  can  be  loaded  in  the  regimental  wagons 
or  the  supply  column  following.  The  cyclists  of  the  main  body, 
in  charge  of  an  officer,  are  particularly  adapted  for  this  duty. 
At  least  one-half  of  those  belonging  to  the  main  body  will  be 
available.  The  advance  guard  will  need  its  cyclists  with  the 
outposts. 

Prolonged  marches  will  induce  the  commanders  of  the 
advance  guard  and  main  body  to  have  part  of  the  cyclists  at 
the  head  of  their  respective  columns  for  use  in  case  of  necessity. 

The  order  contains  no  instructions  concerning  outposts. 
The  service  of  security  and  information  always  is  the  province 
of  the  advance  guard. 

In  establishing  the  cantonment  we  again  see  the  advantage 
of  having  the  main  body  under  the  command  of  the  command- 
ing general  of  the  2d  Brigade. 

It  is  not  necessary  for  the  division  commander  to  bother 
himself  about  the  different  parts  of  the  main  body;  the  brigade 
commander,  who  otherwise  would  have  nothing  to  do  but  go 
to  his  quarters,  can  relieve  him  of  this  office. 

—23— 


346  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Although  there  is  no  tactical  reason  for  assigning  the  2d 
Battalion,  1st  Field  Artillery,  to  the  advance  guard,  it  seems 
advisable  on  the  score  of  obtaining  good  accommodations,  and 
on  May  6th  this  assignment  will  be  retained  if  the  division  com- 
mander has  become  convinced  to-day  that  he  will  need  the 
entire  1st  Brigade  in  the  advance  guard. 

The  division  order  does  not  contain  any  information  about 
the  enemy.  This  will  often  happen  in  war,  when  the  com- 
manders concerned  can  receive  verbal  information  on  the  sub- 
ject. A  repetition  of  this  in  the  order  here  would  simply  be  a 
concession  to  the  model. 

The  order,  with  necessary  additions,  particularly  concern- 
ing the  cyclists,  will  be  sent  to  the  main  body. 

But,  on  account  of  the  strained  situation  and  the  proximity 
of  the  enemy,  the  division  commander  cannot  yet  look  up  his 
quarters.  He  considers  it  necessary  first  to  listen  to  the  ad- 
vance-guard commander's  orders,  and  then  again  to  go  into 
the  territory  in  front  of  his  position. 

Security  and  Information 

The  advance-guard  commander's  orders  will  conclude  the 
day's  work  of  the  1st  Army  Corps,  which  we  have  followed  in 
spirit,  and  will  be  the  capstone  of  the  structure  portrayed  in 
Part  II.  of  this  study. 

I  would  recommend  that  such  readers  as  wish  to  solve  this 
problem  for  themselves  unreservedly  try  their  own  skill  at  it, 
without  consulting  Field  Service  Regulations  or  any  other  text- 
book. It  surely  would  be  impracticable  to  consult  a  book  in 
time  of  war. 

What  arrangements  wile  the  advance-guard  Com- 
mander of  the  First  Division  make  about  i  p.  m.,  May 
5Th? 

(There  are  30  men  of  Troop  C  under  its  captain  at  Eckers- 
dorf ;  10  men  are  with  the  van  guard  at  Horn  railway  station.) 


Combined  Outposts.  347 

The  problem  can  be  solved  in  a  variety  of  ways,  and  any 
arrangements  would  be  suitable  that  secure  the  division  against 
surprise.  It  is  desired  that  hostile  patrols  be  kept  at  a  distance, 
and  that  the  advance  guard  find  a  place  which  will  furnish  sup- 
plies and  force  as  few  men  as  possible  to  bivouac.  And  finally, 
everything  must  be  done  in  the  way  of  reconnaissance  that  the 
means  at  hand  will  possibly  permit. 

Towards  the  east  the  nature  of  the  ground  favors  protec- 
tion. Occupying  the  defile  between  Narien-  and  Mahrung-see 
secures  protection  from  surprise  as  well  as  from  hostile  recon- 
naissance in  this  direction,  and  can  be  effected  with  a  small 
force.  There  is  wider  scope  in  arranging  for  protection  towards 
the  southeast  and  south.  It  would  do  to  have  protection  de- 
pend on  the  infantry  occupying  the  villages  of  Reuszen,  Schwen- 
kendorf,  and  Horn.  It  is  probable  that  pickets  posted  on  the 
roads  leading  towards  the  enemy  and  companies  in  alarm- 
quarters*  at  the  village  entrances  would  give  sufficient  protec- 
tion. It  is  true  that  in  this  case  there  would  be  no  regularly 
detailed  outposts  responsible  for  protection,  which  seems  a 
doubtful  proceeding  in  view  of  the  nearness  of  the  enemy;  and 
a  surprise  might  involve  villages  in  which  artillery  is  quartered. 
This  must  be  avoided  as  much  as  possible.  Besides,  the  hamlet 
of  Schwenkendorf  on  the  main  road  would  have  to  be  over- 
crowded with  troops  and  the  entire  advance  guard  would  have 
to  be  in  a  high  state  of  readiness,  which  would  interfere  with 
recuperation. 

Therefore  it  seems  more  advantageous  to  have  a  force  of 
infantry  march  3^  miles  farther — to  Eckersdorf— and  intrust 
it  with  outpost  duty  in  the  section  between  Gehl-see  and  Mahr- 
ung-see. This  will  increase  the  area  available  for  quartering 
troops,  will  make  it  safe  to  collect  supplies  in  the  large  village 

*In  this  case  troops  would  be  crowded  into  a  smaller  space  than  if 
in  ordinary  quarters;  the  men  would  remain  dressed,  with  arms  at  their 
sides,  and  a  light  burning  in  each  house,  with  a  man  on  guard. 


348  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

of  Eckersdorf,  and  will  support  reconnaissance  towards  Ramten 
and  Locken.  The  infantry  in  Reussen  can  undertake  outpost 
duty  towards  the  south. 

The  following  order  might  result  from  these  reflections 
after  hearing  the  regimental  commander's  suggestions  concern- 
ing the  distribution  of  battalions  and  batteries: 

Advance  Guard,  ist  Division,  ist  Army  Corps, 

Pfeilings,  5  May,  i  p.  m. 
Field  Orders 

No.  . 

i.  The  ist  Cavalry  dispersed  a  hostile  troop  of  cavalry  near  PiT- 
TEHNEN,  and  located  five  other  troops  near  Heiligenthal.     Bruckendorf 

was  in  possession  of  the  enemy  this  morning.     Major  D attacked 

there  with  Troops  A  and  B,  3d  Cavalry,  but  could  not  dislodge  the  enemy; 
he  then  advanced  via  Kloben  and  Kallisten.  Troop  E,  3d  Cavalry,  has 
advanced  via  Gubitten  to  Bruckendorf  with  orders  to  watch  the  latter 
place. 

The  2d  Army  Corps  will  not  march  to  Locken,  but  has  been  deflected 
from  LiEbemuhl  to  Langgut  and  Podleiken. 

The  main  body  of  the  division  will  remain  in  Pfeilings,  Himmel- 
forth,  and  Gr.  Gottswalde;  division  headquarters  at  Himmelforth. 
2.  (a)  The  reserve  of  the  advance  guard  will  take  quarters  as  follows: 
Regimental  Headquarters  and        -\ 
ist  Battalion,  ist  Field  Artillery,    (  Horn 
Company  A,  Engineers,  ( 

Field  Hospitals,  J 

&3££&3££5k,.  i  Schwenkendorf. 

Regimental  Headquarters,  3d  Battalion,      ) 

2d  Infantry,  3d  Battalion,  ist  Infantry   >  ™     „ 
(from  Venedien  and  Paradies),  ) 

Battery  D,  ist  Field  Artillery, 
Headquarters  Advance  Guard,  Horn. 
(6)  Outposts: 

Southern  Section,  Colonel   0 : 

Regimental  Headquarters  and 

2d  and  3d  Battalions,  3d  Infantry,  and 

Remainder  of  Troop  C,  3d  Cavalry, 

now  at  Eckersdorf,  extending  from  Mahrung-  to  Gehl-see. 
Reserve :    Eckersdorf. 

Reconnaissance  to  be  conducted  via  Kammersdorf  and  Locken. 
Prompt  report  is  expected  concerning  the  situation  at  Ramten  and  Locken. 
The  defile  between  Mahrung-  and  Eissing-see  is  to  be  constantly  watched. 
An  attempt  will  be  made  to  obtain  touch  with  Troop  E,  3d  Cavalry, 
via  Magergut,  and  report  of  its  location  to  be  promptly  reported  to  these 
headquarters. 


Combined  Outposts.  349 

Northern  Section,  Lieutenant-Colonel  P ■ 

2d  Battalion,  ist  Infantry, 
1st  Battalion,  3d  Infantry, 
10  men  Troop  C,  3d  Cavalry, 
Battery  F,  ist  Field  Artillery, 

in  the  defile  between  Mahrung-  and  Narien-see. 
Reserve:   Kranthau. 

Reconnaissance  to  be  carried  on  towards  the  Passarge.  A  strong 
patrol  of  cyclists  will  be  sent  to  Kallisten.  Prompt  report  is  expected 
concerning  the  location  of  Troop  E,  3d  Cavalry. 

(c)  The  regimental  commander  2d  Infantry  at  Reussen  will  arrange 
for  outposts  towards  the  south,  conferring  with  the  cantonment  com- 
mandant* of  Gr.  Gottswaldb  on  this  subject. 

(d)  The  various  cantonment  commandants  will  be  responsible  for 
the  interior  and  exterior  guards  of  their  respective  villages.  (In  Horn 
the  colonel   ist  Artillery  will  be  cantonment  commandant.) 

3.     Officers  will  report  for  orders  at  Horn  at  10  p.  m. 
By  command,  etc. 

After  inquiry  among  the  adjutants,  all  cyclists  of  the  ad- 
vance-guard reserve  are  ordered  up  to  the  outpost  sections. 

Many  an  order  worded  quite  differently  from  the  above 
will  answer  the  purpose;  mine  will  serve  as  a  basis  for  some 
additional  remarks. 

In  the  first  place,  I  wish  to  explain  two  of  the  measures 
that  call  for  remarks. 

A  battery  has  been  assigned  to  the  northern  section  of 
outposts.  In  this  way  Kranthau  can  be  used  for  sheltering 
the  horses.  Horn  certainly  is  a  large  village,  but  when  you 
count  the  animals  belonging  to  the  headquarters,  train,  and 
artillery,  it  will  be  quite  a  relief  to  have  horses  of  one  battery 
less  to  care  for.  Besides — and  this  is  the  most  important  rea- 
son for  detaching  the  battery — a  few  guns  posted  on  the  height 
near  Kranthau  will  command  the  road  to  Willnau  and  in  cer- 
tain cases  might  do  good  service  there  during  the  afternoon  or 
early  next  morning. 

This  outpost  section  has  the  ist  Battalion,  3d  Infantry, 
while  the  other  two  battalions  are  in  the  southern  section.     On 


*Similar  to  our  officer  of  the  day. 


35o  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

paper  such  objectionable  separation  easily  could  be  avoided, 
but  it  often  is  otherwise  in  actual  life. 

It  might  seem  profitable  to  many  of  my  readers  to  con- 
sider the 

ARRANGEMENTS     MADE     BY     THE     OUTPOST     COMMANDERS      AND 
THEIR  SUBORDINATES. 

although  these  present  no  special  difficulties. 


About  a  battalion  will  be  required  as  supports  and  pickets 
in  the  southern  section:  a  support  of  two  companies  at  the 
southern  exit  of  Eckersdorf,  the  other  in  Katzendorf.  Pickets 
from  the  former  will  be  stationed  on  the  highway  and  the 
roads  leading  south  from  Eckersdorf,  and  from  the  latter  at 
the  Katzendorf-Gehlfeld  and  Katzendorf-Draglitz  cross-roads; 
while  the  reserve,  which  will  occupy  alarm-quarters  in  Eckers- 
dorf close  behind  the  support,  will  see  to  the  guarding  of  the  vil- 
lage and  will  send  a  detachment  to  the  small  farm -yard  nearly 
a  mile  east  of  Eckersdorf  (near  the  letter  /  of  the  word  "Eckers- 
dorf"). Only  the  small  remnant  of  Troop  C  is  available  for  re- 
connaissance. We  therefore  must  do  without  mounted  orderlies 
at  the  supports  and  reserves;  this  can  easily  be  done,  because 
there  is  a  cyclist  with  each  company.  It  is  hoped  that  a  suffi- 
cient number  will  be  on  hand  to  admit  of  sending  a  patrol  of 
cyclists  via  Magergut  to  Briickendorf,  to  relieve  Troop  C  from 
the  necessity  of  establishing  communication  with  Troop  E. 
In  the  evening  the  patrol  could  be  established  at  Ramten  as 
a  detached  post  to  observe  the  ground  between  Mahrung-  and 
Eissing-see. 

It  cannot  be  foreseen  when  Troop  C  will  return  from  recon- 
naissance from  Kammersdorf.  Quarters  will  be  provided  for 
it  at  the  northern  exit  of  Eckersdorf.  Unless  unusual  circum- 
stances should  detain  it  at  the  front,  such  as  would  demand 
and  warrant  the  sacrifice,  the  troop  should  be  able  to  have  un- 


Combined  Outposts.  351 

broken  rest  during  the  night.  The  prospect  of  this  justifies 
the  troop  commander  to  act  energetically  the  remainder  of  the 
afternoon.  He  has  come  less  than  20  miles  to-day,  measured 
along  the  road.  He  accompanies  the  division  commander  in 
the  ride  from  Mohrungen  to  Kranthau  and  was  able  to  obtain 
a  profound  insight  into  the  military  situation.  It  cannot  have 
escaped  him  that  the  unexpected  change  of  direction  of  the  2d 
Army  Corps  to  all  appearances  has  disarranged  the  reconnais- 
sance service.  His  ambition  urges  him  to  help  matters  along. 
The  wording  of  the  orders  he  received  from  the  outpost  com- 
mander is  not  of  much  importance.  No  matter  how  much  the 
prospect  of  safe  quarters  might  tempt  a  cautious  troop  com- 
mander to  occupy  these  early,  who  knows  if  the  campaign  will 
again  offer  a  similar  opportunity  of  important  service  and  bril- 
iant  action.  The  training  of  the  young  cavalry  commander,  his 
habit  of  self-dependence  and  initiative,  enable  him  to  grasp 
the  full  scope  of  the  situation  and  realize  the  value  of  definite 
information  concerning  the  conditions  east  of  Kudipper  Forest 
(Kudipper  Forst). 

There  is  a  large  group  of  hostile  troopers  in  his  front.  It 
is  therefore  unlikely  that  small  patrols  will  be  able  to  get  through, 
or  that  their  messages  will  come  back  in  time.  In  addition, 
he  is  anxious  to  see  with  his  own  eyes.  Therefore  he  concludes 
to  depart  with  all  of  his  men  that  still  have  serviceable  horses; 
a  decision  that  is  more  easily  arrived  at  on  account  of  the  cyclist 
patrol  advancing  to  Ram  ten  and  Magergut.  He  chooses  the 
route  via  Kammersdorf  to  Windtken,  where  he  is  less  likely 
to  encounter  superior  numbers  of  the  enemy  than  on  the  prin- 
cipal road  to  Stenkienen.  By  keeping  his  men  together  he 
increases  the  chances  of  overcoming  hostile  resistance  and  of 
taking  prisoners  or  intercepting  hostile  messages.  It  will  be 
all  the  better  if  he  can  water  and  feed  before  starting. 

It  is  6  miles  to  Labens-see.  Therefore  he  may  be  able  to 
get  a  view  of  the  vicinity  of  Windtken  and  Stenkienen  and  still 


352  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

get  back  to  Eckersdorf  before  dark.  It  would  be  more  difficult 
for  the  captain  of  a  "chasseur  squadron"  to  come  to  this  deci- 
sion. The  latter  lacks  the  proper  weapons.  A  very  few  hostile 
carbines  would  be  able  to  bar  the  way  forwards  or  backwards. 

A  battalion  also  will  be  used  as  supports  and  pickets  in  the 
northern  section;  two  companies  having  their  support  at  Kl. 
Luzeinen,  and  two  more  at  the  farm  buildings  about  650  yards 
south  of  the  railway  on  the  Kl.  Luzeinen-Schwoiken  road. 
The  front  is  less  than  a  mile  in  extent,  but  the  neighboring 
Tomlack  Woods  facilitate  the  enemy's  approach  to  such  a  degree 
that  a  strong  line  of  outposts  seems  advisable. 

As  both  supports  are  at  farm  buildings,  a  number  of  con- 
veniences will  be  forthcoming.  If  hostile  infantry  should  be 
discovered  on  the  Passarge,  it  might  be  advisable  to  have  two 
other  companies  bivouac  at  Zimek-see  as  an  immediate  reserve. 

The  regular  reserve  will  occupy  alarm  quarters  in  Kran- 
thau  with  a  lookout  on  Ridge  145.  Two  mounted  orderlies 
are  assigned  to  each  support.  The  six  other  troopers  can  take 
quarters  with  the  reserve  of  the  outpost  after  having  investi- 
gated the  situation  at  Briickendorf. 

We  shall  not  go  into  the  details  of  duty  with  the  outposts. 
This  could  be  discussed  to  advantage  only  on  the  ground  itself- 
Besides,  this  duty  is  so  carefully  taught  in  the  German  Army 
that  the  discussion  of  a  case  by  means  of  a  map  may  be  omitted. 
War  would  quickly  strip  off  anything  pedantic  from  peace 
training. 

Of  course  there  are  disadvantages  connected  with  the 
stripping  process,  as  every  commander  learns  who  is  confronted 
by  the  enemy.  A  realization  that  certain  laboriously  learned 
and  practiced  things  are  not  suitable  in  war  and  must  be  changed 
easily  leads  to  a  general  discarding  of  regulations,  and  thus 
much  that  is  necessary  and  good  is  thrust  aside  with  superfluous 
and  harmful  matter.  As  the  regulations  necessarily  are  encum- 
bered with  defects  inherent  in  all  human  efforts,  it  is  right  to 


Combined  Outposts.  353 

attempt  ridding  them  of  any  useless  burdens,  and  the  longer 
peace  lasts,  the  more  energetically  this  should  be  done. 

For  example,  is  it  worth  while  to  devote  time  to  examin- 
ing-posts,  as  is  done  in  the  German  Army? 

To  ease  up  on  most  of  the  double  sentry-posts,  all  persons 
wishing  to  pass  the  chain  of  sentries  are  to  be  sent  to  the  ex- 
amining-post,  whence  they  are  to  be  taken  to  the  picket.  In 
time  of  peace  the  instructions  are  memorized,  but  not  carried 
out,  because  traffic  must  not  be  interfered  with  during  maneu- 
vers. In  time  of  war  the  provision  would  be  inapplicable 
wherever  there  is  no  continuous  chain  of  sentries.  In  addition, 
it  seems  questionable  to  send  people  elsewhere  who  come  from 
the  direction  of  the  enemy.  Instead  of  going  in  the  direction 
indicated,  they  might  go  back,  which  could  not  be  prevented 
at  night.  The  sentry-post  would  have  accomplished  the  oppo- 
site of  what  was  intended.  At  least  in  hostile  territory  the 
news  as  to  the  location  of  our  sentries  would  quickly  spread. 
Would  it  not  be  more  effective  and  simple  to  order  that  all 
persons  coming  from  without  the  lines  should  be  arrested  and 
that  no  one  be  allowed  to  pass  beyond  them?  Such  a  regula- 
tion could  be  carried  out,  for  there  will  be  pickets  or  groups  in 
charge  of  non-commissioned  officers  on  all  roads,  and  besides, 
in  time  of  war  traffic  carried  on  by  the  inhabitants  would  be 
very  slight. 

But  this  matter  is  of  small  importance  compared  with  the 
complicated  and  clumsy  provisions  that  formerly  oppressed 
us,  and  yet  in  their  day  were  considered  necessary  and  useful; 
viz.,  those  that  held  the  outpost  commander  responsible  for 
the  location  and  instruction  of  every  individual  picket  and 
sentry-post;  that  required  every  sentry  to  learn  certain  com- 
plicated formulae  to  be  used  in  the  examination  of  patrols, 
country  people,  flags  of  truce,  and  deserters;  and  that  endan- 
gered the  life  of  every  officer  who  did  not  know  the  countersign. 


354  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

Any  peace  training  having  for  its  guiding  principle  the 
provisions  of  the  German  Field  Service  Regulations  specify- 
ing that  rules  cannot  be  formulated  that  will  fit  all  outposts,  but 
that  in  every  individual  case  the  composition,  relation  of  command, 
and  details  of  the  service  must  be  regulated  by  existing  conditions,'* 
will  prove  satisfactory  in  the  face  of  the  enemy. 

If  we  take"Vrgeneral  glance  at  the  outposts  on  the  after- 
noon of  May  5th,  we  shall  see  a  screen  stretched  from  Reussen 
through  Katzendorf  and  Eckersdorf  affording  ample  protec- 
tion against  hostile  enterprises  likely  to  be  undertaken  during 
the  remainder  of  the  day  or  during  the  night.  Presumably 
the  outpost'eommander  on  his  tour  of  inspection  would  no- 
where find  double^sentry-posts  without  their  reliefs  close  at 
hand.  ThisTsurely  would  be  the  best  arrangement  on  the 
march.  It  does  not  require  any  more  men,  saves  the  reliefs 
from  goingj|long  distances,  makes  use  of  the  intelligence  and 
authorityjfof&non-commissioned  officers,  and  strengthens  the 
advanced  firing-line. 

There|seems  to  be  nothing  lacking  for  the  safety  of  the 
reserve  of  the  advance  guard  or  of  the  main  body  of  the  divi- 
sion. Nobodyfneed  become  excited  if  a  few  shots  are  fired  at 
the  outposts.  In  rear  of  the  latter  everything  would  be  made 
ready  for  action  without  confusion  or  precipitation,  should  the 
enemy  advance,  even  if  the  advanced  cavalry  should  be  late 
in  giving  notice,  or  entirely  fail  to  do  so.  And  yet  the  orders 
of  the  advance-guard  and  outpost  commanders  violate  certain 
provisions  of  the  (German)  regulations.  They  state,  with  refer- 
ence to  the  outpost  commander's  orders,  that  these  must  always 
indicate  what  action  the  outposts  must  take  in  case  they  are 
attacked. t  They  invariably  must  afford  the  main  body  time 
to  prepare  for  action.  J  j&But  they  should  invariably  be  told 

*See  par.   1 29,  F.  S.  R. 
tSee  par.    145,  F.  S.   R. 
JSee  par.  125,  F.  S.  R 


Combined  Outposts.  355 

whether  after  this  they  are  to  fall  back  or  continue  in  posiiton 
until  troops  from  the  main  body  have  joined  them.*  And  the 
advance-guard  commander  is  required  to  indicate  to  each 
subordinate  what  action  the  latter  shall  take  in  case  the  enemy 
attacks. 

It  is  quite  likely  that  some  of  my  readers  who^have  worked 
out  the  duties  of  the  advance-guard  and  outpost  commanders 
failed  to  comply  with  these  requirements,  as  was  the  case  with 
me,  and  it  is  worth  while  to  consider  how  these  omissions  might 
be  rectified. 

What  orders  should  the  advance  guard  and  outpost 
Commanders  issue  with  reference  to  action  of  the  out- 
posts IN  CASE  OF  ATTACK  BY  THE  ENEMY? 

I  should  very  much  like  to  see  my  readers'  solutions  to  the 
foregoing  problem,  for  I  must  confess  that  I  cannot  find  a 
satisfactory  one  myself. 

It  is  no  trick  to  formally  comply  with  the  requirement. 
How  easily  could  the  following  be  added  to  the  advance-guard 
orders:  "In  case  the  enemy  attacks,  the  outposts  will  hold 
their  ground  until  the  arrival  of  the  reserve  of  the  advance 
guard."  And  who  has  not  seen  the  following  in  an  outpost 
order:  "In  case  the  enemy  attacks,  the  line  of  supports  will 
be  held."  These  are  forms  agreed  upon — be  they  good  or 
bad — because  the  problem  insists  upon  a  decision.  But  will 
this  answer  the  purpose  ?  Can  such  instructions  fit  the  manifold 
possibilities?  Does  the  advance-guard  commander  know  be- 
forehand that  he  will  be  able  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  the  out- 
posts with  his  reserve?  Does  he  know  in  advance  what  will  be 
the  division  or  corps  commander's  intentions?  Should  the  sec- 
tion between  Mahrung-  and  Narien-see  be  defended  to  the  ut- 
most even  if  the  enemy  already  should  have  captured  Eckers- 
dorf  ?     Or  should  Eckersdorf  be  defended  if  the  enemy  advances 

*See  par.  139,  F.  S.  R. 


356  Studies  int  Applied  Tactics. 

in  overwhelming  numbers  from  Reussen  towards  Schwenken- 
dorf  ?  Naturally  not.  The  advance-guard  commander  as  well 
as  the  outpost  commanders  in  case  of  a  hostile  attack  will  make 
their  arrangements  and  issue  orders  in  accordance  with  the 
requirements  of  the  situation,  and  as  would  be  their  duty  in 
an  engagement.  But  none  of  them  can  order  in  advance  what 
shall  be  done  in  an  individual  case,  for  none  of  them  knows 
what  the  enemy  will  do,  and  as  a  rule  none  of  them  has  seen 
the  terrain  in  question.  Orders  for  engagements  issued  in 
advance  can  only  be  disturbing  elements  and  interfere  with 
individual  action.  If  we  carefully  go  over  the  situation  pre- 
sented to  the  advance-guard  and  the  outpost  commanders 
on  May  5th  we  must  come  to  the  conclusion  that  it  will  be  best 
for  them  not  to  give  their  subordinates  binding  rules  of  action. 
Then  vigorous  opposition  will  everywhere  be  offered  to  the 
enemy,  which  will  insure  the  main  body  ample  time  for  prepara- 
tion and  ward  off  hostile  skirmishers,  but  which  need  not  be 
prolonged  at  a  loss  contrary  to  one's  designs.  The  superior 
commanders  are  on  the  ground  and  will  do  their  duty. 

The  outposts  will  perform  their  duty  if  they  guard  the  main 
body  against  surprise.  We  can  confidently  intrust  their  com- 
manders with  the  manner  of  doing  this  and  where  and  how  long 
they  are  to  fight.  It  seems  to  me  that  here  the  excellent  Ger- 
man regulations  have  become  untrue  to  their  own  sound  princi- 
ples. Omitting  the  element  of  compulsion  would  not  deprive 
any  superior  commander  of  the  ability  to  give  the  outposts  or 
parts  of  the  same  more  definite  instructions  in  particular  cases. 


The  scarcity  of  cavalry  gives  a  peculiar  appearance  to  the 
outposts  as  a  whole.  In  peace  maneuvers  the  training  of  troops, 
as  a  rule,  calls  for  an  engagement  every  day.  Therefore  the 
opposing  parties  must  be  posted  near  each  other.  There  is  no 
room  left  between  them  for  extended  movements  and  enter- 
prises by  the  cavalry.     Possibly  with  the  exception  of  the  first 


Combined  Outposts.  357 

maneuver  day,  the  cavalry  remains  as  near  the  infantry  as 
would  happen  in  war  only  just  before  a  battle.  And,  as  only 
a  few  complete  cavalry  divisions  can  be  formed  annually,  the 
infantry  has  a  much  larger  force  of  cavalry  attached  to  it  than 
in  time  of  war.  It  follows  that  outposts,  too,  receive  an  unusu- 
ally large  quota  of  cavalry,  which  in  some  instances  produces 
an  erroneous  impression  as  to  the  part  that  will  regularly  be 
taken  by  cavalry  in  outpost  duty.  Until  within  the  past  few 
years  this  presentation  of  peace-time  received  official  recogni- 
tion, and  to  this  day  the  old  method  has  not  entirely  disap- 
peared of  having  a  long  line  of  cavalry  outposts  in  front  of  the 
infantry  as  a  means  of  protection  during  the  day,  and  withdraw- 
ing it  at  night.  The  erroneous  impression  that  sufficient  cav- 
alry would  be  available  for  this  duty  has  not  yet  been  entirely 
removed ;  a  duty  which  in  time  of  war  would  use  up  the  corps 
cavalry  in  a  few  days.  But  the  conviction  will  gain  ground 
that  the  protection  of  a  force  of  all  arms  both  by  day  and  night 
is  the  business  of  the  infantry. 

In  our  example  we  even  see  how  a  large  part  of  the  corps 
cavalry  is  sent  far  to  the  front  to  assist  the  large  bodies  of  cav- 
alry, while  only  a  minimum  amount,  not  enough  even  to  supply 
mounted  orderlies  for  the  outposts,  remains  with  the  infantry. 
This  is  not  an  exceptional  case,  for  army  headquarters  always 
will  endeavor  to  assemble  the  mass  of  the  cavalry  at  the  deci- 
sive point.  Corps  cavalry  always  will  have  to  help  on  one  wing 
of  the  army,  and  particularly  directly  in  front  of  the  army. 
This  should  not  be  overlooked  in  peace  maneuvers.  To  pre- 
vent infantry  becoming  accustomed  to  situations  not  true  to 
war  conditions,  the  unavoidable  excess  of  cavalry  at  maneuvers 
should  be  used  to  reinforce  the  large  reconnoitering  bodies  and 
afford  it  the  opportunity  of  performing  outpost  duty  of  inde- 
pendent cavalry  on  a  remote  flank  where  there  is  no  infantry. 

Infantry  can  easily  do  without  the  protection  afforded  by 
stationary  cavalry.     Even  if  this  is  lacking,  the  infantry  sup- 


358  Studies  in  Applied  Tactics. 

ports  may  do  their  cooking  undisturbed,  because  they  are 
always  ready  for  action. 

Where  formerly  cavalry  pickets  and  vedettes  were  posted, 
the  infantry  nevertheless  had  to  be  prepared  for  sudden  attack 
because  the  scattered  bodies  of  horsemen  only  too  easily  could 
be  thrust  aside  or  penetrated.  Corps  cavalry  is  much  better 
employed  if  it  devotes  itself  continuously  to  reconnaissance. 
We  see  from  our  example  that,  even  shortly  before  a  battle,  it 
must  not  always  look  for  its  place  in  the  line  of  infantry 
outposts. 

On  the  evening  of  May  5th  the  three  troops  commanded 

by  Major  D presumably  will  be  reunited  at  Briickendorf 

and  spend  the  night  there,  while  officer's  patrols  will  remain  in 
the  vicinity  of  Pupkeim  and  Ballingen,  and  resume  their  recon- 

noitering  before  dawn.     Major  D is  justified  in  deciding 

to  remain  in  advance  of  the  infantry  outposts  by  reason  of  the 
knowledge  he  has  obtained  of  hostile  outposts,  the  duty  to 
keep  touch  with  them,  the  advanced  position  of  the  1st  Cav- 
alry, and  the  protection  afforded  him  by  the  Passarge  at  Briick- 
endorf.    Major  D found  out  in  the  morning  how  difficult 

it  was  to  overcome  the  obstacle  presented  by  the  Passarge 
with  an  enemy  on  the  opposite  bank.  He  will  not  voluntarily 
give  up  the  bridges  again.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  after  learn- 
ing of  the  engagement  at  Briickendorf,  Troop  E  remembered 
to  obtain  a  liberal  supply  of  ammunition  from  the  infantry 
ammunition- wagons;  a  few  extra  clips  will  be  cheerfully  carried 
by  each  trooper  in  his  saddle-bags,  notwithstanding  the  extra 
weight.* 

Arrangements  for  quartering  the  cavalry  could  be  made 
at  Briickendorf  in  a  similar  manner  to  what  was  done  at  Schar- 
nick  and  Ivingnau.  Protection  can  be  more  easily  attained  on 
account  of  the  Passarge.  A  dismounted  picket  should  be 
posted  at  the  railway  station  on  the  right  bank  to  act  as  a  pro- 

*German  cavalry  carry  but  45  rounds  per  man. 


Combined  Outposts.  359 

tection  to  patrols  going  and  messengers  returning,  as  well  as 
to  the  advance  of  the  troops  on  May  6th.  The  planks  of  the 
foot-bridge  at  Alt  Kockendorf  will  be  removed  and  hidden  on 
the  left  bank.  An  attempt  will  be  made  to  restore  telegraphic 
communication  with  Horn  railway  station.  There  will  be  no 
difficulty  in  obtaining  supplies,  although,  of  course,  the  troop 
wagons  cannot  be  brought  up. 

The  three  attitudes  in  which  the  cavalry  is  shown  with 
reference  to  the  infantry  in  the  night  positions  of  May  5th-6th 
may  be  taken  as  characteristic  ones.  In  the  north,  at  the  outer 
flank  of  the  army,  an  independent  body  of  cavalry  is  a  day's 
march  in  advance  and  by  its  position  and  far-reaching  recon- 
naissance protecting  the  main  body  of  the  nearest  troops  of 
the  1st  Army  Corps  from  surprise,  so  that  the  troops  at  Gr.  Her- 
menau  and  Mohrungen  will  require  nothing  but  exterior  guards. 
Farther  south,  in  front  of  the  middle  of  the  army  corps,  three 
troops  of  corps  cavalry  are  holding  a  defile,  but  without  making 
regular  outposts  unnecessary  between  Narien-  and  Mahrung- 
see.  In  the  southern  section  the  infantry  must  almost  entirely 
depend  on  itself,  and  must  supplement  the  reconnaissance  and 
messenger  service  of  the  few  remaining  troopers  by  cyclists. 

It  certainly  is  instructive  to  pass  from  the  details  we  have 
described  to  these  characteristics  of  the  situation  as  a  whole. 
But  we  must  remember  that  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  group- 
ings is  the  result  of  a  natural  course  of  events  and  the  peculiarity 
of  the  terrain.  They  do  not,  for  example,  represent  three  forms 
of  the  service  of  security  and  information  arbitrarily  crowded 
by  me  into  the  narrow  limits  of  an  evening's  doings  within  a 
restricted  area.  Any  intelligent  person  will  see  that  there  are 
numerous  other  forms  that  would  have  been  applicable,  and 
that  every  case  requires  its  own  arrangements. 


CONCLUSION. 

The  first  section  of  Part  II.  was  devoted  to  the  arrange- 
ments of  independent  cavalry  seeking  to  pass  the  night  far  in 
advance  of  the  army  and  near  the  enemy.  As  there  was  a  lack 
both  of  war  experience  and  peace  training  to  draw  upon,  tenta- 
tive measures  and  careful  deliberation  had  to  be  employed  to 
arrive  at  a  satisfactory  conclusion.  It  is  believed  that  con- 
siderable information  can  be  drawn  from  this  work;  among 
other  things,  that,  even  where  natural  obstacles  do  not  protect 
troops,  there  are  many  advantages  in  placing  troops  in  quarters 
over  having  them  in  bivouacs.  We  further  saw  with  what  diffi- 
culties pickets  must  contend  that  keep  their  horses  with  them ; 
and  we  saw  the  inadequate  results  and  dangers  of  mounted 
patrolling  by  night.  An  examination  of  modern  inventions 
intended  to  expedite  the  transmission  of  information  and  or- 
ders showed  that  we  must  not  place  our  hopes  too  high,  and 
that  for  the  present  the  automobile  and  motor-cycle  are  the 
most  promising  auxiliaries. 

In  the  second  section  we  considered  the  arrangement  of 
troops  and  the  protection  of  the  march  of  an  army  corps  which 
had  to  look  out  for  hostile  cavalry  on  its  front  and  flanks. 
Important  questions  relating  to  the  distribution  of  troops  and 
order  of  march  were  discussed,  and  great  stress  was  laid  on  the 
importance  of  preventing  hostile  reconnaissance.  The  discus- 
sion of  the  depth  of  columns  afforded  an  insight  into  the  de- 
pendence of  higher  commanders  on  time  and  space  and  the 
obstacles  placed  in  the  way  of  their  plans  by  the  necessity  of 
bringing  up  supplies. 

"  The  third  section  of  Part  II.  dealt  with  the  army  corps' 
halt  for  the  night  and  the  posting  of  outposts  of  infantry  and 
cavalry.  The  scarcity  of  cavalry  was  very  noticeable  both  on 
the  march  and  on  outpost.  At  the  same  time  we  realized  that 
service  of  security  for  large  bodies  of  troops  can  be  carried  on 

360 


Combined  Outposts.  361 

by  the  infantry,  even  if  the  latter  has  but  a  small  number  of 
troopers  left  at  its  disposal,  and  that  this  is  no  reason  for  keep- 
ing back  the  corps  cavalry. 

If  we  may  hope  that  our  mutual  labor  has  improved  our 
judgment  and  helped  to  clear  up  important  questions  in  the 
military  service;  if  we  may  assume  that  thereby  a  sound  found- 
ation has  been  laid  for  further  study  on  the  subjects  of  battles 
and  operations,  still  our  foremost  aim  would  be  to  incite  mental 
activity,  develop  ability,  and  strengthen  the  conviction  that 
the  true  art  of  war  is  progressive  nad  must  not  be  hampered  by 
fetters. 


—24— 


Form  of  message  blank  and  envelope  used  at  the  Army 
Service  Schools,  Fort  Leavenworth,  and  proposed  for  the  re- 
vision of  F.  S.  R. 

This  blank  has  a  margin  on  the  left  for  binding.  The 
back  is  ruled  in  squares  and  provided  with  scales  for  use  in 
making  simple  sketches  explanatory  of  the  message. 

It  is  issued  by  the  Signal  Corps  in  blocks  of  40  with 
duplicating  sheets. 


U.   S.  ARMY  FIELD  MESSAGE 


No. 


Sent  by     Time     Rec'd  by      Time     Check 


Communicated  by 
Buzzer,  'Phone,  Tele- 
graph, Wireless,  Lan- 
tern, Hello,  Flag.  Cy- 
clist, Foot  Messenger, 
Mounted  Messenger. 
(Underscore  means  used) 


From 


[These  spaces  for  Signal  Operators  only] 
[Name  of  sending  detachment] 


At 


[Location  of  sending  detachment] 


Date Hour. 


..No. 


To.. 


Received 


U.  S.  ARMY  FIELD  MESSAGE 


TO 


No. 


(For  Signal  Operators  only) 


When  Sent 

Rate  of  Speed Name  of  Messenger 

When  and  by  Whom  Rec'd 

THIS  ENVELOPE  WILL  BE  RETURNED  TO  BEARER. 


—5%  ins.— 


German  Names  and  Abbreviations  Found  on  the  Maps, 
and  English  Equivalents. 


GERMAN. 

ENGLISH. 

Allensteiner  Buchwald 

Allenstein  beech  woods 

Alt 

Old 

Alte  Schanze 

Old  intrenchment 

B.  (Berg) 

Hill,  mountain 

Bge.  (Berge) 

Hills,  mountains 

Bhf.  (Bahnhof) 

Railway  station 

Brauerei 

Brewery 

Bruch 

Marsh,  moor 

Bruecke 

Bridge 

Cap.  (Capelle) 

Chapel 

Die 

The 

Dt.  (Deutsche) 

German 

Ehem.  (Ehemalig,  Ehemalige,  Ehe- 

Former 

maliger) 

F.  (Foersterei) 

Forester's  house 

Fl.  (Fluss) 

Stream,  river 

Fliess 

Small  stream 

Floss  Gr.  (Graben) 

Timber  runway 

Forst 

Forest  (cared  for) 

Fuhrt 

Ford 

Grosse  Bruch 

Large  marsh 

Hasen  B.  (Berg) 

Rabbit  hill 

Heide 

Moor 

H.  P.  (Halte  Platz) 

Stopping-place 

H.  St.  (Halte  Stelle) 

Station  (railway) 

Kl.  (Klein) 

Small,  lesser 

Lust  Insel 

Pleasure  island 

M.  (Muehle) 

Mill 

Muehlen  T.  (Teich) 

Mill  pond 

Neu 

New 

Neue  T.  (Teich) 

New  pond 

od.  (oder) 

Or 

O.  F  (Ober  Foersterei) 

Senior  forester's  house 

Pr.  (Preusisch) 

Prussian 

R.  G.  (Ritter  Gut) 

Knight's  manor 

S.  (See)  ) 
See         J 

Lake 

Schweden  Schanze 

Swedish  intrenchment 

Steiniger  Grund 

Stift 

T.  (Teich) 

Rocky  ground 

Religious  institution 
Pond 

Thai 
Tomlacker  Wald 

Valley 
Tomlack  woods 

Unter 

Lower 

U.  F.  (Unter  Foersterei) 

Tinder-forester's  house 

Vorst 

Forest  (Old  German,  very  seldom 

used) 

W.  (Wald) 

Woods 

Weichsel 

(Meadows)  Grass  fields 

Wiesen 

Vistula 

Zgl.  (Ziegelei) 

Brickyard 

Zu 

To,  at 

e> 


,f> 


I 


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